



G7 GERMANY

Elmau Progress Report 2022





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Executive Summary

It is a core democratic principle that those in power have to give an account of their activities to those who are affected by their policies. This enables citizens to monitor and check the activities of public institutions, and is a prerequisite for them to be able to hold officeholders accountable. Accountability, as this two-way relationship between citizens and officeholders, can minimise arbitrary exercises of power and ensure that public institutions act in the interests of citizens.

In line with this, accountability is also crucial for the G7, which has exercised a considerable influence on global governance and international development policy for almost 50 years. G7 accountability mechanisms, such as this progress report, aim to make the activities of the group transparent to the public. They address, among other things, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media and academia, which fulfil an important mediating function between citizens and governments.

Accountability to the citizens of G7 countries themselves, though, is not the only accountability relationship that is of importance for the group. G7 policies have impacts far beyond the member countries. This holds true in particular for the development and development-related commitments of the group. Improving accountability to those affected who are not represented at the G7 table is thus crucial.

Finally, accountability mechanisms also have an important function within the administrations of the G7 governments. They keep G7 commitments on the agenda and communicate progress to G7 leaders. In addition, the accountability processes enable learning from past experiences, inform future policymaking, and contribute to better coordination of the individual G7 members' policies.

The G7 accountability process for development and development-related commitments

The G7's informal nature and the legally non-binding character of the G7 declarations rule out judicial forms of accountability. In addition, the G7 does not have its own secretariat or implementing agency that could be held accountable. Against this background, in 2009, the G7 decided to regularly compile and publish accountability reports that monitor the efforts of G7 members in implementing development and development-related commitments of the group.

Every three years since then, the newly-established G7 Accountability Working Group (AWG) has produced a comprehensive Progress Report, such as the present Elmau Progress Report 2022, that assesses the implementation of all commitments included in the monitoring. In the interim years, the G7 has published Progress Reports on commitments belonging to specific sectors or themes. The Elmau Progress Report 2022 succeeds the Carbis Bay Progress Report on Universal Health Coverage and Global Health of 2021. It is the fifth G7 comprehensive Progress Report after Muskoka (2010), Lough Erne (2013), Ise-Shima (2016) and Biarritz (2019).

The monitoring covers development and development-related commitments from the previous six years and earlier commitments that are still considered to be relevant. Each year, the AWG selects new commitments to be added to the monitoring from the Summit declaration. For the follow-up on the implementation of these commitments, the working group develops a detailed methodology that specifies a baseline, indicators and data sources (Annex Methodological Note).

The Elmau Progress Report 2022

The Elmau Progress Report 2022 monitors the G7's progress in implementing 50 commitments, divided into 10 thematic chapters. Building on different data sources, such as publicly accessible databases and information provided by the administrations of G7 members, it provides a comprehensive picture of progress made and reveals remaining gaps.

The first chapter reviews commitments on development aid and aid effectiveness. The COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent economic and social crises have put financing for sustainable development under considerable stress, while, at the same time, funding needs increased substantially. Although representing only a limited share of the relevant funds, ODA and in particular more effective ODA can be a crucial and catalytic resource in supporting developing countries' sustainable recovery. In 2021, G7 countries provided 76% of all development assistance committee (DAC) countries' ODA (USD 135.7 billion). Since the last progress report from 2019, all G7 countries, with the exception of the UK, increased their ODA contributions as a share of their Gross National Income (GNI), reaching an average ratio of 0.32%. In 2021, however, Germany was the only G7 member to reach the UN's 0.7% spending target (Commitment 1).

Reducing poverty, providing decent jobs, and creating widely-shared wealth within the environmental boundaries of our planet are crucial goals of economic development (Chapter 2). G7 commitments in this area concern international trade and supply chains, infrastructure investments and the digital transformation, and they cover capacity-building measures, financial support and the sharing of best practices. For instance, to enable African countries to benefit from the opportunities

of the digital transformation, the G7 provided African countries with USD 37.4 million to improve the region's communication sector in 2019. In addition, G7 members implemented development projects to support African countries with increasing graduation rates from STEM programmes and improving overall Internet access (Commitment 8).

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated once more that health (Chapter 3) is crucial for human well-being, and that health-related issues have an essential impact on societies and economies. Acknowledging the importance of health policy, the G7 made commitments on issues such as Universal Health Coverage, neglected tropical diseases and the eradication of polio (Commitments 9, 15 and 19). Most recently, at the 2021 Summit in Carbis Bay, the G7 committed to accelerating the rollout of safe, effective, accessible and affordable vaccines for the poorest countries (Commitment 20). Taken together, the dose equivalent of G7 members' financial contributions and direct dose sharing since the start of the pandemic have provided for a total of at least two billion vaccine doses. Meanwhile, vaccination rates especially in low-income countries, where only 12% of the population had received a complete initial protocol as of May 2022, remain low.

Access to sufficient and high-quality food for all is still one of the most urgent challenges of our time. The G7 has long identified global food insecurity (Chapter 4) as a priority area, expressing in 2015 their commitment to lift 500 million people out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030 (Commitment 21). Subsequently, G7 partners' direct ODA assistance for food security and nutrition increased from USD 8.8 to 10.7 billion between 2015 and 2019, with support directed towards sub-Saharan Africa accounting for over 70% of the spending in 2019. However, the Food and Agriculture Organization

of the United Nations (FAO) reports that in 2020 between 720 and 811 million people still suffered from acute hunger.

Inclusive and equitable quality education (Chapter 5) is also an integral part of sustainable development and a crucial requisite for achieving many other development goals. Lack of access to educational services, though, is still a major issue, in particular for women and girls and in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. In 2018, the G7 committed to increasing ODA to education in fragile states, with the aim of advancing gender equality (Commitment 22). Since then, their collective contribution has slightly increased, from USD 1.4 billion in 2018 to 1.5 billion in 2020. However, demand for supporting the education of women and girls, especially in conflict-affected and fragile areas, has also tremendously increased due to the adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on learning opportunities of women and girls in many parts of the world.

Gendered inequalities exist in the economic sphere regarding access to health services and education, the distribution of unpaid and paid care work, the risk of experiencing violence, the allocation of social positions associated with high decision-making power, and the access to business and financial services. Fostering gender equality (Chapter 6) thus remains an important task for the G7. In past years, the G7 committed to supporting legislative frameworks that provide full and equal legal protection to women and girls. UN Women reports that 124 laws and policies to promote gender equality were adopted in 2020. The G7 supported multiple countries with the design and implementation of legislative frameworks for equal protection through bilateral and multilateral development cooperation programmes (Commitment 28).

Concerning governance (Chapter 7), the G7 focuses its development and development-related commitments primarily on four issues: the fight against

corruption, resources governance, taxation, and land transparency. Concerning corruption and taxation, all G7 members form part of the OECD/G20 BEPS Inclusive Framework and formally fulfil the requirements of the four minimum standards on countering harmful tax practices and tax treaty abuse, and improving dispute resolution mechanisms (Commitment 33). In 2021, 137 jurisdictions, including the G7, endorsed the two-pillar solution to improve tax fairness and address tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy. Pillar one establishes new rules on where and how taxes should be paid. Pillar two introduces a global minimum tax for multinationals. The G7 also worked in several partnerships to address issues in developing countries concerning extractive industries' transparency (Commitments 30 and 31) and land ownership (Commitment 38).

In many parts of the world, major threats to peace and security persist and have grave consequences for local populations, and often also regional or global repercussions (Chapter 8). One focus of G7 commitments in this context has been on African countries and the role of women in peace and security. An example is the group committed to supporting African capacity to better prevent, respond to and manage crises and conflicts through cooperation and dialogue with African countries and regional organisations (Commitment 41). To implement this commitment, G7 members have supported several relevant initiatives and projects, such as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Despite the great challenges in this area, G7 ODA to activities related to conflict, peace and security in developing countries in Africa has only shown a minor increase, from USD 909 million in the baseline year 2017 to USD 922 million in 2020.

Due to the existential threat that the environmental crises pose to societies globally, important G7 commitments concern environment and energy

(Chapter 9) and focus on climate action, biodiversity loss, marine litter and (renewable) energy. G7 commitments on environment and energy were only partially implemented, though. For instance, in 2015, the G7 committed to increasing the number of people with access to insurance against climate-change-related hazards in the most vulnerable developing countries by up to 400 million by the year 2020 (Commitment 44). However, the InsuResilience Global Partnership (IGP) by the G7 and other partners could only report contributions to the financial protection of 150 million people in 2021.

Migration and forced displacement are another core topic of the G7 (Chapter 10). Human mobility can have positive economic impacts on countries of origin and destination. At the same time, in many parts of the world migrants and displaced people face repression and are deprived of basic rights. The G7 committed to increasing international assistance for refugees and other migrants, and addressing drivers of migration (Commitments 49 and 50). To implement these commitments, the G7 members provide funding to several UN and civil-society organisations. Furthermore, the G7 supported initiatives, especially in African countries, that aim to create new jobs, increase food security and advance governance structures in origin or transit countries.

The COVID-19 pandemic and challenges ahead

Since the publication of the Biarritz Progress Report in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic adversely affected the implementation of many development and development-related commitments of the G7.

The fiscal space for important public spending narrowed due to the financial burdens and reductions in tax revenues many governments have been facing. In addition, the pandemic drew attention and resources away from other important health issues, such as the eradication of polio. Economic shocks and school closures worsened access to education and put more girls at risk of child marriage. Gender-based violence intensified during the pandemic. And disruptions of international trade and global supply chains affected economic goals.

While the worst impacts of the pandemic will at some point be behind us, new threats have already emerged to the realisation of many of the development goals that G7 commitments focus on. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, with its far-reaching repercussions for peace and security, international cooperation, food security and the global economy at large, is certainly among these new threats. At the same time, existing challenges persist, such as incredibly high economic inequality and widespread autocratisation trends. The aggravating climate and biodiversity crisis will impact sustainable development more than ever. It will thus not become easier to finally guarantee the human rights of all people and to foster the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

All of these challenges have a transnational dimension. International cooperation and development policy will remain of utmost importance in addressing them. Assessing the role of the G7 in this context – measured against its own commitments – will remain the function of G7 accountability reports.

1. Aid and aid effectiveness

Increasing funding for development cooperation and improving its effectiveness are both central levers for fostering sustainable development globally. The G7 countries have historically played an important part in mobilising aid and continue to do so as their collective Official Development Assistance (ODA) accounted for 76% of all OECD DAC donor countries in 2021. Furthermore, they have supported efforts to foster aid effectiveness ever since the first High-Level Forum in Rome in 2003.

Since the last progress report was published in 2019, the G7 commitments on increasing development assistance and effectiveness, as well as on mobilising innovative sources of financing, have increased in importance. The COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent economic and social crises have put financing for sustainable development under considerable stress. Most available funding sources (public and private) were negatively affected, while

at the same time funding needs increased. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) financing gap, which had been at an estimated USD2.5 trillion even before the pandemic, is thus predicted to increase even further.¹ Although representing only a small share of this sum, ODA and in particular more effective ODA can make strategic contributions to supporting developing countries' sustainable recovery.²

In light of the great financing needs, aid effectiveness is even more critical to ensure that scarce financial resources can make the greatest possible contribution and impact to achieving the SDGs. Aid transparency, for instance, ensures that decisions on the allocation of aid are open to public scrutiny; it facilitates information sharing and mutual learning among donors and enables recipient countries to take aid flows into account in their own planning.³

Commitment 1

Increasing development assistance

“We reaffirm our respective ODA commitments, such as the 0.7% ODA/GNI target as well as our commitment to reverse the declining trend of ODA to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and to better target ODA towards countries where the needs are greatest.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 19

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

The goal of spending 0.7% of the Gross National Income (GNI) on Official Development Assistance (ODA) has for long been an important political target.⁴ Due to its continued relevance, G7 leaders reaffirmed their respective commitments to increasing ODA, such as reaching the 0.7% ODA/GNI target, at the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005 and again at the G7 Elmau Summit in 2015.

In 2021, the G7 total ratio of ODA/GNI increased to 0.32%. All G7 countries, with the exception of the UK, had increased their ODA contributions as a share of their GNI as compared to both the year of the reaffirmation of the commitment in 2015 and the year of the last progress report in 2019 (see Figure 1). In 2021, Germany was the only G7 member to reach the UN's 0.7% spending target. The UK's ODA/GNI ratio, which had maintained the targeted share of 0.7% ODA/GNI since 2013, fell to 0.5% in 2021 as the result of a policy change due to the COVID-19 pandemic.


In absolute terms, G7 countries' ODA increased from USD 114 billion in 2019 to USD 135.71 billion in 2021, meaning that G7 donors provided

76% of all DAC countries' ODA in 2021.⁵ While the EU and its Member States' collective ODA⁶ decreased from USD 84.23 billion in 2019 to 83.02 billion in 2021 due to the withdrawal of the UK, a comparison of the ODA from the EU and its current 27 Member States shows an increase compared to their USD 64.85 billion in 2019.

At the 2015 Summit in Elmau, the G7 also committed to reversing the then declining trend of ODA to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and to better target ODA towards countries where the needs are greatest.

Between 2015–2020, G7 countries' total net ODA to LDCs (bilateral net ODA + imputed multilateral ODA), increased from USD 27.91 billion to USD 36.31 billion.⁷ **G7 countries' ODA to LDCs as share of total ODA in 2020 was equal to the baseline in 2015 at 30.3%** (see Figure 2).

Figure 1: G7, DAC and EU collective ODA as a percent of GNI, 2015–2021⁸




Source: Own compilation based on OECD-DAC1

Note: EU collective figures include amongst others the G7 countries France, Germany, Italy and UK (the latter only from 2015–2019).

(p) Values for 2021 are preliminary.

Figure 2: G7 countries' total ODA to LDCs, 2015–2020 (USD billion, current prices)




Source: Own compilation based on OECD-DAC2a

In order to measure progress on the commitment to better target countries that are most in need of ODA, the G7 have decided to report the shares of their ODA contribution to the following country categories: LDCs, Low Income Countries (LICs),⁹ Small Island Development States (SIDSs), Land-locked Development Countries (LLDCs) and Fragile States.

In 2020, the volume of G7 countries' net ODA to these country categories (bilateral net ODA +

imputed multilateral ODA) had increased as compared to the baseline in 2015. Meanwhile, relative targeting had decreased for Fragile States, LICs and LLDCs, remained stable for LDCs and slightly increased for SIDSs (see Figure 3). In 2020, G7 countries contributed USD 47.53 billion to Fragile States, USD 36.31 billion to LDCs, USD 26.21 billion to LICs, USD 19.16 billion to LLDCs, and USD 2.88 billion to SIDSs.¹⁰ Shares of G7 countries' ODA to these country categories in the past 5 years were the highest in 2018.

Figure 3: G7 countries' ODA to LDCs, LICs, LLDCs, SIDSs, and Fragile States 2015–2020 (in USD billions and as percent of total ODA)



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-DAC2a

Canada's ODA/GNI ratio, which had been decreasing between 2015 and 2017 (flow basis method), showed a slight but continuous positive trend since 2018 (see Figure 1). In 2021, Canada's ODA/GNI ratio increased to 0.32% (grant equivalent method), as a result of a significant increase in ODA volume and a Canadian economy recovering from the global pandemic. Canada's volumes and shares of

ODA to countries where the needs are greatest decreased between 2018 and 2020, falling below the 2015 baseline. In 2020, Canada attributed USD 1,832 million to Fragile States (38.9% of total ODA), USD 1,437 million to LDCs (30.5% of total ODA), USD 1,051 million to LICs (22.3% of total ODA), USD 716 million to LLDCs (15.2% of total ODA), and USD 121 million to SIDSs (2.6% of total ODA).

France has continued to increase its ODA/GNI ratio with an increase from 0.43% to 0.53% between 2018 and 2020, coming closer to the 0.7% target. Preliminary data for 2021 suggests a slight decline to 0.52% ODA/GNI (see Figure 1). Since 2015, France has increased its volume of ODA to countries where the needs are greatest. France's shares of overall ODA to these country categories (except to SIDS) in 2020 remained below the 2015 baseline. At the same time, France's shares of bilateral ODA to these country categories increased (again, except for SIDS). In 2020, France attributed USD 4,870 million to Fragile States (31.1% of total ODA), USD 3,804 million to LDCs (24.3% of total ODA), USD 2,753 million to LICs (17.6% of total ODA), and USD 2,246 million to LLDCs (14.4% of total ODA). France's volume and share of ODA to SIDSs has increased since 2015, reaching USD 814 million in 2020 (5.2% of total ODA).

Germany spent 0.74% of its GNI on ODA in 2021, achieving the 0.7% target for the third time since 2016 (see Figure 1). Germany's volumes and shares of ODA to countries where the needs are greatest have increased since the baseline in 2015, except for a slight decrease in the share of ODA to SIDS. As compared to 2018, volumes have also increased for all country categories, except SIDS, though shares have increased only for ODA to LICs. In 2020, Germany attributed USD 7,967 million to Fragile States (27.5% of total ODA), USD 5,605 million to LDCs (19.4% of total ODA), USD 5,193 million to LICs (17.9% of total ODA), and USD 3,280 million to LLDCs (11.3% of total ODA), and USD 195 million to SIDS (0.7% of total ODA).

Italy's ODA/GNI ratio, which had been increasing between 2015 and 2017 (flow basis method), showed a decreasing trend between 2018 and 2020, reaching 0.22% (grant equivalent method). Preliminary data for 2021 suggests that Italy's ODA/GNI ratio has increased again to 0.28% (see Figure 1). The volume and share of Italian ODA to each of the above-mentioned country categories

increased in 2020 as compared to the baseline in 2015, but decreased as compared to 2018. In 2020, Italy attributed USD 1,377 million to Fragile States (33.3% of total ODA), USD 1,070 million to LDCs (25.9% of total ODA), USD 789 million to LICs (19.1% of total ODA), USD 639 million to LLDCs (15.4%), and USD 77 million to SIDSs (1.9% of total ODA).

Japan's ODA/GNI ratio continued to increase, reaching a share of 0.31% in 2020. Preliminary data for 2021 suggests that Japan's ODA/GNI ratio has increased to 0.34% (see Figure 1). The volume of Japan's ODA to countries where the needs are greatest had increased in 2020 as compared to 2015. Over the same time span, the share of ODA increased for the country categories Fragile States, LDCs and SIDSs, but decreased for LICs and LLDCs. Between 2018 and 2020, the shares of ODA decreased for all of these country categories. In 2020, Japan attributed USD 7,345 million to Fragile States (55.2% of total ODA), USD 5,962 million to LDCs (44.8% of ODA), USD 1,767 million to LICs (13.3% of total ODA), USD 2,064 million to LLDCs (15.5% of total ODA), and USD 581 million to SIDSs (4.4% of total ODA).

The **UK** was the only G7 member to maintain the targeted share of 0.7% ODA/GNI between 2013 and 2020 (see Figure 1). In 2021, however, the UK government temporarily reduced its ODA spend to 0.5% of GNI due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹¹ In 2020, the volumes and shares of UK's ODA to Fragile States, LDCs, LICs and LLDCs had decreased, as compared to the baseline in 2015 and as compared to the last reporting in 2018. Meanwhile, the volume and share of ODA to SIDSs increased. In 2020, the UK attributed USD 7,364 million to Fragile States (39.3% of total ODA), USD 5,662 million to LDCs (30.2% of total ODA), USD 4,471 million to LICs (23.8% of total ODA), USD 3,033 million to LLDCs (16.2% of total ODA), and USD 319 million to SIDSs (1.7% of total ODA).

The **US**' ODA/GNI ratio has remained more or less steady. In 2020, the share of GNI spent for ODA reached 0.17%. Preliminary data for 2021 suggests that the share has increased to 0.18% (see Figure 1). The US continues to be the largest DAC donor in absolute terms, with more than USD 42.3 billion disbursed in 2021 (grant equivalents). In 2020, the volumes of the US' ODA to countries where the needs are greatest had increased as compared to the baseline in 2015 and as compared to the last reporting in 2018. Shares of ODA to these country categories also increased, except for the share of ODA to SIDSs, which slightly decreased. In 2020, the US attributed USD 16,778 million to Fragile States (48.7% of total ODA), USD 12,769 million to LDCs (37.1% of total ODA), USD 10,181 million to LICs (29.6% of total ODA), USD 7,183 million to LLDCs (20.9% of total ODA), and USD 775 million to SIDSs (2.3% of total ODA).

The **EU** and its Member States' collective ODA/GNI ratio increased from 0.47% in 2018 to 0.49% in 2021 (based on preliminary data for 2021). Since 2015, the volumes of ODA that the EU Institutions attributed to countries where the needs are greatest have increased (except for SIDSs, where ODA in 2020 was lower than in 2015). The relative targeting of these country categories, however, has decreased both since the baseline in 2015 and since the last reporting in 2018. In 2020, EU Institutions attributed USD 6,408 million to Fragile States (30.4% of total ODA), USD 4,916 million to LDCs (23.4% of total ODA), USD 3,681 million to LICs (17.5% of total ODA), USD 3,299 million to LLDCs (15.7% of total ODA), and USD 400 million to SIDS (1.9% of total ODA).

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. % Official Development Aid (ODA)/Gross National Income (GNI)	OECD-DAC1
	2. % ODA to Least Developed Countries (LDCs)	OECD-DAC2a
	3. ODA to LDCs, Low Income Countries (LICs), Small Island Development States (SIDSs), Landlocked Development Countries (LLDCs) and Fragile States, as % of total ODA	

Commitment 2

Development effectiveness

“We will implement and be monitored on all commitments we made in the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness [now superseded by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation], including enhancing efforts to untie aid; disbursing aid in a timely and predictable fashion, through partner country systems where possible, increasing harmonization and donor coordination, including more programme based approaches. We have all agreed to implement the Busan Common Standard on Aid Transparency, including both the Creditor Reporting System of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), by 2015. To show greater G8 leadership we will ensure data on G8 development assistance is open, timely, comprehensive and comparable.”

Gleneagles 2005, Africa, para. 32

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders' Communiqué, para. 49

SDGs:



Score:



Below expectations

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) was founded at the 4th High-Level Political Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. Building on the High-Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Rome (2003), Paris (2005) and Accra (2008), this joint-government and multi-stakeholder initiative committed to a set of common principles to foster development effectiveness: country ownership, focus on results, inclusive partnerships, and transparency and accountability.

From the beginning, G7 members actively supported and shaped the process of improving the quality and impact of development cooperation and have been important stakeholders in the GPEDC. At the 2013 Lough Erne Summit, they committed to be monitored by the GPEDC on the implementation of the principles laid out in the Busan Partnership


for Effective Development Cooperation and to implement the Busan Common Standard on Aid Transparency. Thereby, they renewed the commitment made at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005 to be monitored on all commitments made in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

Implementation of the Paris Declaration and Busan Principles for Effective Development Co-operation

The monitoring of the Global Partnership tracks both partner countries' and development partners' (including the G7 members) progress on aligning development cooperation with effectiveness principles.¹² In the following, six indicators of the performance of G7 members will be reported. For G7 members' individual performance, please refer to Figure 4. There have been three rounds of the

Figure 4.1–4.6: G7 members' performance on indicators of aid effectiveness according to the Global Partnership monitoring in 2014, 2016 and 2018¹³

Figure 4.1: Use of country-led results frameworks



GPEDC monitoring since the baseline of this commitment in 2011 (2014, 2016 and 2018). Since the monitoring exercise is currently under review, more recent data is not available.

In order to assess the **use of country-led results frameworks**, the Global Partnership monitoring

calculates two shares: 1) the degree to which development partners rely on objectives from country-led results frameworks, and 2) the share of results indicators that they draw from such frameworks (including national, sector and sub-national planning tools).¹⁴ On average, G7 countries increased the share of new development

Figure 4.2: Annual predictability





Figure 4.3: Medium-term predictability



interventions, which draw their objectives from country-led results frameworks, from 78% in 2016 to 82% in 2018. This was in contrast to the general trend for development partners. Regarding the second aspect, G7 countries on average drew a lower share of results indicators from country-led results frameworks. Between 2016 and 2018, the share declined from 52% to 48%.

Annual predictability is measured by the share of development cooperation funding that is disbursed to the partner country governments within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled. As such, it captures development partners' reliability, as well as their capacity to accurately forecast and disburse this funding. G7 countries improved their average performance for timely disbursement of funding,

Figure 4.4: Aid on budget





Figure 4.5: Use of public financial management and procurement systems




both between 2016 and 2018, and since the baseline, by 5 %-points reaching 85% in the 2018 monitoring round.

Medium-term predictability is assessed by looking at how development partners have improved in sharing forward-looking information on planned funding. More specifically, it assesses the estimated

share of development funding covered by indicative forward expenditure or detailed implementation plans shared with partner governments. The calculated share is the average of the assessments for one, two and three years ahead. Between 2016 and 2018, average G7 medium-term predictability continued to decrease to 59%, thus remaining below the baseline level of 71%.

Figure 4.6: Untied aid



Source 4.1–4.6: Own compilation based on GPEDC Global Partnership monitoring

Aid on budget is measured by the percentage of development cooperation funding (scheduled for disbursement by development partners) that is recorded in the annual budgets of a given partner country, and as such, has been approved by its legislature and is subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Between 2016 and 2018, the average G7 share of aid on budget continued to decrease by 8 %-points to 54%. As such, it remained below the baseline level of 64%.

In order to assess the **use of country public financial management and procurement systems**, the GPEDC calculates the share of development cooperation funding that – instead of using rules and procedures of the development partner – is disbursed to a partner government by using the country’s own financial management and procurement systems for tasks like budget execution, financial reporting, auditing and the procurement of goods and services. After a reduction of the shares between 2014 and 2016, G7 countries’ use of partner country systems slightly increased again, reaching an average share of 54% (+4 %-points). Nevertheless, this share remains below the baseline level of 55.7%.

Finally, the indicator on **untied aid** assesses the share of development cooperation funding that does not underlie any geographical restrictions with respect to the origin of goods or services that are purchased by partner countries. Data for this indicator is self-reported to the OECD. Overall, G7 countries have continued to untie their aid, reaching an average share of 90% untied aid in the 2018 GPEDC monitoring round. This share is a significant improvement to the baseline of 70% in the 2014 monitoring round.¹⁵

In sum, the development of **G7 countries’ average performance with respect to the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation since the**

baseline year in 2013, and since the publication of the last CAR, shows a mixed picture with improvements for some indicators and a worsening of others.

Transparency

Another milestone that was committed to at the 4th High-level Political Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan was the Busan Common Standard. This standard set out good practices for publishing and reporting data on development cooperation. Due to their complementary qualities, it recognises three systems:

The OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) records activity-level development cooperation flows that lie in the past. It is used for statistical, accountability and monitoring purposes.

The OECD Forward Spending Survey (FSS) records development partners’ future development cooperation plans and is used to increase predictability.

The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) provides an open-data standard that allows publishers to deliver detailed information about their development cooperation activities.

The Global Partnership monitoring assesses development partners’ reporting to these systems on the basis of the transparency dimensions decided in the Busan Partnership and later updates: timeliness, comprehensiveness, provision of forward-looking information, data accuracy, and public availability. Development partners receive an overall percentage score for their reporting to each of the three systems. The scores are then translated into a four-tiered scale: “excellent”, “good”, “fair” and “needs improvement”.¹⁶

While some G7 members have received excellent ratings for their performance on publishing and

reporting information to the CRS and the FSS, **G7 average performance decreased from a “good” to a “fair” assessment between the 2016 and 2018**

monitoring round. In the IATI publishing assessment, most G7 members received a “needs improvement” rating (see Table 1).

Table 1: Global Partnership monitoring assessment of G7 members’ publishing of aid information to CRS, FSS and IATI¹⁷

	CRS		FSS 1		IATI 2	
	2016	2018	2016	2018	2016	2018
Excellent	CAN, GER, JPN	JPN	CAN, EU	CAN, GER, EU		CAN
Good	FRA, EU, G7 average	CAN, US, EU	GER, ITA, UK G7 average	ITA	CAN, UK, EU	UK, EU
Fair	ITA, US	FRA, GER, UK G7 average		US G7 average	US G7 average	US G7 average
Needs Improvement	UK	ITA	US	UK	FRA, GER, ITA, JPN	FRA, GER, ITA, JPN

1 Scores for publishing to FSS are not reported for all G7 members. This is partly due to technical barriers to FSS reporting.

2 More detailed and recent information is provided by the IATI’s own publishing statistics, which are currently in a piloting phase. While many G7 publishing organisations are performing good to excellent on timeliness and comprehensiveness, providing forward-looking aid information remains a challenge for most. Also, aid agencies are generally performing better at publishing aid information than ministries – a tendency that was also observed by the British NGO “Publish What You Fund” in their 2020 Aid Transparency Report.

More details: <http://publishingstats.iati-standard.org/> and <https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2020/>

Canada took steps to streamline its data quality assurance, leading to timelier and better reports to the OECD, including flows in support of the SDGs, beyond ODA (i.e. TOSSD & mobilised private finance). It also worked with other DAC members to agree on new codes to better capture information related to *COVID-19 recovery, innovation and disability*. Canada also made its flagship International Assistance Report more interactive and better integrated with its user-friendly platform, the International Assistance Project Browser. As an active member of IATI, Canada supported efforts to address the needs of partner country stakeholders with better tools and information in multiple languages, while continuing to improve IATI data quality.

France has published information on its development funding according to the standards of the IATI since 2014. Detailed and regularly updated information regarding projects carried out by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Agence Française de Développement are provided on the aid transparency website set up in 2016.¹⁸ As part of the Open Government Partnership, France established a national action plan for 2018–2019, in which it committed to the transparency of official development assistance data. In August 2021, a programming act was passed, which provides that within one year the government shall consult with stakeholders and set up an open database to gather information on France’s official bilateral and multilateral development assistance.¹⁹ This database is currently being set up.

Germany: Since March 2013, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been publishing data and documents on bilateral development cooperation according to the IATI standard. This data is updated monthly and is also published on the BMZ transparency page.²⁰ In recent years, the ministry has made great progress in the area of transparency, especially with regard to the quality of data being published. Since 2020, the ministry has intensified its activities to review and continuously update and improve the IATI Organisation and Project Files both in terms of technology and content. Currently, first steps are being taken to set up a new BMZ-IATI transparency portal with the aim of creating an interactive, dynamic portal that makes the activities of the BMZ visible and information accessible in a user-friendly and simple way.

Italy: The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) has been a member of the IATI since 2017. It publishes data on its aid activities on the IATI register as well as on an Open Aid platform.²¹ Additionally, AICS publishes information on programmes and projects, including funding decisions, via its website and various social media channels. In 2019 Italy approved an Aid Effectiveness Action Plan that included specific commitments on transparency and accountability. In 2020 and 2021, Italy completely updated the flow of data to IATI to the newest version and worked to develop a new internal data management system, which will allow more timely, accurate and transparent publication of data to IATI.

Japan has committed to the OECD CRS reporting and received a ranking of “Excellent” in the 2019 GPEDC Progress Report. Since 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA Japan) has published data on the major projects implemented by all governmental bodies. This includes projects by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which used to publish independently to the IATI between 2008 and 2015. MoFA Japan has

been reporting to the IATI since 2016. As for the TOSSD, Japan has been reporting its data since 2019. For the purpose of increasing transparency, Japan updated its ODA website in 2021. The website contains information on individual projects in 114 countries and lists Exchanges of Notes related to ODA from 2001 to 2021.

The **UK** has received international recognition for its expertise in transparency and aid spending. The UK is a member of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and shares information about our aid programming on GOV.UK and the DevTracker platform. Detailed reporting via DevTracker has continued throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. The UK is committed to improving the transparency of aid globally and maintaining its high standards for overseas spending. These principles are being promoted across the UK government via a Transparency Community of Practice which has established a beneficial exchange of learning between aid-spending departments.

The **US** remains committed to reporting accurate and detailed data to the CRS. While participation in the FSS is partly constrained due to the separation of the US government’s executive and legislative powers, Executive Branch budgetary requests and Congressional appropriations are made available elsewhere to the fullest extent possible. Since 2018, the US improved its reporting to IATI and improved both the quantity and quality of data it reports on USAID’s development and humanitarian assistance programs. This now includes monthly publishing of most health and humanitarian activities and translations of IATI data into French, Spanish and Portuguese to facilitate data use by stakeholders. The US now also reports Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) and has launched a new ForeignAssistance.gov site to visualize foreign assistance reporting and gather information on reporting to the OECD, IATI, and elsewhere.²²

EU: The European Commission constantly invests in more complete and high-quality publication of data and aid information. Besides its publications in OECD CRS and the IATI platform, it has been involved in creating the TOSSD standard (Total Official Support in Sustainable Development) and has reported on it since 2020. On a European level, the Commission promotes joint financial tracking

and results-reporting of joint actions by European Member States and Development Banks (known as Team Europe initiatives). Further, it developed a European ODA data visualisation tool, the EU Aid Explorer.²³ Internally, the Commission is currently reforming its data management system to allow for more automatic management, disclosure and publication of information and documents.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2013	<p>1. Implementation of the Paris Declaration and the principles laid out in the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: Using the GPEDC Progress report specific indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of Country Results Frameworks • Annual Predictability • Medium-term Predictability • Aid on Budget • Use of Country Public Financial Management (PFM) and Procurement Systems, • Untied Aid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GPEDC Progress Report
	<p>2. Transparency:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donors' performance with respect to reporting/publishing of information to implement the Common Standard for Aid Information endorsed at the Busan High-Level Forum. • Reform steps taken by donors severally 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IATI and CRS data • GPEDC Progress Report • If needed, CAR will feature a note reflecting the range and limitations of the methodology used • Additional and voluntary self-reporting on reform steps.

Commitment 3

Innovative financing

“... we have committed to the Charlevoix Commitment on Innovative Financing for Development to promote economic growth in developing economies and foster greater equality of opportunity within and between countries.”

“We recognize the value in development and humanitarian assistance that promotes greater equality of opportunity, and gender equality, and prioritizes the most vulnerable, and will continue to work to develop innovative financing models to ensure that no one is left behind.”

Charlevoix 2018, G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 7

SDGs:



Score:  *Satisfactory*

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will only be possible with substantial additional resources. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the SDG financing gap was estimated to lie at USD 2.5 trillion for developing countries. As the pandemic has led to regress in many areas and has put financing for sustainable development under considerable additional stress, this figure is likely to have increased. Public resources alone will not be able to cover this gap.

In 2018, recognising the scarcity of public funds available for sustainable development, the G7 adopted the Charlevoix Commitment on Innovative Financing for Development, which highlights the complementary role of domestic and international private resources. G7 leaders committed to develop innovative financing models that make use of these resources and foster inclusive development and equality. Follow-through with this commitment is

measured by reporting on three indicators: the share and amount of Private Sector Instruments (PSI) in G7 members' ODA, the share and amount of mobilised private capital and PSI on TOSSD, and the volume of funding provided by G7 members through innovative initiatives and partnerships with the private sector. Additionally, G7 members provide narrative examples of innovative development financing mechanisms.

Part and amount of Private Sector Instruments in G7 bilateral ODA

Private Sector Instruments (PSI) are all financing instruments that are used by donors to engage the private sector in development cooperation.²⁴ They include loans, guarantees, mezzanine finance and equity provided to private-sector entities. Overall, **the share of PSI in G7 countries' bilateral ODA has increased by 1.3 %-points from 2018 to 2020, reaching USD 3,420 million** (see Tables 2 and 3).²⁵

Table 2: Share of PSI in bilateral ODA in %

	2018	2019	2020	Δ in %-points
Canada	2.18	7.17	10.45	8.3
France	8.12	8.51	7.11	-1
Germany	1.63	4.19	3.81	2.2
Italy	-	-	-	-
Japan	0.94	2.13	4.23	3.3
UK	8.19	10.35	7.88	-0.3
US	-	-	-	-
G7, total	2.41	3.82	3.74	1.3
EU Institutions	0.89	-4.68	0.02	-0.9

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-DAC1 (Transactiontype 11030; Grant equivalents)

Table 3: PSI in bilateral ODA (USD million)

	2018	2019	2020	Δ in %
Canada	77.15	231.66	406.78	427
France	542.51	631.25	650.18	20
Germany	306.39	778.77	841.93	175
Italy	-	-	-	-
Japan	100.73	250.69	557.43	453
UK	1,009.00	1,352.51	963.72	-4
US	-1.45	-	-	-
G7, total	2,034.36	3,244.88	3,420.04	68
EU Institutions	143.26	-682.05	4.05	-97

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-DAC1 (Transactiontype 11030; Grant equivalents)

Absolute volumes of ODA to PSI have increased for all G7 members, except the UK and EU Institutions. Italy and the US did not report on PSI in recent years.²⁶

Mobilised private capital and total PSI on TOSSD

Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) is a new international standard for

measuring the full array of resources in support of the 2030 Agenda. It was designed by an International Task Force and recognized in March 2022 by the UN Statistical Commission as a way to monitor all official resources flowing into developing countries for their sustainable development, but also private resources mobilised through official means. As such, TOSSD goes beyond the Official Development Assistance (ODA) measure by

also capturing other types of support, including non-concessional flows, South-South cooperation, activities to address global challenges, and private finance mobilised by official interventions.

In 2020, G7 countries (excl. Germany²⁷) collectively provided USD 5,059 million through PSI, which equalled 8.2% of cross-border resources (TOSSD

Pillar 1²⁸). These were USD 692 million and 0.9 %-points more than in 2019. The amount of G7 countries' mobilised TOSSD private finance decreased by USD 2,281 million to USD 9,790 million in 2020. This equalled 15.9% of cross-border resources (– 4.24 %-points as compared to 2019) (see Table 4).

Table 4: Share and amount of G7 members' Private Sector Instruments and mobilised private finance on TOSSD (in % and million USD)

2019	TOSSD Pillar 1 – Cross-border resources	PSI	% PSI in Pillar 1	Private mobilisation	% Private mobilisation in Pillar 1
2020					
Canada	2,526	233	9.2	16	0.6
	2,641	422	16.0	130	4.9
France	7,155	1,684	23.5	3,415	47.7
	10,228	1,667	16.3	1,768	17.3
Italy	936	17	1.8	–	–
	840	104	12.4	31	3.7
Japan	14,189	290	2.0	128	0.9
	16,131	590	3.7	513	3.2
UK	8,770	1,459	16.6	1,372	15.6
	7,511	1,368	18.2	1,520	20.2
US	26,263	684	2.6	7,140	27.2
	24,102	908	3.8	5,827	24.2
G7, total	59,839	4,367	7.3	12,071	20.2
	61,455	5,059	8.2	9,790	15.9
EU Institutions	15,194	1,699	11.2	3690	24.3
	22,982	1,813	7.9	6,928	30.1

Source: OECD

Volume of funding provided by G7 members through innovative initiatives and partnerships with private sector

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are formalised, cooperative arrangements between a government and a private partner in which the private partner delivers and funds services and infrastructure

assets that have traditionally been provided by government, such as schools, roads, or water treatment plants. In addition, financing for development cooperation may also be channelled through private-sector institutions, such as banks, pension funds and insurance corporations.

Table 5: Bilateral ODA through PPPs and private-sector institutions (USD million, current prices)

	2018	2019	Δ in %
Canada	42.87	378.17	49.5
France	2.8	34.52	1131.8
Germany	99.75	149.33	49.7
Italy	2.11	2.37	12.5
Japan	28.62	35.14	22.8
UK	1379	1359.67	-1.4
US	5666.44	5546.85	-2.1
G7, total	7221.6	7192	-0.4
EU Institutions	378.17	356.81	-5.6

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-DAC1 (Transactiontype 11030; Grant equivalents)

The volume of funding provided through PPPs and private-sector institutions has increased for most G7 members between 2018 and 2019.²⁹ In 2019, the G7 countries' bilateral ODA through these channels amounted to USD 7,192 million (-0.4% as compared to 2018) (see Table 5). The US made up the largest share here, channelling USD 5,547 million through PPPs and private-sector institutions. France showed a large increase, from 2.8 million USD in 2018 to 34.5 million USD in 2019, channelled through PPPs and private-sector institutions.

Financing development through innovative financing mechanisms

Encompassing many of the instruments described above, the World Bank defines innovative finance as “any financing approach that helps to: 1) Generate additional development funds by tapping new funding sources (...) or by engaging new partners (such as emerging donors and actors in the private sector); 2) Enhance the efficiency of financial flows, by reducing delivery time and/or costs, especially for emergency needs and in crisis situations; and 3) Make financial flows more results-oriented, by explicitly linking funding flows to measurable performance on the ground.”³⁰

Canada has made several blended finance investments with its concessional resources via the International Assistance Innovation Program, a CAD 900 million five-year pilot that uses catalytic capital for SDG investments and was launched in 2018. Further innovative investments for development that Canada has made since 2018 include the creation of a gender-smart COVID relief facility³¹ (CAD 75.9 million), and a repayable contribution of CAD 12.5 million to the African Guarantee Fund³² to increase access to finance for female-owned businesses, a CAD 40 million contribution to GuarantCo to improve access to infrastructure, and a CAD 32 million CAD contribution to support the BUILD Fund and the BUILDER Technical Assistance Facility to provide direct support to small and medium-sized enterprises. Canada also set up innovative funds for development financing: the Equality Fund³³ (CAD 300 million), the Canada-CARICOM Climate Adaptation Fund³⁴ (CAD 20 million, 2020–2023), which covers premiums for catastrophe risk insurance and helps mobilise private capital for climate adaptation and disaster mitigation, and the Outcome Fund for Education Results (OFFER) program³⁵ (CAD 20 million over 8 years).

France has earmarked revenues from an air ticket levy and a financial transaction tax to be used for development cooperation. The tax on airline tickets (TSBA) was created in 2006 and generated revenues for development of EUR 210 million in 2019–2020. The financial transaction tax was created in 2012 and is based on transactions involving the purchase of shares in French companies with a market capitalization above EUR 1 billion. In 2019–2020, the tax generated revenues of EUR 528 million for development. In 2021, France also structured its first Development Impact Bond of EUR 3 million, dedicated to enhancing healthy menstrual hygiene management practices in Ethiopia.

Germany, together with G20 and V20 partners, founded the InsuResilience Global Partnership (IGP) in 2017, which became the leading global initiative for scaling-up finance and insurance solutions to protect vulnerable people and countries against climate and disaster risks. To date, Germany has committed EUR 800 million to the IGP. Further examples of innovative financing include the Latin America Green Bond Fund (LAGreen), the AfricaGrow Fund, and the Women’s World Banking Partners Fund II. Furthermore, German debt-to-health swaps with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) mobilised approx. EUR 100 million for the 2017–2019 period.

Italy is a major donor to the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm)³⁶, which front-loads sovereign donors’ contributions to Gavi and CEPI by issuing the so-called “vaccine bonds”. Between 2018 and 2021, Italy provided a total of EUR 101.91 million to IFFIm-Gavi and EUR 5 million to IFFIm-CEPI.³⁷

The **UK**-funded Financial Sector Deepening Africa (FSDA)³⁸ works to tackle the challenges faced by Africa’s financial markets, enabling high-quality services and long-term capital to reach where they are most needed. Another example of innovative financing for development is the MOBILIST programme, which works with the financial services industry to enable investment in products that can create development impact. The UK has also contributed to the ‘Education Outcomes Fund’ in Sierra Leone and Ghana, which aims to use impact bonds (results-based contracts) to improve primary education.³⁹

The **EU**, through the European Public Development Banks, including DFIs, is instrumental in the development of thematic bond markets and plays a crucial role in developing local capital markets by supporting the necessary policy reforms.⁴⁰ Together with Germany, the EU supports the Latin America Green Bond (LAGreen) Fund.⁴¹ Further, the Commission has started exploring, together with development finance institutions in a Team Europe approach, the scaling-up and further developing of green bond markets in partner countries by addressing challenges to green bond issuance, notably through guarantees to de-risk investments as well as dedicated technical assistance to help create credible local sustainable finance frameworks and build up capacity of local financial-sector actors.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2018	1.1 For each G7 country: part and amount of private sector instrument (PSI) in bilateral ODA (% and USD). (Ratio of gender markers 1 & 2 of screened ODA-optional)	OECD DAC on PSI. (DAC1; Aid types 11030 Private Sector Instruments and 11015 ODA, bilateral total; Flow type: Grant Equivalents); Gender marker 1: significant and 2: principal, as total
	1.2 For each G7 country: amount of mobilised private capital and total PSI on TOSSD (% and USD).	TOSSD published data (On a voluntary basis until TOSSD is formally established and without prejudice to the future use of TOSSD as indicator within the methodology (to be reviewed after formal establishment of TOSSD).
	2. Volume of funding provided by G7 members (ODA) through innovative initiatives and partnerships with PPPs and private sector	For PPPs, private-sector delivery mechanisms: OECD-DAC CRS channel codes 31000, 60000.
	3. Supplementary information: G7 members' narrative examples of financing for development through innovative mechanisms, which may also include solidarity levies, debt swaps, green bonds, development impact bonds, crowdfunding.	Self-reporting. For the needs of reporting on innovative financing, the World Bank definition is applied.

Case Study 1: Collective

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) and the 2019 Kampala Principles



Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation

Engaging the private sector for effective development cooperation is a key component of SDG 17 “Partnerships for the Goals”. The G7 members, in close cooperation with the wider development community, are actively engaged in advancing the necessary outreach. Their aim is to leverage additional finance and expertise in support of sustainable development, create and strengthen partnerships, and help build inclusive markets and value chains across key sectors.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) has been the primary multi-stakeholder forum for driving development effectiveness since 2012. The GPEDC has developed a set of principles to provide a novel blueprint and normative guidance for making private-sector partnerships more effective, leading to greater impact for sustainable development and achieving the SDGs: The “Kampala Principles”, launched in 2019.

The Kampala Principles are the result of successful and extensive multi-stakeholder consultations with G7 and non-G7 governments both in developed and developing countries, development partners, private-sector representatives, and non-state actors. They comprise five mutually reinforcing principles that address key challenges and opportunities for 1) inclusive country ownership, 2) results and targeted impact 3) inclusive partnership 4) transparency and accountability and 5) leaving no one behind.

Implementation of these principles is voluntary. Engaging the private sector through development cooperation is about working together in a way that is driven by interlinked objectives: Purpose and profit.

The principles intend to enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation partnerships with the private sector at the country level, consistent with the GPEDC country ownership principle. Development partners’ adherence to the principles aims to ensure the alignment of their private-sector engagement (PSE) projects and programmes with national sustainable development priorities.

Since their launch in 2019, the Kampala Principles have been put into concrete action in various development cooperation partnerships with the private sector worldwide. The GPEDC “Business Leaders Caucus” (BLC) – a multi-regional and multi-sectoral senior-level advisory group, composed of business leaders from multi-national companies, large domestic firms and micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) – has proven instrumental in bringing the principles to life.

Whether the aim is partnering up to create innovative COVID-19 testing in Bangladesh, providing Colombian women with medical services, or using upskilling and reskilling to address employee well-being and health in the Philippines, the Kampala Principles are enhancing PSE activities by making them more effective and inclusive – generating business returns alongside real, tangible development impacts. The GPEDC’s Action Dialogues in partner countries have disseminated the principles’ message further and identified businesses that are true Kampala Principles champions.

Endnotes Chapter 1:

- 1 OECD (2020). *Global Outlook on Financing for Sustainable Development 2021: A New Way to Invest for People and Planet*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1787/e3c30a9a-en>
- 2 OECD (2020). *Six decades of ODA: insights and outlook in the COVID-19 crisis*. OECD Development Co-operation Profiles 2020. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1787/2dcf1367-en>
- 3 Publish What You Fund (2020). *Aid Transparency Index 2020*. London: Author. Retrieved from <https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2020/>
- 4 This target was first adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1972 and has since been used as a measure by the OECD-DAC.
- 5 2021 ODA data is preliminary and will be confirmed at the end of 2022. <https://motiontools.bmz.de/web/std/commitment-1-increasing-development-assistance-20951/merge-amendments>
- 6 The EU and its Member States' collective ODA refers to all EU Member States that report ODA to the OECD, including those that report voluntarily as they are not members of the DAC (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus (the latter except in 2016, 2017 and 2021) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania), as well as EU institutions' ODA not imputed to EU Member States and other donors.
- 7 Please note that the ODA/GNI ratio from 2018 onwards is reported based on ODA grant equivalents and is thus only conditionally comparable to previous ratios. In 2018, the OECD-DAC introduced the grant equivalent method as a new way of measuring ODA that more accurately reflects the actual effort of donor countries concerning loans (private sector instruments continue to be recorded only on a flow-basis). Until then, the ODA target was indicated only as net-ODA on a flow basis that is by subtracting incoming flows (i.e. loan repayments) from outgoing flows (i.e. grants and loans at their face value). The new method converts loans to their grant equivalent, which makes loans and grants more easily comparable. (For further information on the modernisation of the DAC statistical system see: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/modernisation-dac-statistical-system.htm>) Since the grant equivalent system has replaced the flow method for the calculation of the ODA/GNI ratio, the Elmau Progress Report 2022 adapted its reporting accordingly. ODA volumes and shares to LDCs and other country categories, however, continue to be reported as ODA flows in order to be able to include imputed multilateral ODA contributions, which are only available as ODA flows.
- 8 Total ODA to all recipients as well as for selected country categories is calculated as an aggregate of total bilateral net ODA and imputed multilateral ODA, based on ODA flows. Despite the advantages of the new ODA Grant Equivalent method in better capturing donor effort, this procedure was chosen to be able to include imputed multilateral ODA contributions which are only available as ODA flows. The reported figures do not consider regional ODA known to benefit LDCs. The OECD has recently published data on regional ODA to LDCs for 2020, which can be accessed via the OECD-CRS.
- 9 Values for LICs reported here draw on the LIC World Bank country category.
- 10 It is important to note that these country categories are not mutually exclusive, as countries can be listed in several of them at the same time. Thus, volumes and shares cannot be added up. Also, the lists of countries for each of these categories might be updated annually and thus subject to change (countries being removed or added to the list), which might also affect the development of volumes and shares of ODA attributed to them.
- 11 Brian, P. and Loft, P. (2021). *The 0.7% aid target*. London: House of Commons Library. Retrieved from <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn03714/>.
- 12 The procedure for data collection varies for the different indicators. In general, the monitoring is led by partner countries that collect inputs from different stakeholders. For some indicators, development partners provide inputs, which are then validated by partner countries (Use of Country Results Frameworks, Annual Predictability, Use of Country Systems). In other cases, partner countries provide the input (Medium-Term Predictability) and development partners can complement this with additional inputs (Aid on Budget). There are also cases in which global sources provide inputs and partner countries can complement them as needed (Untied Aid, Transparent Aid Information).
- 13 Please note that the indicator on the use of country-led results frameworks was first assessed in 2016. Please further note that there was no data available on EU performance on untied aid in the 2018 monitoring round.
- 14 With respect to the indicator "use of country-led result frameworks", the GPEDC also monitors additional sub-indicators not reported here. Performance on these indicators can be accessed via the GPEDC monitoring dashboard (<https://www.effectivecooperation.org/>). This report focuses on the percentage of new development interventions that draw their objectives from country-led results frameworks (sub-indicator 2).
- 15 For more information on untying aid, please refer to: OECD (2020). 2020 report on the DAC recommendation to untying aid. Paris: Author. Retrieved from [https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC\(2020\)54/FINAL/en/pdf](https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC(2020)54/FINAL/en/pdf)
- 16 For more information on the underlying methodology, please consult: GPEDC (2018). *Technical Companion Document*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from <https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/technical-companion-document>
- 17 Scores for publishing to FSS are not reported for all G7 members. This is partly due to technical barriers to FSS reporting. More detailed and recent information on IATI publishing is provided by the IATI's own publishing statistics, which are currently in a piloting phase. While many G7 publishing organisations are rated as good to excellent on timeliness and comprehensiveness, providing forward-looking aid information remains a challenge for most. Also, aid agencies generally perform better in publishing aid information than ministries – a tendency that was also observed by the British NGO "Publish What You Fund" in their 2020 Aid Transparency Report. More details: <https://publishingstats.iatistandard.org/> and <https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/the-index/2020/>.
- 18 AFD (2022). *Consultez nos données*. Retrieved from: <https://afd.opendatasoft.com/explore/?sort=modified>
- 19 For more information on the programming act on inclusive development and combating global inequalities, please consult: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000043898536/>
- 20 Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) (2020). *Transparenz für mehr Wirksamkeit*. Retrieved from <https://www.bmz.de/transparenz> [English: <https://www.bmz.de/en/ministry/facts-figures/project-and-organisation-data>].
- 21 AICS (2022). *Open AID*. Retrieved from <http://openaid.aics.gov.it/>. Italy also regularly publishes information on humanitarian programmes on <https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/hac> and <https://fts.unocha.org>.
- 22 More information: USAID Data Services (2022). *Foreign Assistance Dashboard*. Retrieved from <https://foreignassistance.gov/>
- 23 European Commission (2022). *EU Aid Explorer*. Retrieved from https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/index_en

- 24 As defined in: OECD (2016). Peer Inventory 1: Private Sector Engagement Terminology and Typology. Private Sector Peer Learning. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/private-sector-engagement-for-sustainable-development-lessons-from-the-dac.htm>
- 25 Please note that the 2019 Biarritz Progress Report reported on preliminary OECD data for 2018. This report was able to draw on final published data for both 2018 and 2019, which differ slightly from the previously reported preliminary figures.
- 26 Currently, private-sector instruments are still measured using a cash-flow method. This can lead to negative amounts if return flows are greater than disbursements.
- 27 Germany is not reporting to TOSSD.
- 28 TOSSD data is presented in two categories or “pillars”: cross-border resources (Pillar 1) and support to international public goods and global challenges (Pillar 2). TOSSD through PSI is included in Pillar 1. Mobilised private finance is presented separately from the two pillars.
- 29 Data for 2020 was not yet available.
- 30 World Bank (2010). *Innovative Finance for Development Solutions. Initiatives of the World Bank Group*. Retrieved from https://olc.worldbank.org/system/files/Innovative_Finance_for_Development_Soluti--org/.pdf
- 31 FinDev Canada (2021). *FinDev Canada and Global Affairs Canada partner to promote a gender-focused economic recovery in developing countries*. Retrieved from: <https://www.findevcanada.ca/en/news/findev-canada-and-global-affairs-canada-partner-promote-gender-focused-economic-recovery>
- 32 Prime Minister of Canada (2019). *Strengthening the partnership with Africa*. Retrieved from <https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/backgrounders/2019/08/26/creating-better-future>
- 33 Equality Fund (2022). *Investments*. Retrieved from <https://equalityfund.ca/what-we-do/investment/>
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- 35 Government of Canada (2021). *Canada announces projects in Colombia to support most vulnerable populations*. Retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2021/03/canada-announces-projects-in-colombia-to-support-most-vulnerable-populations.html>
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- 38 FSD Africa (2020). *Impact Report: what we've learned and what we've achieved*. Retrieved from <https://www.fsdafrika.org/publication/impact-report/>
- 39 Education Outcomes Fund (EOF) (2022). *About*. Retrieved from <https://www.educationoutcomesfund.org/about>
- 40 European Commission (2022). *NextGenerationEU Green Bonds*. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/eu-borrower-investor-relations/nextgenerationeu-green-bonds_en
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2. Economic development

Inclusive and sustainable economic development can be an important means to further human well-being. The eradication of poverty, the provision of decent jobs, and the creation of widely-shared wealth are prime objectives of economic development. One of the greatest challenges of our time is to realise the fundamental transformation of our economies that is necessary to achieve these aims in an equitable way within the environmental planetary boundaries.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, disruptions of supply chains in the manufacturing sector, workplace absenteeism, health impacts and a reduction of human mobility have had severe economic consequences. The World Bank estimates that in 2020 about 97 million more people lived in extreme income poverty than before the pandemic.¹ In addition, the number of unemployed people worldwide increased by 33 million between 2019 and 2020.² Present challenges for the global economy also include a high level of political uncertainty, inflation risks, and the impacts of economic sanctions following the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine.

Due to international trade in goods and services, the economies of the G7 countries are closely connected to the economies of most countries worldwide. One of the focusses of G7 activities with respect to economic development thus concerns trade and international supply chains. In this context, the G7 committed to supporting the integration of developing countries into international trade, especially through technical assistance and capacity-building for trade facilitation

(Commitment 4 on Trade and Development). In addition, the group committed to supporting intra-African trade and trade-related infrastructure in African countries (Commitment 5 on Trade and Infrastructure in Africa). Finally, the G7 committed to improving the application of labour, social and environmental standards in global supply chains (Commitment 7 on Responsible Global Supply Chains).

A second focus of the development and development-related commitments of the G7 on economic issues is on infrastructure investments. A well-functioning infrastructure is crucial for the viability and competitiveness of economic activities. At the same time, infrastructure investments must also limit negative externalities. The G7 committed to aligning its infrastructure investment with the G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment, which address, for instance, issues related to governance, social and environmental impacts, as well as alignment with development strategies (Commitment 6 on Quality Infrastructure Investment).

A third topic of G7 activities to foster economic development concerns the digital transformation in African countries. Undeniably, digitalisation is currently leading to profound structural changes in many sectors of the economy. The G7 committed to supporting African countries in this transformation, for instance by providing funding for digital infrastructure or the sharing of best practices among G7 and African states (Commitment 8 on Digital Transformation in Africa).

Commitment 4

Trade and development

“We stand ready to continue to provide, within our current Aid for Trade commitments, substantial technical assistance and capacity building to help implement a WTO Trade Facilitation deal, in particular to the benefit of the Least Developed Countries. We will also be more transparent in reporting the aid we provide, and work with developing countries, especially the poorest, to ensure that resources are better matched to needs.”

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders' Communiqué, para. 17

SDGs:



Score:



Below expectations

Properly designed, international trade can be an engine for inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction and thus an important means to achieve sustainable development. The international community has repeatedly acknowledged this potential of trade, including with the foundation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, the foundation of the Aid for Trade Initiative in 2006, and the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015.³ Especially the so called Least Developed Countries (LDCs), however, continue to face many obstacles to engaging in international trade. Among these obstacles are overly complex and inefficient border procedures that increase trade costs and hinder participation in the globalized economy, where goods often cross borders many times. Trade facilitation measures are aimed at removing such barriers by streamlining and simplifying the technical and legal border procedures.⁴

In order to support this process, G7 leaders at the Lough Erne Summit in 2013 committed to provide substantial technical assistance and capacity building with respect to trade facilitation, in particular to LDCs. To monitor progress on this commitment, the G7 decided to report on Aid for Trade disbursement figures for trade facilitation to LDCs, and to compare their spending areas with needs assessments and diagnostic studies of international organisations.

Aid for Trade and Trade Facilitation impact and needs assessments

The Aid for Trade (AFT) initiative was launched at the WTO Ministerial Conference in 2005 with the aim to support so called developing countries in identifying their trade-related constraints and needs, and to address them by mobilising financial support. The 2019 review of the initiative found that, overall, donor support through AFT has helped developing countries to expand and

diversify their trade, improve competitiveness, attract foreign direct investment, and create employment. Results, however, varied depending on the type of AfT intervention, sector and country. Factors for success included the alignment of AfT support with national or regional priorities, as well as the consideration of both the enabling environment at the macro level (i.e. political and institutional reform) as well as needs and capacities at the micro level (i.e. of small enterprises and disadvantaged groups). According to partner countries' responses in the 2019 monitoring, AfT finance delivered the most impacts in the category of trade facilitation.⁵

The WTO's Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) entered into force in 2017. According to the WTO, full implementation of the TFA will especially benefit LDCs. As of April 2022, the rate of implementation of TFA commitments in LDCs was at 43%.⁶ According to the WTO Trade Facilitation


Committee, factors hindering TFA implementation in most LDCs include capacity and technology constraints, as well as limited awareness of the TFA. The Committee encourages donor country members to extend additional support based on the countries' specific assistance requirements in order to overcome these challenges.⁷

G7 members' support for Trade Facilitation and other Aid for Trade activities

G7 members' bilateral ODA for trade facilitation has decreased overall since the baseline in 2012.

Between 2012 and 2020, contributions have fluctuated, with peaks of USD 42 million to LDCs in 2014 and USD 420 million to all recipient countries in 2018. **In 2020, G7 members contributed USD 245 million to trade facilitation in general (– 17.5% as compared to 2012), of which 11.8% or USD 29 million were directed towards LDCs (see Figure 5). This was the lowest contribution to LDCs since 2012.**

Figure 5: G7 members' (incl. EU institutions') bilateral ODA for trade facilitation in all developing countries and LDCs, 2012–2020



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (Purpose Code 33120)

In the following, G7 members' individual contributions to Aid for Trade (AfT) are reported:

Canada promotes inclusive trade and gender equality in its trade and development approach, in line with the Feminist International Assistance Policy's goals. Canada is actively engaged in multilateral organisations undertaking trade and development financing and trade facilitation. One of these is the Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation (GATF), through which Canada supports developing countries in the implementation of the WTO TFA (CAD 10 million, 2015–2024). Through its engagement in the International Trade Centre (ITC), Canada especially supports women and small business. Canada also supports the African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) to boost intra-African trade (CAD 13.2 million from 2015–2020).

Bilaterally, Canada provides technical assistance and capacity building to developing countries through the Expert Deployment Mechanism for Trade and Development (EDM) (CAD 16.5 million; 2018–2025) and the Canadian Trade and Investment Facility for Development (CTIF) (CAD 12 million; 2018–2025).

France: Through AfT, France aims to link trade and development policies. In doing so, France has put a special focus on supporting social and human rights and environmental due diligence in global value chains. Between 2009–2019, France's AfT more than doubled, totalling USD 20.3 billion in AfT (21.2% of French ODA). The development agency AFD mainly contributes to AfT through loans, in particular for major infrastructure projects. AFD's grants have mainly benefited LDCs (51% of the total over 2009–2019). In addition, AFD implements the Trade Capacity Building Program (PRCC), which is France's main bilateral AfT programme. Between 2012 and 2022, EUR 81.9 million were granted under the PRCC.⁸

At the multilateral level, France supported the WTO's AfT programmes (including, among others,

the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF), the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF), and the TFA Facility with an average of more than EUR 2 million per year over the 2018–2020 period. Also, France renewed its bilateral agreement with the WTO in 2021, through which it finances part of the technical assistance provided by the WTO Secretariat (EUR 1.85 million per year; 2021–2023).

Germany: Among the five AfT categories, 'economic infrastructure' and 'productive capacity building' continued to be those with the largest German ODA disbursements. This is not surprising given that these categories include a wide range of measures and that funding infrastructure is costly. Based on the assessment that Non-Tariff Barriers (such as trade costs, difficulties in meeting quality standards, and lacking integration of regional value chains) are increasingly the main trade obstacles for developing countries, however, Trade Facilitation, Quality Infrastructure and Regional Economic Integration were adopted as new key areas in the new German AfT strategy from 2017.⁹

Besides funding, these issues require cooperation between many actors including government entities as well as businesses alike. Germany has therefore started to build new alliances among these actors, collaborating on measures in all three areas. Notably, Germany is a member of the Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation (GATF) and set up the complementary and closely cooperating German Alliance for Trade Facilitation. Further, Germany also set up the Alliance for Product Quality in Africa and has supported the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA) since its early stages. ACFTA is expected to accelerate the dismantling of trade barriers between African countries, stimulate intra-African trade, and strengthen regional value chains and diversify economic structures.

Japan has supported various countries in implementing the WTO TFA, by providing approximately USD 14 million of assistance and capacity-building

resources between 2019 and 2020. Putting into practice a holistic approach in its own Aid for Trade efforts, Japan provides comprehensive assistance in the areas of productive capacity building as well as trade policy and regulations, among others, in order to meet the needs of the recipient countries. It has been reaffirmed that mobilisation of private resources including Foreign Direct Investment plays an important role in such areas as trade facilitation and digital trade, and that creating a good investment environment through policy consistency and transparency is critical. While, ultimately, efforts made by the countries themselves are key to achieving sustainable economic development, Japan's Aid for Trade aims to support and catalyse these processes.

UK: Trade and development is a priority for the UK, which engages with developing countries in various multilateral and regional forums, including the WTO, G20, ASEAN, Commonwealth and UN. The UK also continues to support developing countries so they can fully participate at the WTO, and it has advanced trade and development, including through AfT offers. The UK funds innovative programmes that help countries strengthen their capability to trade internationally, breaking down barriers to trade and enabling them to participate effectively in the global trading system. An example is the TAF2+ programme, which provides technical support, analysis and advice to developing countries to help them effectively participate in trade and investment negotiations.

Due to the strong impact of the pandemic on the UK economy, the government temporarily reduced the overall amount spent on ODA to 0.5% of GNI. Nevertheless, trade remains one of the top government priorities for ODA spend, with GBP 12.5 million allocated to AfT programmes in 2021/22.

The United States has regularly submitted its notification to the WTO's Committee on Trade Facilitation in keeping with its obligations. The

United States has regularly completed the surveys on Aid for Trade, which identify donor country priorities and noteworthy Aid for Trade activities. Survey responses have been prepared by USAID and submitted by USTR on behalf of USG. The United States is advancing the Prosper Africa initiative to increase trade and investment with Africa – driving job creation, fuelling sustainable growth, and advancing shared prosperity.

EU: In 2019, the EU and EU Member States' commitments in AfT amounted to EUR 17.9 billion, 38% of the AfT from all donors. The EU supports developing countries' sustainable integration into the world economy through multilateral, regional and bilateral programmes. 15% of EU and EU Member States' AfT went to LDCs.

At the multilateral level, the EU supports participation in multilateral trade negotiations as well as implementation of agreements, such as for Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the TFA. Between 2014–2019 the European Commission supported the TFA with EUR 423.7 million. In addition, the EU and eight of its Member States support Phase Two of the Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) to help the LDCs harness trade for poverty reduction, inclusive growth and sustainable development. Team Europe's commitments as of the end of 2020 amounted to USD 68 million.

EU AfT also supported regional integration through multi-country programmes focusing on the negotiation and implementation of regional trade agreements and on support for key regional value chains. Between 2014 and 2020 the EU has supported the negotiation, ratification and implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) through its Pan-African Programme, with more than EUR 74 million.¹⁰

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2012	1. Aid for Trade (AfT) disbursement figures for trade facilitation to LDCs <hr/> 2. Comparison of AfT spending areas with needs assessments or diagnostic studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD Creditor Reporting System data, using data reported under the sector spending codes for Trade Facilitation • Reports from WTO Trade Facilitation Committee on implementation progress • G7 members’ own information and statistical publications on aid spending • Published trade diagnostics or needs assessments, e.g. DTIS published by EIF or World Bank UNCTAD needs assessments, regional aid for trade strategies, development support. • OECD/WTO Aid for Trade review (once every two years) that surveys developing countries’ priorities on trade

Commitment 5

Trade and infrastructure in Africa

“The G8 will work with African countries and regional economic communities to meet the AU’s target of doubling intra-Africa trade and reducing crossing times at key border posts by 50% by 2022. The G8 commits to provide increased support for project preparation facilities for African regional infrastructure programmes.”

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, paras. 19–20

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – the world’s largest free trade area in terms of members, connecting 1.3 billion people across 55 countries – which started trading on the 1st of January in 2021, is undoubtedly a promising development on the African continent. The AfCFTA is expected to increase total exports by 29% relative to business as usual, and intercontinental exports by more than 81%. This is due to the agreement’s reduction of tariffs among members, its regulatory measures such as sanitary and phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade standards, and its coverage of policy areas like trade facilitation and services.¹¹ Between 2017 and 2021, intra-African trade slightly increased, from 16.7% in 2017 to 18 % of total exports in 2021. The goal of the African Union’s (AU) Action Plan on Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT) was to double this to 22% before 2022. However, African exports and imports declined by 19.3% and 13.2% in 2021, and the share of Africa’s share in global trade is currently only 3%. Further, between 2019 and 2020, FDI inflows to Africa decreased by 16% while FDI outflows from Africa fell by 68%, from USD 4.9 billion in 2019 to USD 1.6 billion in 2020.¹² These

decreases are likely due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a particularly negative effect on trade as some borders were closed to mitigate the spread of the virus. In general, cross-border trade is difficult to report on since unrecorded small-scale transactions play a crucial role: In Benin, for instance, unrecorded imports were found to be just as important as recorded ones, and for exports, the value of unrecorded transactions is more than five times higher than the official exports reported in customs statistics.¹³

Due to the issue’s continued relevance, the G7 committed in Lough Erne in 2013 to increase support for trade and infrastructure in Africa. In order to follow through, the G7 monitors the improvements at key border crossings, the G7’s support for intra-African trade and the G7 Members’ contributions to regional project preparation facilities.

Improvements at key border crossings

TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) is an aid-for-trade organisation working towards the aim of growing prosperity in East Africa through increased trade.

The **UK** is the largest donor to TMEA, contributing 63% of its funds; other G7 funders include the **US**, **Canada** and **France**. With G7 support, TMEA has amongst other things been able to build five high-volume one-stop border posts, which together with the improvements to procedures have reduced crossing times by an average of 70%. Another initiative that was funded by multiple G7 members is the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (NEPAD-IPPF) funded by **Canada**, **Germany** and the **UK**. The NEPAD-IPPF is a Multi-Donor Special Fund hosted by the African Development Bank Group (AfDB). The Fund supports the preparation of bankable regional infrastructure projects in line with the priorities of the Regional Member Countries (RMCs) and the African Union Commission (AUC), among other stakeholder groups.

Through TMEA, **Canada** supports the 'Making Trade Work for Women in Eastern Africa' Project (CAD 18.3 million), which aims to promote the economic empowerment of female traders in Eastern Africa and reduce sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The project supports informal cross-border traders at 20 borders in Eastern Africa. Results as of March 2021 include the development of a Women in Trade Empowerment Index, new advocacy initiatives benefitting over 15,910 women, an increase in women representation on joint border committees, the emergence of two types of sexual and gender-based reporting mechanisms and the establishment of Operational Resource Centres.

France's Aid for Trade policy is designed to facilitate trade by implementing projects that are meant to simplify customs procedures, contributing to more efficient market risk management policies and mechanisms for strategic products, including food security. In 2020, AFD launched a EUR 32 million project dedicated to strengthening regional integration in the Horn of Africa by enhancing the competitiveness and inclusiveness of the Addis-

Djibouti corridor (EUR 29.6 million from EU delegated funds). This corridor will focus on reducing transit times and will promote the simplification and rationalization of operational procedures, the widespread use of digital technology and the coordination and interoperability of information and management systems in order to harmonise the standards and regulations governing trade between the two countries.¹⁴

From 2016 to 2021, **Germany** has been specifically supporting improvements at the border crossings in Kasumbalesa (Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC, and Zambia), and along the Dakar-Bamako trade corridor, through the Trade for Development Fund, financed by the BMZ.¹⁵ Through NEPAD-IPPF, Germany supported the design, construction and opening of a 1.9 km bridge crossing the Gambia River in 2019. It enables the free flow of people, goods and vehicles between the northern and southern parts of both the Gambia and Senegal, and is expected to reduce travel time, boost trade and unite communities that were previously isolated. It will also facilitate and increase sub-regional trade and open up rural areas while increasing the level and quality of service of the Nouakchott-Dakar-Lagos road corridors (the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) zone). The project contributes to the development of transport infrastructures in West Africa. It is also a key link contributing to the Trans-African Highway (TAH) programme, which is a sub-programme of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

During the current reporting period of 2019–2021, **Italy** financed training initiatives conducted by the Italian security forces (Arma dei Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza) with the aim of strengthening capacity building in terms of customs and border control, fighting illegal trafficking, and controlling people and goods, in order to combat illegal immigration and smuggling. The training courses mainly benefitted the staff of the law enforcement agencies of countries of crucial importance for

border control and for the fight against terrorism and the protection of human rights, such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Republic of Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Seychelles. The training activities aim at providing learners with specific knowledge on the main transnational criminal phenomena directly connected with economic and financial flows and the associated techniques of analysis, investigation and contrast. Furthermore, Italy has provided contributions to regional organisations such as IGAD and the G5 Sahel Permanent Secretariat to strengthen the peace processes in Somalia and South Sudan and to promote training activities that combat the illicit trafficking of goods and prevent and counteract violent extremism in the Sahelian countries. Both initiatives were supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in order to guarantee the development and security of the member countries, the fight against terrorism and illicit trafficking, and the control and management of migratory flows, improving the living conditions of the populations.

Many of the One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs) aimed to reduce transit times across East African border crossings and were implemented by TMEA through **UK** support. Some of these programmes include:

- The Busia OSBP (Kenya-Uganda) was completed in 2016/17 and led to a 55% time reduction.
- The Kagitumba-Mirama Hills OSBP (Rwanda-Uganda) was completed in 2016/17 and led to an 86% time reduction.
- The Holili-Taveta OSBP (Kenya-Tanzania) was completed in 2016/17 and led to a 76% time reduction.

At these OSBPs, TMEA has supported both “hard” and “soft” infrastructure improvements. Hard infrastructure includes the development of new buildings to house border agencies and the construction or upgrades of inspection sheds, warehouses, etc., to help border agencies handle

and process cross-border traffic. Soft infrastructure includes the application of Integrated Border Management systems and procedures that help facilitate the clearance of trade and passenger traffic. This involves establishing project management structures, providing ICT systems, furniture and utilities, developing the legal and policy framework for OSBPs, developing OSBP operational procedures, training and sensitising border agency officers and selected categories of users, and piloting/launching of OSBP operations.

The **U.S.** Department of State works with other parts of the federal government, including the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency, to offer international training programs providing assistance to African customs and border officials along with long-term regional advisors, short term experts, equipment donations, and exchange programs funding African official participation. Through the State Partnership Program, various State national guard programs funded exchanges and practical programs with 15 African national partners on operational procedures to improve efficiency and security while respecting the rule of law at land and maritime borders. For example, the Utah National Guard and the Kingdom of Morocco worked together to improve capacity in border security, and the North Dakota National Guard worked with Benin and Togo to improve regional operating partnerships among military, civilians and businesses.

In 2019, the **EU** and EU Member States committed EUR 8.5 billion in Trade-Related Infrastructure, i.e. physical infrastructure including transport and storage, communications, and energy generation and supply. This represents the second-largest component under Aid for Trade categories, close to commitments of EUR 9.1 billion for Building Productive Capacity, which includes business development and activities to improve the business climate, privatisation, assistance to banking and financial services, agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, mineral resources and mining, and tourism.

EU Aid for Trade for Transport Infrastructure amounted to 21–24% of total Aid for Trade for LDCs, LMICS and UMICS. In 2019, the EU and EU Member States' commitments in Aid for Trade amounted to EUR 17.9 billion. The primary purpose of the EU's "East and Southern African (EA-SA) Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme" is to develop and implement harmonised road transport policies, laws, regulations and standards for efficient cross-border road transport and transit networks, transport and logistics services, systems and procedures in the EA-SA region.

Support for intra-African trade

Canada is a founding donor to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) (having committed CAD 48 million to date since 2003). Through Canada's funding, ATPC provides technical assistance to AU member states, with regard to AfCFTA negotiations and in terms of implementation of the Agreement based on service requests. ATPC provides training to key stakeholders and undertakes research and analysis on focus areas (i.e. gender, climate). ATPC also facilitates the participation of private-sector operators, civil-society organisations, including women entrepreneurs, traders and organisations in regional and continental dialogue on the AU's trade agenda.

France has long supported economic integration in Africa as an impulse for inclusive economic growth, poverty reduction, decent jobs, trade, investment and sustainable development throughout the continent. Some of these programmes include:

- The French Technical Assistance facility to the African Union (EUR 1.5 million in 2019), supporting e-commerce strategies.
- The Climate Credit line to the Trade and Development Bank (EUR 150 million in 2020), to finance green and sustainable infrastructure projects in Eastern and Southern Africa.

- The Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA) Air Route Optimization Programme (EUR 90 million, of which EUR 30 million are EU delegated funds).

Since 2016, **Germany** supported the build-up of the AfCFTA with up to EUR 28 million; in 2021, the funding year of the AfCFTA, an additional amount of EUR 50 million was allocated. Cooperation takes place at multiple levels and across different topics. Several programmes cooperate with continental stakeholders such as the AU Commission and the AfCFTA Secretariat, with selected Regional Economic Commissions (SADC, ECOWAS and EAC) as well as selected pilot countries.¹⁶ The actors are supported in the further negotiation of the AfCFTA, in the dismantling of non-tariff and technical trade barriers, in the involvement of the private sector and the implementation of trade facilitation measures. Specifically, Germany supports the development of digital customs systems and contributes to strengthening the quality infrastructure, for example, in order to improve product quality. As part of the 2021 commitments, Germany contributed EUR 8 million to the EU Joint Technical Assistance Facility. Projects are implemented by GIZ, UNCTAD and Germany's National Metrology Institute (PTB).

In 2021, **Italy**, represented by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, financed the initiative "Training Program towards an effective African Continental Free Trade Area/ AfCFTA". The initiative, promoted by UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) and ASeS (Farmers Solidarity and Development), is focused on enhancing intra-African trade, in the framework of the implementation of the AfCFTA, through inclusive, sustainable and development-friendly trade arrangements and capacity building. Special care is placed on ensuring that such capacity building can enhance employment opportunities, have positive impacts on gender equity, and contribute to strengthening the general

welfare of people in Africa, as an important precondition to peace and stability. The project goal is to provide the AfCFTA Secretariat and the participating countries with high-level specialized training on tax, customs, trade issues and legislation, with the aim of supporting local companies, including Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), and improving their international trade relations.

The **UK** has supported both the African Union Commission and, more recently, the AfCFTA Secretariat to achieve its aims regarding regional integration and the establishment of the AfCFTA. This has focused on three main areas: direct support to the AfCFTA negotiations through secondments of technical advisory capacity, research and analysis to support negotiations and broader trade policy, and support for the country-level implementation of the agreement.¹⁷

The **US**, represented by USAID, supports technical advisors in regional organisations to further AfCFTA implementation in coordination with US trade policy agencies. USAID and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) coordinate with the ECOWAS Regional Competition Authority (ERCA) to develop a common approach to AfCFTA Stage II negotiations related to competition policy, which can be replicated across the continent. A programme of capacity building, including a resident advisor and specialized workshop, should be developed by September 2022. These programmes work on the ground to reduce regional trade barriers, facilitate two-way trade under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and promote clear and transparent policies and procedures that help to ensure a stable, low-risk environment for trade and investment. In addition, the United States signed a joint statement with the African Union concerning the development of the African Continental Free Trade Area in 2019, emphasizing the mutual benefit of trade partnership with goals for regional integration.

EU Aid for Trade also supports regional integration through multi-country programmes focusing on the negotiation and implementation of regional trade agreements and support to key regional value chains. In particular, between 2014 and 2020, the EU has supported the AfCFTA through its Pan-African Programme with more than EUR 74 million. The EU's "East and Southern African (EA-SA) Transport and Transit Facilitation Programme" has facilitated the development of a more competitive, integrated and liberalised regional road transport market in the EA-SA region as an overall strategic objective.¹⁸

Regional project preparation facilities

The G7, specifically **Canada**, **Germany** and the **UK**, have continued to support the NEPAD-IPPF, which approved 13 grants in 2019 and 2020 with a total value of roughly USD 20 million in support of project preparation in Africa for regional infrastructure projects in the energy, transport, and information and communications technology sectors. In general, greater focus on quality infrastructure preparation is needed to ensure there is a bankable pipeline of investment projects. IPPF continues to strengthen its strategy and operational performance but remains short of funding to meet the need and demand for regional infrastructure development.

France will be part of the European Technical Assistance Facility for the AfCFTA in order to facilitate regional trade integration as well as the harmonisation of trade rules, which, in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, will also ensure coordination of trade policies in order to alleviate its economic and social impacts. This Team Europe Initiative aims to provide the AU with expertise in regional integration and economic partnerships towards the creation of a customs union and a common market.

Germany expanded its support to the AU's Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) with an additional EUR 7 million in 2021

through its technical assistance program “Green Infrastructure Corridors for Intra-African Trade”, supporting green infrastructure development by pushing projects to a financial close and promoting digital, green smart technologies to secure private-sector investment.¹⁹ Further, Germany continues to support the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Secretariat with a EUR 13.5 million grant (2017) for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Project Preparation Development Facility (PPDF). The PPDF aims at creating a pipeline of bankable projects that facilitate regional integration in the energy, transport, tourism, and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sectors. It will begin the implementation of its third phase, PPDF III, by mid-2022.

In 2021 – on the occasion of the third Italy-Africa Ministerial Conference, “Encounters with Africa”, held in Rome on October 7 and 8 – **Italy**, represented by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, signed a Letter of Intent with UNECA/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, aimed at enhancing the economic cooperation with the commission. Within this framework, in 2021 Italy supported the above-mentioned “Training Program towards an effective African Continental Free Trade Area/ AFCFTA”, with the aim of enhancing intra-African

trade, through inclusive, sustainable and development-friendly trade arrangements and capacity building, ensuring that such capacity building can enhance employment opportunities, have positive impacts on gender equity, and contribute to improving the general welfare of people in Africa.

Japan has supported the formulation of strategic master plans for regional corridors and promotes region-wide development, such as the East African Northern Corridor, the Nacala Corridor, and the West Africa Growth Ring.

UK provided GBP 95 million to the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund pre-2016. There were no new commitments in 2019–2021.

The **US** supports regional trade and investment platforms in East, West, and Southern Africa that advance intra-regional, US, and international trade with Africa by connecting businesses, investors, and partner governments with its full range of support services, including business-to-business and investor match-making, market entry support, transaction facilitation, targeted policy interventions, and technical assistance for trade capacity building. Prosper Africa also coordinates with the U.S. Trade and Development Agency on regional project preparation activities.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2013	1. Improvements at key designated border crossings, regardless of whether they are achieved through improvement in policy or infrastructure, where there is currently concerted action by the G7.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • G7 members own records of activities • Infrastructure Consortium for Africa Annual Report • The NEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF) Annual Report • EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) Annual Report
	2. Continuing G7 support for intra-Africa trade.	
	3. G7 Members’ contributions to regional project preparation facilities.	

Commitment 6

Quality Infrastructure Investment

“[W]e strive to align our own infrastructure investment with the G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment, as set out in the Annex. We further encourage the relevant stakeholders, namely governments, international organizations, including MDBs, and the private sector, such as in PPP projects, to align their infrastructure investment and assistance with the Principles, including the introduction and promotion of a transparent, competitive procurement process that takes full account of value for money and quality of infrastructure.”

Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p.9

“We will aim for a step change in our approach to infrastructure financing, notably on quality infrastructure and investment, to strengthen partnerships with developing countries and help meet their infrastructure needs (...) This partnership will orient development finance tools toward the range of challenges faced by developing countries, including in resilient infrastructure and technologies to address the impacts of climate change; health systems and security; developing digital solutions; and advancing gender equality and education.”

Carbis Bay 2021, G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 67

SDGs:



Score:  Good

By 2040, the need for infrastructure investment is estimated to reach USD 94 trillion globally, with a further USD 3.5 trillion required to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for electricity and water.²⁰ Currently, it is forecasted that the infrastructure investment gap will amount to USD 15 trillion globally if the countries continue to invest in line with the current trends.²¹ In order to close this outlined global-supply gap of infrastructure investments as well as promoting strong,

sustainable and balanced growth while enhancing security and resilience and contributing to the global efforts for the SDGs, the G7 developed the Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment in 2016. These are a set of five principles covering governance, economic, social and environmental impacts, alignment with economic development, and effective resource mobilization. The five quality principles are:

- **Principle 1:** Ensuring effective governance, reliable operation, and economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost, as well as safety and resilience against natural disaster, terrorism, and cyber-attack risks.
- **Principle 2:** Ensuring job creation, capacity building, and transfer of expertise and know-how for local communities.
- **Principle 3:** Addressing social and environmental impacts.
- **Principle 4:** Ensuring alignment with economic and development strategies, including aspects of climate change and environment at the national and regional levels.
- **Principle 5:** Enhancing effective resource mobilization including through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).

Due to the increased importance of infrastructure investment, the G7 reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening partnerships with developing countries to help meet their infrastructure needs, both at the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit and at the Carbis Bay Summit in 2021. In order to follow through, G7 members' efforts to promote Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) and align their own infrastructure investment with the G7 Ise-Shima Principles are monitored at the project level. In addition, the G7 monitors its efforts to encourage the relevant stakeholders (governments and international organizations, including multilateral development banks (MDBs), and the private sector, (through PPP projects)) to align their infrastructure investment and assistance with the Ise-Shima Principles.

Promoting quality infrastructure investments in G7 members' policies

Canada has continued its investments in the African Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) while also announcing its contribution (March 2021) towards Investing in Inclusive Infrastructure with GuarantCo. This project aims to enhance provision of affordable and sustainable infrastructure services in low-income countries and fragile states to

combat poverty and help economies grow. GuarantCo, part of the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), addresses the shortage of long-term patient funding and the lack of local currency infrastructure financing and local capital market development in Africa and Asia. PIDG investments promote socio-economic development within a just transition to net zero emissions, combat poverty, and contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Canada also played a key role in the G7 Task Force on Development Finance to drive forward this work with a view to promoting a values-driven, collaborative, high-quality and market-led approach to supporting infrastructure development in low- and middle-income countries.

The **French** development agency (AFD) has adopted an ambitious strategy and robust methodology to ensure that the projects it finances are in accordance with the G7 Ise-Sima Principles:

- Environmental and social risks are managed in line with international best practices;
- Debt analysis includes long-term sustainability analysis;
- As part of its mandate to align with the Sustainable Development Goals, AFD has set up an internal mechanism to ensure that projects contribute to sustainable development issues along six dimensions: the fight against inequalities and the reduction of social imbalances, the contribution to a sustainable and resilient economy, gender equality, the preservation of biodiversity, the transition to a low-carbon path, resilience to climate change, and the sustainability of the project's effects and governance framework.
- In line with its 100% Paris Agreement strategy, AFD has a real "climate" selectivity for the projects it finances to ensure that they are aligned with the necessary transition of development trajectories, with ambitious objectives for projects that have climate co-benefits.

- Finally, among its financing selectivity tools, AFD has an exclusion list that was revised in 2021. This list helps to control risks by filtering out possible projects that are not in line with the Group’s mandate. The 2021 update explicitly excludes (1) construction, extension and renovation of power and heat production units using fossil fuels, including gas and, (2) in the area of electricity, all fossil fuel-based production, leading to a complete exclusion of the fossil fuel production cycle (infrastructure associated with power plants and exclusive transport of hydrocarbons).
- In all infrastructure projects financed by AFD, technical assistance is mobilised to reinforce the capacity of local counterparts in the fields of planning, modelling, technical expertise, project management, procurement, environmental and social issues, etc.

All these concerns are part of AFD’s operations. Sustainable infrastructure thus represents 50% of the AFD Group’s commitments. For the four main sectors, the total commitment in 2021 is EUR 4.8 billion. To this digital and agricultural infrastructure (irrigation) should be added.

For its own domestic infrastructure projects, **Germany** has incorporated the recommendations of the G7 Ise-Shima Principles in its legal regulations. For example, Germany has implemented the Assessment System for Sustainable Building (BNB) as a holistic methodology for planning and evaluating buildings and their surroundings to ensure the sustainability of public construction projects. Furthermore, Germany is supporting quality infrastructure investment by financing infrastructure projects in its partner countries in the sectors of energy, water management, housing, transportation, urban development and digitalisation. The projects are aligned with high quality standards and are submitted to rigorous climate mainstreaming and social-environmental assessments. Another example is the Urban NEXUS training approach, which seeks out synergies and benefits of

nature-based solutions from system integration in cities and metropolitan regions at the different scales of the built environment and its infrastructures.

Japan has actively promoted and implemented quality infrastructure investment. In 2016, Japan launched the “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” initiative, which aimed to provide approximately USD 200 billion in public and private capital to quality infrastructure projects across the world from 2017 to 2021. Until 2019, it provided approximately USD 106 billion. Japan has been strengthening connectivity in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region both in hard and soft infrastructure, with a focus on the ongoing two trillion yen worth of land, sea, and air corridor connectivity and providing training for 1,000 individuals from 2020 to 2022 for ASEAN countries, based on the Japan-ASEAN Connectivity Initiative.

The **UK** actively supports and promotes quality infrastructure investment. The UK’s Development Finance Institution, British International Investment (BII), formerly CDC, has set a Policy on Responsible Investing that incorporates key international standards – most prominently the International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards – and other standards including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as well as higher, bespoke requirements in relation to climate change. BII has dedicated teams responsible for implementing the Policy throughout the investment cycle from origination until exit, including Environmental and Social (E&S) and Business Integrity teams. Between 2017 and 2021 BII’s investments supported businesses that employ almost 1 million workers, generated 277,000 gigawatt hours of electricity, and paid more than GBP 10 billion in taxes. In addition, BII mobilised USD 3.8 billion of private-sector capital between 2016 and 2022, of which USD 555 million was raised in 2020 alone. BII activities in the energy sector include renewable generation, investment in

transmission and distribution, energy access, energy efficiency, and other energy-related sectors.

The **US** supports and promotes the development of quality infrastructure investment and encourages greater private-sector investment in projects in the developing world, in line with the G7 Ise-Shima Principles. Last year at the Carbis Bay Summit, the US announced its Partnership for Global Infrastructure (PGI) in the G7. With PGI, the United States and like-minded partners intend to coordinate in mobilising investment to help meet the infrastructure needs of the 21st century – with a focus on climate, health and health security, digital connectivity, and gender equity and equality. We need to coordinate our respective development finance toolkits and identify ways we can harmonise and strengthen the collective impact of our efforts. In 2020, USAID updated its operational policy to improve the quality of its infrastructure investments, by requiring the use of a screening tool to assess the procurement and implementation approaches of planned infrastructure programs against best practice. The policy seeks to ensure that USAID investments in infrastructure are locally appropriate, consider social and environmental impacts, are climate-resilient and operationally sustainable, and support national and regional strategies for development.

The **EU** supports quality infrastructure improvements and their main components of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as well as the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement through multiple projects. Quality infrastructure includes the regulatory and operational aspects of standardisation, accreditation, conformity assessment and market surveillance. Capacity building of regulators and competent authorities is a crucial enabler of trade and investment. Food safety systems and laboratory equipment are also important. Finally, technical assistance to producers and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in complying with technical regulations, private standards, food safety, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures is crucial.

Promoting quality infrastructure investments among G7 members' partner

Canada continues to promote the Ise-Shima principles through a variety of mechanisms, including through its multilateral development bank (MDB) membership, through the creation of its Development Finance Institution, FinDev Canada and through its active role in the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF). The GIF is a 2014 G20 initiative with the overarching goal of increasing private participation and investment in developing countries' infrastructure, and improving services contributing to poverty reduction and equitable growth. The GIF supports governments and multilateral development banks to address the lack of quality and sustainable infrastructure projects in developing countries and emerging markets through the provision of end-to-end transaction advisory services. As of 31 October 2021, the GIF has supported 120 infrastructure programs and projects across 58 developing countries. At the project level, a prime example of Canada's commitment is through the Initiative on Closing the Investment Gap in Sustainable Infrastructure (CIGI). CIGI is a partnership between the UNDP and the University of Maryland (UMD) to promote sustainable infrastructure projects to potential investors, build the capacity of developing countries to develop early investment grade portfolios, and create an enabling environment for sustainable, inclusive and climate-resilient projects. The overall goal in the initial period is to mobilise the necessary investment for these projects at reasonable terms, using a minimal amount of public capital and relying – to the maximum extent possible – on private capital.

Germany is financing various project preparation facilities, among these the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF), the C40 Cities Finance Facility and the Programme on Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). These facilities support partner countries in planning and tendering infrastructure projects by integrating high standards of governance, transparency, inclusivity, environmental and

social aspects into the project design. This contributes to the creation of a pipeline of bankable projects and attracts larger investments from the private sector. PIDA has resulted in the development of various tools and instruments of implementation, such as the Service Delivery Mechanism (SDM), the PIDA Quality Label and the Quick Check Methodology (QCM), as the standard for excellence in early-stage project preparation. Additionally, Germany has further developed the Sustainable Infrastructure Tool Navigator – a platform that allows users to navigate the increasingly complex landscape of sustainability instruments and standards for infrastructure development. Moreover, the CONNEX Support Unit, a G7 initiative funded by Germany and the European Union, provides ad hoc legal and technical advice to governments in negotiating investment projects, including in the infrastructure sector.²²

During its G20 presidency in 2019, **Japan** took a leadership role in formulating and endorsing the “G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment” which includes key elements such as openness, transparency, and economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost and debt sustainability. Japan has been promoting these Principles in multinational forums including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN-Japan Summit, and ASEAN Plus Three Summit (APT). Japan has also been cooperating with the UN and the OECD to promote and implement quality infrastructure investment. For instance, Japan co-hosted the UN General Assembly High-Level Side Event “Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment” in 2017 and 2018, and supported OECD in compiling the OECD Compendium of Policy Good Practices for Quality Infrastructure Investment, which was welcomed in 2020 in the OECD Ministerial Council Statement.²³

The **UK** provided world-class technical support to partner countries – governments as well as private-sector organisations – to plan, regulate and deliver infrastructure that complies with the Ise-Shima

Principles. A few of the many examples include supporting:

- the government of Nepal to finance and deliver quality infrastructure that unlocked USD 1.2 billion of investment in a major hydropower project that will almost double Nepal’s generation capacity, displacing fossil fuels,
- the government of Kenya to transform 425 acres of Nairobi City Centre into a new multi-modal transportation hub. The UK will also look to apply green standards to improve urban sustainability and, together with the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), to help Kenya’s PPP Unit deliver green and sustainable infrastructure projects,
- the governments of Uganda and Zambia to enable public and private investment in quality urban development and infrastructure.

The **UK** also had a key role in supporting Multilateral Banks to better align their operations to the Ise-Shima Principles. Some examples are the African Development Bank (ADB), which adopted a new energy policy, higher finance targets and an increase in support for climate-change, nature and quality infrastructure. The UK and likeminded countries have also pressured seven multilateral development banks into aligning themselves with the Paris Agreement, building up to the COP26.²⁴ Furthermore, the UK supported the private sector to finance more high-quality infrastructure projects, for example through an innovative programme that works with the financial services industry to develop listed products on the London Stock Exchange and other major stock exchanges. The first set of products resulted in the first listing of an investment trust fund exclusively focused on emerging-market renewable energy. In addition, UK Export Finance, UK’s Export Credit Agency, is no longer providing support for the fossil fuel energy sector and is committed to net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 across its portfolio and operations.

The **US** has promoted quality infrastructure and supported efforts to raise standards in infrastructure development. The US Trade and Development Agency’s Global Procurement Initiative has educated public officials in emerging markets on how to establish procurement practices and policies that integrate life-cycle cost analysis and best value determination in a fair, transparent manner. The US, along with partners Australia and Japan, continues to work towards operationalising the Blue Dot Network certification methodology

and assessment framework for quality infrastructure projects. USAID continues to promote quality infrastructure through its programmes such as the Asia’s Linear Infrastructure SafeGuarding Nature (ALIGN) project, which seeks to enhance the development and implementation of safeguards that will ameliorate adverse natural resource impacts from rapidly expanding linear infrastructure development in Asia, targeting the transportation and energy-related infrastructure with an emphasis on capacity building.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2016	1. G7 members’ effort to promote Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) at the project level, striving to align their own infrastructure investment with the G7 Ise-Shima Principles. (In particular, G7 members’ experiences and best practices which provide characteristics of the infrastructure projects/programs conducted and are in line with the elements listed in the G7 Ise-Shima Principles).	Self-reporting
	2. G7’s effort to encourage the relevant stakeholders (governments, international organizations, including multilateral development banks (MDBs), and the private sector, such as in PPP projects) to align their infrastructure investment and assistance with the Ise-Shima Principles (Support, adoption or reference of, as well as actions on the elements of the Ise-Shima Principles by relevant stakeholders).	Documents of other international fora supporting the elements of the G7 Ise-Shima Principles

Commitment 7

Responsible global supply chains

“We will strive for better application of internationally recognized labour, social and environmental standards, principles and commitments ..., increase our support to help SMEs develop a common understanding of due diligence and responsible supply chain management ..., strengthen multi-stakeholder initiatives in our countries and in partner countries ..., support partner countries in taking advantage of responsible global supply chains. We also commit to strengthening mechanisms for providing access to remedies including the National Contact Points (NCPs) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ...”

Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 6

“We commit to striving for better application and promotion of internationally recognized social, labor, safety, tax cooperation and environmental standards throughout the global economy and its supply chains.”

Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 22

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

Today, a large portion of the products we use and consume in our everyday lives are grown, produced, and assembled in other countries. In our globalised world, goods move along global supply chains, passing through many hands and companies and often crossing numerous borders before reaching their final destination. Global trade has enabled unprecedented specialisation. At the same time, it has allowed commercial agents to benefit from regulatory arbitrage and exploit weak or insufficiently imposed labour, social and environmental protection laws in the countries where they or their suppliers are producing.

The G7 countries are amongst the largest economies in the world, and subsequently are responsible for a major part of global trade and consumption. Furthermore, they are home to the headquarters of many of the world's largest companies and corporations. As such, the G7 members have recognised their responsibility to contribute to the creation of responsible global supply chains. At the Elmau Summit in 2015 and the Taormina Summit in 2017, G7 leaders committed to support Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in developing a common understanding of due diligence and responsible supply chain management, to

strengthen multi-stakeholder initiatives working on the issue, and to support partner countries in taking advantage of responsible global supply chains. Further, the G7 committed to strengthen mechanisms for providing access to remedies including the National Contact Points (NCPs) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise, and, ultimately, to strive for a better application and promotion of internationally recognised social, labour, safety, tax cooperation and environmental standards throughout global supply chains.

G7 support to multi-stakeholder initiatives

G7 members have supported multi-stakeholder initiatives with the aim of creating responsible global supply chains in numerous ways. **Canada**, for instance, has been active in promoting sustainability in mining and mineral supply chains by endorsing and encouraging development partners and Canadian natural resource companies to follow due diligence guidelines.²⁵ Further, Canada has supported the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF), and worked with stakeholders on the issue of conflict-free rough diamonds.²⁶ **Germany** supports and funds numerous MSIs in a variety of supply chains. Prominent examples are the Partnership for Sustainable Textiles, the German Initiative on Sustainable Cocoa (GISCO), the European Partnership for Responsible Minerals (EPRM), the Initiative on Sustainable Agricultural Supply Chains, and several other agricultural supply chain initiatives. Furthermore, Germany has established the Partnerships2030 programme, which offers advice, support and training to MSIs to facilitate and strengthen effective and efficient cooperation among public, private and civil-society stakeholders (approx. EUR 3.5 million for 3 years). Further, in 2021 the G7 launched the G7 Sustainable Supply Chain Initiative under the **UK** Presidency, a new commitment by 22 leading food and agriculture companies headquartered in G7 countries to take action to improve the environmental and social impact of their supply chains and business operations.

G7 support to partner countries

G7 members have also worked with partner countries to create more socially and environmentally just and responsible supply chains. **Canada** includes comprehensive and enforceable labour obligations in its free trade agreements, including on child and forced labour, and provides technical assistance, to the extent possible, to support partner countries in respecting these labour protections.

France, for instance, through AFD Group, supports the structuring of integrated production chains, which favour the use of local resources and whose social and environmental externalities are as positive or neutral as possible. The sustainable value chain approach is also a central theme of France's Trade Capacity Building Programme (PRCC).²⁷

Germany supports, for example, the DRC in certifying, formalising and strengthening control of artisanal and small-scale mining to establish responsible supply chains, prevent conflict financing, and introduce social and environmental standards. At the regional level, Germany supports and advises the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and several member states in the implementation of the Regional Certification Mechanism (EUR 18 million). In the agricultural sector, Germany is implementing a global project on sustainable agricultural supply chains, supporting 11 countries (EUR 26.8 million in 2021). Here, living income, fight against child labour and deforestation-free value chains are key. In the textiles sector, Germany supports several initiatives, including the regional project FABRIC, which supports governments and private sector actors in Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Pakistan, and Vietnam in implementing labour and social standards, and in improving environmental and resource management (approx. EUR 21.8 million).

Japan, through JICA, implemented several technical cooperation projects that aim to develop food

value chains in the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Papua New Guinea, and it provided training programs to understand the process from food production to consumption in Japan.

The **UK** contributed to enhancing the economic empowerment of women in global supply chains through the Work and Opportunities for Women (WOW) programme. The UK also provided over GBP 6 million (2018–2021) to the Commonwealth Standards Network to help Commonwealth Countries meet and use international standards to enhance trade.²⁸

G7 support to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs)

In 2022, **Canada** launched a new 5-year responsible business conduct strategy that sets priorities for the government of Canada, through the Trade Commissioner Service and partners, to help Canadian companies abroad to: adopt world leading responsible business practices, help them gain a competitive advantage, mitigate risks, and contribute to a strong and inclusive economic recovery. The new Strategy applies to all Canadian companies active abroad, but places specific emphasis on SMEs. Canada also supports SMEs through its Trade Commissioner Service, which regularly advises Canadian exporters on Canada's RBC expectations (including the importance of conducting thorough supply chain due diligence) and can recommend service providers and tools to support them.

France's development agency AFD and its subsidiary Proparco are working with companies and SMEs to improve their supply chain responsibly, including through technical assistance projects. For instance, Proparco supported a Cambodian rice exporter in establishing of a responsible contractual relationship with a network of smallholders.²⁹ Responsible supply chain management is also a focus of the Moringa fund³⁰ that France has supported through the FISEA+ investment facility.³¹

Germany supports companies, including SMEs with regard to their human rights due diligence requirements via the Helpdesk on Business & Human Rights³² (since 2017) and the Initiative Global Solidarity (2021).³³ Germany also supported the establishment of the ESG First Fund (EUR 50 million), which is focused on strengthening the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)³⁴ practice of businesses in Africa and Asia. Additional support to SMEs has been provided in specific sectors. In 2019, Germany launched the Green button – a government-run certification label for sustainable textiles, which includes a set of due diligence requirements based on the UN Guiding Principles and the OECD sector guidance.³⁵ The Government also conducts dialogues with sectors that are facing specific human rights risks, e.g. with the automotive sector, in order to support the implementation of due diligence procedures.

Japan contributes to many supply-chain-related projects through the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), which facilitates capacity building for forestry stakeholders/small business owners on the requirements for implementing legal and sustainable supply chains for forestry products in countries in the Congo Basin, as well as helping to build capacity to develop and deploy timber tracking to help reduce illegal logging and trade, especially in regions like Central/Latin America. During the reporting period of 2019–2021, Japan funded about USD 2.7 million to supply chain-related projects in ITTO.³⁶ Further, the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency together with 9 local branches of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) conducted seminars for SMEs in order to raise awareness of human rights due diligence.

The **UK** supports SMEs through export promotion projects, which include environmental and climate mainstreaming, whereby businesses are coached on value chain sustainability, local sourcing, product traceability, environmental issues and fair trade.³⁷ The SheTrades Commonwealth project

(GBP 11.8 million), which connects Women Owned Businesses and SMEs to large corporations as suppliers, helped the private sector move towards more sustainable and inclusive supply chains.³⁸ Further, the UK supported the implementation of Trade4MSMEs (Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises), which helps MSMEs in developing and developed countries find trade-related information, including on due diligence, and improve their abilities to trade internationally.³⁹

G7 actions to strengthen National Contact Points for OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises

Governments adhering to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises⁴⁰ are required to install National Contact Points (NCPs), whose role includes furthering the effectiveness of the Guidelines (including related due diligence guidance) and assisting in the resolution of issues that may arise in their implementation.⁴¹ The NCPs of **Canada**, **Germany** and the **UK** have participated in peer reviews since 2017. In 2017, the German NCP concluded its own peer review, resulting in a general strengthening of the NCP mandate and several improvements regarding its structure and operations. In March 2022, the UK and German NCPs took part in the peer review of the Brazil NCP. This was an opportunity to exchange best practices and to learn from each other. Additionally, the UK NCP regularly engages with the US, German, and French NCPs on a 1-to-1 basis. This takes the form of ad-hoc informal discussions about key NCP matters. Since 2017, the German NCP also participated in and hosted several peer learning events. The German NCP has also regularly engages with other NCPs on key NCP matters.

G7 actions to promote and apply internationally recognised labour rights and environmental standards throughout global supply chains

Canada participates in several Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and provides funding to enable their implementation. This includes

funding for: the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which supports developing countries in meeting their obligations towards several MEAs; the Minamata, Stockholm, Basel, and Rotterdam Conventions (on mercury, POPs, and chemical life cycles, respectively); and the Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances. Canada implements its MEA obligations through various legislative authorities, regulations, programs and other activities. In addition, on 1 July 2020, Canada amended its Customs Tariff to prohibit the importation of goods that have been mined, manufactured or produced in whole or in part by forced labour. To further its engagement with the ILO, Canada has taken action to strengthen and increase its national compliance with the ILO's Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (FPRW). For instance, Canada has ratified all the FPRW binding conventions, which include freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Canada also funds capacity building projects in a number of partner countries, including in the garment sector through the ILO Better Work Program, to foster greater compliance with internationally recognized labour rights and principles. Finally, as a titular government member, Canada will be actively participating in the upcoming ILO Tripartite Working Group meetings, which are expected to establish building blocks for an ILO strategy on addressing decent work in supply chains

Germany has also ratified several MEAs, including the Stockholm Convention, the Basel Convention and the Minamata Convention. In 2021, the German parliament adopted the Supply Chain Due Diligence Act, which requires in-scope companies to respect human rights in their supply chains, including internationally recognised labour rights. In addition, Germany supports a variety of activities to promote respect for internationally recognised labour rights globally. An example is the ILO Vision

Zero Fund (VZF), which aims at preventing severe and fatal work-related accidents, injuries and diseases in global supply chains. Further, Germany funds the ILO Better Work Programme (2017–2022), which aims to improve compliance with social and labour standards in the textile and garment sector in partner countries, and supports the ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour.

Japan contributes to development cooperation projects that target workers in the lowest tiers of

the global supply chains by funding ILO/Japan multi-bilateral development cooperation. This includes projects that help the governments improve decent work deficits for workers in South Asia and strengthen the education and training systems to eliminate child labour in ASEAN countries. Japan also supports a UNDP project to promote responsible business conduct across 17 countries, which will guide companies to carry out human rights due diligence and help target countries develop policies to tackle business-related human rights abuses.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. Support offered to multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) in G7 countries and in partner countries (separately counted), participants and wider geographical reach of MSI.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD • ILO • World Bank reports • Self-reporting
	2. Funding or other support to partner countries in taking advantage of responsible global supply chains.	
	3. Funding or other support to SMEs to understand due diligence and responsible supply chain management.	
	4. Number of offers to host and/or attend voluntary G7 NCP peer reviews among all NCPs.	
	5. Number of G7 NCP peer learning activities.	
2017	6. Implementation of obligations under Multilateral Environmental Agreements to which each G7 country is a party, and from which it has not expressed its intention to withdraw.	
	7. Increase in national compliance with and promoting respect for internationally recognized labor rights, as described in the International Labour Organization (ILO) 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.	

Commitment 8

Digital transformation in Africa

“We collectively endeavor to provide strong support to bridge the digital divide and promote digital transformation in Africa in line with our national commitments. (...) Our common strategy for Africa will be based on the following objectives:

- (i) Enabling the necessary digital infrastructure in order to reduce the digital gap and inequality, including in isolated countries and regions that are excluded or underserved, and encouraging the transport and logistics activities that serve e-commerce and e-government on a regional basis (...).
- (ii) Developing digital literacy and skills, particularly in the field of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), in order to equip young people, especially young women and girls, with the skills necessary to take advantage of the growth and prosperity promised by the digital economy, whilst protecting against online risks and harms, and promoting inclusion, notably for women.
- (iii) Fostering digital transformation for growth, entrepreneurship, job creation, and private-sector empowerment, particularly digital start-ups, SMEs and innovative community initiatives, by using digital technologies to provide support.
- (iv) Expanding new solutions offered by digitalisation across other sectors, such as health, agriculture, energy, e-commerce, electronic payment and governance.
- (v) Creating enabling environments to allow national stakeholders to manage digital risks in coordination with the existing work of international and African organisations.
- (vi) Sharing best practices between G7 and African partners, including experiences about creating legislative and regulatory frameworks, notably regarding data protection.

We also commit to addressing telecommunications security – including 5G security – and to ensuring that the digital transformation benefits all and promotes good governance, environmental sustainability, equitable economic transformation and job creation.”

Biarritz 2019, Biarritz Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership, para. 8; Digital transformation in Africa (Annex of the Biarritz Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership), paras. 4 & 6

SDGs:



Score:



New commitment, no score

The digital transformation offers many opportunities for developing economies. In particular, African economies could benefit from accelerated development. The World Bank states that digital technologies could support African nations in providing work opportunities for the rapidly growing youth population on the continent. However, many people still lack access to the internet and digital skills in several African countries. This, along with inadequate skills-development resources and finances, hinders innovation and job creation. African governments need to invest more strategically and systematically, develop their digital infrastructure and enable corresponding services and investments. With such investments, African countries could foster innovation and entrepreneurship and empower African youth.⁴² Nevertheless, the suggested investments would need to equally benefit households and individuals from all parts of society to ensure that the poor and vulnerable do not fall further behind.

During the 2019 Biarritz Summit, the G7 identified the digital transformation as a potential game-changer for the African continent and an opportunity to boost inclusive economic growth, industrialisation, and poverty alleviation.⁴³ To support Africa with its digital transformation, G7 partners committed to monitor their bilateral ODA spending on communication and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the digital sector in Africa. Furthermore, the G7 tracks developments in mobile-broadband subscriptions and the number of African students graduating with degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). Lastly, the G7 partners report on best practices and experiences on promoting digital infrastructure in coordination with international and African organisations.

Access to the mobile internet in Africa

According to the ITU, Africa's active mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants experienced a progressive increase from 79.6 per 100 inhabitants in 2019 to 82.3 per 100 inhabitants in 2020.⁴⁴ In


Sub-Saharan Africa, there are significant differences in internet access between men and women, as women are 37% less likely to use mobile internet. Even though coverage has increased substantially since 2014, half of the population does not have access to a 4G network. Lack of affordability limits access to internet even in areas where there is coverage. Additionally, limited digital literacy and skills create a usage gap in areas with coverage.⁴⁵

G7 ODA contributions in the communication sector and foreign direct investment (FDI)

In the baseline year 2019, the G7 provided African countries with USD 37.4 million to improve the region's communication sector. The EU made the largest investments in each of the sub-sectors except Radio, Television and Print Media, which Japan led (Figure 6). Overall FDI declined by USD 7.4 billion between 2019 and 2020.⁴⁶ In terms of FDI, businesses from France and the United Kingdom invested the most funds in Africa, with USD 5,479 million and USD 5,115 million in 2019, respectively. Germany and Italy followed with investments of USD 1,417 million and USD 1,540 million each. For Japan and the United States, FDI is negative, which could result from loans that businesses in African countries provide to their parent companies. The 2021 Africa Attractiveness Report found that investments in financial technology businesses like digital payment systems plummeted in 2020 due to pandemic-related uncertainties. Many people living in Africa do not have a bank account and are excluded from the banking system, creating the potential for future investments.

Students graduating from STEM programmes in Africa and G7 engagement

To use Africa's digital potential, the continent requires investing in and fostering local and regional professionals in STEM topics that can lead the digital transformation. To ensure that this digital transformation is equitable and rights-respecting, STEM curricula must be grounded in ethics and rooted in interdisciplinary partnerships

Figure 6: G7 ODA contributions to the communication sector by sub-sector in Africa in 2019

Source: Own compilation with OECD CSR GE data (22010, 22020, 22030 and 22040)

that enhance understanding of the broader social and political impacts of technologists' work. According to Times Higher Education and the United Nations Scientific, Cultural and Educational Organization, 47% of African STEM graduates are women.⁴⁷

The G7 partners implemented development projects to support African countries with increasing graduation rates from STEM programmes. **Canada** supported the African Institute for Mathematical Sciences, a pan-African network of Centres of Excellence for postgraduate education, research and public engagement in mathematical sciences. **France's** development agency supported the implementation of the education sector plan in Benin by strengthening teachers' capacities in science teaching to improve access and retention of learners, especially girls. With its bilateral #eSkills4Girls projects, **Germany** provided technical training in nine countries. For instance, the WeCode programming academy in Rwanda offered young women prospects in the IT sector. **Italy** aimed to increase the percentage of young women and girls graduating from STEM in Africa. For instance, its "Coding Girls – Tackling the Gender

and Geographic Divide in the ICT Sector in Mozambique" initiative improved the professional opportunities of girls and young women. In Senegal, Ethiopia and Mozambique, **Japan** supported children, particularly girls and children in vulnerable situations at the primary level, in acquiring basic mathematics skills. With the Ghana Ministry of Education and other collaborating organisations and universities, the **UK** has supported the OpenSTEM Africa initiative to improve participation in STEM subjects, particularly among girls. The **US** development agency supported the Apatseni Mwai Atsikana Aphunzire programme in Malawi, which provides targeted support to adolescent girls and young women in upper primary and secondary school. The programme built eleven schools, including science classrooms and lab kits.

Collaboration between the G7 and African partners to promote digital infrastructures

To improve the overall access to the internet and help African countries build a reliable network, the G7 supported governments with several projects and programmes.

As 2022 Chair of the Freedom Online Coalition, **Canada** aims to advance digital inclusion. The effort includes four pillars: connectivity, digital literacy, civic participation, and safety of online systems. With the Coalition, Canada aims to improve regional dialogue through workshops and learning calls, advancing human rights online and overcoming digital divides.

In 2021, **France** supported a working group of the Smart Africa NGO that formulates recommendations on harmonising data frameworks for member countries and the African Union. In addition, France joined the African Union-European Union D4D Hub project with Belgium, Germany, Estonia and Luxembourg. The programme offers a comprehensive package of services, products and activities to create an enabling environment for digital actors in Africa and Europe. The effort includes knowledge sharing on best practices and lessons learned as well as needs-based technical assistance.

Germany promoted cooperation with the private sector on digital transformation in Africa via the Make-IT programme, which supported digital innovation ecosystems and fostered an inclusive and sustainable digital transformation worldwide. Moreover, the German co-innovation network connected international tech companies, associations, research institutions and civil society. A practical example for these activities is the development partnership with Orange through which physical training hubs (“Orange Digital Center”) are created in 13 African countries to train 20,000 young people on digital skills for employment and entrepreneurship, with a special focus on women.

Italy provided an increased number of scholarships through the Partnership for Knowledge, a higher education initiative of the Italian development cooperation. Between 2019 and 2022, the programme offered around 90 Master of Science scholarships and PhD fellowships in several academic fields, collaborating with Italian universities. Participants conduct research in four areas,

including sustainable energy, environment and industrial innovation.

For human resource development in science and technology in Africa, **Japan** implemented technical cooperation in university education, research and management. For example, Japan supported the Egypt-Japan University of Science and Technology (E-JUST). Established in 2010, E-JUST conferred 242 PhD and 121 Master of Science degrees to graduate students. Today, E-JUST accommodates African students and stresses the importance of female education to acquire higher degrees. The percentage of female students in undergraduate education is 31%, and that of postgraduate programmes is 38%. Moreover, Japan also supported the Pan African University Institute for Basic Sciences, Technology and Innovation through the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) to strengthen the scientific and technological foundation in Africa.

Since 2019, the **UK** Digital Access Programme (DAP) has been promoting digital development in Africa, focusing on Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa and directly reaching more than 2.3 million people through sustainable and replicable digital inclusion initiatives in 2021.⁴⁸ The UK supported partner countries through technical assistance and capacity building for policy and regulatory frameworks, fostering innovative and scalable technology and business models for inclusive connectivity. Examples included support for the development regulations of rural connectivity solutions and capacity strengthening of community networks. The programme also supported digital skills development, cybersecurity capacity building and digital innovations for local development challenges. The DAP enabled the development of 18 national digital transformation plans, policies, strategies and regulations in Africa, including the National ICT plan, the TV White Space regulation for last-mile connectivity and shared spectrum framework in Kenya, and the Nigeria National Broadband Plan.⁴⁹

The **US**’ Prosper Africa programme supported priority sectors such as digital connectivity. For instance, Prosper analysed the connectivity value chain on the continent, identifying infrastructure and policy priorities to expand access. Moreover, Prosper Africa promoted investments and facilitated transactions across the digital sector, including supporting private companies’ efforts to raise equity capital through the Prosper Africa Deal Room. Additionally, USAID has provided technical assistance and capacity building to help African governments establish ICT policy and telecommunication regulatory frameworks to enable an inclusive digital economy that advances democratic values. The Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership, comprising ten US agencies, promotes an open, interoperable, secure and reliable internet for all. The partnership provided technical assistance to government officials, emerging leaders and other stakeholders in over 40 countries.

Founded by Germany, France, Belgium and Estonia, the African European Digital Innovation Bridge is an **EU** flagship project that aims to connect and promote the innovation ecosystems of Africa and Europe. The German development ministry currently coordinates an expansion of the initiative through the Digital Innovation Hubs and its 16 Digital Transformation Centres, other bilateral projects, and European partners. In collaboration with the African Union (AU) and the International Communication Union (ITU), the EU’s PRIDA initiative aims to create a harmonised and enabling policy, legal and regulatory framework, using ICT for social and economic development. PRIDA supports the implementation of the Digital Transformation Strategy (DTS) for Africa (2020–2030) by creating the sectoral DTS for the agriculture, health and education sectors.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2019	1. Part of the G7 bilateral ODA disbursed on communications dedicated to Africa (volume and percentage).	OECD CRS (purpose code 220 for communications)
	2. G7 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the digital sector in Africa.	Africa Attractiveness report, World Investment Report (UNCTAD)
	3. African’s score of A- active mobile-broadband subscription/100 inhabitants in Africa and B- households with internet access at home.	ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database
	4. Percentage in Africa of students graduating from STEM disaggregated by sex, in accordance with SDG indicator 4.4.2 methodology	The Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum)
	5. Best practices and experiences between G7 and African partners on promoting digital infrastructure, fostering telecom innovation, securing advanced communication network, and creating legislative and regulatory frameworks for personal data protection, in coordination with the existing work of international and African organisations	Self-reporting

Case Study 2: Collective

Digital transformation in Africa



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As the G7 leaders recognized at the Biarritz Summit in 2019, digital transformation “could be a game changer for the African continent”, presenting an opportunity to strengthen economic growth and industrialisation, drive innovation and job creation and, critically, close the digital gap and reduce related inequalities. Although the internet gender gap has been narrowing in many global regions, between 2013 and 2019, in Africa, the gender gap was increasing as most new Internet users since 2013 were men.⁵⁰

G7 countries have been strongly engaging on digital development, the strengthening of digital innovation ecosystems, and enhancement of the required enabling environments in Africa through bi- and multilateral efforts, such as the UK’s Digital Access Programme (DAP), the Germany-led “Make-IT” initiative, the US initiative “Prosper Africa”, the Canada-funded Artificial Intelligence for Development in Africa (AI4D Africa) programme, and the “Digital for Development” project (D4D Hub) initiated by the African Union and the EU.

Africa’s **path to an equitable digital transformation includes a trustworthy, open and sustainable digital public infrastructure**. Such infrastructure helps countries to gain and maintain digital sovereignty and provide good digital services to citizens. The European Commission cooperates with its African partners on digital connectivity with the “Global Partnerships Initiative”. It supports an accelerated expansion of secure digital infrastructures and the development of an inclusive, people-centred, and sustainable digital and data economy.

All G7 members are active members of the **Freedom Online Coalition (FOC)**, a group of governments deeply committed to the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. Resting on the four pillars of connectivity, digital literacy, civic participation and safety of online systems, Canada as 2022 FOC Chair continues to advance FOC’s agenda of digital inclusion, with the priorities of strengthening human rights online and bridging digital divides.

One component of a comprehensive approach towards a digital transformation for everyone are digital public goods. Digital public goods have been defined by the UN Secretary-General as a key tool for a people-centred, digital transformation in development cooperation to achieve the SDGs. Digital public goods open the possibility of a human-centred approach to technology based on democratic values.

Initiated by the Government of Norway and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and based on the guidelines of the Digital Roadmap as well as the UN report “The age of digital interdependence”, the **Digital Public Goods Alliance (DPGA) was established in December 2019**. The Germany-supported DPGA is a multi-stakeholder initiative united around a common vision, strategic objectives, definition, and standards for digital public goods. In December 2021, the US announced at the “Summit for Democracy” the start of the process to develop a **Charter for Digital Public Goods**. Germany, the UK and US are (co-) initiators of this initiative, alongside other bilateral donors as well as UN agencies and foundations. So far **four G7 countries** (France, Germany, the UK and US) are part of the charter process. The process is facilitated by the Digital Impact Alliance, hosted by the UN Foundation. In addition to a common vision, a multitude of commitments are to be achieved and consistently communicated throughout 2022.

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3. Health

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated once again that health is crucial for individual human flourishing and that health-related issues fundamentally affect our societies and economies, with a disproportionate burden on women, vulnerable and underrepresented populations, as well as on workers in the informal economy. Even before the pandemic, though, millions of people suffered from an inadequate standard of living and were unable to realise their human right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. Health, defined in the broadest sense as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity,¹ has been out of reach for many people worldwide. In addition, the pandemic revealed and exacerbated health gaps and inequities across the globe.

Until 2019, many global indicators on health issues were moving in the right direction. For instance, the under-5 mortality rate was halved from 2000 to 2019; the incidence of many communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis, malaria, HIV/AIDS and polio, declined; and progress was made in reducing mortality from many non-communicable diseases. However, improvements were in most cases not substantial enough for the world to meet the targets of SDG 3 on Good Health and Well-Being by 2030.²

Many positive trends have been halted or reversed over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. Life expectancy, for instance, seems to have significantly declined.³ Overall, the pandemic has been associated with a substantial direct disease burden from COVID-19 infection, causing millions of deaths globally. Furthermore, disruptions to health

services such as maternal, newborn and child health services, routine immunisations, and communicable and non-communicable disease services,⁴ along with the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic, have led to significant excess mortality.⁵ The pandemic has aggravated underlying inequities and inequalities affecting health, with a disproportionate impact on people who are marginalised or in vulnerable situations, such as persons with disabilities, the elderly, the poor, refugees and migrants.⁶ Also, the pandemic had disproportionate and dramatic consequences on the health and well-being of billions of women and girls, including through a renewed increase in gender-based violence and disruptions of sexual and reproductive health services. As such, the pandemic put at risk 20 years of progress in achieving gender equality and reducing gender-based inequality and discrimination.

Acknowledging the importance of health policy, the G7 members have made several health-related commitments. Due to the timely nature of the topic, last year's G7 Carbis Bay Progress Report focused exclusively on Commitment 9 on Universal Health Coverage and Commitment 10 on Preventing and Responding to Future Outbreaks of Public Health Emergencies. This year's report will take up all 12 G7 development or development-related health commitments whose implementation is currently monitored by the G7. Besides directly addressing the COVID-19 pandemic (Commitment 20 on the Delivery of Vaccine Doses), these commitments also address other critical health issues, such as the eradication of HIV/AIDS and polio, the replenishing of the Global Fund, neglected tropical diseases, and antimicrobial resistances.

Commitment 9

Attaining Universal Health Coverage (UHC) with strong health systems and better preparedness for public health emergencies

“We are therefore strongly committed to continuing our engagement in this field with a specific focus on strengthening health systems through bilateral programmes and multi-lateral structures. We are also committed to support country-led HSS in collaboration with relevant partners including the WHO ... We place particular emphasis on addressing the links between health crises and wider social determinants of health such as poverty and structural inequalities and leaving no one behind by advancing the achievement of Universal Health Coverage.”

“We commit to promote Universal Health Coverage (UHC) ... We emphasise the need for a strengthened international framework to coordinate the efforts and expertise of all relevant stakeholders and various fora/initiatives at the international level, including disease-specific efforts.”

“We ... commit to strengthen(ing) policy making and management capacity for disease prevention and health promotion. We ... commit to ... building a sufficient capacity of motivated and adequately trained health workers ...”

“We place particular emphasis on increasing the resilience of global health systems to deal with outbreaks of emerging and enduring pathogens, including by investing in the health and care workforce worldwide to build capacity and keep health care workers safe, and ensuring fairness, inclusion, and equity, including the empowerment and leadership of women and minorities in the health and care sectors.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p.12

Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, pp.2, 11, 12

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

Universal health coverage (UHC) means that all individuals and communities receive the health services they need without suffering financial hardship. It includes the full spectrum of essential, quality health services, from health promotion to prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and palliative care across the life course. UHC has a crucial role in addressing health needs and inequalities. Target 3.8 of the Agenda 2030 specifically addresses UHC with a focus on improving access to quality essential health services, ensuring financial risk protection and improving access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all. In 2019, WHO estimated that if current trends continued, up to 5 billion people might not be covered by essential health services in 2030. Notably, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed existing challenges in national health systems and disrupted access to essential health services in many countries. Therefore, global efforts to reach SDG 3.8 need to be accelerated further.


During the 2015 Elmau and the 2016 Ise-Shima Summits, the G7 committed to assisting developing

countries and strengthening multilateral structures for UHC. To measure this achievement, the G7 reports on its ODA spending on general health, the positioning of Health System Strengthening (HSS) in strategies and operations of multilateral organisations, support for the International Health Partnership for UHC 2030, and support towards reaching a global target of a minimum of 4.45 health workers per 1,000 people.

G7 ODA spending on general health

The OECD calculates ODA for “general health” as a combination of spending in health policy and administrative management, medical education and training, medical research and medical services. Since the baseline in 2015, the G7 members have increased their ODA spending on general health from USD 0.9 billion to USD 1.7 billion in 2020 (Figure 7). However, the OECD recorded a drop of USD 170 million in overall G7 spending between 2018 and 2019, which was mainly caused by a spending decrease by the US of USD 226 million. Overall, the UK has provided most of the ODA for general health since 2015, totalling USD 3.2 billion.

Figure 7: G7 ODA spending on general health in developing countries in million US Dollar



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (121)

G7 support to position Health System Strengthening (HSS) through multilateral organisations

The G7 continued to support the positioning of HSS in the strategies and operations of several multilateral organisations, such as the Global Fund, Gavi, the WHO, and the Global Financing Facility.

The Global Fund is a Public Private Partnership designed to accelerate the end of the HIV, TB and malaria epidemics. In the current financing cycle (2020–2022) more than USD 4 billion have been mobilised each year to support programmes implemented in more than 100 partner countries, including USD 1 billion a year to support resilient and sustainable systems for health.⁷ In addition, France, the UK and Germany offer technical support in cooperation with the Global Fund to increase country stakeholders' HSS capacities through BACKUP Health and l'initiative. **All G7 countries** actively contributed to the development of the Fund's new strategy (2023–2028), emphasising the importance of strengthening integrated and people-centred systems for health.^{8,9} In the Investment Case for the 7th Replenishment of the Global Fund that will be hosted by the US in 2022, a total of USD 6 billion is being sought for strengthening health systems.

Since 2000, Gavi has improved the access of developing countries to new and under-used vaccines. Gavi's health system and immunisation strengthening (HSIS) framework, launched in 2016, combines all Gavi support streams and ensures long-term grant planning and budgeting predictability.¹⁰ From 2016 to 2020, Gavi dedicated approximately USD 1.42 billion to HSS, and **France** contributed EUR 117 million to this effort.¹¹ **Canada** and other key partners have advocated for ensuring HSS proposals, including budgeted activities to address gender barriers to immunisation and promoting close collaboration with Gavi's HSS activities. **Germany** played an active role in increasing Gavi's engagement and investments in HSS to strengthen the sustainability of program-

matic efforts. With a view to achieving universal health coverage (UHC), **Japan** has pledged USD 300 million between 2021 and 2025 to support Gavi, including its efforts to strengthen HSS and to ensure that interventions are impactful, effectively measured and monitored, clearly targeted, and complementary to others' interventions. The UK contributed GBP 1.44 billion to Gavi between 2016 and 2020 and in 2020 committed a further GBP 1.65 billion to Gavi for 2021–2025. The UK assisted Gavi in shaping and launching its new equity accelerator fund and developing measurable HSS metrics in its strategy. Moreover, UK funding contributed to a Gavi uplift for HSS support in developing countries with USD 500 million between 2021 and 2025. **Italy** contributed EUR 80 million to Gavi between 2019 and 2021. The **EU** has contributed EUR 200 million between 2020 and 2022.

Strengthening Health Systems is a key priority embedded throughout WHO's General Programme of Work, and will be paramount in enabling WHO to succeed in achieving all of its strategic goals on: Universal Health Coverage, Health Emergencies, and Health and Well-being. This prominent position of HSS is further reflected in various WHO initiatives, like the UHC Partnership, UHC2030, the Providing for Health Network (P4H) and the Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-being for All. Between 2015 and 2018, **Canada** provided CAD 7.3 million in earmarked voluntary contributions for WHO's HSS efforts, including data management and capacity building for health workers. In 2020 and 2021, Canada contributed CAD 100 million to the ACT-A Health Systems Connector (HSRC) and CAD 30 million towards strengthening primary health care in the context of COVID-19. **France** also supported WHO action in responding to COVID-19 by financing the Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan and the HSRC with EUR 100 million between 2020 and 2022. **Germany** supported the WHO in HSS at various levels. For instance, it contributed to the global infrastructure, such as the Global Outbreak and Alert Network,

the Tripartite (FAO, WHO, OIE), the Digital Health Division and the UHC Partnership. In 2020 and 2021, Germany contributed EUR 2.2 billion to the ACT Accelerator. Since 2020, the UK has provided up to GBP 813 million to the ACT Accelerator as well as an additional commitment of up to GBP 105 million to help vulnerable countries respond to the Omicron variant. The EU has contributed close to EUR 1 billion to the ACT Accelerator, and EUR 146 million to the UHC Partnership.

In addition, G7 partners provided support to other multilateral organisations for HSS. The Global Financing Facility is focused on achieving good health outcomes for women, children and adolescents through a health system strengthening approach. Since 2015, Canada has played a leadership role in the Global Financing Facility and committed CAD 630 million to the Global Financing Facility towards strengthening country-led, integrated health systems that include SRHR and nutrition as core components. This includes CAD 90 million towards the COVID-19 Essential Health Services grants that support the COVID response while protecting essential health services, including SRHR and nutrition. The US development agency, USAID, is working closely with the Global Financing Facility's Essential Health Grants Initiative, which focuses on health workforce planning and management, including community health workers, as part of an over USD 87 million

investment. The UK has been actively engaged in the development of the Global Financing Facility, including their recent strategy, and has committed GBP 95 million since 2017. In 2020 and 2021, Germany provided 50 million EUR to the Global Financing Facility. In March 2021, the US, through USAID, released a new vision for HSS, which serves as an agency policy for the work with bilateral and multilateral partners. The EU provided EUR 26.5 million to the Global Financing Facility in 2018–2020.

G7 financial and technical contributions to UHC 2030

The International Health Partnership for UHC 2030 (UHC 2030) functions as a global platform to connect and influence national and international health commitments through multiple stakeholder collaboration. Since 2019, UHC 2030 has galvanised political leadership for UHC and helped secure ambitious commitments in the 2019 UN Political Declaration on UHC. Moreover, the secretariat and UHC2030 network advocated for and supported the positioning of UHC and health systems as part of the COVID-19 response and recovery, mobilising diverse partners around the priorities for health systems to achieve UHC and health security. Table 6 summarises the contributions by the European Commission, France, Japan and Germany to UHC 2030 between 2019 and 2022.

Table 6: G7 contributions to UHC 2030 between 2019 and 2022

Partner	Period	Contribution
European Commission	2019–2023	USD 3.9 million
France	2020–2021; 2021–2022	USD 2.1 million; USD 2.1 million
Japan	2019; 2020; 2021	USD 1.0 million; USD 0.8 million; USD 0.7 million
Germany	2018–2019	EUR 1.0 million

Source: UHC 2030 Secretariat

From 2010 to 2020, HSS, in support of UHC, was a pillar of Canada's flagship commitments to Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, with total funding of CAD 6.5 billion. Since 2020, **Canada** has been building on that legacy with a 10-year commitment to global health and rights, with funding to reach CAD 1.4 billion annually in 2023. **France** provided UHC 2030 with a financial contribution of EUR 4 million over the period 2020–2022 (Table 6) and became co-president of the high-income country constituency. **Germany** contributed EUR 1 million for UHC 2030 for the 2018–2019 period; EUR 200,000 of this support was targeted to support preparations for the UN High-Level Meeting on UHC in September 2019, which also received support from **Japan** and the **UK**. Germany also supports several UHC 2030-related Initiatives, like the P4H network to strengthen national health systems in 2021, which received additional funding of EUR 6 million from **France** over the period 2020–2022.¹² In addition, Germany helped UHC2030 by playing a proactive role in the development of the Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-being for all. **Japan** has made financial contributions every year (except for 2017) since its establishment, totalling over USD 6.5 million. Japan has actively contributed to the policy-making and governance of UHC 2030 as a member of the Steering Committee, and co-organised events in international fora. The **UK** has helped to shape the direction of the UHC 2030 Steering Committee and has provided technical feedback on strategic papers. Moreover, UK experts engage in technical working groups linked to UHC2030, including being the donor representatives to the Health Data Collaborative and aligning investments to WHO on HSS and the UHC Partnership through the Multi-Donor Coordination Committee. The **EU** initiated the UHC Partnership programme in 2012 as a way to promote country actions, leading to the implementation of the national plans to implement the SDG 3. In this context, the EU has contributed USD 3.9 million to support the secretariat of the UHC 2030 and

provided EUR 146 million to the UHC Partnership from 2019 to 2022.

G7 support towards 4.45 health workers per 1,000 people worldwide

WHO identifies the health workforce as one of the six important building blocks needed to maintain strong health systems. Hence, SDG 3 on Good Health and Well Being emphasises the importance of increasing the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries. In addition to expanding access to UHC, supporting health workforce development contributes to progress towards achieving SDG 4 (quality education), SDG 5 (gender equality), and SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth).


To address the global shortage of health workers, the G7 is committed to supporting the increase in the density of health workers, aiming globally to achieve the WHO threshold of a minimum of 4.45 health workers per 1,000 people, but with a particular focus on national government leadership.^{13,14} Figure 8 shows that global density increased between 2015 and 2020 from 5.1 to 6.1. However, significant regional differences still exist, leaving African countries with only 1.4 health workers per 1,000 in 2020. Overall, only Europe, the Americas and Western Pacific regions meet the G7's goal, which they already did in 2015.

In Nigeria, **Canada** provided CAD 15 million (2014–2021) to the WHO to strengthen the capacities of midwives, nurses, and community health workers to deliver maternal, new-born and child health services. In Haiti, a CAD 15 million project (2018–2022) with UNFPA seeks to help reduce maternal and neonatal mortality by training midwives at the national midwifery training institute. Between 2015 and 2020, **France** reported an investment of USD 891 million to support increasing a skilled health workforce. In 2020, France and WHO founded the WHO Academy,

which France supported with a grant of USD 100 million and which provides learning opportunities to millions of health workers. In 2021, France launched the Gender Equal Health and Care Workforce Initiative, aiming at increasing visibility, dialogue, and commitment to action on gender equity in the health and care workforce. The initiative has been joined by the **US**. At the international level, the **German** government supports, among other initiatives, the High-Level Commission on Health Employment and Economic Growth and the implementation of the joint action plan of the WHO, ILO and OECD.¹⁵ Since 2016, **Germany** has supported over 362 partnerships between German clinics and health care institutions in 65 low- and middle-income countries through the initiative “Clinic Partnerships – Partners Strengthen Health”. From 2019 to 2021, **Italy** provided approximately EUR 17 million to increase the density of a skilled health workforce. The **Japanese** ODA imple-

menting agency, JICA, has been contributing to enhancing health systems through various cooperation projects mainly in Asia and Africa. Some projects had a particular focus on hospital management, emphasising the quality and safety of hospital services as well as capacity development of the health workforce. The **UK’s** country programmes support multiple elements of health workforce development. For example, in Bangladesh between June 2020 and May 2021, over 1400 licensed midwives have been deployed, enabling over 480 health facilities to provide access maternal and new-born care.¹⁶ The **US** President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief trained 20,000 new health care workers and supported the remuneration of 260,000 additional health workers to deliver HIV services between 2019 and 2020. Furthermore, the US used the initiative’s partner network in 45 countries, supporting 138,358 health workers.

Figure 8: Density of health workers in WHO regions



Source: Own compilation based on G7 Carbis Bay Progress Report 2021

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. Support to Health System Strengthening (HSS) remains at least stable (measured by OECD-DAC CRS 121)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD/DAC data • Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, Global Vaccine Action Plan report • GFATM • WHO WB UHC 2030
2016	2. Enhanced positioning of HSS in strategies and operations of GFATM, Gavi, WHO and other multilateral organisations through G7 members (measured by self-reporting, e.g. based on board meeting protocols)	WHO National Health Workforce Accounts
	3. G7 financial and technical contributions for the establishment and strengthening of the International Health Partnership for UHC 2030 (UHC 2030) and G7 engagement in UHC 2030 activities (measured by collective assessment based on the progress of UHC 2030).	Global Health Observatory Data Repository
	4. G7 financial and technical support towards increasing skilled health workforce (midwives, nurses and physicians) density towards 4.45 health workers per 1000 population.	Self-reporting

Commitment 10

Preventing and responding to future outbreaks

“We commit to preventing future outbreaks from becoming epidemics by assisting countries to implement the World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations (IHR), including through Global Health Security Agenda and its common targets and other multilateral initiatives. In this framework, we will also be mindful of the healthcare needs of migrants and refugees ... We place particular emphasis on improving integration, by strengthening a ‘One Health’ approach across all aspects of pandemic prevention and preparedness.”

“... we call on the international community to support the Contingency Fund for Emergency (CFE) to enable swift initial responses by the WHO ... we welcome the World Bank’s formal announcement of launching the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF), and invite the international community including G7 members to extend technical support and financial contributions to this end ... We place particular emphasis on improving the speed of response by developing global protocols which trigger collective action in the event of a future pandemic. We agree to enhance and further develop medium- and long-term global health financing mechanisms for pandemic preparedness, prevention, detection and response ... We will explore options for building consensus this year [2021], around sustainable global health and health security financing, supported by robust financial reporting, increased and defined accountability, and oversight.”

“We renew our support to a coordinated approach to offer concrete assistance to 76 countries and regions and support to these partners to develop national plans in close coordination with the WHO and other relevant organisations.

... we intend to assist these partners to achieve the common and measurable targets of the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) tool published by the WHO.

We remain committed to advancing compliance with the WHO’s IHR objectives including through the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) ... We place particular emphasis on strengthening transparency and accountability, including reiterating our commitment to the full implementation of, and improved compliance with, the International Health Regulations 2005. This includes investigating, reporting and responding to unknown outbreaks and improving the speed of response by developing global protocols which trigger collective action in the event of a future pandemic.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p.12

Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, pp.10–11

Carbis Bay 2021, Carbis Bay Summit Communiqué, p.16; Carbis Bay Health Declaration, p.2

SDGs:



Score:  Satisfactory

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the devastating effects that a global pandemic unfolds, as a health security threat anywhere can be a health threat everywhere. Due to the world's interconnectedness, infectious diseases can spread enormously quickly from one part of the world to another. Thus, prevention, preparedness and response to infectious disease threats are critical in mitigating risks and protecting people from falling ill. To effectively respond to health emergencies, countries require support in detecting and assessing hazards and data to inform decision-making. Moreover, the coordination of different actors assumes a crucial role in the rapid and effective management of crises.

Multilateral organisations have developed concepts, programmes, and approaches to address this challenge, aiming to improve the capacity of countries' health systems, respond swiftly to threats, finance national health systems and responses, and assess countries' overall preparedness and responsiveness. Examples of these activities include the WHO's International Health Regulations (IHR) and its Contingency Fund for Emergency (CFE), and the World Bank's Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF).

During the Summits at Elmau in 2015, Ise-Shima in 2016 and Carbis Bay in 2021, the G7 committed to supporting 76 countries with implementing the IHR and further providing support to other multilateral assistance initiatives. In particular, the G7 partners decided to contribute to the CFE and PEF as well as support, undergo and share the Joint External Evaluation (JEE), led by WHO, with partners and relevant organisations.

G7 assistance to implement WHO's IHR


The WHO's IHR aim to improve preparedness and responsiveness during health emergencies. The Regulations require all countries to develop capacities, including surveillance systems to detect threats, assess and report potential public health emergencies of international concern, and respond

to risks and crises.¹⁷ During the 2015 Elmau Summit, the G7 pledged support to 76 countries and regions in implementing the IHR by the end of 2020.¹⁸ WHO assesses the implementation of the IHR annually with its State Party Self-Assessment Tool, consisting of 35 indicators that are grouped under 15 IHR capacities.¹⁹ These capacities include surveillance, laboratory capacity and IHR coordination and National IHR Focal Point. WHO scores them according to the annual self-assessment reports of participating countries. In 2021, 75 countries received support from the G7 for this implementation, leaving only Grenada from the initial 76 without G7 engagement.²⁰ Figure 9 shows the progress of 65 G7 focus countries in implementing the IHR between 2018 and 2020.²¹ The majority of the focus countries improved their overall IHR capacity score in the period. The 2020 IHR score data also reveal regional differences within the G7 focus countries implementing the standard. With an average score of 49 out of 100, the African focus countries lag behind other regions, which all have a score over 58. Focus countries in South-East Asia and the Americas get average scores of 68 and 67, respectively.

G7 contributions to global partnership and initiatives


The CFE was created after the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Western Africa and provides a tool for responding immediately to acute health emergencies. More than 50 countries and territories received CFE support, helping them deal with health crises.²² Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the UK provided USD 6.1, 1.7, 83.2, 32.9 and 27.0 million, respectively, to the CEF between 2015 and 2021, totalling USD 150.8 million. The other G7 partners do not provide funding to the initiative.²³ Additionally, Figure 10 shows that the G7 members' contributions accounted for the largest share of the fund's financial resources in almost every year since 2015. Moreover, the figure displays large fluctuations in G7 funding between 2018 and 2021, as contributions ranged between USD 6 and 45 million.

Figure 9: G7 countries focus countries’ progress in strengthening IHR capacities²⁴



Source: Own compilation based on WHO State Party Self-Assessment Tool

Figure 10: G7 contributions to the CFE in million USD



Source: Own compilation based on WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies – Contributions and Allocations

Moreover, some G7 countries supported the World Bank’s PEF initiative, which aims to rapidly mobilise funding for the world’s poorest countries to respond to cross-border and large-scale outbreaks. In 2020, the PEF allocated USD 195.84 million to 64 of the world’s lowest-income countries with reported cases of COVID-19. The PEF officially closed in April 2021. Japan supported the establishment and

implementation of the PEF with USD 50 million. Germany contributed USD 74.1 million to the initiative.

Additionally, G7 members supported other global partnerships and initiatives. The **UK** provided additional support to the WHO’s COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan. France

contributed USD 25 million to the Health Emergencies Programme between 2020 and 2021, including USD 4 million to the WHO Lyon Office. The US also provided funding and technical and policy support to the emergencies programme. In 2021, USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA) provided WHO with a three-year USD 45 million award to continue supporting the initiative through 2024. This also included funding and staff support to the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to help address outbreaks like Ebola and yellow fever as well as after-action reviews. Moreover, WHO established a platform for key standard operating procedures for emergencies and built a cadre of staff and mechanisms to ensure effective supply chain management with USD 35 million assistance from USAID/BHA. Since 2019, the German Robert Koch Institute has hosted the WHO Collaborating Centre for the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. In this capacity, it has contributed to the network's activities, including training and roll-out of IT tools for contact tracing. Italy set up an Emergency Bilateral Fund with WHO; this mechanism allows WHO to rapidly mobilise funds for humanitarian health crises. In addition, Italy supported the dispatch of lifesaving emergency health supplies from the prepositioned stocks at UNHRDs in Brindisi.

G7 assistance to WHO JEE

The WHO Joint External Evaluations (JEE) analyses countries' capacities to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to public health risks, thereby identifying critical gaps. Participating countries write self-evaluation reports that assess national capacities in 19 technical areas. Overall, 115 JEEs were completed as of 2022, with 48 reports coming from countries in the African region.²⁵

Canada has contributed technical expertise to the WHO JEE Roster since 2017. Canadian experts led or participated in WHO external evaluation teams, conducting JEEs in countries around the world. Moreover, Canada voluntarily underwent a JEE in

June 2018 to evaluate its capacity to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to public health threats under the IHR. By undertaking this JEE process, Canada aimed to strengthen its public health systems and capability to contribute to enhanced global health security.

France has deployed French experts to support 16 JEE exercises between 2016 and 2019, including evaluations in Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, Thailand, Guinea-Conakry, Burkina-Faso, Chad, Cameroun, Djibouti, Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. France plans to finance more JEE expert deployments in the near future.

In 2019, **Germany** voluntarily participated in the JEE process for the first time, allowing external experts from other countries to assess its health system. As part of the Global Health Protection Programme, Germany has provided almost EUR 1 million to some of its projects, thereby contributing to the JEE process as well as implementing the IHR. Between 2016 and 2021, the Robert Koch Institute supported JEEs in approximately 20 countries by facilitating subject matter experts to join missions. The Institute also conducted an IHR Summer School in 2017, 2018 and 2019 for participants from selected South-Eastern-European and African countries to facilitate exchange on good practices regarding the preparation and implementation of a JEE.

From 2015 to 2021, the **UK** sent 28 different staff members to participate in 23 JEEs. In Nigeria, the UK's International Health Regulation Strengthening Project country lead also provided technical expertise for a subnational JEE across several states between 2019 and 2021. The UK's Tackling Deadly Diseases in Africa Programme supported WHO AFRO to undertake 20 JEEs in the Africa region. Work under this programme also included more focused support for strengthening IHR compliance in Uganda, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. In 2021, the UK, through

several national institutions, engaged in WHO’s activities to review and strengthen the IHR Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. The UK provided significant senior public health, technical and policy expertise to both of the technical groups to review the JEE and the SPAR tool update, to help them better align and reflect COVID-19 learning as well as sub-national assessments.

A pilot **US** Global Health Security Agenda external assessment and the Global Health Security Agenda “Roadmap” processes evolved into two of the WHO IHR Monitoring and Evaluation Framework tools, the JEE and National Action Plan for Health Security. US agencies have provided financial and technical support to work with countries in advancing progress across seven technical areas consistent with needs identified in the WHO JEE. The US currently works bilaterally with 19 partner countries and is considering expanding its programming. The US Center for Disease Control (CDC) helped fund and provide experts who have taken part in more than 60 JEEs to date, and is working with priority countries to prepare for repeat JEEs. CDC provided support to the JEE

Secretariat to establish hybrid and virtual JEEs as well as 69 technical experts for JEE missions. The agency also coordinated US government contributions and provided technical input in the revision of the JEE. In addition, USAID provided technical experts to three JEE missions. The **US** underwent a JEE in 2016 and, informed by the results, developed the 2018 United States Health Security National Action Plan: Strengthening Implementation of the International Health Regulations.

The **EU** has been providing indirect support to the JEE, through the ongoing *EU-WHO Health Systems Strengthening for Universal Health Coverage Partnership* Programme, which supports 78 countries across Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific regions. The health security component of the Programme (EUR 30 million) aims to strengthen country capacities for health emergencies beyond COVID-19 and to support the implementation of priority actions of all-hazards National Action Plans for Health Security, which are informed by the results of JEEs and IHR M&E Framework assessments.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. G7 assistance to implement WHO IHR. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of countries that have received offers of support (by the G7 or other existing partnerships) for assistance with IHR implementation by end 2020 (with a target of minimum 76 countries). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WHO • World Bank • IHR reporting (every 2 years at WHA) • UNICEF, GPEI, FAO • OIE • Self-reporting
	2. G7 contributions to global partnership and initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE) and Health emergencies Programme to enable better preparedness and swift initial responses by the WHO. • G7 contributions to the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) to extend technical support and financial contributions. 	
	3. G7 assistance to WHO JEE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • G7 financial and technical contributions to support the WHO Joint External Evaluation process 	

Commitment 11

Setting up mechanisms for rapid deployment

“Simultaneously, we will coordinate to fight future epidemics and will set up or strengthen mechanisms for rapid deployment of multidisciplinary teams of experts coordinated through a common platform.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 13

SDGs:



Score:  Good

In case of emergencies, such as natural disasters or epidemics of highly infectious diseases, affected countries often request and receive help from international medical teams. In the past, however, it used to be difficult for receiving countries to evaluate and coordinate such offers, as organisations deployed teams with differing capacities and used different terminologies in classifying them. Therefore, in 2010, the Emergency Medical Teams (EMT) initiative was formed by the WHO to develop common principles, criteria and standards for the deployment of teams of medical experts.²⁶

At the 2015 Elmau Summit, G7 leaders committed to support this process by better coordinating the fight against epidemics, and by setting up or strengthening mechanisms for rapid deployment of multidisciplinary expert teams through a common platform. To track progress on this commitment, the G7 agreed to monitor: 1) the number of EMTs of G7 countries registered with the WHO; 2) contributions by and deployment of health experts by the G7; and 3) the establishment of national protocols and SOPs for the deployment of expert teams.

Progress in global EMT deployment

In the past years, significant progress was made in developing a standardised approach for EMT response. Today, the global EMT community uses a common language, and agreed minimum standards and deployment mechanisms have been established. An example of successful rapid EMT response was the deployment of 18 international EMTs (557 personnel) to the Samoa measles outbreak in 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic has further highlighted the importance and possibilities of the EMT initiative and has led to rapid EMT evolution. In the case of infectious disease outbreaks and other health emergencies, the EMT mechanism is increasingly providing countries with more bespoke support tailored to the individual health environment and needs of the health system. Especially in the African WHO region, the WHO is working on increasing the capacity of its member states for sending and receiving health personnel during a public health emergency as well as supporting the establishment of national EMT teams.

In 2021, the WHO continued to work on setting global standards for EMTs, including an update on

the 2013 Classification and Minimum Standards for EMTs,²⁷ a guidance document on the engagement of EMTs in conflict settings, and standards and recommendations for EMTs on maternal, newborn and child health. Also, technical working groups were formed to develop standards on Highly Infectious Diseases (HID), Medical Evacuation and Spinal Cord Injuries.

Number of EMTs of G7 countries registered with the WHO

As of May 2022, 33 international classified EMTs were registered with the WHO and a further 90 teams were in the process of classification. G7 countries had 4 governmental and 7 NGO-led

EMTs classified by the WHO. France, Italy, Japan and the UK have each registered one governmental EMT. Germany has 5 NGOs, and the US has 2 NGOs with classified EMTs.²⁸

Countries with classified EMTs have been engaged in providing technical expertise for the definition of standards, mentorship for other teams, technical trainings and donations. According to the WHO, formal engagement and support, including financial support, is important to maintain and further increase the capacity to address multi-hazard health emergencies on a regular and consistent basis.

Table 7: WHO registered EMTs by G7 members

Canada	None so far. However, Canada supports the deployment of emergency response units (ERUs) through an partnership with the Canadian Red Cross Society, whose ERU is pursuing an EMT WHO certification under a Red Channel Agreement, with the goal of ensuring standards are in line with the WHO's certified EMT standards.
France	Elément de Sécurité Civile Rapide d'intervention Médicale (ESCRIM).
Germany	NGO-hosted EMTs: Johanniter, Arbeiter Samariter-Bund, Humedica, I.S.A.R. Germany, Malteser International. National Focal Point on EMTs: Robert Koch Institute (RKI). 3 additional EMTs are in the process of receiving WHO classification.
Italy	EMT Regione Piemonte supported by Italian Civil Protection.
Japan	Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR) under the leadership of Ministry of Foreign Affairs with its secretariat at Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
UK	UK Emergency Medical Team (UK-EMT) under the leadership of Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office.
US	NGO-hosted EMTs: Team Rubicon, International Medical Corps.
EU	European Medical Corps capacities available under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) include 6 WHO-verified EMTs registered by UCPM Member states into the European Civil Protection Pool (ECPP) (Norway, Portugal, Poland, Italy, Spain, Turkey). 6 additional Member States EMTs are expected to join the ECPP once their WHO classification is complete (Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Romania).

Source: Own compilation based on WHO data

Contributions by and deployment of health experts by G7 members

Canada has deployed public health experts – including epidemiologists and nurses, as well as emergency management, infection prevention control, border health and logistics experts – to support outbreak responses around the world. For example, between 2015 and 2018, Canada deployed 76 public health experts to assist with Ebola outbreaks in Africa and Bangladesh, and in 2020, Canada deployed 6 public health experts to support COVID-19 response efforts, including to the WHO headquarters in Geneva, the US CDC’s emergency operations centre in Atlanta, and Japan.

France regularly deploys experts to support WHO outbreak responses. Between 2015 and 2019, France deployed experts to Guinea and other sub-regions during both the emergency and post-crisis phases of the West African Ebola outbreak. In 2016, France contributed to the regional response to the Zika virus outbreak. Since 2018, France has deployed experts to the national health security agencies of Guinea and DRC to support the implementation of the Franco-Congolese roadmap for the fight against epidemics.

Germany deployed approximately 170 health experts from German EMTs in response to health crises worldwide between 2019 and March 2022. This included COVID-19 support missions, provision of emergency care, e.g. after the Haiti earthquake in 2021, as well as basic health care in the context of the migrant crisis in Lesbos, Greece, in 2020. Most of these deployments were activated and coordinated through the EMT initiative, with a limited number being initiated based on bilateral requests. The German Robert-Koch Institute (RKI), which is the national focal point for EMT, has supported all EMT deployments and/or led joint EMT deployments of EMT and RKI health experts. As of March 2022, Germany organised 49 deployments through the German Epidemic Preparedness Team (SEEG). Between 2019–2021, SEEG support

has focused on strengthening COVID-19 diagnostic capacities in partner countries requesting support, with 28 deployments of over 100 experts and over 4 million SARS-CoV-2 PCR test kits and other materials.²⁹

Italy has deployed health experts to Mozambique (2019), Armenia, Serbia and Azerbaijan. The deployments were subject to the coordination mechanism established with the Italian Civil Protection, the Italian Red Cross and the EMT2 team of the Region of Piemonte.

Japan deploys health experts through the Japan Disaster Relief (JDR): Expert Team, Medical Team (classified as EMT by the WHO), and Infectious Diseases Response Team (IDRT). IDRT was established in 2015 to extend international emergency assistance to countries affected by infectious disease outbreaks, with five areas of expertise: epidemiology, public health, clinical issues (treatment and infection control), laboratory testing and diagnosis, and logistics. Between 2019–2021, Japan deployed an EMT to Mozambique in 2019 in response to the cyclone damage, together with a team of two experts for EMT Coordination Cells (EMTCC) on promotion of Minimum Data Sets, and IDRT in 2019 to the Independent State of Samoa in response to the measles outbreak, as part of JDR activities.³⁰ In addition, 11 Japanese experts were deployed through GOARN from 2019 to 2021 to Nigeria (Lassa fever), Yemen (cholera outbreak), the Philippines and Papua New Guinea (COVID-19 response), among others.

The **UK** deploys health experts through the UK Public Health Rapid Support Team (UK-PHRST), the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA, previously PHE) rapid response mechanism and the UK Emergency Medical Team (UK-EMT). Between April 2017 and March 2022, the UK-PHRST responded to 26 requests for outbreak response and deployed 79 individuals to 17 countries. Also, UK-PHRST is working with Africa CDC to develop

the African Volunteers Health Corps (AVoHC) for regional response. Deployments of UK-PHRST and UKHSA were mostly through GOARN; others were bilateral or with UK-EMT. UK-EMT deployed experts to Bangladesh (diphtheria outbreak 2017), Samoa (measles outbreak 2019), Mozambique (cyclone 2019), Lebanon (Beirut port explosion 2020), and to Haiti (earthquake 2021). In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, UK-EMT has deployed over 80 experts to 17 countries. In addition, UK-EMT provided remote support on developing COVID-19 rehabilitation care guidance to Lesotho and to the WHO Severe Acute Respiratory Infections Treatment Centres.

The **US** department of Health and Human Services and the CDC deploy the bulk of technical experts to countries. On average, USAID provides USD 800,000 annually to GOARN to deploy health experts to countries to respond to outbreaks and to improve preparedness for future infectious disease threats. USAID's Administrator has further prioritised outbreak response by committing USAID to establishing a new dedicated emergency response unit focused on infectious disease outbreaks that can help countries respond rapidly to pandemic threats. In 2015, CDC established its Global Rapid Response Team (GRRT) to create mechanisms (including SOPs) and a roster of public-health subject-matter experts for rapid and coordinated deployment for public health emergencies and outbreak response. GRRT deploys CDC staff in coordination with host country ministries of health primarily through letters of invitation via CDC Country Office staff (if present) or through communications with the CDC's Global Disease Detection Operations Center (GODOC). CDC GRRT can also deploy staff in coordination with the WHO Health Emergencies Programme or GOARN. Currently, the CDC GRRT roster exceeds 500 personnel and has the capacity to respond within 72 hours of a request for deployment for our GRRT Core Staff and within one week for surge staff.

Deployers from CDC are experts in Epidemiology, Communication, Logistics, Infection Prevention and Control, Laboratory, and Management and Operations.

The **EU** has been providing support to the WHO EMT secretariat. Via the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM), the EU supports the deployment of EMTs both inside and outside the EU. The European Medical Corps gathers certified health-related capacities made available by Member states under the European Civil Protection Pool (including EMTS), as well as capacities under rescEU, to respond to health emergencies. The EU has coordinated and supported the deployment of Member States' EMTs through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism in the past: Mozambique (2019), Samoa (2019), [Italy (2020)], Haiti (2021) and Madagascar (2022). The EU has also mobilised its rescEU medical stockpile on various occasions since 2020. The EU provides specific funding for the upgrade and repair of UCPM Member States' EMTs through dedicated adaptation grants. In parallel, the EU directly funds and supports the WHO EMT Secretariat for the classification of European EMTs. The EU also contributes, through dedicated projects, to the twinning and building up of EMTs in its neighbouring countries (Armenia and Georgia) and the development of specific training packages for EMTs.

Establishment of national protocols and SOPs for the deployment of expert teams

All G7 members except Italy and the EU have established national protocols and SOPs for the deployment of expert teams.

In the case of Germany this is true for both the SEEG and the five WHO-classified EMTs, which are hosted by NGOs. In addition, the national EMT focal point at RKI and the German EMTs are developing processes and procedures for joint response missions. Similarly, the UK has SOPs in

place for both the UK-PHRST and the WHO-registered UK-EMT. In the case of Japan, JDR deployment of both the classified EMT and IDRT are based on the JDR Act (1987), with SOPs in place for the

classified EMT. For the US, since 2015, the CDC has established, implemented, evaluated and refined its SOPs and pre-deployment readiness trainings for rapid deployments of health experts.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. Contributions by and deployment of health experts by G7	Self-reporting
	2. Number of Foreign Medical Teams of G7 countries registered with WHO	WHO
	3. Establishment of national protocols and SOPs for the deployment of expert teams	Self-reporting

Commitment 12

Reforming and strengthening WHO's capacities

“We support the ongoing process to reform and strengthen the WHO’s capacity to prepare for and respond to complex health crises while reaffirming the central role of the WHO for international health security.”

“We commit to take leadership in reinforcing the Global Health Architecture, relying on strengthening existing organizations. ... We ... support the WHO to implement its emergency and wider reforms, including its One WHO approach across the three levels of the Organization, namely its headquarters, regional and country offices, in a timely manner, recognizing its resource needs.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p. 13

Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, p. 10

SDGs:



Score:  *Satisfactory*

The World Health Organization (WHO) is the central international body for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options, providing technical support to countries, and monitoring and assessing health trends. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has once more shown the urgent need for strong and effective global health leadership in our interconnected world. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa in 2014 had revealed serious deficiencies in global epidemic response mechanisms. There have been continuous efforts to reform the WHO and strengthen its capacity to prepare and respond to complex health crises, including administrative, managerial and financial reforms. These efforts were intensified in the aftermath of the Ebola epidemic.

At the G7 Summits in Elmau 2015 and Ise-Shima 2016, G7 leaders committed to support the process of reforming and strengthening the WHO’s crisis response capacity and its ability to take leadership in reinforcing the Global Health Architecture. To follow through on this commitment, the G7 members decided to report on 1) funding to the WHO to strengthen crisis response capacity; 2) the G7’s financial and technical contributions to support the WHO’s reform processes; as well as 3) G7 members’ support of strengthened coordination arrangements between the WHO, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and other relevant partners during global health emergencies.

State of WHO reform and effect of COVID-19 pandemic

In 2017, the WHO set out on a deep-rooted Transformation Agenda, which continues to be implemented in phases, and has shown initial results,³¹ although the emergence of COVID-19 has impacted implementation timelines.

The WHO continues to play a crucial technical, normative and coordinating role in the global COVID-19 pandemic response. However, its initial response in particular came under strong criticism. The pandemic revealed once more that the WHO is legally and financially inadequately equipped to meet the growing expectations towards it.³² The WHO's capacity to coordinate the response to global health challenges continues to be greatly determined by the willingness of its Member States to cooperate and provide the WHO with the necessary resources. Under ACT-A, in which the WHO and other organisations received substantial funding from donors to fight the acute pandemic, the WHO was much better able to exercise its coordinating role, which has included operational support and service delivery in many circumstances.

Recognizing the crucial leadership, convening and coordination role of the WHO in global health, in strengthening multilateral cooperation and in steering the world's preparation and response to public health emergencies, the G7 members have remained committed to strengthening the WHO's role and capacities and supporting its continued reform processes.

Funding the WHO to strengthen crisis response capacity

Improving the way the WHO is financed is essential, if the organisation is going to play its leadership role and fulfil its mandates. Currently, less than 20% of the WHO's core budget is funded through mandatory assessed contributions, while over 80% is funded through voluntary and often heavily earmarked contributions. Unconditional contribu-

tions provide the WHO with flexibility, which is crucial for predictability and long-term strategic planning, as well as increasing its rapid response capacity.³³

Since 2018, **Canada** has contributed CAD 7 million to the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE), which included CAD 2 million in 2021 to support the WHO in responding rapidly and flexibly to global health emergencies. Since 2014, Canada's Weapons Threat Reduction Program has provided approximately CAD 23 million to the WHO to support a broad array of biological security and global health security activities. Currently, this programme is funding two major initiatives with CAD 15 million: First, the establishment of a permanent Biosecurity and Health Security Interface Unit, which WHO can deploy in response to deliberate chemical and biological incidents. Second, the establishment of a WHO Health Science Foresight Secretariat to scout, investigate and reach out to research entities, academia and start-ups regarding activities that have the potential to be misapplied.

France contributes to the WHO with voluntary, core, and earmarked funding. From 2014–2021, it has contributed USD 347 million, of which USD 113 million were contributed in 2020–2021. For the year 2021, France dedicated more than EUR 49 million to the WHO, including EUR 30.52 million of voluntary contributions. These included: 1) EUR 14 million of support for the WHO response plan on COVID-19, including EUR 3 million to the WHO Lyon Office; 2) EUR 5 million of support for the Health Systems Strengthening programme; 3) EUR 2 million of support to WHO's activities relating to the "One Health" approach; and 4) an undesignated contribution to the WHO's general budget of EUR 1 million. A further EUR 1.5 million were dedicated to support the development of the Technology Transfer hub for mRNA vaccines in South Africa. EUR 250,000 were dedicated to the WHO CFE.

Germany increased its overall contribution to the WHO to USD 1.15 billion for the biennium 2020–2021, compared to USD 359 million in 2018–2019. This includes assessed contributions of approximately USD 58 million and voluntary contributions of approximately USD 1.1 billion.³⁴ The voluntary contributions also include USD 886 million to the WHO’s COVID-19 response (including to COVAX). This made Germany the overall top contributor to the WHO for the biennium.³⁵ Germany is one of the key donors to the WHO’s CFE, with a financial contribution of over USD 83.19 million from 2015–2021. In the 2019–2021 period, Germany contributed USD 54.27 million to CFE.³⁶

Italy funded WHO emergency programmes in the humanitarian envelope for a total amount of EUR 21.2 million in the period 2019–2021.

Japan has contributed USD 182 million to the WHO for the biennium 2020–2021, compared to USD 185 million in 2018–2019. This includes assessed contributions of approximately USD 175 million and voluntary contributions of approximately USD 193 million. The voluntary contributions also include USD 60 million to the WHO’s COVID-19 response (including to COVAX). This made Japan the fourth-greatest contributor overall to the WHO for the biennium. Japan also contributed to the WHO’s CFE, with a financial contribution of over USD 47 million from 2016–2021. In the 2019–2021 period, Japan contributed USD 22 million to CFE.

The **UK** is a top donor to the WHO, providing GBP 340 million of fully flexible core funding (2020–2024) to support WHO reform, to address the UK’s global health priorities, and to tackle future pandemics with the aim of enabling the WHO to meet its busy work plan and overcome skew in its budget.³⁷ The UK has also contributed USD 27 million to the WHO CFE from 2015 to 2021.

Between 2016–2020, the **US** provided the WHO with more than USD 1.3 billion in voluntary contributions to support a variety of efforts, including responding to health emergencies and containing the spread of COVID-19. While the US government in 2020 announced its intention to withdraw from the WHO and suspend financial support, this decision has since been reversed by the new administration.

The **EU** has committed EUR 114 million to the UN Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan led by the WHO to boost public health emergency preparedness response work in countries with weak health systems and limited resilience, as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, the Commission allocated EUR 25 million from the European Development Fund (EDF) reserve and EUR 30 million from the ECHO budget to support the WHO in its immediate and short-term response to the coronavirus in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.³⁸

G7 members’ support of the WHO reform processes

The G7 members support WHO reform processes, including through financial and technical contributions.

Canada contributes significant technical expertise and both in-kind and financial resources to the WHO. For instance, in 2021, Canada provided three grants totalling CAD 145 million to the WHO in support of the COVID-19 response and recovery. Canada has been actively engaged in the Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies and the WHO Working Group on Sustainable Financing (WGSF). Throughout WGSF negotiations, Canada championed the development of an implementation plan that will set objectives, milestones and deliverables for increased efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and relevance at WHO, to roll out alongside increases in assessed contributions.

France is part of the Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies (launched in 2021) whose mandate is to prioritise reflection on the desirability of a new international legal instrument and to report on this. France supports the establishment of a legally binding international instrument and the proposed amendment of the International Health Regulations (IHR). France also supports the establishment of a Universal Health and Preparedness Review (UHPR).

Germany has continuously advocated for strengthening the leading, normative, standard-setting and coordinating role of the WHO. As strengthening the WHO also requires a significant increase in sustainable and long-term plannable resources, Germany alongside other member states has been championing calls to significantly increase the assessed contributions by member states to the WHO. Germany has chaired the WHO Working Group on Sustainable Financing since March 2021, which will develop recommendations for considerations by the Executive Board and World Health Assembly in 2022.³⁹ In 2018, Germany contributed EUR 1.9 million to support the WHO reform processes. In 2019–2021, Germany contributed approximately EUR 15 million to strengthening the enabling functions of the WHO.

Japan has been actively engaged in the Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies, which established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB) as well as a focused working group to consider proposed targeted amendments to the IHR. Japan, as a vice-chair of the INB, has been contributing to its mandate to draft and negotiate a WHO convention, agreement or other international instrument on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response. Japan actively participated in the WHO Working Group on Sustainable Financing

between March 2021 and April 2022 and contributed to the discussions on strengthening governance, transparency, accountability, efficiency and compliance of the WHO.

The **UK** provided a core voluntary contribution of GBP 58 million to the WHO over the 2016–2020 period, with an emphasis on driving the WHO reform processes. 50% of the funding was performance-based, meaning that it was only released if the WHO met the key reform targets set out in a Performance Agreement. The UK's Performance Agreement has incentivised the WHO to make tangible progress on key areas of reform, especially on Value for Money and Transparency.

The UK is one of the most important funders of WHO and is a longstanding supporter of WHO development and reform. The UK provides GBP 340 million of fully flexible core funding to WHO (2020–2024), which aims to enable WHO reform, among other goals. Alongside other partners, the UK is actively participating in the WHO Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies, which proposed reforms and a way forward for revisions to International Health Regulations, and the WHO Working Group on Sustainable Financing, which proposes substantive increases in Member States Assessed contributions, better equipping the WHO to tackle future pandemics. The UK is also participating in early conversations on governing-body reforms, including the creation of an Executive Board sub-committee aimed at increasing Board oversight of the WHO's health emergencies work.

The **US** is a major supporter of the WHO Health Emergencies (WHE) Programme and has provided funding and continued technical and policy support in recent years. From 2017–2019, USAID provided USD 35 million to the WHO to strengthen its emergency response capacity, including a

platform for key standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergencies and ensuring effective supply chain management. With an additional USD 3.7 million in 2019, the WHO improved the SOPs, updated training courses, and trained more than 11,600 health care personnel on emergency response procedures. In 2021, USAID provided the WHO with a USD 45 million award to continue supporting the WHE program through 2024.

Since 2014, the EU has supported the Universal Health Coverage partnership programme with EUR 146 million, supplemented by contributions from other partners funding an annual budget of currently USD 75 million. The objectives of this programme were to strengthen the WHO's capacities, to help the WHO facilitate policy dialogue at the country level (in approx. 30 countries in 2014 and 115 countries in 2021), and to support Health System Strengthening in partner countries.

G7 members' support for strengthened coordination arrangements between the WHO and relevant partners in global public health emergencies

Since their commitment in 2016, all G7 members have supported efforts to strengthen coordination between WHO, UNOCHA, and other relevant partners in global public health emergencies.

Canada, for instance, does so through active participation and leadership in executive boards, donor support groups, briefings, and engagement with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. **Italy** supports coordination efforts at the global level and inter-cluster coordination at the field level through participation in technical coordination meetings at the operational level. **Germany** has supported efforts to improve coordination and harmonisation of global health actors at the global and country level, especially through the Global

Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-being for All (GAP). The GAP was established in 2019 in response to a request made by the Heads of Government of Germany, Ghana and Norway, and comprises 13 international organisations from the areas of health and development assistance, who have pledged to join forces to support countries in advancing the implementation of the health-related SDGs.⁴⁰ In addition, the **US** provided USD 2.5 million in 2019–2021 to UNOCHA in support of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Secretariat, which coordinates UN, NGO, and other stakeholders to ensure coherent, effective and strengthened humanitarian action.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2014	1. Funding to WHO to strengthen crisis response capacity (voluntary, core funding and/or earmarked funding) based on assessment of progress of WHO reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WHO, including Performance Measures Framework reports (US) • UN, including UNOCHA, UNICEF and UNHCR and post-Ebola assessment • Self-reporting
	2. G7's financial and technical contributions to support WHO reforms processes.	
	3. Strengthened coordination arrangement	

Commitment 13

Mobilising support for the Global Fund

“Mobilising support for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. We fully support a successful 5th replenishment of the GF.

We reaffirm our commitment to end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and look forward to the success of the 6th replenishment of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.”

St. Petersburg 2006, Fight Against Infectious Diseases, p. 2

Muskoka 2010, Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, para. 15

Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p.12

Biarritz 2019 Sahel Partnership Action Plan, para. 16

SDGs:



Score:  Excellent

Every year millions of people worldwide become infected with diseases that can cause adverse, long-term effects on their well-being. Annually, around 1.5 million people contract HIV, 10 million become infected with tuberculosis, and in 2020, 241 million suffered from a malaria infection. Approximately 2.8 million people die from these diseases each year. All three diseases can be prevented. The health programmes supported by the Global Fund partnership alone have saved 44 million lives. The Global Fund is a partnership designed to accelerate the end of AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) and malaria as epidemics by supporting national programmes to fight these diseases and strengthening health care systems.⁴¹

At four Summits, the G7 committed to mobilising funds for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria.⁴² To track achievements, G7 partners

monitor the growth rate of their support and the financial commitments that members made at the latest replenishment of the Global Fund.

Activities of the Global Fund

Between 2020 and 2022, the Global Fund mobilised more than USD 4 billion each year to support programmes run by national structures in more than 100 partner countries. Investments to strengthen formal health systems and community health networks already comprise nearly one-third of the Global Fund's grants, with over USD 1 billion per year in the current cycle. This also includes funding made available through catalytic investments, which complement country allocations and further contribute to building more resilient and sustainable health systems and advancing cross-cutting objectives. Overall, these investments support countries to build capacities not only to

fight AIDS, TB and malaria, but also to combat COVID-19 and detect and respond to future pandemics.

In response to the devastating impact of COVID-19, the Global Fund launched the COVID-19 Response Mechanism (C19RM) in April 2020 to support countries to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on health programmes that fight AIDS, TB and malaria, reinforce the national response to the pandemic, and initiate urgent improvements in health and community systems. Four of the G7 members provided substantial additional funding to support this effort. The European Commission has provided EUR 50 million to C19RM as of April 2022 and an additional EUR 100 million as of May 2022. As of April 2022, the Global Fund approved USD 4.3 billion to 108 countries and 22 multi-country programmes through C19RM, providing grant support to low- and middle-income countries for COVID-19 tests, treatments (such as medical oxygen), personal protective equipment, and the strengthening of health systems.

G7 Contribution to the Global Fund


The G7 members historically have been significant contributors to the Global Fund and lead members of the Global Fund Board, contributing to the Global Fund's Strategy for 2017–2022 and the recent approval of the 2023–2028 strategy. Their financial contributions accounted for 79% of the organisation's total contributions between 2006 and 2022. Figure 11 displays the contributions by G7 members since 2006, showcasing that the US has been the main donor of the Global Fund since its launch, with France being the second largest donor. Overall, G7 contributions increased by 107% compared to the baseline in 2006. Between 2017 and 2019, the growth rate fell slightly to 71% compared to the previous period. In absolute

numbers, contributions increased substantially from USD 3.6 billion in the first financing cycle (2006–2007) to USD 11.3 billion in the latest cycle (2020–2022).⁴³ During the sixth replenishment in 2019, strong engagement from the G7 led to donors pledging the largest amount ever raised for the Global Fund, with USD 14.0 billion in total for the financing cycle 2020–2022. At the start of 2022, G7 partners contributed USD 7.7 billion of their pledged USD 11.3 billion for the funding period. In addition, some G7 partners have made additional contributions to address the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the UK's GBP 60 million donation.

Seventh Replenishment

The support of the G7 to the Global Fund has been critical to achieving progress over the last two decades in the fight against HIV, TB and malaria, while catalysing greater focus and funding for Resilient and Sustainable Systems for Health and mitigating the impact of COVID-19. The pandemic severely disrupted services despite all efforts, causing significant setbacks in the fight against the three diseases and overstressing fragile health systems. For the Seventh Replenishment, the Global Fund estimates that at least USD 18 billion are needed to get the world back on track toward ending AIDS, TB and malaria by 2030, to build people-centred and integrated systems for health to deliver impact, resilience and sustainability, and to strengthen pandemic preparedness, making the world more equitable and safer from future threats, with the aim of achieving Universal Health Coverage. To achieve this goal, all G7 donors and the European Commission must increase their contributions by 30% to USD 18 billion (over their Sixth Replenishment contributions). The US will be hosting the Global Fund's Seventh Replenishment in the third quarter of 2022.

Figure 11: G7 contributions in billion US Dollars by country to the Global Fund, and growth rate of total contributions between 2006 and 2022



Source: Global Fund Secretariat

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2006	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> % growth rate in G7 support provided to Global Fund (GFATM) (current prices), between 2006 (commitment) and the latest data Commitments made by G7 countries on the occasion of the 6th replenishment. 	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

Commitment 14

Antimicrobial Resistance

“We fully support the recently adopted WHO Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance. We will develop or review and effectively implement our national action plans and support other countries as they develop their own national action plans ... We commit to taking into account the Annex (Joint Efforts to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance) as we develop or review and share our national action plans. We commit to make collective efforts for strengthening and actively implementing a multi-sectoral One Health Approach, taking into account the sectors including human and animal health, agriculture, food and the environment.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p.13
Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, pp.12

SDGs:



Score:  Good

The WHO describes Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) as one of the top 10 global public health threats facing humanity.⁴⁴ As AMR spreads, antimicrobials become increasingly ineffective making it more difficult to treat infections and prevent infection-related deaths. Use, misuse and overuse of antimicrobials across human, animal and plant health systems and the agricultural sector are the main drivers of the increasing number of drug-resistant pathogens. Additionally, a lack of access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), as well as poor infection and disease prevention and control in health-care facilities, wet markets, livestock farms and elsewhere, promote the spread of infection and subsequently AMR. AMR infections can lead to death or disability and often require lengthy and expensive treatment. Thus, besides causing substantial human and animal suffering, AMR

poses significant costs to national economies and health systems as well as damages to the environment and global health security.

Due to its complexity, addressing the further emergence, spread and impact of AMR requires united and coordinated action across countries and sectors. Therefore, in 2015, the World Health Assembly endorsed the WHO Global Action Plan on AMR, whereby countries committed to developing and implementing multi-sectoral national action plans to fight AMR. A few months later, at the 2015 Elmau Summit and again at the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, the G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment made in the World Health Assembly and underlined their intention to assist other countries in doing the same. In order to track implementation of these commitments, the G7 decided to monitor the development of national

AMR action plans and whether these plans apply a One Health approach, as well as the number of countries the G7 supported in their efforts to develop their own national action plans.

Global and G7 progress on the development of national AMR action plans

Progress on the development and implementation of national AMR action plans is monitored by an annual country self-assessment survey.⁴⁵ According to the survey data, **the number of countries that have developed a national AMR action plan increased from 79 out of 159 responding countries in 2016/2017 to 140 out of 163 responding countries in 2020/2021** (Figure 12; categories C, D, and E).⁴⁶ Many countries also progressed in the implementation of these plans. Out of the 140 countries that had developed a plan in 2020/2021, 63 were implementing these plans (Category D), and 32 were doing so with monitoring and evaluation frameworks in place (Category E). The countries that have proceeded furthest in developing and implementing national AMR action plans are largely high- and middle-income countries. This is indicative of the barriers faced by countries, especially LMICS, to design, implement and monitor progress against their NAPs. These barriers include financial and human resource constraints, competing health priorities and the securing of political will. Among the 32 countries that have fully developed and implemented such plans and have monitoring frameworks in place are 16 high-income, 9 upper-middle-income, 5 lower-middle-income, and 2 low-income countries. At the end of 2021, the number of countries that had finalised their NAPs had risen to 148, of which 102 are lower-middle-income countries.

All G7 countries, with the exception of Canada,⁴⁷ have developed national AMR action plans. In doing so, France, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US are applying monitoring and evaluation frameworks (Category E). The US and UK updated their national action plans in 2020 and 2021 respectively, and France and Japan are in the process of doing so. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and result-


ing national responses affected the implementation process in all G7 countries.

To effectively address the further emergence, spread and impact of AMR, it is important that action plans apply a One Health approach, which recognises that the health of humans, animals and their shared ecosystems are interdependent. In the AMR contexts, applying a One Health approach means bringing together multiple sectors and stakeholders engaged in the fields of human, animal and plant health, food and feed production, and the environment. These stakeholders communicate and collaborate on the design and implementation of programmes, policies, legislation and research in order to attain better public health outcomes.⁴⁸ **By 2020/2021, 150 out of 163 participating countries stated that they were applying some form of multi-sector and One Health collaboration and coordination,** which represents 38 more countries than in 2016/2017.⁴⁹ However, as gaps remain in the implementation of a One Health approach, notably in disease surveillance, the current political momentum on the One Health and surveillance agendas is an opportunity to be leveraged.⁵⁰

All G7 countries apply some form of multi-sector and One Health collaboration and coordination.

France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US use integrated approaches to implement their national AMR action plans, including the use of relevant data and lessons learned from other sectors to adapt implementation of the action plan (Category E). Italy has functional multi-sectoral working groups in place, with clear terms of reference, regular meetings, funding for their activities, and defined reporting arrangements (Category C). Canada has established a multi-sectoral AMR governance framework that includes representation of federal and provincial/territorial government organisations and stakeholders across the One Health spectrum. The governance framework includes technical working groups with multi-jurisdictional government leadership (Category B).

Figure 12: Country progress with development of a national action plan on AMR 2020/2021



Source: Global Database for the Tripartite Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) Country Self-assessment Survey (TrACSS) 2020-21

Countries supported in developing national AMR action plans⁵¹

In 2017, **Canada** contributed CAD 9 million to the WHO AMR Secretariat to support LMICs in four WHO regions (Africa, Americas, South-East Asia and Western Pacific) in implementing One Health AMR National Action Plans.

Between 2018 and 2021, **France** worked with the Guinean government in the development of its national AMR action plan. The plan uses a One Health approach and was aligned with other health security and infection prevention and control policies. Under the “West African Network of Biomedical Analysis Laboratories” project, France supports the countries of Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo in strengthening the quality of medical biology services, particularly in the monitoring of antimicrobial resistance. The project started its 3rd phase in

2019. Since 2021, France has also funded the SARA project (Surveillance of Antibiotic Resistance in Africa), which is coordinated by the Pasteur Institute and supports six countries (Cameroon, Madagascar, Morocco, Senegal, Benin and the Central African Republic) in defining strategies to fight antibiotic resistance by creating a dedicated surveillance and research network. France also supports several initiatives aimed at strengthening the AMR capacities of some developing countries.⁵²

Since 2016, **Germany** has supported AMR action plan development in several countries through measures to strengthen microbiological diagnostics, ensure prudent antimicrobial use and implement infection prevention and control. Moreover, assistance is given to build One Health monitoring and surveillance systems for antimicrobial use and resistance in the veterinary sector. The number of participating countries increased since the last

report. Germany contributed via multilateral activities such as the EU-JAMRAI, the EU One Health network on AMR, and the WHO. Between 2019 and 2021, Germany provided USD 15 million to WHO AMR activities. Germany provided support to the Tripartite Joint Secretariat on AMR (EUR 1 million and technical support) and EUR 3 million to the AMR Multi-Partner Trust Fund.⁵³

Italy has actively participated in the multi-country Joint Action EU-JAMRAI, taking part in integrated One-Health country visits to promote the development and implementation of national action plans. In 2019, the Italian National Institute of Health (ISS) hosted the PHACEE (Public Health Alliance Central Eastern Europe) Summit on major public health threats for the European area, including AMR. Italy has committed through a collaboration protocol to contribute to the fight against AMR in Southern and Eastern European countries with the development and implementation of national action plans.

Japan contributed to AMR and Healthcare-Associated Infection Control through training in Japan (2019) and virtually (2020, 2021), especially for Uganda, Egypt, Mongolia, Myanmar, Zambia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Bhutan.

The **UK** supports other countries in developing and implementing National Action Plans through the Fleming Fund, which is a UK aid programme tackling antimicrobial resistance.⁵⁴ The Fleming Fund provides grants to the FAO, the OIE and the WHO to further One-Health action on AMR, which includes the Multi-Partner Trust Fund on AMR, as well as strengthening surveillance of AMR in 22 lower-middle-income countries across Africa and Asia.⁵⁵ In addition, country-based Health Advisors also support the development, implementation and monitoring of AMR action plans.

The **US** development agency USAID supported 18 countries in the development, updating, endorsement, validation and/or dissemination of AMR national strategies, action plans and implementation plans. Since 2015, the objectives of its support have shifted from the development to the implementation and monitoring of AMR action plans. USAID supported country efforts to monitor implementation in 8 countries, including through participation in the annual TrACSS. USAID also helped establish and/or facilitate meetings of governance bodies and/or national multi-sectoral committees in eleven countries. To support implementation, USAID worked with countries to strengthen laboratory capacity for AMR surveillance, including supply chains, enhanced reporting, and stewardship efforts; to bolster infection prevention and control capacities; and to increase AMR education and awareness campaigns across sectors. In addition, the US has assisted 9 countries since 2016 in the development of national AMR action plans via the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC has also assisted with the initiation of AMR containment programs through improved infection prevention and control in several countries, and has set up international networks to improve detection and control of AMR threats.

The **EU** has also been supporting the WHO in building a body of data on antibiotic consumption and use patterns, the implementing of antimicrobial stewardship programmes in hospitals and the incidence of bacterial multi-resistance in Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing to the objectives outlined in the Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. Monitoring of G7 Countries AMR action plans consistent with the WHO Global Action Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WHO Reporting on AMR Action Plans • OIE • FAO • Self-reporting
	2. Number of countries supported for developing national AMR action plans	
	3. Number of country AMR action plans developed	
	4. Number of country AMR action plans that recognize and apply a One Health approach	

Commitment 15

Neglected tropical diseases

“We commit to supporting NTD-related research, focusing notably on areas of most urgent need. (...) We support community based response mechanisms to distribute therapies and otherwise prevent, control and ultimately eliminate these diseases. We will invest in the prevention and control of NTDs in order to achieve 2020 elimination goals. We also acknowledge the importance and contribution of R&D and innovation to preserve and deploy existing remedies, and to discover new remedies for these and other health areas, such as neglected tropical diseases and poverty related infectious diseases.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 11
Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p. 10

SDGs:



Score:



Below expectations

The term Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs) describes a group of 20 different conditions that cause serious damage to people's health.⁵⁶ They are mainly prevalent in tropical areas, mostly affecting impoverished communities and, among those, disproportionately affecting women and children. It is estimated that they are responsible every year for approximately 200,000 deaths and the loss of 19 million disability-adjusted life years.⁵⁷ Affected people do not only suffer from the direct consequences of the illnesses, with insufficient treatment and care frequently aggravating their situation. Patients also often face stigmatisation and social exclusion, and their condition can put them and their families into serious financial distress. According to WHO estimations, NTDs cost developing communities the equivalent of billions of USD each year in direct health costs, loss of productivity and reduced socioeconomic and educational attainment.

In spite of these facts, NTDs have long been overlooked on the global health policy agenda. The WHO set out its first roadmap to overcome the global impact of NTDs, which included ambitious elimination goals.⁵⁸ The topic gained further attention with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015, which set the goal of ending NTDs by 2030 (SDG target 3.3). In order to achieve this goal, the G7 leaders at the Elmau Summit in 2015 committed to support NTD research, prevention and control, as well as their elimination and treatment. The G7 agreed to track progress on this commitment by monitoring 1) spending on prevention and control of NTDs; 2) support for community-based responses in support of the WHO 2020 NTD elimination and eradication goals;⁵⁹ 3) contributions and support to NTD-related research and existing initiatives to develop new drugs and diagnostics; and 4) the implementation of policies, programmes and other

initiatives to encourage the development of and access to medical products.

The state of NTD elimination

Data shows that global efforts to fight NTDs have been effective. In fact, WHO describes interventions to prevent and control NTDs as one of the “best buys” in global public health, with high net benefits. Today, 600 million fewer people require interventions against NTDs than in 2010, and in 42 countries, territories and regions at least one disease has been eliminated. Nevertheless, many of the targets set out in the WHO 2020 NTD elimination road map were not met. The new NTD road map for 2021–2030 calls for further multi-sectoral action for all NTDs, and stresses the continued importance of partners to support national efforts in fighting NTDs. In order to prevent, control, eliminate and eradicate a diverse set of NTDs by 2030 and ensure universal health coverage, WHO estimates that over 1.7 billion people must be targeted by NTD interventions.⁶⁰

G7 contributions to NTD research, prevention and control

G7 countries are among the largest public donors to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance for the 2021–2025 strategic period. Gavi provisionally approved a vaccine against rabies in 2018. Gavi is planning to introduce post-exposure prophylaxis in its supported countries, as well as building the capacity of veterinary services and research on the diagnosis of rabies. However, post-exposure prophylaxis for rabies for endemic disease prevention will only be introduced starting in 2023, since the Vaccine Innovation Strategy has been paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Since 2015, **France** supported the prevention and control of NTDs by providing EUR 10 million for the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), contributing to the development of five new and affordable treatments for NTDs. In addition, France is the leading donor to Unitaid (EUR 700 million donated since 2015), which helps speed up

access to high-quality, affordable treatments and diagnostics for NTDs, such as Chagas disease, particularly by reducing prices.

To support NTD research, France launched a francophone network on NTDs (RFMTN) in 2016, which aims to eliminate the 18 NTDs defined by the WHO. The network is operated under the banner of the French National Research Alliance for Life Sciences and Health (Aviesan). Further, France supports the missions of the Institute Pasteur International Network through the funding of international technical experts, mainly in Africa. With a presence in endemic areas, this network has demonstrated its major role as a sentinel for infectious emergencies, through collaborations in scientific research, public health services and training.

Germany supports prevention and control of NTDs by strengthening national health systems, and by implementing water sanitation and hygiene programs, which follow a One Health approach (EUR 82 million since 2015).⁶¹ Additionally, Germany supported the elimination of dog-mediated rabies in Namibia with EUR 1.21 million, through a cooperation with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).

Germany supports NTD research by supporting various programmes and research centres. Among them are the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR), the One Health Research, Education and Outreach Centre for Africa, the International Livestock Research Institute,⁶² and research programs for young researchers of Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) member countries. Germany also supports the Bernhard-Nocht-Institut für Tropenmedizin, which conducts basic science, therapeutic research and diagnostics development. Further, Germany has funded the Research Networks for Health Innovations in Sub-Saharan Africa (EUR 54 million since 2015),⁶³ the European and Developing Countries Clinical

Trials Partnership (EDCTP)⁶⁴ and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI).⁶⁵ In 2020, Germany launched the German Alliance for Global Health Research (GLOHRA), which will be funded until 2025 with a total of EUR 3.34 million.⁶⁶

Germany encourages the development of and access to medical products for NTDs through the Hospital Partnerships funding programme⁶⁷ and the funding of product development partnerships (PDPs) (EUR 85.4 million since 2015).⁶⁸ Finally, Germany supports the WHO Expanded Special Project for Elimination of Neglected Tropical Diseases (ESPEN) (EUR 2 million, 2019–2021). The funding supports the distribution of around EUR 15 billion worth of drugs donated by the pharmaceutical industry.

Italy is the seventh largest public donor to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which provisionally approved a vaccine against rabies in 2019. Gavi is planning to introduce post-exposure prophylaxis in its supported countries, also building the capacity of veterinary services and research on the diagnosis of rabies. However, post-exposure prophylaxis for rabies for endemic disease prevention will only be introduced starting in 2023, since the Vaccine Innovation Strategy has been paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic.⁶⁹

Japan has been contributing technically and financially to the prevention and control of NTDs. This includes contributions through JICA, which amount to about JPY 363 million in 2019 and 2021, and more than JPY 1 billion since 2015 for technical cooperation and international joint research on several NTDs. Approximately JPY 3.1 million was also funded to the Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical Diseases (TDR) by UNICEF, UNDP, the World Bank and the WHO, where Japan is a member of the Joint Coordinating Board. Japan also contributed approximately JPY 6 billion between 2019 and 2021, and nearly JPY 14 billion since 2015, to support research and development for diseases including NTDs; these funds were also

channelled through Public-Private Partnerships including the Global Health Innovative Technology (GHIT) Fund, an international public-private partnership between the Government of Japan, pharmaceutical companies, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Wellcome Trust, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

In order to encourage the development of and access to medical products for NTDs, Japan has been supporting the GHIT. Furthermore, Japan has contributed to the Access and Delivery Partnership (ADP), partnering with UNDP, WHO, TDR and the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health (PATH). The partnership helps countries strengthen their policies, human capacities, systems and regulations to ensure that medicines, vaccines and diagnostics are delivered to the people who need them. In 2019, Japan launched a global platform called Uniting Efforts for Innovation, Access and Delivery in collaboration with ADP and the GHIT Fund to promote innovation, access and delivery of medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and health technologies.⁷⁰

The **UK** government spent an estimated GBP 52 million between 2019 and 2020 on implementation programmes to tackle NTDs. UK programmes focused on delivering NTD services by training community health workers and drug distributors, and providing communications to communities to raise awareness about NTD prevention and treatment. The health systems strengthening activities of the programmes also contributed to strengthening community systems and co-ordination with sectors such as WASH.

Between 2017 and 2019, the UK reached 166.1 million people through Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD) programmes, including 159 million people who received preventative medication.

The UK has funded operational research and product development for NTDs for many years. Between 2019 and 2020 the UK government spent GBP 31 million on NTD research programmes.

The research funded has helped deliver innovative technologies such as new diagnostics and treatments for NTDs, for example the first rapid diagnostic test as well as the first-ever oral-only drug to treat all stages of sleeping sickness. Currently, the UK funds the Coalition for Operational Research on NTDs and the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi).

Between 2015 and 2021, the **US** spent USD 807 million through USAID for the prevention and control of NTDs, which provided over 1.5 billion treatments through community-based responses across 30 countries. Between 2019–2021, USAID spent USD 245 million in support of national programmes to conduct disease mapping, planning, implementation and monitoring of mass drug administration of preventive chemotherapy within the context of national COVID plans, resulting in the provision of over 400 million treatments.

Since 2015, USAID has invested USD 52 million in NTD-related research. Between 2019 and 2021, the US invested USD 26 million, with a particular emphasis on diagnostics, surveillance, drug development and surgical training simulators. In addition, USAID established a program through the African Research Network for NTDs to support young researchers involved in NTD research

(2018–today). The US has also contributed to NTD-related research, improved diagnostics and surveillance through the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Research by the National Institutes of Health has focused on identification of targets for potential new drugs and vaccines, and strategies for controlling the organisms that transmit NTD-causing agents to humans.

To encourage the development of and access to medical products for NTDs, USAID has funded national programs in over 30 countries to 1) update national policies to incorporate NTD drugs and diagnostics into strategic planning documents; 2) submit drug applications to access private-sector drug donation programs; 3) collaborate with pharmaceutical companies to continue and expand their donation programs; and 4) work with the WHO to pre-qualify drug manufacturers.

Since 2015, the **EU** has been responding to the needs of partner countries regarding NTDs. Following a pilot project identifying key gaps in the research and development cycle for NTDs, including the need for incremental research to noticeably help improve the acceptability of treatments and diagnostics to populations affected by NTD, several contributions totalling EUR 3 million to the WHO were concluded.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. G7 contribution and support to NTD-related research and existing initiatives including Public-Private Partnership to develop new drugs and diagnostics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-reporting • WHO NTD Reports • WHO
	2. Spending on prevention and control of NTD	
	3. Support for community based responses in support of the WHO 2020 NTD elimination and eradication goals	
	4. Implement policies, programmes and other initiatives to encourage the development of and access to medical products for those diseases	

Commitment 16

Ending preventable child deaths and improving maternal health

“We are committed to ending preventable child deaths and improving maternal health worldwide. We continue to take leadership in promoting the health of women and girls, adolescents and children, including through efforts to provide access to sexual and reproductive health, rights and services, immunization, better nutrition, and needs-based responses in emergencies and disasters.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p.15
Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, p.12

SDGs:



Score:  *Satisfactory*

Around the world, women and girls, adolescents and children continue to face major health challenges. For instance, insufficient access to quality health services, including to treatment of illnesses and preventive measures such as vaccinations, is causing unnecessary suffering and high mortality among mothers and young children. And in the field of sexual and reproductive health and rights, insufficient information and support continue to have severe consequences for the health and lives of many women and adolescents. Under the Every Woman Every Child (EWEC) movement, launched in 2010 by the UN Secretary-General, the international community has strived to address these challenges.⁷¹ In addition, a strong focus on the health of women, children and adolescents was put into the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which the United Nations adopted in 2015.

At the G7 Summits in Elmau 2015 and Ise-Shima 2016, G7 leaders confirmed their commitment to

ending preventable child deaths and improving maternal health worldwide and to taking leadership in promoting the health of women and girls, adolescents and children. To follow through with this commitment, the G7 decided to monitor 1) G7 contributions to reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH) measured by the OECD/DAC RMNCH Marker; 2) G7 contributions to implement, directly or indirectly, the Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health; as well as 3) six related SDG indicators to track global progress on improving women’s, children’s and adolescents’ health.

G7 contributions to reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH)


When reporting ODA disbursements to the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS), countries indicate, among other information, their contribution to reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH). Projects are assigned a RMNCH

marker if they: 1) contribute directly to improving the health of mothers and children; 2) serve to improve women's and children's access to basic health measures; 3) strengthen health systems with the aim of improving access to and the provision of health services specific to RMNCH; and/or 4) have the objective of training health care professionals with reference to RMNCH. Projects can be assigned one of four scores, depending on how much of their funding supports RMNCH (at least a quarter, half, most, or explicit primary objective).⁷²

Between 2015 and 2020, the volume of G7 members' ODA that supported RMNCH more than doubled, from USD 3,878 million to USD 8,706 million. The share of total ODA that contributes to RMNCH has also increased from 3.9% to 6.6%

(see Figure 13). The increase was primarily driven by G7 ODA to projects targeting RMNCH with at least a quarter to half of their funding. The former increased from USD 1,376 million in 2015 to USD 5,801 million in 2020. The latter rose from USD 1,860 million in 2015 to USD 2,520 million in 2020. However, the volume of G7 ODA towards projects targeting RMNCH with most of their funding or having RMNCH as the explicit primary objective decreased. While USD 85 million of G7 members' ODA supported projects that targeted RMNCH with most of their funding in 2015, there was no funding reported in this category in 2020. Notably, in 2020, the volume of G7 ODA supporting projects where RMNCH is the explicit primary objective was the smallest (USD 385 million) since the commitment was taken in 2015.⁷³

Figure 13: G7 members'* bilateral ODA to RMNCH (USD million)



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS
*incl. EU institutions

Table 8 shows G7 members' individual ODA contributions that were marked to contribute to RMNCH. All G7 members have contributed to

RMNCH-marked ODA, and most increased the volume of RMNCH marked ODA since 2015.

Table 8: G7 members' bilateral ODA to RMNCH (USD million)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Canada	379	408	521	570	541	516
France	16	2	30	47	53	52
Germany	825	1,374	1,525	1,999	1,925	2,769
Italy	87	52	117	170	152	119
Japan	717	483	567	408	500	385
UK	–	–	–	–	975	1,414
US	1,370	1,218	1,239	1,618	1,408	1,585
EU Institutions	484	839	1,088	1,078	1,018	1,865
G7, total (incl. EU Inst.)	3,878	4,376	5,087	5,889	6,572	8,706

Source: OECD-CRS RMNCH Markers 1–4 for all sectors

G7 contributions to implement, directly or indirectly, the Global Strategy for Women's, Children's, and Adolescents' Health

Since 2010, the Global Strategy for Women's, Children's and Adolescents' Health has served as a road map for ending all preventable deaths of women, children and adolescents within a generation and ensuring their well-being. The strategy is put into action by the Every Woman Every Child (EWEC) movement, which was launched in 2010 by the UN Secretary-General. It aims at mobilising and intensifying action by governments, multilaterals, the private sector and civil society to address major health challenges facing women, children and adolescents around the world.

Canada played a leadership role in the development of EWEC supporting mechanisms, and, in 2015, was a founding donor of the Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF), to which it since has provided CAD 630 million. In addition, Canada supported the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH) with CAD 3.7 million. Further, Canada's Minister of International Development provided strategic guidance to EWEC as an initial member of

the High-Level Steering Group for EWEC when it was created in 2017. Under the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal Health, Newborn and Child Health, which Canada spearheaded under its 2018 G7 presidency, Canada exceeded its commitments with total investments of CAD 6.7 billion. Since 2020, Canada announced a 10-year commitment to the health and rights of women and children, with funding to reach CAD 1.4 billion annually in 2023, including an average of CAD 700 million annually for sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR).

France aims to improve the health, well-being, and nutrition of women, mothers, newborns, children and adolescents through the French Muskoka Fund (FFM). Created in 2011, the fund brings together four UN agencies (UN Women, UNFPA, WHO and Unicef) focused on RMNCH support in nine sub-Saharan African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. France allocated nearly EUR 153 million to the FFM over the past 10 years. In 2021, France renewed its commitment with EUR 50 million until 2026. 25% of the funds for the 2019–2024 period are committed to be allocated

to nutrition. The French commitment for the FFM is part of a larger commitment on RMNCH and SRHR of EUR 400 million within the next five years through bilateral and multilateral channels, and in support of various initiatives such as the UNFPA Supplies programme (EUR 90 million for 5 years).

As part of its contribution to the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal Health, Newborn and Child Health, **Germany** launched the Initiative on Rights Family Planning and Maternal Health in 2011. From 2019 to 2021, Germany committed EUR 380 million within the framework of the initiative. Moreover, between 2019 and 2021, Germany supported UNFPA with EUR 158 million (of which EUR 143 million were core funding). Furthermore, Germany contributed EUR 50 million to the Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents (GFF) (for 2020/21).

Japan has been contributing to RMNCH not only by supporting international organisations such as UNFPA, IPPF, WHO and UNICEF, but also by carrying out a wide range of projects such as strengthening continuous MCH care through the Maternal and Child Health Handbook, improving MCH nutrition, and implementing capacity building of health personnel through training projects in Japan. Further, Japan has contributed USD 50 million to the Global Financing Facility (GFF) since 2015 to support RMNCAH, with a plan to provide another USD 50 million through GFF this year.

The **UK** contributed approximately GBP 1.1 billion annually (2011–2019) to RMNCH measured by the Muskoka methodology, which made it the second largest donor government after the US. This was spent on a range of centrally managed programmes, including contributions to the GFF, the UNFPA Supplies programme and the regional Women's Integrated Sexual Health Programme. This also included bilateral programmes in up to 18 countries. In December 2021, the UK launched two key papers, on ending preventable deaths of mothers,

babies and children as well as on health systems strengthening, to define the UK's approach through 2030. The papers outline the importance of strong health systems and the wider determinants of health on RMNCAH outcomes, and the need to target those most left behind, consistent with achieving Universal Health Coverage.

The **US** to date, since 2021, has supported UNFPA with USD 124.1 million (of which USD 50.8 million was core funding) for implementing President Biden's Memorandum on Protecting Women's Health at Home and Abroad.

The **EU** has contributed to UNFPA supplies, the GFF (EUR 26.5 million; 2018–2020), and the spotlight initiative (EUR 500 million, of which EUR 100 million were to SRHR). In addition to this, the EU has supported reduction of FGM and child marriage with an additional investment of EUR 21.1 million. As per the Muskoka methodology, around 30% of bilateral country support from the European Commission targets SRHR. Each year, the Commission provides an estimated EUR 200 million in support for humanitarian health programmes that include SRHR services, in line with the health policy of the Commission services responsible for civil protection and humanitarian aid operations. In 2019, the EU allocated more than an estimated 20 EUR million to reproductive health under its humanitarian aid health programming. This funding enabled the urgent provision of SRHR services for the most vulnerable groups affected by crises.

Global progress on improving women's, children's and adolescents' health

Over the past decade, significant progress was made. Under-five deaths, for instance, reached an all-time low in 2019, and more than a billion children were vaccinated between 2010–2020. However, this progress has been uneven and threatens to be reversed by conflicts, the effects of climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the 2020 EWEC Progress report, the pandemic has caused significant disruptions to essential health services and has disproportionately impacted the most vulnerable women and children.⁷⁴ The report notes that over 50% of countries reported partial disruptions in routine immunization services, malaria prevention campaigns, family planning and antenatal care services, which will impact RMNCH SDG indicators. For example, the 2020 WUENIC report notes that strained health systems and associated disruptions in 2020 have resulted in an increase of 3.7 million children missing out on vaccination, the highest number since 2009.⁷⁵ In addition, UNICEF warns of a dramatic surge in adolescent pregnancy, which may result in 10 million additional child marriages by 2028 that would have otherwise been averted.⁷⁶ In the following, progress on six SDG indicators is reported based on WHO and UNICEF databases. However, due to data lags, effects of the COVID-19 pandemic might not yet be reflected.

Global **maternal mortality** has decreased by more than 38% since the beginning of the century. However, the rate of this decrease has slowed in recent years. Between 2015 and 2017 (most recent data available), the ratio decreased by 3.6%, reaching a new low of 211 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. As such, maternal mortality is still about three times higher than demanded by SDG target 3.1, which aims to reduce maternal mortality to fewer than 70 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2030. As in the years before, the situation remains most critical in Africa, where 525 deaths per 100,000 live births were recorded in 2017, representing 65% of the global maternal deaths for that year.⁷⁷

In 2020, the **new-born mortality** rate was 17 deaths per 1,000 live births on the global level. In 2015, the rate had been at 19 deaths per 1,000 live births. Despite a continuous decrease, the current global rate is still too high to meet SDG target 3.2.2 of a new-born mortality rate of less than 12 deaths per 1,000 live births by 2030. The highest rate of

neonatal mortality in 2020 was recorded in Western and Central Africa with 30 deaths per 1,000 live births (down from 33 neonatal deaths per 1,000 live births in 2015).⁷⁸

In the past 30 years, global **under-five mortality** has decreased by almost 60%. Over the last decade, however, the pace of the decline has slowed. Between 2015 and 2020, under-five mortality was reduced from 43 to 37 deaths per 1,000 live births. Still, much remains to be done to meet SDG target 3.2.1 of reducing under-five mortality to 25 per 1,000 live births or lower by 2030. Comparing geographical regions, under-five mortality was highest in West and Central Africa, with 91 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2020, down from 105 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2015.⁷⁹

Diphtheria tetanus toxoid and pertussis (DTP3) immunization coverage among one-year-olds, which had been at a stable 85% between 2016 and 2019, decreased to 83% in 2020. Looking at World Bank income groups, DTP3 immunization coverage was lowest among Low Income Countries (LICs), with 72%. In a comparison of the geographical WHO region, immunization coverage among one-year-olds was lowest in Africa, also with only 72%.⁸⁰


Between 2015 and 2020, **the adolescent birth rate**, meaning the number of adolescent women (aged 15–19) giving births, has continued to decrease. While in 2015, 45 out of 1,000 women in this age group gave birth, this number decreased to 41 out of 1,000 in 2020. In Sub-Saharan Africa, which is still the region with the most adolescent births, the ratio has decreased from 109 to 101 out of 1,000 women aged 15–19 years who gave birth between 2015 and 2020.⁸¹ (Data on birth rates among adolescent women aged 10–15 years was not available.)

Data on **SRHR-related laws and regulations** was first collected in 2019. SDG indicator 5.6.2 measures the legal and regulatory environment across four broad parameters of SRHR: Maternity Care,

Contraception and Family Planning, Comprehensive Sexuality Education and Information, and Sexual Health and Well-Being. Within these four sections, data was collected on 13 components that address areas susceptible to regulation by law. On the basis of the existence of legal enablers (positive laws and regulations) and legal barriers, a score was

calculated to reflect the extent to which countries have laws and regulations that guarantee access to SRHR. The 75 countries that reported complete data in 2019 on average have 73% of the laws and regulations in place that are needed to guarantee full and equal access to SRHR (see Figure 14).⁸²

Figure 14: Extent to which countries have laws and regulations that guarantee women aged 15–49 access to sexual and reproductive health care, information and education (SDG 5.6.2). At the regional level by SDG regional grouping, 2019 (in %).



Source: United Nations Population Fund, global databases, 2020.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. G7 contribution measured by the OECD/DAC RMNCH Marker	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD/DAC • The Global Progress Report on Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health • UNFPA • UNICEF • WHO
	2. G7 contribution to implement, directly or indirectly, the Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health	
	3. Maternal mortality ratio (SDGs 3.1.1)	
	4. New-born mortality rates (SDGs 3.2.2)	
	5. Under-five mortality rates (SDGs 3.2.1)	
	6. Immunization (DPT3) coverage (under SDG 3.b)	
	7. Adolescent birth rate (10–15, 15–19) per 1000 women in that age group (SDG 3.7.2)	
	8. Number of countries with laws and regulations that guarantee women aged 15–49 access to sexual and reproductive health care, information and education. (SDG 5.6.2)	

Commitments 17/18

Prevention and treatment for HIV/AIDS & HIV/AIDS: stigma, discrimination and rights violation

“We reaffirm our commitment to come as close as possible to universal access to prevention, treatment, care and support with respect to HIV/AIDS.”

Muskoka 2010, Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, para. 15

“We commit to counter any form of stigma, discrimination and human rights violation and to promote the rights of persons with disabilities and the elimination of travel restrictions on people with HIV/AIDS.”

L’Aquila 2009, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, para. 123

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

HIV continues to be a major global public health threat, having claimed a total of 36.3 million lives so far. There is still no cure for HIV infections. However, with increasing access to effective HIV prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care, including for opportunistic infections, an HIV infection has become a manageable chronic health condition, enabling people living with HIV to lead long and healthy lives.⁸³ Nevertheless, despite this progress, the world is not on track to reach the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target 3.3. to end AIDS by 2030, and progress has been further stalled by the COVID-19 pandemic.⁸⁴

The G7 members have long been committed to coming as close as possible to the goal of universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support. At the Muskoka Summit in 2010, the G7 reaffirmed this commitment and agreed to monitor

progress on G7 support for HIV/AIDS as it is measured by UNAIDS and the Kaiser Family Foundation.

Even before this, the G7 played a major part in keeping health issues high on the global policy agenda. The Okinawa and Genoa Summits, in 2000 and 2001 respectively, for instance, resulted in the launch of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. In 2022, the G7 members are supporting a successful outcome of the Seventh Replenishment Conference for the Global Fund, which has the ambition to reach at least 18 billion USD to fight these three diseases for the 2023–2026 cycle.

The state of HIV/AIDS worldwide

Annual new infections and HIV-related deaths decreased in recent years, indicating progress in both prevention and treatment. In 2020, an

estimated 1.5 million people were newly infected with HIV and 680,000 people died from AIDS-related causes. The WHO African region remains the most affected, with about 25.4 million people living with HIV out of an estimated 37.7 million worldwide in 2020. In Sub-Saharan Africa, women and girls continue to be disproportionately affected by new HIV infections. Still, there has been progress in eastern and southern Africa, where new HIV infections have declined by 43% since 2010. This is in stark contrast to Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which has seen a staggering 43% rise in new HIV infections since 2010.⁸⁵

COVID-19 has further stalled the AIDS response, which has seen declines in HIV testing and prevention services for key and vulnerable populations who were already disproportionately affected. For example, compared with 2019, the percentage of mothers receiving medicine to prevent transmission of HIV to their babies dropped by 4.5%.⁸⁶ According to the Global Fund investment case for an USD 18 billion seventh replenishment and UNAIDS, significant efforts and investments are needed to bring the world back on track to end AIDS, which was reiterated in the 2021 United Nations General Assembly Political Declaration on ending inequalities and getting on track to end AIDS by 2030.⁸⁷

HIV/AIDS discrimination and rights

Entrenched inequalities stand in the way of further progress against AIDS. HIV-related stigma and discrimination remain among the major obstacles blocking the achievement of the goal of ending AIDS by 2030, especially in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has reinforced existing inequalities, stigma and discrimination against members of marginalised groups. At the L'Aquila Summit in 2009, G7 leaders committed to counteracting any form of health-related stigma, discrimination and human rights violation and to promote the elimination of travel restrictions on people with HIV/AIDS.

Stigma and discrimination violate the dignity and rights of people living with or affected by HIV, and in many countries result in continued limitations on access to HIV prevention, testing and treatment services. This is especially true for key populations, including people who use drugs, transgender people, female sex workers and men who have sex with men, who are at a significantly greater risk of acquiring HIV infection (25–35%). Gender-based violence, which disproportionately affects women and girls, also increases vulnerability to HIV infection and undermines access to HIV services.⁸⁸ In addition, more than 50% of adults still have discriminatory attitudes towards people living with HIV,⁸⁹ and UNAIDS counts 46 countries, territories and areas that continue to impose some form of restriction on the entry, stay and residence of people living with HIV based on their HIV status.⁹⁰

Considering these developments, financial support from G7 members not only for prevention and treatment, but also for fighting HIV-related discrimination and human rights violations continues to be of high importance, especially so as the two fields are interconnected.


G7 financial contributions to HIV/AIDS assistance

Since 2007, G7 members' financial contributions to HIV/AIDS assistance, as measured by UNAIDS and the Kaiser Family Foundation, have increased significantly by 95%, from USD 3,932 million in 2007 to USD 7,669 million in 2020 (Figure 15). In 2009, when Commitment 18 was adopted, G7 members contributed USD 6,350 million. Since 2018, which was the last year to be reported in the Biarritz Progress Report, G7 members' financial contributions to HIV/AIDS assistance increased by USD 341 million, or 5%. G7-funded assistance to HIV/AIDS made up 94% of total international donors funding to HIV/AIDS assistance in 2020. The US is by far the largest donor. In 2020, its contribution of USD 6,211 million constituted 81% of total G7 members' assistance.⁹¹ These figures

include contributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which accounts for 25% of all international financing for HIV programmes (10% of available resources). Since its founding in 2002, the Global Fund has invested USD 22.7 billion in programmes to prevent and treat HIV and AIDS, 75% of which was provided by G7 members.

Nevertheless, every year HIV resources have fallen far short of the global targets. Resources in low- and middle-income countries peaked in 2017 and started decreasing in 2018, with only USD 18.6 billion (in constant 2016 USD) available in 2019 – just 71% of the 2020 target. UNAIDS estimates that an investment of USD 29 billion by 2025 is needed to meet the needs of low- and middle-income countries in the AIDS response.⁹²

Figure 15: International HIV/AIDS assistance from G7 members (USD million)



Source: Own compilation based on data by Kaiser Family Foundation and UNAIDS

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2007 (17) 2009 (18)	1. G7 support for HIV/AIDS as measured by the UNAIDS/Kaiser Foundation methodology (which is based on OECD/DAC reporting).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD-DAC • UNAIDS/Kaiser Foundation

Commitment 19

Polio

“We stress our continuing commitment to the eradication of polio which is a reachable objective ... To this end, we will continue to support the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. We ... reaffirm our continued commitment to reaching polio eradication targets.”

*Deauville 2011, Deauville G8 Declaration, para. 60 (d)
Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p.12*

SDGs:



Score:  *Below expectations*

Poliomyelitis, commonly referred to as polio, is a highly infectious viral disease that can cause muscle weakness and flaccid paralysis and largely affects children under the age of 5. In the early 20th century, polio was one of the most feared diseases, paralysing hundreds of thousands of children every year. While there is still no treatment for the disease, the development of effective vaccines in the mid-20th century has made it possible to control its spread and made polio eradication a reachable objective. In 1988, the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution for the worldwide eradication of polio and launched the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI).⁹³ From the beginning, G7 members contributed significantly to the initiative. By 2011, the incidence of wild poliovirus had decreased by more than 99.8%, from an estimated 350,000 in 1988 to 650 cases.

At the Deauville Summit in 2011, G7 leaders expressed that they remain committed to the eradication of polio and to supporting the GPEI, and reaffirmed this commitment once more at the Ise-Shima Summit in 2016. In order to track

follow-through, the G7 Accountability Working Group has decided to monitor the number of poliovirus cases, the number of country polio transition plans developed, and the G7 financial support for the GPEI.

Number of poliovirus cases today

Global efforts to eradicate polio by immunising children have further reduced the numbers of wild and vaccine-derived poliovirus cases⁹⁴ since 2011, although numbers have been on the rise again since 2017/2018 (see Figure 16). In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly hampered and, in some cases, reversed previously achieved progress since its worldwide spread in the beginning of 2020.


Due to the extensive vaccination of children under the age of five with the oral polio vaccine (OPV), two of three wild poliovirus types were eradicated in 2015 and 2019. Only in two countries – Afghanistan and Pakistan – is poliovirus still considered endemic. The last of the African countries, Nigeria, was declared wild poliovirus-free in June 2020.

However, as of February 2022, a new case of wild poliovirus type 1 was detected in Malawi, which could be traced back to a strain from Pakistan from 2019.

Between 2011 and 2017, wild poliovirus cases had decreased by more than 96%, reaching a low of only 22 cases globally in 2017. Vaccine-derived poliovirus cases reached their lowest number in

2016 with only 5 reported for that year worldwide. Since then, outbreaks in various countries, particularly in the West African region, have led numbers to increase again. In 2020, the GPEI reported 140 cases of wild poliovirus and 1,113 cases of vaccine-derived poliovirus, although these numbers come with a degree of uncertainty, as the COVID-19 pandemic has in many cases disrupted polio surveillance.⁹⁵

Figure 16: Total numbers of wild poliovirus cases and vaccine-derived poliovirus cases (all types), 2011–2020⁹⁶



Source: Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) 2022

The pandemic has also had negative effects on immunisation. Coverage for the first dose of inactivated polio vaccine fell from 82% in 2019 to 80% in 2020.⁹⁷ Despite these setbacks, the Polio Programme was able to implement the first nationwide immunisation campaign in Afghanistan in three years at the end of 2021, reaching approximately 8.5 million children. The largest integrated immunisation campaign was successfully implemented in Pakistan in 2021 to protect 90 million children against polio, measles and rubella. In 2021, wild poliovirus cases in both countries were at a historically low level (Afghanistan: 4 cases,

Pakistan: 1 case). This marks a momentum where the world is closer than ever to polio eradication.

Number of country polio transition plans developed in priority countries

Transition planning is critical to prepare for and maintain a world free of polio. After polio is eradicated in a given country, the GPEI often continues to provide essential functions to maintain this status, including polio surveillance, outbreak response and continued immunisation. In the transition process, national governments and the GPEI partners plan to incorporate these

functions into national health systems and seek to preserve valuable infrastructures and knowledge that was built up during the eradication of polio.⁹⁸ These polio assets often contribute to the broader health systems beyond polio, for instance in tackling multiple health emergencies such as the Ebola outbreak in 2014 and the current COVID-19 response.

The polio transition process started in 2015, with the release of the guidelines for preparing polio transition plans. In 2016, an independent monitoring board was established to overlook and guide the process. Worldwide, 16 countries in three WHO Regions are currently prioritised for polio transition.⁹⁹ In addition, four countries (Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen) with fragile health systems have been added. Most of them developed their transition plans over the period 2016–2017. As of 2020, 14 of these countries had developed transition plans, 5 of which still required formal endorsement.¹⁰⁰ All 6 countries that have not yet developed polio transition plans are located in the Eastern Mediterranean WHO Region. Pakistan and Afghanistan have not begun transition planning because they continue to focus on eradication first, as polio is still endemic in these countries. In the other cases, state fragility and conflicts, paired with health emergencies and natural hazards, are posing significant obstacles to the progress of transition planning.

While the infrastructure in place for the polio program has been tremendously helpful in managing the COVID-19 response in many geographies, the pandemic has also negatively affected the implementation of polio transition plans in all priority countries, as not only financial resources but also staff and structures were repurposed to fight the pandemic. Limited funding had already been a key obstacle to the implementation of transition plans in many countries. In some countries, especially in the African and Eastern Mediterranean Regions, transition plans have recently been under revision to adjust their

timeliness and assessments of budgetary needs given the COVID-19 context.


G7 financial support for the GPEI

Since 2011, G7 members have contributed USD 3,027.22 million to the GPEI budget. Annual contributions show a fluctuating but overall declining trend. Between 2011 and 2020, collective G7 contributions declined by 26%, from USD 315.68 million to USD 233.25 million. Since 2018, which was the last year covered in the Biarritz Progress Report, contributions decreased by 18%. As total funds to the GPEI have decreased by 34% since 2011, G7 contributions have increased in relative importance. In 2020, 30% of all funds of the initiative came from G7 members.¹⁰¹

Numbers for 2021 are not yet available for all G7 members. However, a steep drop can be expected as the UK, historically the second largest donor to the GPEI, will cut down funding to the GPEI to GBP 5 million. GPEI expects these cuts to have profound impacts, setting back eradication efforts at a critical moment.¹⁰²

Canada has been a long-time supporter of polio eradication efforts, with CAD 586 million committed to polio eradication efforts since 2011, of which CAD 478 million have already been disbursed. Canada is the 4th largest sovereign donor to the GPEI, after the US, UK and Germany, and the 8th largest donor overall. Recent contributions and commitments include: CAD 190 million to support the 2019–2023 Endgame Strategy; CAD 100 million to support the 2017 Endgame Strategy; and CAD 250 million to support the 2013–2018 Endgame Strategy.

France is not directly contributing to the GPEI but contributes indirectly through its contribution to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which is funding the introduction of inactivated polio vaccines (IPV) into routine immunisation in the poorest countries. France was the fifth largest sovereign donor to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, with a commitment of

Figure 17: G7 contribution to the GPEI, 2011–2020

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-DAC2a

USD 619 million for the period 2016–2020 (Gavi 4.0 strategy 2016–2020). France also supports GPEI through its industry, as Sanofi Pasteur is the world's leading supplier of oral and injectable polio vaccines with recently increased IPV production capacity.

Germany is the third biggest donor to GPEI. Between 2011–2020, Germany provided USD 341.71 million to the Polio Programme. This includes bilateral support through the KfW Development Bank to achieve polio eradication in Afghanistan, India, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tajikistan. From 2020 onwards, Germany's contributions are provided directly to GPEI and are unearmarked (EUR 35 million per year). In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Germany contributed an additional EUR 5 million each to the bilateral polio programs of Nigeria and Pakistan in 2020. Germany is also the fourth largest sovereign donor to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, with a commitment of EUR 600 million for the Gavi 4.0 (2016–2020) and 5.0 strategy (2021–2025) periods respectively.

Italy is the seventh largest public donor to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which has been one of the core partners of GPEI since 2018, and has collaborated to introduce the Inactivated Polio Vaccine into national immunisation programmes in the 71 Gavi-supported countries by early 2019. Between 2018–2021, Gavi's direct contribution to the Inactivated Polio Vaccine was USD 704 million, including USD 192 million in 2021 for programmatic expenditure for 2021, which was 18% of the total vaccine programmes.¹⁰³

Japan has continued to support Pakistan and Afghanistan in collaboration with UNICEF towards eradication of wild polio, as it has done since 1996. In 2021, approximately USD 4.5 million of grant aid were provided to UNICEF as a support to Pakistan. In addition, since 2011, Japan has adopted a loan conversion model, which realises innovative financing in a partnership with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Under this model, Japan has provided development assistance loans to the governments of Pakistan (approximately USD

108 million) and Nigeria (approximately USD 75.3 million) for vaccine and operational costs.

The **UK** provided a total of GBP 485 million to the GPEI between 2011 and 2021. Since the last progress report was published, the UK has provided GBP 50 million in its fiscal year 2018/2019, GBP 33 million in 2019/2020, and GBP 70 million in 2020/2021. For the fiscal year 2021/2022, however, due to COVID-induced budget pressures, the UK reduced its budget to GPEI to GBP 5 million, although historically it remains GPEI’s second largest sovereign donor.¹⁰⁴

The **US**, through CDC and USAID, has provided USD 2.28 billion for GPEI between 2011 and 2021. Between 2018 and 2021, the US provided USD 948

million for GPEI. These funds have supported polio laboratories, facility and community surveillance, immunisation campaigns, outbreak response, communication and behavioural change, field epidemiologists and data analysis.

The **EU** is supporting Afghanistan, for instance, with EUR 25 million in collaboration with UNICEF and WHO. Indirect support is also provided through a EUR 300 million contribution to GAVI (2021–2025), which is part of the GPEI and facilitates access to the inactivated polio vaccine.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2011	1. G7 financial support for GPEI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GPEI • UNICEF • WHO • Self-reporting
	2. Number of polio cases	
	3. Number of country polio transition plans developed	

Commitment 20

Delivery of doses

“Recognising the urgent need to speed up delivery of doses, we are committing to share at least 870 million doses directly over the next year. We will make these doses available as soon as possible and aim to deliver at least half by the end of 2021 primarily channelled through COVAX towards those in greatest need. Taken together, the dose equivalent of our financial contributions and our direct dose sharing mean that the G7’s commitments since the start of the pandemic provide for a total of over two billion vaccine doses.”

Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 9

SDGs:



Score:  *Excellent*

The COVID-19 pandemic and its subsequent crises have had severe effects on people’s health and livelihoods worldwide. Hard-won progress on many of the urgent matters discussed in this very report has halted or been erased. Like a magnifying glass, the pandemic has amplified pre-existing inequalities. Two years after the WHO characterised the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic, and after several vaccines have been developed, this pandemic is still ongoing in most parts of the world.

At the 2021 Summit in Carbis Bay, G7 leaders recognised that in our globalised world COVID-19 will not be under control anywhere until it is under control everywhere. Therefore, the G7 expressed their willingness to accelerate the rollout of safe, effective, accessible and affordable vaccines for the poorest countries, describing the role of extensive immunisation as a global public good.¹⁰⁵

More specifically, the G7 committed to share at least 870 million doses by June 2022, including

435 million doses through the end of 2021, mainly to countries where the needs are greatest. Further, they committed that, taken together, the dose equivalent of G7 financial contributions and direct dose sharing should provide for a total of 2 billion vaccine doses. Thereby, the G7 agreed that the primary route for providing these vaccines should continue to be the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) and its COVID-19 Global Vaccine Access Initiative (COVAX).

The ACT-A is a global collaboration launched in April 2020 to accelerate the development and production of as well as equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments and vaccines. One of its pillars is COVAX, which works together with governments, manufacturers, international partners and science to accelerate the development and manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines and to ensure fair and equitable access to vaccines for every country worldwide. This is especially important for countries that would otherwise be unable to

afford vaccines, or that do not have bilateral deals with manufacturers. The initiative is being coordinated by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the WHO, and the research alliance CEPI (Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations). As such, COVAX makes use of the established global structures of Gavi and its partners, which have been immunising children around the world against infectious diseases for many years.¹⁰⁶

State of global immunisation

While many high-income countries have started giving out third and fourth booster vaccinations to their citizens, many people worldwide, especially in low-income countries, have not yet received any COVID-19 immunisation. According to data published by Our World in Data, 59.2% of the world's population had received a complete initial protocol and a further 6.16% were partly vaccinated as of the beginning of May 2022. Among low-income countries, however, only 15.48% had received at least one dose and 12.32% had received

a complete initial protocol.¹⁰⁷ The WHO vaccination tracker shows that the African continent lags furthest behind, with an average of 34 vaccine doses administered per 100 population.¹⁰⁸

State of dose delivery and dose sharing

As of the beginning of May 2022, COVAX had shipped more than 1.44 billion doses to 145 countries.¹⁰⁹ In March, Gavi estimated that lower-income countries will have received 1,153 million doses of vaccines through COVAX AMC by mid-2022. At that point, countries had pledged to donate 1,949 million doses through COVAX and bilaterally.¹¹⁰

Delivery of doses by G7 countries

By the end of December 2021, G7 countries had donated approximately 814.88 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine doses, including to COVAX and through direct bilateral donations, thereby achieving their goal of delivering at least 435 million doses by that point in time (see Table 9).

Table 9: Number of COVID-19 vaccine doses donated by G7 members by the end of December 2021 (in million, approx.)

	Donated total	Donated through COVAX	Donated bilaterally
Canada	12.6	11.9	0.8
France	69.9	65.8	4.1
Germany	103.0	95.0	7.7
Italy	52.9	50.3	2.6
Japan	35.0	14.8	20.2
UK	30.8	25.4	5.5
US	366.7	307.9	58.8
EU/Team Europe (excl. DE, FR, IT)	144.0	110.0	34.0
G7, total	814.88	681.04	133.65

Source: G7 members' self-reporting

By April 2022, G7 countries had donated 1.16 billion vaccine doses. 85.3% of these doses were donated through the COVAX Facility (see Table 10). Most G7 countries donated the remaining portion bilaterally, mainly to low- and middle-income

countries. As such, the G7 members have achieved their goal of delivering at least 870 million vaccine doses mainly through COVAX, and the remaining portion bilaterally, to low- and middle-income countries and regions by June 2022.

Table 10: Number of COVID-19 vaccine doses donated by G7 members by the end of April 2022 (in million, approx.)

	Donated total	Donated through COVAX	Donated bilaterally
Canada	50.8	50.0	0.8
France	86.5	750.5	11.0
Germany	143.8	135.8	8.0
Italy	73.4	69.7	3.7
Japan	44.0	19.4	24.7
UK	44.7	37.8	7.0
US	531.2	466.7	65.0
EU/Team Europe (excl. DE, FR, IT)	185.8	134.5	51.3
G7, total	1.160.16	928.27	170.81

Source: G7 members' self-reporting

Taken together, the dose equivalent of G7 members' financial contributions and direct dose sharing since the start of the pandemic provided for a total of at least two billion vaccine doses.¹¹¹ The total number of doses donated by G7 members that were delivered to recipient countries by the end of April amounted to 997.03 million. It is important to note, however, that the delivery of vaccine doses is not only in the hands of donors such as the G7, but is determined by multiple factors, including changing demand in partner countries and logistical issues.

More information on individual G7 members' vaccine donations

To date **Canada** has donated approximately 50 million surplus vaccine doses through the COVAX Facility. In the same timeframe, Canada shared 762,020 AstraZeneca doses through direct, bilateral arrangements with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Additionally, Canada's financial contributions to COVAX have supported the procurement of approximately 87 million vaccine doses for low- and middle-income countries.

As of the end of April 2022, **France** had donated 86.53 million vaccines, of which 68.67 million have been delivered. 75.45 million doses were donated through the COVAX facility (62 million delivered)

and 11 million vaccines have been donated bilaterally to low- and middle-income countries (6.58 million delivered). Between 2020 and 2022, France contributed EUR 300 million to COVAX.

Germany had donated a total of 143.78 million doses by the end of April 2022, of which 104.48 million have been delivered to recipient countries. The majority of doses, 135.78 million, were donated to the COVAX facility, of which more than 96 million have already been delivered. 8 million doses were donated bilaterally to lower-middle-income countries (Ukraine, Egypt, Ghana and Vietnam) and upper-middle-income countries (Thailand, Namibia). Further, Germany has supported COVAX with USD 2,658 million.

Italy allocated 69,710,914 doses through 30 April 2022, of which 44,978,220 were delivered through COVAX by 30 April 2022. Additionally, Italy donated 3,652,000 doses bilaterally. Further, Italy contributed EUR 385.5 million to COVAX to procure vaccines for lower-middle income countries.

Japan had donated approximately 44 million doses of vaccines as of the end of April 2022. This includes approximately 19.38 million doses through the COVAX Facility and 24.65 million doses donated bilaterally. In addition to dose donations, Japan is committed to providing up to USD 500 million to COVAX in addition to the contribution of USD 1 billion already disbursed. Japan co-hosted the COVAX AMC Summit with Gavi in June 2021 and called for further commitments from other donors. The Summit succeeded in securing USD 9.6 billion, which closed the financial gap for the target to cover 30% of the population in AMC-eligible economies by the end of 2021. Japan has also been supporting cold chain system development as “Last One Mile Support” to ensure the delivery of vaccines to vaccination sites, amounting to JPY 18 billion to 77 countries and regions (as of March 2022).

The **UK** donated 44.7 million vaccine doses by mid-March. This included 38.2 million doses already delivered to COVAX, plus 6.6 million delivered directly to countries in need. COVAX and the bilateral partners have agreed to take a further 23.6 million doses, to be delivered in the near future. All donations have been to countries eligible to receive Overseas Development Assistance. In addition to this, the UK has committed GBP 548 million to COVAX to buy vaccines.

The **US** government has contributed USD 4 billion to Gavi (in March and July 2021) in support of COVAX for the procurement and delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, which is the largest single-country contribution to COVAX. This funding, along with additional US government funds, was used toward the purchase of the first 500 million Pfizer doses distributed by COVAX to low-and middle-income economies around the world, as defined by Gavi’s Advance Market Commitment and additional countries in the African Union. On 22 September 2021, President Biden committed to supplying an additional 500 million Pfizer vaccine doses to COVAX for delivery to the same low- and lower-income economies, making available more than 1 billion vaccine doses in partnership with COVAX. As of 30 April 2022, 531.2 million US-donated doses were delivered through COVAX, including 363.8 million Pfizer doses facilitated by the USG.

As of April 2022, **EU** member states/Team Europe (not counting Germany, France and Italy, who reported here separately on their own share of vaccine dose donations as a part of the Team Europe approach) had shared 185.8 million doses. Of these, 134.5 million doses were donated through COVAX, and 51.3 million were direct bilateral donations. In addition, the 24 EU Member States and the Commission have supported COVAX for vaccine purchases with more than EUR 1.2 billion in grants and EUR 600 million in EU-guaranteed loans through EIB, used for the front-load payment for vaccines.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2021	1. 2 billion doses delivered to recipient countries through direct dose sharing and from financial contributions* to COVAX to buy vaccines.	Self-reporting confirmed and related to public data from ACT-A
	2. 870m vaccine doses are donated mainly through the COVAX Facility** and the remaining proportion bilaterally to mainly low- and middle-income countries and regions*** by June 2022.	
	3. 435m doses are donated by end of December 2021.	

* Once the OCED methodology is finalised, the AWG should reassess its methodology for consistency with that of the OECD.

** For doses donated through COVAX, data received from G7 donor countries is cross-checked with data from COVAX/ACT-A for consistency and to track progress.

*** All doses shared bilaterally should be donated to mainly low- and middle-income countries and regions and not sold or exchanged.



Case Study: European Union

Manufacturing and access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies in Africa



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The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the vulnerabilities of current global pharmaceutical supply chains. African companies' participation in these complex value chains is negligible, as Africa imports 99% of its vaccines and more than 90% of its medicines and health technology products.

Strengthening African pharmaceutical systems and regional manufacturing capacities will not only help to diversify global pharmaceutical supply chains, but will also facilitate easier access to quality, safe, effective and affordable essential vaccines, medicines and health technologies across the continent, contributing to stronger and more resilient national health systems.

Responding to the call for action from the African Union during the first conference on vaccine manufacturing in Africa in April 2021, the European Commission (EC) has initiated a coordinated effort leveraging resources from various services of the EC, European financing institutions and EU Member States to tackle barriers to local manufacturing and access to health products and technologies in Africa from different angles, with a focus on the continent's own actors and institutions. Following a 360-degree approach, the effort will encompass support under three dimensions: Supply and demand-side measures embedded in actions to build and strengthen the crucial enabling environment that health and pharmaceutical systems need to thrive (regulation, technology transfer, vocational training and higher education, research and development).

During the World Health Summit in Rome in May 2021, President von der Leyen announced that the EC will invest EUR 1 billion through the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation

Instrument during the budget cycle 2021–2027 for a Team Europe Initiative to promote local manufacturing and thus improve access to vaccines, medicines and health technologies in Africa.

So far, the EC has mobilised nearly EUR 100 million in the budget planning cycles for 2021 and 2022.

DG INTPA has been working closely with the Africa Centre for Disease Control and Prevention and the Partnerships for African Vaccine Manufacturing to support the development of a continental Framework for Action, published in December 2021. This provides the foundation for all stakeholders to contribute to Africa's ambition to produce 60% of its required vaccines on the continent by 2040.

Bilateral measures for local pharmaceutical production have been initiated in Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa, and opportunities are being evaluated in other countries like Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco and Nigeria. Regionally, the global WHO mRNA Technology Transfer Hub in South Africa with spokes in Latin America, South and South-East Asia received crucial support, and a partnership between the European Medicine Agency and the new Africa Medicine Agency is underway. While the focus initially is on vaccines, the EC sees its engagement in the TEI MAV+ as a long-term commitment going beyond the short-term needs of the current pandemic.

Establishing local pharmaceutical production in Africa takes time and requires a comprehensive 360-degree approach involving local stakeholders. It is a complex undertaking but possible – it needs expertise, finance, endurance, commitment, innovation and cooperation – and the EC is committed to staying in it for the long run.

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- 103 More information: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (2022). *Inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) support*. Retrieved from <https://www.gavi.org/types-support/vaccine-support/inactivated-polio-vaccine>
- 104 Details are available on: FCDO (2014). *Development Tracker. Global Polio Eradication Initiative 2008–2013*. Retrieved from <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-114311/summary> 2013–2019; and FCDO (2020). *Development Tracker. Support to Polio Eradication through GPEI – 2020–2023*. Retrieved from <https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-1-300739/summary>
- 105 G7 (2021). Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué. (para. 8.) Retrieved from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/50361/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique.pdf>
- 106 For more information on COVAX please refer to: WHO (2022). *COVAX Working for global equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines*. Retrieved from <https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax> And: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (2020). *COVAX explained*. Retrieved from <https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained>
- 107 Our World in Data (2022). *Coronavirus (COVID-19) Vaccinations*. Retrieved from <https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations>
- 108 WHO (2022). *WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard*. Retrieved from <https://covid19.who.int/>
- 109 UNICEF (2022). *COVID-19 Vaccine Market Dashboard*. Retrieved from <https://www.unicef.org/supply/covid-19-vaccine-market-dashboard>
- 110 Gavi the Vaccine Alliance (2022). *Dose donation pledge table*. Retrieved from <https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-Dose-Donation-Table.pdf>
- 111 The COVID-19 vaccine dose equivalent of G7 financial contributions to COVAX is calculated by dividing total financial contributions by an estimated price per vaccine dose and allowing for a substantial buffer for costs other than vaccine purchases.

4. Food security and nutrition

Food security and nutrition are of particular concern, as this area is deteriorating severely due to conflicts, socio-economic shocks, climate change and other environmental stressors as well as the impact of COVID-19. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has exacerbated this situation through its impact on rising food, fuel and fertiliser prices. Russia and Ukraine account for a significant share of global food markets (72.7% of sunflower oil, 35.1% of wheat, 26.8% of barley and over 15.3% of maize by volume), with Middle Eastern and African countries being the biggest importers.¹ The conflict is disrupting global food supply chains, aggravating existing world food price inflation, and food insecurity and malnutrition are increasing. 1.7 billion people in over 100 countries are now facing food, energy and commodity price rises. Humanitarian need is at an all-time high, with over 300 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2022 – a fourfold increase since 2015 – and 43 million people living a step away from famine, compared with 25 million in 2020.

Meanwhile, malnutrition is not limited to undernutrition, but also includes overnutrition. This double burden was, for instance, addressed at the Tokyo Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2021, where the Tokyo Compact on Global Nutrition for Growth was issued with more than 200 endorsements from a wide range of stakeholders to demonstrate the

global direction for improving nutrition, together with priority areas such as sustainable food systems and tackling nutritional issues exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Stronger global engagement is needed to fight food insecurity and malnutrition. The G7 has supported various global and regional food security initiatives. In 2012, the G7 launched the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition as a 10-year initiative to pull 50 million people out of poverty in Africa. In 2015, the G7 supported the Elmau commitment to lift 500 million people out of hunger and malnutrition in developing countries by 2030. The commitment forms part of a broad effort involving partner countries and international actors, and significantly contributes to the Post-2015 Development Agenda. Since then, the G7 Food Security Working Group has started discussions on how to report G7 members' progress regarding their commitments on Food Security and Nutrition Development.

The following section monitors the G7 leaders' engagement towards achieving this goal; it assesses global and regional hunger and malnutrition trends, and details G7 political and financial contributions to agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition in developing countries, as well as to multilateral organisations.

Commitment 21

Broad food security and nutrition development

“As part of a broad effort involving our partner countries, and international actors, and as a significant contribution to the Post 2015 Development Agenda, we aim to lift 500 million people in developing countries out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030. The G7 Broad Food Security and Nutrition Development Approach, as set out in the annex, will make substantial contributions to these goals”

“We have therefore decided to raise our collective support for food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa through an array of possible actions, such as increasing Official Development Assistance, better targeting and measuring our respective interventions in line with food security and nutrition-related recommendations defined at Elmau and Ise-Shima, and ensuring they reach women and girls, backing efforts to attract responsible private investments and additional resources from other development stakeholders. We will encourage blended finance and public private partnerships (PPPs). We will act in line with African countries priorities and consistently with the African Union Agenda 2063, aiming to reach also the most neglected areas and the most vulnerable people.”

Elmau 2015, Elmau Leaders' Communiqué, p. 19
Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 27
Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 30
Carbis Bay, 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 66

SDGs:



Score:



Below expectations

For many countries around the world, it is still a major challenge to feed all people even though in principle the global food production system could provide for everyone on earth. The main drivers of food insecurity are conflicts, climate-change-related disasters, socio-economic shocks as well as structural poverty and inequality. The number of undernourished and malnourished people has increased gradually since 2014, and the COVID-19

pandemic has exacerbated food insecurity around the world. Overall, FAO reports that between 720 and 811 million people suffered from acute hunger in 2020.² The SDG progress report for 2021 estimates that between 83 and 132 million people were pushed into chronic hunger in 2020, and many countries all over the world struggle with multiple forms of malnutrition.³ Food insecurity and malnutrition create problems over the whole

life at every age, with children being particularly affected. Undernourishment can have devastating effects on pregnant women and children. For instance, malnutrition in early childhood causes deficits in cognitive and physical development that can only partially be regained in later life.⁴

During the 2015 Elmau, 2017 Taormina, and 2021 Carbis Bay Summits, the G7 leaders reaffirmed their commitment to ensure food security for millions and support their nutritional development, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the G7 committed to strengthening agricultural outputs and food systems, providing technical support to implement nutrition-sensitive programmes and interventions, and improving the link between relief and development for food security and nutrition support. Additionally, the G7 agreed to introduce financial reporting on food security and nutrition, taking account of global trends for hunger and malnutrition and reporting on the policy measures and volumes of assistance they provide in accordance with the Broad Approach on Food Security and Nutrition as agreed in the Annex to the Elmau Declaration in 2015.

Global trends for hunger and malnutrition


Since the baseline in 2015, the number of undernourished people worldwide increased from 615 million to 768 million in 2020, and the prevalence of undernourishment rose from 8.3% to 9.9%.⁵ The most considerable proportion of people suffering from hunger lives in Central and Southern Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa with 308.3 and 264.2 million people, respectively. The number of stunted children decreased from 163.4 to 149.2 million worldwide in the same period. However, there are significant regional differences, and numbers for Sub-Saharan Africa remained at almost the same level, with 57.3 million children still suffering from stunting in 2020. Similarly, South Asia has a large number of undernourished children, with 53.8 million in the same year.⁶

G7's ODA spending for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition

Between 2015 and 2017, G7 partners' direct ODA assistance for food security and nutrition increased from USD 8.8 billion to USD 10.7 billion, with support directed towards Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for over 70% of the investments in 2019. Figure 18 summarises the G7's spending in sectors relevant to food security between 2017 and 2019, according to the financial reporting, towards the Elmau goal.⁷ Notably, members made the highest investments in the agricultural and emergency food assistance sectors with USD 3,744 million and USD 4,883 million, respectively, in 2019. While the volume for the agricultural sector decreased over time, the spending in the emergency food sector rose in these three years. Spending for the two sectors follows the same trend in the Sub-Saharan region. Overall, the G7 spent half of their total disbursements in this region. For instance, shares of total ODA spending in the development food assistance and basic nutrition sectors are 63% and 49% each in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.

On the one hand, the total support provided to multilateral organisations increased from USD 976 million to USD 4,421 million in the period. The largest recipients of funds were WFP and World Bank, with USD 2,440 million and USD 763 million in 2019, respectively. At the same time, the G7 decreased direct ODA spending from USD 6,222 million to USD 2,257 million, indicating that the G7 started to rely more on multilateral organisations over time. For instance, the US channelled USD 178 million to multilateral organisations in 2017 compared to USD 3,729 million in 2019. G7 members committed to showing their progress on sustainable agriculture investments based on outcomes such as the 10 core performance criteria and 5 advanced criteria of the FAO TAPE tool.

Figure 18: G7 total spending in ODA assistance in million USD for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition between 2017 and 2019



Source: G7 Food Security Working Group Financial Report

The G7's activities to improve food security and nutrition development

Since 2017, the G7 Food Security Working Group has published the annual Financial Report on Food Security and Nutrition, which monitors the G7's efforts to enhance food security and nutrition development.⁸ The reports measure the G7's outputs qualitatively and quantitatively, focusing on nutrition, gender, and climate change adaptation and mitigation. They include bilateral and multilateral financial commitments, as well as disbursements in sectors that support food security and nutrition. The following section integrates the reports' findings from 2019 (based on 2017 data), 2020 (based on 2018 data) and 2021 (based on 2019 data), as the next version of the Financial Report on Food Security and Nutrition will become available after this accountability report is published.^{9,10}

Alignment with international Guidelines

G7 members committed to integrating the performance standards "Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems" (RAI) and "Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible

Governance of Tenure" (VGGT) in their investment instruments. Most members aligned their ODA spending with the two standards, and France, Germany, the US and the EU have fully integrated the VGGT and Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (PRAI) into their instruments. The UK has prioritised compliance with the VGGT throughout their programme and has issued guidance to drive responsible agriculture investments, building on the RAI. Italy and Japan started the reviewing process, which is ongoing. Only Canada did not begin reviewing its ODA instruments for consistency with VGGT and RAI.

Strategies to bridge the humanitarian-development nexus

Better linkages between humanitarian and development actors can strengthen the short-, medium- and long-term success of food security and nutrition initiatives. To improve the interaction between these stakeholders, G7 members committed to developing multi-sectoral strategies that enhance the transition from relief to development. Almost all members had such a strategy in place

following the first release of the Financial Report in 2017. Germany and Italy were still developing their multi-sectoral strategy, leaving only Canada without a strategic approach on how to bridge the humanitarian-development nexus in 2019.

Capacities to analyse food security and nutrition indicators

To achieve the objectives of SDG 2 on Zero Hunger, it is crucial to enhance the monitoring capacities of countries. Thus, G7 members decided to provide technical support and funding to increase countries' abilities to collect and analyse indicators that measure the fulfilment of SDG 2. The majority of members implemented programmes to achieve this commitment, except for Canada.

G7 member programmes on agriculture and rural development

Between 2017 and 2019, the G7 members increased the number of programmes that aim to raise the incomes of smallholders from 1,512 to 2,243, accounting for 62.2% and 75.6% of the total number of agricultural development programmes. Especially Italy and Japan targeted income creation for smallholders in 2019, as 391 Italian programmes and 1,605 Japanese programmes addressed the issue. The other G7 members combined implemented 247 programmes with the objective of supporting smallholders monetarily in 2019. Additionally, G7 members committed to showing their progress on sustainable agriculture investments based on outcomes such as the 10 core performance criteria and 5 advanced criteria of the FAO's TAPE tool.

Resources committed to projects with a nutrition focus

The G7 increased the volume of assistance dedicated to nutrition-specific interventions compared to the baseline of USD 560 million in 2015. While spending remained at the same level in 2017, the G7 spent 43.4%, or USD 242 million, more on nutrition-specific interventions in 2019. Mainly, France's and the EU's expenditures influence this change, as

their assistance rose threefold and twofold to USD 25.8 million and USD 243 million for 2019, respectively. For investments in nutrition-sensitive interventions, the increase stagnated at over 20% compared to the baseline in 2017 and 2019. Notably, the US primarily drove these increases compared to the 2015 baseline. Its expenditure increased by USD 726 million and USD 1,681 million in 2018 and 2019, respectively. For comparison, as the second-largest donor, the UK spent a total of USD 873 million in 2019. The spending compared to the baseline varies significantly between G7 members. For instance, Canada and the EU spent 32.6% and 17.0% less on nutrition-sensitive interventions than in 2015, while France increased its spending by 188%.

Resources committed to agricultural projects with a gender focus

The volume dedicated to projects in the agricultural sector¹¹ with an integrated gender objective decreased between 2017 and 2019 from 71.9% to 56.3%, while the spending on projects with gender as the main objective increased from 0.3% to 4.8% in the same period. France recorded a significant drop in resources committed to the former project type, with a decrease of 67.2 %-points to a spending share of 13.5% on gender projects in the agricultural sector in three years, while Germany and Japan recorded a reduction in spending of 25.6 %-points and 31.7 %-points, respectively. The UK and the US recorded volumes below the G7 average, also contributing to the decrease. At the same time, the overall contributions to the agricultural sector did not increase but remained stable between USD 5,652 million and USD 5,148 million in this period.

Resources committed to agricultural projects with a climate change focus

The percentage of resources committed to agriculture that targeted the mitigation of climate change¹² increased from 26.8% to 33.0% between 2017 and 2019. This increase was primarily driven by a decrease in total spending, as total expenditure in the agricultural sector fell by USD 651 million in 2019.

The G7 spent USD 147 million more on agriculture projects aiming to mitigate climate change. Similarly, the absolute spending volume for climate change adaptation decreased, but the spending

share remained stable at 60%, as the total spending in the sector fell from USD 5,847 million to USD 5,196 million in the same period.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
	1. (total and Sub-Saharan Africa data reported separately): Trend of hunger and malnutrition <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No of people suffering from hunger • No. of people suffering from stunting 	Alignment with SDG2 Monitoring (e.g. FAO SOFI; UNICEF-WB Stunting Database; ICN2 Progress Report, GNR)
	2.1 Percentage of G7 member programmes on agriculture and rural development that include objectives and expected results to increase the incomes of smallholder farmers	G7 self-reporting, OECD-DAC data base
	2.2 Percentage of resources committed to agriculture that include specific gender objectives	
	2.3 G7 donors' performance standards for ODA supported investment instruments are reviewed to be aligned with the VGGT and the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems	
2015	2.4 Percentage of resources committed to agriculture that include climate adaptation and/or mitigation objectives	
	2.5 Resources committed to nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions	
	2.6 G7 strategic focus to strengthen linkages between short-, medium- and long-term food security and nutrition support/ programmes and to enhance transition between relief and development	
	2.7 G7 governments have provided technical support and/or funding to improve and/or expand capacities to collect, analyse, and/or use food security and nutrition indicators in support of SDG2 targets.	
	3.1 G7 members Direct Assistance for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition.	G7 Self-reporting based on CRS Codes and agreed methodology
	3.2 G7 members other assistance with explicit objectives to improve people's food security and/or nutrition.	



Case Study: United Kingdom

Adapting and investing in sustainable agriculture programming



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The unfolding crisis in Ukraine is leading to sharp food-price rises and risks exacerbating global food insecurity. Even prior to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, conflict, climate change and COVID-19 had caused food insecurity to reach record levels, with almost 1 billion people globally experiencing insufficient food consumption by the close of 2021. The UK is responding, through its investments in agriculture, to support recovery in the most affected countries around the world.

In 2020 the UK's live *commercial agriculture programmes* had reached **52 million smallholders in Africa and Asia**, generated **GBP 320 million in annual income gains** for nearly 20 million farmers, created **230,000 new jobs** and helped 31.7 million people adapt to climate change impacts.

The UK adapted many of its agriculture programmes to address COVID-19 impacts. The *Commercial Agriculture for Smallholders and Agribusiness programme (CASA)* helped vital food supply chains in Uganda, Malawi and Nepal remain functional, integrate digital innovation and improve food processing, storage and transport.

Across 2021, CASA supported smallholders and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) to respond to pandemic impact, working with **18 businesses and producer organisations** and supporting **39,000 farmers** with new market routes, seeds for product diversification and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):

- In Uganda, CASA distributed **early-maturing vegetable seeds and PPE** to boost food security given market disruptions.

- In Nepal, CASA supported 9 SMEs to establish **e-commerce platforms**, increasing vegetable purchases from smallholders, and helped dairies convert raw milk to skimmed powder, sustaining smallholder incomes. Vegetable seeds and fertilizer were distributed and dairy herd replacement funded for the worst-affected farmers.
- In Malawi, support given to farmers improved **access to fish markets and contained fish disease**.

The UK also co-chaired the multilateral **Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP)**, which rapidly adapted its portfolio and committed new funding to mitigating COVID-19 impact. GAFSP continued to showcase best practices in its allocations to fragile countries and needs-based targeting of the most vulnerable populations. This increased focus on fragile and conflict geographies is a result of UK influence, supported by like-minded donors. In December 2021, GAFSP committed all available USD 150 million to greener recovery in the poorest countries most affected by conflict, climate change and COVID-19. The call for proposals was oversubscribed, underlining the significantly increased need for support to aid sustainable recovery of agriculture that can deliver improved food security for the poorest as well as sustainable climate and environmental outcomes.

Endnotes Chapter 4:

- 1 Glauber, J., Laborde, D. (2022). *How will Russia's invasion of Ukraine affect global food security?* Retrieved from <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/how-will-russias-invasion-ukraine-affect-global-food-security>
- 2 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. (2021). *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021. Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all*. Rome: FAO. Retrieved from <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cb4474en>
- 3 United Nations. (2021). *Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals: Report of the Secretary-General*. New York: Author. Retrieved from <https://undocs.org/en/E/2021/58>
- 4 Behrman, J., Alderman, H., & Hoddinott, J. (2004). *Malnutrition and Hunger*. In B. Lomberg (Ed.), *Global crises, global solutions* (pp. 363–442). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from doi:10.1017/CBO9780511492624.008
- 5 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. (2021). *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2021. Transforming food systems for food security, improved nutrition and affordable healthy diets for all*. Rome: FAO. Retrieved from <https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cb4474en>
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 The latest available G7 Food Security Working Group Financial Report on Food Security and Nutrition is from 2019. Thus, reporting periods differ from the information in the section “Global trends for hunger and malnutrition”.
- 8 As the G7 Food Security Group only started monitoring progress in 2017, comparisons to the 2015 baseline are only possible for agricultural projects with a nutrition focus, as a baseline was pre-established here.
- 9 G7. (2019). *G7 food security working group: Financial report on food security and nutrition 2019*. Retrieved from https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/g7-food-security-vf_cle8f57b9.pdf
- 10 G7. (2021). *G7 food security working group: Financial report on food security and nutrition 2020 and 2021*. Retrieved from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1039850/G7-Food-Security-Working-Group-financial-report-on-food-security-and-nutrition-2021.pdf
- 11 OECD CRS Codes 311, 32161, 312, 313, and 43040
- 12 OECD CRS Code 310

5. Education

Inclusive and equitable quality education, as envisioned by Sustainable Development Goal 4, is an integral part of sustainable development and a crucial requisite for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. By adopting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015, G7 countries have renewed their commitment to actively supporting quality education on a global scale.

For decades, G7 members have been major donors to education. Besides making bilateral contributions, they have been important donors to multilateral initiatives such as the Global Partnership for Education, which is the largest global fund dedicated to promoting equitable and quality education for all in lower-income countries, and Education Cannot Wait, a global fund dedicated to education in emergencies and protracted crises. In the past four years, the G7 members have adopted 3 new commitments on education, focusing on quality education and learning outcomes, the promotion of gender equality, especially in low-income and fragile and conflict-affected countries including in the G5 Sahel, and two new SDG 4 milestone objectives to ensure education is at the heart of COVID-19 recovery.

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused an education crisis of unprecedented scale with severe effects on learning opportunities and outcomes. While progress on SDG4 was already slow and insufficient, the UN describes the pandemic's effects on education as a "generational catastrophe", wiping out 20 years of education gains.¹ Worldwide, almost 90% of learners experienced disruption in their education and around one billion children have lost nearly one year in schooling.²

The crisis has exacerbated existing inequalities in education – between and within countries, but also between genders. Most of the world's school-age children live in low- and middle-income countries, where they have suffered from the consequences of longer school closures and often lower preparedness for delivering remote learning. Especially fragile regions are expected to fall behind on progress towards SDG 4.³ But the crisis has also exacerbated gendered educational inequalities. Girls were especially affected by negative side effects of school closures and lockdowns, ranging from limited access to ICT for remote learning to increased risks of gender-based violence. It is estimated that millions of girls and young women will never return to school.⁴

Under these circumstances, G7 support in these areas continues to be of high importance. Through initiatives like the GPE, G7 members have set up additional grants to help countries in their education response to the COVID-19 crisis.⁵ The following chapter will give insights on how G7 members have followed through with their commitments to increase educational opportunities for women and girls in developing countries and fragile states (Commitment 22); to continue their support to strengthening education systems in the G5 Sahel countries (Commitment 23); and – in light of the devastating effects of the pandemic on girls' education opportunities – to support the achievement of the global targets for girls' education (Commitment 24).

Commitment 22

Quality education for women and girls

“Through the Charlevoix Declaration on Quality Education for Girls, Adolescent Girls and Women in Developing Countries, we demonstrate our commitment to increase opportunities for at least 12 years of safe and quality education for all and to dismantle the barriers to girls’ and women’s quality education, particularly in emergencies and in conflict-affected and fragile states.”

Charlevoix 2018, G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 11

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

Gendered educational inequalities continue to affect especially women and girls in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, gender gaps in educational access and equity had narrowed in these countries, but mostly at the primary level.⁶ At the secondary level, classroom and teaching environments, systemic and institutional barriers, and social norms often-times prevent girls from attending school.⁷ In addition, early and forced marriages and early pregnancies disrupt and limit the affected girls’ educational advancements.

At the 2018 Charlevoix Summit, G7 leaders committed to increasing opportunities for at least 12 years of safe and quality education for all and to dismantling the barriers to girls’ and women’s quality education, particularly in emergencies and in conflict-affected and fragile states. To track progress on this commitment, the G7 members agreed to monitor ODA to education with the aim of achieving gender equality, as well as gross and

net enrolment ratios and completion rates in developing countries and fragile states.⁸

G7 ODA to education in fragile states with the aim of achieving gender equality


G7 members’ bilateral ODA to education in fragile states has increased from USD 2,680 million in 2018 to USD 2,763 million in 2020. Meanwhile, the relative contribution to education in fragile states as a share of ODA to education to all recipient countries has decreased from 33% to 31% (see Figure 19).

In order to assess the volume of contributions with the aim of achieving gender equality, donor countries assign Gender Markers to their development measures when reporting them to the OECD Creditor Reporting System. The Gender Markers indicate to what extent a project pursues the objective of promoting gender equality and women’s rights, and reducing discrimination and inequality between women and men, girls and

boys. A development measure can either receive a score of 2 (if gender equality is its principal objective), a score of 1 (if gender equality is a significant

objective, though not the principal reason for undertaking the measure), or a score of 0 (if none of the above apply).

Figure 19: G7 members’* bilateral ODA to education (all levels aggregated) in fragile states (in USD million and as % of total ODA to education), incl. contributions with Gender Markers 0–2



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS Grant Equivalent, Purpose codes 111, 112, 113, 114
*includes EU Institutions

Between 2018 and 2020, the share of G7 members’ ODA to education in fragile states that has been assigned the Gender Markers 1 and 2 increased from 59% to 62%. The share of G7 members’ ODA with Gender Marker 2, meaning that it was spent on development measures whose principal objective is achieving gender equality, also increased from 6% to 7% (see Table 11).⁹

Female enrolment in education

Data on female enrolment ratios and completion rates were not available for the country categories of developing countries and fragile states.

Table 11: G7 members' bilateral ODA to education (all levels aggregated) in fragile states in 2018 and 2020, with shares of contributions with Gender Markers 1+2 and 2

	2018			2020		
	ODA to education in fragile states (USD million)	Of which Gender markers 1+2 (% of total ODA)	Of which Gender marker 2 (% of total ODA)	ODA to education in fragile states (USD million)	Of which Gender markers 1+2 (% of total ODA)	Of which Gender marker 2 (% of total ODA)
Canada	97.08	97	4	133.57	97	48
France	320.81	95	1	404.86	81	3
Germany	645.75	37	1	906.5	39	2
Italy	46.78	37	5	47.42	25	4
Japan	180.06	18	1	163.72	31	2
United Kingdom	376.55	89	24	220.55	92	27
United States	734.48	46	6	517.5	53	6
EU Institutions	278.85	77	7	369.23	96	2
G7 members (incl. EU Inst.)	2,680.37	59	6	2,763.35	62	7

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS Grant Equivalent, Purpose codes 111, 112, 113, 114

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2018	1. G7 ODA to education (all levels aggregated) with the aim of achieving gender equality between women and men, boys and girls, disaggregated for emergencies, conflict-affected, and fragile states, as defined by the OECD or the World Bank. (Gender markers: 2. Principal and 1. Significant as total and single markers).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD DAC CRS • UIS Stats Database • UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report • Global Partnership for Education Annual Results Report • Education Cannot Wait Annual Results Reports • Countries featured either in the OECD States of Fragility Report or in the World Bank Harmonized List of Fragile Situation, for the fiscal year of reference.
	2.1 Gross and net enrolment ratios by level of education (sex disaggregated; and disaggregated by all developing countries and fragile states).	
	2.2 Completion rates by level of education (sex disaggregated; and disaggregated by all developing countries and fragile states).	

Commitment 23

Basic education in the Sahel

“We recall that 3 million children are still deprived of access to primary school in the Sahel region, due in particular to the closure of schools in conflict-affected areas, and that the quality of teaching remains a significant issue. We will continue our engagement in support of education and will encourage partner countries’ governments and other donors to join a collective effort in strengthening education systems, thus increasing our coordination and our political and financial support to education, including basic education. We encourage the commitment of G5 Sahel countries for improved education systems and policies, with an emphasis on gender equality, which remains an overarching need.”

Biarritz 2019, Sahel partnership Action Plan, para. 15

SDGs:



Score:  Satisfactory

G5 Sahel is a regional organisation of the five Sahel states Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso. It was founded in 2014 with the aim of strengthening cooperation on development and security. In 2017, G7 members founded the Sahel Alliance, whose aims included coordinated support of the G5 Sahel countries in achieving certain development goals and addressing common challenges.¹⁰ One of these challenges continues to be the provision of quality basic education, especially in areas affected by continuously spreading conflict where school closures have rapidly increased in recent years.

At the 2019 Summit in Biarritz, G7 members committed to continuing their engagement in support of education and encouraging G5 Sahel countries’ governments and other donors to join a collective effort in strengthening education systems. To monitor follow-through with these

commitments, the G7 agreed to report on contextual indicators as well as G7 contributions. Contextual indicators include the net enrolment rate, the proportion of qualified teachers and share of government spending on education in the G5 Sahel countries. Indicators measuring G7 contributions are G7 bilateral ODA to basic education to G5 Sahel countries, the proportion of humanitarian appeals in education that are funded by the G7 in these countries, and G7 actions and good practices to encourage G5 countries’ governments and other donors to join a collective effort in strengthening education systems.

Net enrolment in primary and secondary education in the G5 Sahel countries

In the past years, net enrolment rates in primary education in the G5 Sahel countries have on average remained at 69%, with latest rates ranging between 59–77% (see Table 12). Enrolment is

significantly lower at higher levels of education, though large differences persist between G5 Sahel countries. The latest enrolment rates range between 35–72% for lower secondary and 14–39% for higher secondary education. This data suggests

high student dropout with increasing years of schooling, although data on secondary enrolment showed a positive trend before the adoption of this commitment in 2019.

Table 12: Net enrolment rates at different educational levels in the G5 Sahel countries

	Primary (%)	Lower Secondary (%)	Upper Secondary (%)	Years of reference
Burkina Faso	75	53	33	2020
Chad	74	38	22	2019
Mali	59	47	25	2018
Mauritania	70	72	39	2019
Niger	59	35	14	2019, 2017, 2017

Source: Own compilation based on UIS data

Qualification of teachers in G5 Sahel countries

Out of the 5 G5 countries, data is only available for Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. High levels of untrained teachers, poor educational outcomes and inadequate data needed for more effective management of their teachers are predominant in the region. At the same time, there are high numbers of out-of-school children, compounded by rising population displacement; and the consequences of increasing state fragility are exacerbating challenges around teacher deployment. Over the next 20 years, the population of the Sahel countries is expected to double, from 80 to 160 million inhabitants, meaning the education system will have to service an increasing number of school-age children. This rising demand is putting pressure on education systems and increases the need for well-trained teachers who can deliver quality education. Since 2019, Burkina Faso has seen an increase of its proportion of teachers with the required minimum qualifications in both pre-primary and primary education. In pre-primary education, the share of teachers with required qualifications

rose from 42.6% in 2019 to 48.2% in 2020, and in primary education the share of teachers with required qualifications rose from 88.6% in 2019 to 89.5% in 2020. In Mauritania, data is only available for teachers' required qualifications at the primary level, and only for 2019, which was at 96.9%. In Niger, the latest data on teachers' qualifications is from 2018, when the share of teachers with at least the minimum qualification was at 36.5% for pre-primary education and at 61.6% for primary education.

G5 Sahel countries' expenditure on education

According to the UIS database, the share of government expenditure for education in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger in 2019 was below the internationally recommended margin of 15–20%.¹¹ In 2021, Chad and Mali were within this margin, with 15.1% and 16.0% respectively. Mauritania's share of government expenditure on education was at 10.2% in 2019 and 9.7% in 2020. Niger's share of government expenditure on education decreased from 13.0% in 2019 to 12.0% in 2021.

The latest data for Burkina Faso from 2018 indicates that this share was above the recommended margin, at 22.7%.


The countries' expenditure on education as a share of GDP in 2019 was at 5.8% for Burkina Faso, 2.4% for Chad, 3.4% for Mali, 1.9% for Mauritania, and 3.5% for Niger. As such, only Burkina Faso's expenditure on education fell within the internationally recommended margin of 4–6%. More

recent data is only available for Mauritania, which kept education expenditure stable at 1.9% in 2020.

G7 ODA to education to G5 Sahel countries

G7 members' ODA to education in the G5 Sahel countries was at USD 169.71 million in 2019, which was the most recent data available. Of this, USD 82.84 million, or 48.8%, were attributed to basic education.

Figure 20: G7 members'* bilateral ODA to education and basic education dedicated to G5 Sahel countries, 2019 (USD million)



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS
*including EU Institutions

Proportion of humanitarian appeals in education in G5 countries funded by the G7

Since 2019, the volume of G7 members' funding to humanitarian appeals in education in the G5 Sahel countries fluctuated, reaching a peak of USD 10.15

million in 2020 (see Table 13). The share of humanitarian appeals in education that were funded by G7 members has increased from 29.5% in 2019 to 54.3% in 2021.

Table 13: Volume (in USD million) and share of humanitarian appeals in education in G5 Sahel countries funded by G7 members¹²

Source location	2019	2020	2021
All appeals	18.34	27.92	10.07
G7 funded appeals	5.41	10.15	5.47
	29.50%	36.30%	54.30%

Source: UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service

G7 actions and good practices to encourage the strengthening of education systems in the Sahel

All G7 members contribute to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), which supports Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to ensure that even the most vulnerable children get a quality education. In 2019, the G7 education and development ministers endorsed the Gender at the Centre Initiative, which champions the leadership of education ministries and other national actors to advance gender equality in education and to embed gender equality in the core of national education systems. GCI is being implemented in eight pilot countries, including those of the G5 Sahel.¹³

Canada contributes to systematic and transformative change in the education sector of the G5 Sahel countries and to the overall resilience of their education systems. In coordination with UNICEF, Canada supports the “Improving Girls’ Rights to Education” project in Niger, which aims to improve access and quality of education, strengthen the education system’s capacity to better meet the specific needs of girls, and increase retention at the primary and secondary levels. In addition, Canada supports the Education and Training Sector Transition Program in Niger, which aims to improve the governance of the education system and quality education for girls and adolescent girls. In Burkina Faso, Canada supports projects aiming to reinforce the governance as well as financial and procurement management of the basic education system, and to reinforce the rights of girls to access education. Canada’s support to projects in Mali aims to address the barriers to girls’ education and to improve gender mainstreaming in the basic education system. These projects enable greater recognition of the right to an education that is inclusive and gender-sensitive in conflict-affected areas.

France, through the Agence Française de Développement – AFD, supports education systems in the G5 Sahel countries. AFD’s total commitments to education over the period 2019–2022 in the G5 Sahel countries amount to EUR 336 million, of which 62% (EUR 209 million) were allocated to basic education. AFD has, in recent years, diversified its intervention and project management modalities in order to improve the articulation between short-term issues, through support to NGOs in order to respond to crisis situations, and long-term needs; the latter entails accompanying systemic change in the governance and management of education systems and supporting ecosystems for employment and entrepreneurship. These two temporalities and methods of action make it possible to face the challenge of strengthening public counterparts, while responding to the emergencies generated in certain territories. AFD is also increasingly incorporating its commitments to education and employability into the principles of the Integrated Territorial Approach promoted by the Sahel Alliance. In 2022, within the Education and Employability sector group of the Sahel Alliance, AFD will promote a reflection on employment, including informal learning and jobs. In 2021, AFD facilitated an international workshop on education in emergencies.

Germany supports education systems in the G5 Sahel countries through increased contributions to the multilateral education funds GPE and Education Cannot Wait (ECW). To support girls’ education, Germany launched the SHE Initiative in 2021 with a contribution of EUR 100 million to the GPE Girls’ Education Accelerator. Chad, Mali and Niger are eligible to use GEA funding for measures that explicitly benefit girls’ and young women’s education. From 2019–2021, Germany funded GCI with EUR 1.3 million. With a commitment of EUR 100 million (2019–2021), Germany also supported UNICEF in implementing the Building Resilience in

the Sahel Initiative in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The initiative aims at strengthening local communities, improving access to social services including education, and contributing to adaptive, gender-sensitive education systems.

Italy supports the three-year “Girls’ Education Accelerator” project in Niger, which was developed by the Nigerian Ministry of Primary Education, Literacy, Promotion of National Languages and Civic Education. Its objectives are to intensify interventions for women’s education in 10 municipalities of the Maradi Region and to contribute to the implementation of the National Strategy for Accelerating the Education and Training of Girls and Women. Italy will contribute EUR 3 million, and EUR 300,000 for the technical assistance component, whose implementation started in 2021 and is carried out by UN Women.

Japan’s “School for All” project aims to improve the quality and access of children’s education through the active participation of parents, teachers and community members. The project has now expanded to around 70,600 primary and secondary schools in nine African countries, among them Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.¹⁴

The **UK** is the largest bilateral donor to the GPE and second largest to ECW. In 2021, the UK co-hosted the Global Education Summit with Kenya, raising USD 4 billion for GPE, which will continue to benefit the Sahel countries. In 2019, up to GBP 30 million of UK support to ECW was earmarked to benefit the Sahel and surrounding countries. The UK funds the Gender at the Centre Initiative (GCI) and is an active partner in the GCI governance, representing GCI donors on the Executive Committee and ensuring the coordination of donor efforts to support the success of the Initiative and learn from the emerging evidence. The UK has engaged closely with GCI implementing partners and national stakeholders across the Sahel to support the programme’s success; it has raised awareness of the GCI through regional

coordination platforms and has undertaken two progress reviews to ensure the successful roll-out of the initiative.

The **US** supports the strengthening of education systems in the Sahel region through its continued technical and financial support to GPE and ECW, which focus on gender equity and equality and underserved and vulnerable populations, including displaced learners and out-of-school populations. The US is one of the largest bilateral donors to the GPE and to ECW.

The **EU** is funding a programme in the G5 Sahel countries that seeks to improve teacher governance and teacher training, as well as gender balance in the teaching profession (EUR 9.9 million; 2020–2014). The programme involves targeted activities that reflect the specific context and needs of each country, and is implemented by UNESCO. Further, the EU promotes gender equality and inclusion in the education sector in the G5 Sahel countries through the GCI, with an overall EU contribution of EUR 1 million. The EU also continues to fund the GPE (pledge of EUR 700 million; 2021–2027), and has provided EUR 27.5 million to ECW since the inception of the initiative. ECW, among other things, has supported Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad to ensure access to education to crisis-affected populations. Niger also benefitted from the EU-financed BRiCE Programme (Building Resilience: Education Opportunities in Fragile and Crisis Affected Environments) (EUR 1.2 million out of EUR 24 million). Further, following extensive consultations with stakeholders, the EU adopted Multiannual Indicative Programmes in favour of every G5 Sahel country for the 2021–2027 period, with a spending target of EUR 209 million for the 2021–2024 period. In order to join forces for greater impact, the European Commission and EU Member States also jointly formulated multi-sector Team Europe Initiatives in all G5 Sahel countries that include support for the education sector and will be rolled out between 2021–2024.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2019	1. G7 bilateral ODA disbursed to education and basic education dedicated to the G5 Sahel countries	OECD CRS-GE (purpose codes 110 for education and 112 for basic education).
	2. Progress in national budget dedicated to education in the Sahel region, to be compared with the international recommendation of allocating 15–20% of public expenditure to education and 4–6% of GDP.	UNESCO UIS tracking, UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report
	3. SDG Indicator 4.c.1. Proportion of teachers in: (a) pre-primary education; (b) primary education; who have received at least the minimum organized teacher training (e.g. pedagogical training) pre-service or in-service required for teaching at the relevant level-disaggregated for the G5 Sahel countries	UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report, SDG Tracker if available.
	4. G7 actions and good practices to encourage partner countries' governments and other donors to join a collective effort in strengthening education systems.	Self-reporting
	5. Education in Emergencies indicator: Proportion of humanitarian appeals in education that are funded by the G7 in the Sahel region.	Financial Tracking Service UNOCHA
	6. Net enrolment rate (%) disaggregated by level of education (pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary) in the G5 Sahel countries.	UIS Stats Database, UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report, Global Partnership for Education Annual Results Report, Education Cannot Wait Annual Results Reports

Commitment 24

Girls' education targets

“COVID-19 has exacerbated underlying inequalities, leading to one of the worst education crises in history for children around the world, but especially for the most marginalised and at risk girls. Around 11 million girls from pre-primary to secondary school are at risk of not returning to school. We commit to two new global SDG4 milestone girls' education targets: 40 million more girls in education by 2026 in low and lower-middle income countries; and 20 million more girls reading by age 10 or the end of primary school by 2026, in low and lower-middle income countries.”

Carbis Bay 2021, G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 47

SDGs:



Score:



New commitment, no score

In the years before the COVID-19 pandemic, gendered educational inequalities were receding on a global scale. However, in countries affected by fragility and violence, girls are 2.5 times more likely to be out of school. At the secondary level, they are 90% more likely to be out of secondary school than their counterparts in countries not affected by conflict. The negative effects of the pandemic, however, are expected to reverse many of these improvements and exacerbate existing inequalities in access to quality education and skills training, as they especially affect girls' education opportunities. Girls often have reduced access to ICT devices, internet, and ICT skill development, which can constitute an obstacle to remote learning. Gendered discrimination in the allocation of household chores reduces girls' time available for schoolwork. School closures have also contributed to an increased risk of sexual and gender-based violence, early and forced marriage and unintended preg-

nancies. Millions of girls and young women will likely never return to school.¹⁵ Early evidence for this includes a survey in Kenya, which found that twice as many girls (16%) failed to return to school in January 2021 compared to boys (8%).¹⁶

To help counter these developments, G7 leaders at the 2021 Carbis Bay Summit committed to the two new global targets on girls' education: 1) 40 million more girls in education by 2026 in low and lower-middle income countries, and 2) 20 million more girls reading by age 10 or the end of primary school by 2026, in low and lower-middle income countries. To follow through on this commitment, the G7 agreed to monitor female enrolment in primary and secondary education, as well as reading proficiencies in grades 2/3 and at the end of primary school, both with a focus on Low-Income and Low-Middle-Income Countries (LICs and LMICs).

Number of female enrolment in different levels of education in LICs and LMICs

The accountability exercise on this indicator will effectively begin once data for the 2021 baseline are available. When finalising this report, this was not yet the case. Nevertheless, available data for 2020 were collected to give a general idea of the situation.

According to estimations by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), in 2020, the share of female enrolment in primary, lower secondary and upper secondary education was below 50% for both country categories, LICs and LMICs. In LMICs,

female enrolment for all three education levels ranged between 47 and 49%. For LICs, female enrolment was lower, between 43 and 47%.

Notably, the share of female enrolment in LICs in 2020 decreased with increasing levels of education, pointing to a higher female than male drop-out rate with increasing years of schooling. Being able to disaggregate information on the number of children returning to school by gender, but also by location, disability or belonging to any other disadvantaged group, is of particular importance following the impact of COVID-19 as it will help countries track those who do not return.¹⁷

Table 14: Enrollment in different levels of education in 2020 (Number of enrolled students, UIS estimations)

	Lower Income Countries	Lower-Middle Income Countries
Primary education		
all	110,262,056	356,972,813
female	52,214,853	172,141,631
male	58,047,203	184,831,182
share of female enrollment	47.36%	48.22%
Lower secondary education		
all	24,156,525	161,504,605
female	10,918,780	78,666,692
male	13,237,745	82,837,914
share of female enrollment	45.20%	48.71%
Upper secondary education		
all	12,510,332	128,618,696
female	5,378,691	60,713,592
male	7,131,641	67,905,105
share of female enrollment	42.99%	47.20%

Source: Own compilation based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics data

Number of girls with minimum reading proficiency levels

The accountability exercise on this indicator will effectively begin once data for the 2021 baseline is available. When finalising this report, this was not

yet the case. The first annual progress report on the two new global targets will be published in Summer 2022, ahead of the High Level Political Forum and UN Secretary General’s Transforming Education Summit.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
	1. Number of enrolled girls and female adolescents of primary and lower and upper secondary school age (sex disaggregated, and disaggregated by LICs and LMICs).	UIS enrolment data
2021	2. Number of girls with minimum learning proficiency levels for reading in grades 2/3* or at the end of primary school (SDG 4.1.1a & SDG4.1.1b plus UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) school population data to turn proficiency rate into the number of girls) (sex disaggregated, and disaggregated by LICs and LMICs).	UIS minimum learning proficiency data (*Data to be modelled and provided by UIS in FCDO funded annual report.)



Case Study: Italy

Basic educational support in Senegal



© AICS

Background

Education is a key factor in sustainable economic growth and in eliminating social inequalities. The Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) has been supporting several initiatives in Western Africa and especially in Senegal. One of these is the “Support program for the basic education system in Senegal” (PASEB). The aim of the project is to support the government of Senegal in achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, through the improvement of the education system and the elimination of inequalities in access to basic education. The PASEB actions also strengthened the Senegalese National Program of Education and Training 2018–2030 (PAQUET). In Senegal, many schooling facilities are inadequate and the quality of teacher training is poor. To address this situation, in the period 2018–2022, the AICS together with the PASEB funded EUR 12,500,000 to contribute to the improvement of Senegal’s education system by supporting basic education supply in the country’s most disadvantaged regions (Kaolack, Kaffrine, Kolda and Sédhiou).

Tangible achievements of the initiative

The initiative improves access to basic education services through rehabilitation, construction and equipping of school buildings, and improves the quality of pedagogical and didactic offerings. The project has renovated 300 classrooms and built 50 comprehensive schools, improving access to educational services for people with disabilities as well. The project built 37 water points in comprehensive elementary and secondary schools, and 13 deep-water drillings. The initiative also focused on coordinating activities in favour of girls’ education, and

advocated for policies aimed at improving women’s human rights. The project provided didactic materials for beneficiary schools, organised training courses, distributed scholarships including for people with disabilities, trained teachers and inspectors, and strengthened the Ministry of Education’s monitoring, evaluation, and capitalisation system. The ongoing project reached 35,000 students from the identified primary and secondary schools; the management and teaching staff of the intervention areas; and 300,000 people from the communities involved in the intervention (120 villages) in 4 regions of Senegal (Kaolack, Kaffrine, Kolda, Sédhiou).

Lessons learnt

The technical execution of activities is based on the “hands-on” strategy through institutional accountability. This approach promotes the process of decentralisation and devolution of the management of the education system through a bottom-up approach. Another innovative approach is that, in addition to the national standards and official plans, the schools have been built by applying technical specifications related to disability, which take into account the international standards on inclusion.

Way forward and conclusions

In the framework of the domestic implementation of the 2030 Agenda, this initiative focuses on inclusivity, equity and accessibility of the school system and promotes students’ transversal competencies on sustainable development. Furthermore, the initiative will ensure the long-term sustainability of the activity results and project achievements.

Endnotes Chapter 5:

- 1 United Nations (2022). *Goal 4. Progress and Info*. Retrieved from <https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal4>
- 2 Education Cannot Wait (2021). *Winning the Human Race: 2020 Annual Results Report*. New York: Author. Retrieved from <https://www.educationcannotwait.org/annual-report-2020/>
- 3 See Box 1.1 in: OECD (2020). *States of Fragility 2020*. Paris: Author. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1787/ba7c22e7-en>
- 4 UNESCO (2020). *Global Education Monitoring Report – Gender Report: A new generation: 25 years of efforts for gender equality in education*. Paris: Author. Retrieved from <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000374514>
- 5 Further information: Global Partnership for Education (GPE) (2021). *Results Report 2021. Final results report on GPE's 2016–2020 strategy*. Washington, Paris, and Brussels: Author. Retrieved from <https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/results-report-2021>
- 6 Global Partnership for Education. (2021). *Results Report 2021. Final results report on GPE's 2016–2020 strategy*. Washington, Paris, and Brussels: Global Partnership for Education. Retrieved from <https://www.globalpartnership.org/content/results-report-2021>
- 7 Education Cannot Wait. (2021). *Winning the Human Race: 2020 Annual Results Report*. New York: Education Cannot Wait. Retrieved from <https://www.educationcannotwait.org/annual-report-2020/>
- 8 The Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) also tracks the amount of funding pledged and self-reported as disbursed by donors against their Charlevoix commitments. The Charlevoix Funding Dashboard can be accessed via: <https://inee.org/gender/charlevoix-funding-dashboard>
- 9 Please note that data on RMNCH markers is not available for all ODA projects (missing values). The figures depicted here might thus to some degree underestimate or distort the actual contributions of G7 members.
- 10 The Sahel Alliance was founded by Germany, France and the EU. The UK led the Gender group of the Alliance for three years. Today, it has 14 members and additional observers.
- 11 The recommendations to allocate 15–20% of government expenditure and 4–6% of GDP to education were defined by the Incheon Declaration and the Framework for Action for Achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 on ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education for all. More information: UNESCO. (2016). *Education 2030 Incheon Declaration – Towards inclusive and equitable quality education and lifelong learning for all*. Retrieved from http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/education-2030-incheon-framework-for-action-implementation-of-sdg4-2016-en_2.pdf
- 12 The G7 contributions reported here include funding from the following G7 members: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, US.
- 13 For more information on the Gender at the Centre Initiative, please consult: United Nations Girls Education Initiative. (2022). *UNGEI – What we do*. Retrieved from <https://www.ungei.org/what-we-do/gci>
- 14 For more information on the “School for All” project, please consult: JIAC. (2021). *The evolving “School for All” project: Expanding to 53,000 schools in eight African countries, promoting children’s learning, school lunches, and hand washing awareness*. Retrieved from https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/field/2021/20210601_01.html
- 15 Global Education Monitoring Report Team (2020). *Global education monitoring report 2020: gender report, A new generation: 25 years of efforts for gender equality in education*. Paris: UNESCO. Retrieved from <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000374514>
- 16 World Bank (2022). *Prioritizing Learning during COVID-19: The Most Effective Ways to Keep Children Learning during and Post-Pandemic: Recommendations of the Global Education Evidence Advisory Panel*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. Retrieved from <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/114361643124941686/recommendations-of-the-global-education-evidence-advisory-panel>
- 17 UNESCO/UNICEF/The World Bank (2022). *Where are we on Education Recovery? Taking the Global Pulse of a RAPID Response*. Retrieved from <https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/1391-where-are-we-on-education-recovery-taking-the-global-pulse-of-a-rapid-response.html>

6. Equality

Inequality and discrimination related to gender identities and sexual orientations are harming women, girls, and LGBTIQ+ people all over the world. Gendered inequalities exist in the economic sphere regarding access to health services and education, the distribution of unpaid and paid care work, the risk of experiencing violence, the allocation of social positions associated with high decision-making power, and lack of access to business and financial services. For instance, almost one third of all women have been subject to physical or gender-based violence (GBV) at least once since the age of 15; GBV affects women's economic empowerment and security in monetary ways, such as decreased labour capabilities, decreased productivity, missing work, and less income. Further, only about 25% of representatives in national parliaments and about 28% of persons in managerial positions are women.¹ In many cases, gendered inequality interacts with other forms of economic and social inequality and discrimination. Holistic, systems-based, intersectional approaches are thus crucial in tackling these inequalities and their subsequent impact on women's decreased economic security. This report is thus based on an inclusive and intersectional understanding of women and girls in all their diversity.

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic also have a gender equity and equality dimension, with increases in GBV and poverty since the start of the pandemic. Economic shocks, supply-chain disruptions, inflation, lockdowns and school closures put more girls at risk of child early and forced marriage; gender-based violence intensified during the pandemic; and women are disproportionately

shouldering the increasing workload of unpaid domestic activities and care work. For those who identify as LGBTIQ+, the pandemic's effects may be even greater.

G7 members' decisions do not just affect gender equality and equity and women's economic empowerment; domestic and international development policies and legislation have the power to harm or help women and girls. Against this background, the G7 convened a Gender Equality Advisory Council (GEAC) of independent experts from various backgrounds in 2018 that is mandated to support the G7 in integrating gender issues into all themes of the group's agenda. The GEAC has produced annual reports that compile recommendations on how the G7 could drive women's empowerment and promote gender equality. Likewise, there must be a LGBTIQ+-inclusive approach to COVID-19 recovery.

Before establishing the GEAC, the G7 was already committed to tackling gender inequalities and inequities, particularly in the Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Working Group established in 2015. This chapter monitors four development or development-related commitments on gender equality that the group has made since 2014. Commitment 25 concerns sexual and reproductive health and rights; Commitment 26 Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) for women and girls; Commitment 27 women's economic empowerment; and Commitment 28 the role of non-discriminatory legislation in advancing gender equality.

Commitment 25

Sexual and reproductive health and rights

“We are committed to ensuring sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, and ending child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation and other harmful practices.”

Brussels 2014, The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration, para. 21

Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communique, para. 18

Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communique, para. 46

SDGs:



Score:



Below expectations

The Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) approach underlines that all individuals have the right to make decisions governing their bodies and to access services that support that right. This includes a variety of aspects, for instance access to a choice of safe and effective contraceptive methods, comprehensive sexuality education, detecting and preventing gender-based violence, female genital mutilation (FGM), and child, early, and forced marriage (CEFM).² Even if progress has been made, significant gaps regarding the realisation of sexual and reproductive health and rights exist. Nearly half of all pregnancies (121 million) are unintended each year due to a variety of reasons, including a lack of sexual and reproductive health care information, lack of modern contraception methods available, harmful stigma and norms around fertility, sexual violence and gender inequality.³ The pandemic has negatively affected and limited women's access to sexual and reproductive health services, threatening past achievements.⁴ This has led to 2.6 mother and child deaths for every COVID-19 death in lower-middle income countries.⁵

During the 2014 Brussels, 2017 Taormina and 2021 Carbis Bay Summits, the G7 committed to ensuring sexual and reproductive health and rights as well as ending child, early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and other harmful practices. To assess the achievement of their commitment, the G7 partners monitor four indicators: the global prevalence of FGM and CEFM, ODA contributions to enhance SRHR, G7 support of international resolutions on CEFM and FGM, and attention to CEFM and FGM in development programming.

The global prevalence of FGM and CEFM

UNICEF reports that CEFM has decreased by 15% over the past ten years. Still, one out of five women were married before 18, and CEFM is a critical challenge in situations of fragility.⁶ Drivers to reduce child marriage include economic development and poverty reduction as well as access to education and labour markets. COVID-19 exacerbated the risk of CEFM due to school closures, income losses of households, disruption of health services, early pregnancies, and death of caretakers. UNICEF estimates that 10 million additional girls

are at risk of CEFM over the next decade.⁷ This trend challenges the effort to achieve target 5.3 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) to end child marriage by 2030.


According to UNICEF, at least 200 million girls and women alive today endured FGM in 30 countries where data exist, while the exact number remains unknown.⁸ Data from 2004-2020 show that FGM prevalence among girls aged 15 to 19 is particularly high in several countries, including Somalia with 99%, Guinea with 95%, Mali with 89% and Sudan with 87%. However, figures vary between countries across Africa; for instance, Cameroon, Niger and Ghana record FGM prevalence at 1%, 2%, and 2%, respectively.⁹

G7 ODA contributions to improve SRHR

The DAC members screen their ODA contributions that support Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn and

Child Health (RMNCH) using the so-called RMNCH policy marker. To assess G7 contributions to SRHR, this report looks at G7 members' bilateral ODA marked to contribute to RMNCH as well as reproductive health care (purpose code 13020). Between 2014 and 2020, G7 members' ODA spending associated with RMNCH for reproductive health care increased from USD 661 million to USD 878 million (Figure 21). At the same time, expenditure as the share of G7 bilateral ODA on RMNCH fell from 22.0% in 2014 to 5.7% in 2020, while G7 ODA on RMNCH increased from USD 3,878 million to USD 8,706 million. (For further information on G7 ODA expenditure on RMNCH, please see Commitment 16). The United States had the highest spending for reproductive health care each year since 2014.

Figure 21: Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (RMNCH)-screened ODA contributions by G7 members (incl. EU Institutions) for Reproductive Health Care, 2014–2020 (USD million)¹⁰



Source: OECD CRS data (purpose code 13020)

Global mechanisms to collect data on FGM and CEFM

To improve efforts against FGM and CEFM, the data collection mechanism plays an important role in informing evidence-based policy making and addressing the root causes. Multilateral partner organisations do crucial work to collect and track the global prevalence of FGM and CEFM. For instance, **Canada** supported the launch of UNICEF’s Child Marriage Monitoring Mechanism, which generates relevant analyses, makes data accessible and promotes data use to inform policies and programmes and hold governments accountable for progress. **France** committed to the roadmap of the Generation Equality action for bodily autonomy and SRHR, which prioritises FGM and CEFM. Within this action coalition space, France committed to allocating EUR 400 million to SRHR for the next 5 years. The accountability mechanism will be implemented and monitored by UN Women to track key performance indicators’ progress. Germany also supported the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against women with EUR 5.7 million until 2023, of which EUR 2.8 million had already been disbursed by 2021. This built on the UK’s contribution of GBP 25 million since 2014, including support for the UN Trust Fund’s COVID special funding window, which launched in 2020. Additional support was given to the Spotlight Initiative, including a pillar dedicated to ensuring quality, disaggregated and globally comparable data, between 2017 and 2023 with EUR 500 million. The **US** supports the collection of data to generate country and regional estimates of the prevalence, attitudes toward, and consequences of CEFM and FGM through the Demographic and Health Surveys Program (DHS). **France, Germany, Italy, the UK, the US and the EU** contributed to the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme to End Female Genital Mutilation, which collects and tracks data on the prevalence of FGM in 17 high-prevalence countries. The UK, Canada, Italy and the EU also contributed to the UNICEF-UNFPA Global Programme to End Child Marriage, which tackles

child marriage across 12 medium-high-prevalence countries.

G7 partners support of international resolutions on CEFM and FGM

Together with Zambia, **Canada** has co-led biennial UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on CEFM on five occasions. The most recent UNGA resolution on CEFM was adopted by consensus at the General Assembly in 2020 with 114 co-sponsors from all regions of the world, and reflected the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the incidence of CEFM and on efforts to end the practice. Since 2015, Canada has also actively supported and co-sponsored the biennial UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution on CEFM. Canada is a member of the core group of countries that develop the text and advocate for support. Canada co-sponsored the four UN General Assembly resolutions on “Intensifying Global Efforts for the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation”. Canada also co-sponsored the UN Human Rights Council resolutions on the elimination of FGM in 2014, 2016, 2018 and 2020.

France participated and joined multiple resolutions on gender equality and SRHR at the UN General Assembly, the human rights committee, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) commissions and the security council. France also participated in several joint statements for gender equality and SRHR recognition, such as the joint statement at the HRC calling for the recognition of the Generation Equality Forum’s “Global Acceleration Plan” as a collective roadmap for gender equality.

Germany supported the resolution on the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation, adopted by the Human Rights Council on 17 July 2020. In 2020, Germany supported the resolution on an EU strategy to put an end to female genital mutilation around the world.

Italy supported ten UNGA74 and HRC resolutions on the rights of women and girls, including accelerating efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls and to eliminate all forms of discrimination against women and girls, among others. In 2020, Italy supported eleven UNGA75 and HRC resolutions on the rights of women and girls, in particular the Human Rights Council resolutions on “Promoting and protecting the human rights of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations”.

Japan was a co-sponsor of the UNGA resolutions “Intensifying global efforts for the elimination of female genital mutilation” and “Child, early and forced marriage”. Moreover, Japan supported the HRC’s resolutions “Elimination of female genital mutilation” and “Child, early and forced marriage in times of crisis, including the COVID-19 pandemic”.

The **UK** has supported all FGM and CEFM resolutions tabled at the Third Committee. The UK is also a member of the Core Group of the resolution on Child, Early and Forced Marriage, which has enabled the country to shape the text and work closely with facilitators to deliver a strong result.

The **US** co-sponsored a resolution on “Ending violence against children through health systems strengthening and multisectoral approaches” during the 2021 World Health Assembly, which was passed by consensus.

In 2020, the European Parliament voted on a resolution on an **EU** strategy to end FGM around the world. The UNGA resolution to end CEFM co-led by Canada and Zambia received the support of all 27 EU Member States. In 2020, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on FGM as a national development and human rights priority, which the African Group presented and the EU co-sponsored.

G7 partners development programming on CEFM and FGM

Since 2013, **Canada** has allocated over CAD 245 million in new project funding to help end CEFM and FGM. In 2019, Canada made an additional commitment to raise its funding to reach an average of CAD 1.4 billion annually by 2023 to support women’s, children’s and adolescents’ health around the world, with CAD 700 million of the annual investment dedicated to SRHR, including sexual and gender-based violence and harmful practices.

In 2021, **France** funded civil-society programmes to end FGM through the special Fund for Feminist Movements. This fund of EUR 120 million launched in 2019 identifies SRHR as one of the main priorities.

Germany has supported several projects for the prevention of FGM. For instance, the “Improving the Prevention of FGM in Africa” project was funded with EUR 5.9 million and implemented in Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia between 2020 and 2023. The aim is to strengthen the capacities of relevant (non)-governmental actors. Furthermore, organisations and activists from the diaspora communities in Germany and Europe have increasingly been linked with the relevant ministries in the partner countries. The “Reproductive Health and Family Health” project started in 2015 in Guinea and aimed to modernise sexual and reproductive health services in Guinea and raise awareness about FGM. Since its start, the proportion of adolescents and young adults (15–24 years) rejecting female genital mutilation has increased by 47% in the four project regions. Germany provided EUR 22.6 million for the implementation.

In 2020, **Italy** contributed EUR 3 million to reducing maternal and child mortality, improving access to quality maternal and reproductive health services and family planning services under the United Nations Trust Fund for Somalia. The

programme aimed to prevent the spread of female genital mutilation and alleviate its consequences on survivors. In the same year, Italy approved new guidelines for its development cooperation efforts that underline six priorities for action, including combating gender-based violence and promoting sexual and reproductive health.

Japan supported a UN Women project on mitigating social tension and hosted a forum on CEFM for community police officers in 2020.

Since 2013, **UK** aid programmes have helped over 10,000 communities with over 27 million people to abandon FGM. Since 2019, the UK has supported the Gambia, Nigeria, Mauritania and most recently Sudan in making the practice illegal, and helped Burkina Faso, Egypt, Guinea and Uganda strengthen their laws against FGM. The UK has been supporting a Sudan-led movement to end FGM for 7 years, which contributed to a law criminalising FGM in Sudan in 2020. In November 2021, the UK announced GBP 18 million in new funding to prevent child marriage, working through the UNFPA-UNICEF Global Programme to End Child Marriage. This builds on the UK's flagship investment of up to GBP 38 million to end child marriage between 2015 and 2020, including funding for the UN Global Programme and multi-donor trust fund AmplifyChange. The programme funds grassroots organisations focused on advocacy around neglected SRHR issues, including child marriage.

The **US** resumed its funding to the UNFPA, providing close to USD 125 million with over USD 50.5 million in core funding, including support for

the organisation's mandate to end gender-based violence, including CEFM and FGM. Of this funding, the US made available additional resources in light of the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 and gender-based violence on women and girls. In addition, the US has been a leading donor to the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation. Through USAID, the US also invested in CEFM activities in Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique. The US Mission to the African Union supported Koota Injena, a three-year project that worked to secure declarations from leaders of semi-nomadic clans to end the practice of CEFM and FGM/C in Northern Kenya, as well as to improve knowledge about, promote positive attitudes toward, and increase commitment to ending this practice among adults and youth in communities.

The **EU's** main programmes on CEFM and FGM are part of the ongoing regional Africa programme of the EU-UN Spotlight Initiative, in partnership with UN agencies, the African Union, academia, civil-society organisations, regional and intergovernmental entities, and the media. The activities included building capacities of the African Union Commission and other regional bodies, strengthening accountability, and supporting advocacy against CEFM to support new and existing policies in 13 countries. Moreover, in 16 African countries, the EU promoted the inclusion of FGM on the political agenda, engaged high-level political champions to amplify commitments toward the elimination of FGM, and helped to coordinate regional-level civil-society movements.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2014	1. OECD RMNCH Policy Marker child, early and forced marriage (CEFM) and femal genital mutilation (FGM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • G7 members own records – self assessed • OECD/DAC data (to be used for sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) but not for CEFM/FGM) • UNICEF Global Database on Child Protection • Reports from UNFPA, Countdown 2015 (only to be used for global progress on SRHR, not for countries’ financial contributions) • UNFPA reports and database • UN Pop Division World Population Prospects • Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) (both regarding CEFM/FGM) • World Bank’s Gender Data Portal (CEFM) • UN Commission on Population and Development (CPD) (regarding SRH&RR)
	2. Global mechanisms in place to collect data and track prevalence of FGM and CEFM in line with UN Sustainable Development Goals and indicators (to be finalised respectively in September 2015 and March 2016).	
	3. G7 countries sign up to international resolutions on CEFM and FGM (e.g. forthcoming Third Committee Resolution on CEFM)	
	4. Development programming on CEFM and FGM	
	5. Reduced global prevalence of CEFM and FGM	

Commitment 26

Technical and vocational education and training for women and girls

“We commit to increasing the number of women and girls technically and vocationally educated and trained in developing countries through G7 measures by one third (compared to ‘business as usual’) by 2030.”

Elmau 2015, p. 20

SDGs:



Score:  Good

For many countries, technical and vocational education and training (TVET) is a vital part of their educational system, encompassing skills advancement for specific occupational fields, production and services. The Education Commission estimates that by 2030, in low- and middle-income countries, half of the school-age children will not be on track to acquire the most basic skills they need to succeed and transition into the workforce. This situation is worse for girls who face social, financial and policy constraints on their ability to make decisions affecting their education, work, and social capital. TVET presents an ideal opportunity for women and girls to escape poverty and decrease gender inequality by equipping them with the skills required for employment, decent work, and entrepreneurship. It is considered a tool for economic development and reducing unemployment, which disproportionately affects women and girls in many countries. The OECD estimates that discrimination against women accounts for an 8% loss in the global level of investment and cuts their participation in the labour force by 12%. Countries

could increase the world’s GDP by 0.4% every year if gender equality goals are achieved by 2030. TVET assumes a crucial role in supporting the empowerment of women and girls, allowing them to fully participate in economic development.

During the 2015 Elmau Summit, the G7 leaders committed to increasing the number of women and girls reached through TVET measures. Specifically, they aim to provide direct support to women and girls, strengthen initiatives implemented through educational institutions, and foster policy-level interventions to improve women’s and girls’ access to TVET. To standardise the monitoring process, the G7 TVET expert working group developed a framework that helps members assess their achievements (Table 15).

Direct support to support women’s and girls’ access to TVET

Global Affairs **Canada** trained 13,654 people in demand-driven TVET in 2020–2021, with at least 7,777 of the participants being women. Canada

worked with its partners to provide TVET measures directly to vulnerable women and girls, including indigenous and displaced communities, in sectors associated with climate change, environmental management, the green economy, tourism and hospitality. For example, Canada supported Rohingya women and girls, including 286 adolescent girls and 564 women, who received livelihood/self-reliance training specifically in the areas of sewing, embroidery, handicrafts and food production through Multi-Purpose Women Centres.

France paid particular attention to TVET for young women, who are often excluded from such opportunities due to harmful traditions, norms and practices. Interventions included raising the awareness of young women, employers and training centres about gender norms and stereotypes, improving women's access to TVET through child care services or transport, and providing them with individual support. To overcome sexual and gender-based violence during commutes, France, particularly through its AFD-funded programmes, encouraged activities that ensure safe transportation for young women to their vocational training centres or apprenticeship. In some cases, AFD also helps finance part of the transportation costs for female learners. Additionally, France worked to desegregate job areas, allowing young women to access TVET opportunities according to their interest. In 2019, 124,000 young women and men benefitted from TVET interventions supported by the French development agency AFD.

Germany advanced its TVET measures in partner countries, and compared to 2015, the number of women and girls receiving TVET more than doubled from 354,841 to 862,978 in 2018. The high numbers of women trained in 2018 resulted from the German development cooperation efforts with China, which recently ended. Without the figures from China, 7,779 girls and women profited from technical cooperation and 14,792 from financial cooperation in 2016. In 2018, 88,909 girls and women received support in vocational training

(again without the figures from China). In 2021, 63,513 women and girls participated in vocational trainings within the scope of German technical cooperation, and an additional 16,570 women and girls profited from German financial cooperation. Adjusted for the numbers from China, the total number of girls and women in TVET measures in the development cooperation partner countries has increased significantly since 2015. The German government has worked with an improved aggregated reporting system to enhance data quality since 2019.

Italy implemented and planned TVET for young women and girls in its development cooperation activities during the period 2019–2021. Italy defines projects with a special focus on TVET for women and girls through gender markers. Around EUR 4 million were dedicated for TVET for women and girls.

Japan estimates that about 3,400 female students participated in technical cooperation projects in TVET initiatives between 2019 and 2021.

The **UK** supported 40,000 young women and adolescent girls by improving their access to high-quality education and skills development and training opportunities through tertiary education programmes between 2019 and 2021, aiming to increase employability.

In 2019, more than an estimated 553,000 females participated in tertiary, vocational, and other formal and non-formal workforce development education interventions with **US** government support. In 2020, more than an estimated 578,000 females participated in tertiary, vocational, and other formal and non-formal workforce development education interventions with US government support.

Under the European Commission's multi-annual financial framework 2014–2020, the EU invested an estimated EUR 700 million in overall TVET actions,

including funding geared towards educational institutions that directly benefit women and girls. As part of the corporate result framework, the European Commission compiled information on the number of beneficiaries through its delegations. In 2019 and 2020, a total of 66,797 women benefitted from institutional or workplace-based TVET and skills development interventions compared to 88,000 men. Due to lacking data disaggregation, the proportions could change substantially, as data on gender was not available for around 550,000 beneficiaries. The EU planned to improve its result framework's data collection mechanism.

G7 support to educational institutions for TVET

Globally, **Canada** supports the capacity building of government bodies, the private sector, and skills training institutes and colleges for the development of gender-responsive, market-relevant programmes and degrees for work in a global economy. For example, through its network of specialised colleges and institutes, Canada provided technical support to the national TVET institutes of 12 partner countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. This included developing new training programmes that meet local and regional job market needs, strengthening relationships between training facilities and the private sector to develop job market integration services for youth, particularly women and girls, establishing demand-driven and industry-responsive training systems that integrate gender equality considerations, and providing training for the qualification and employability of vulnerable women and indigenous youth.

France supported access to quality education for all women and girls by strengthening educational institutions' capacities for gender-sensitive and transformative education planning and management. For instance, initiatives in schools aimed to address and prevent sexual and gender-based violence, provide adequate sanitation and hygiene

infrastructures, create curricula free of gender bias, and offer teacher training on gender issues. Specifically, France funded the Gender at the Centre Initiative, which aimed to advance gender equality in the education systems of eight African countries. The programme supported governments' filling of technical gaps and implementing gender-responsive budgeting by integrating gender equality into sector planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting as well as tackling barriers like harmful traditional practices and norms.

Germany provided support for TVET measures through educational institutions. For example, Germany conducted a technical cooperation project for economic and employment promotion in Rwanda from 2020 to 2022. With measures in the areas of private-sector promotion, vocational training and job placement, the project pursued an integrated approach to promoting employment. The vocational training component supported Rwanda Polytechnic, the national authority for vocational training, in improving the quality of the training system in Rwanda. Selected vocational training institutions were supported through capacity building and the qualification of management staff and teachers. In addition, the programme qualified training staff in companies. During the previous phase of the project, 3,085 enrolled vocational students were able to take part in the training courses at subsidised vocational schools in 2019, with 40% being women. Additionally, the project supported training in the IT sector for 210 women, with the "WeCode" software academy. The participants received training as software and app developers for national and international companies.

Italy supported various educational institutions. For example, the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation supported Afghanistan's Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD). The objective of the project was to increase the employment rate of young Afghans in the areas of intervention that influence the level of

income, with particular attention on the illiterate youth population, including women and girls. The programme involved the organisation of professional training courses, the creation of micro-enterprises and start-ups, and training in entrepreneurship as well as the stimulation of savings.

Japan estimates that a development project in Egypt helped to enrol 2,730 female students in technical secondary schools between 2017 and 2022.

The **UK** supported 200 educational institutions through re-designed curricula, teacher training, enhanced quality assurance (QA) practices, enhanced digital education, and enhanced access and equity for approximately 1.2 million women.

The **US**, through USAID, supported the Jordanian Ministry of Education's gender equality strategy and action plan by helping to develop a training curriculum for early childhood education teachers about gender-responsive approaches in care, play and learning. USAID worked with the Ministry of Education in Jordan and the Vocational Training Centre to promote non-traditional vocational education, conducting needs assessments to integrate gender issues into counselling for prospective vocational education students and to develop visual content.

The **EU** advocated for TVET actions linked to labour-market needs and opportunities, focusing on the participation of women in programmes. Under the flagship programme TVET Toolbox, actions included piloting innovative strategies for market-relevant skills and sustainable employment for disadvantaged youth, particularly young women. For instance, the Plan International project in Tanzania and the STEP programme in Malawi were examples of a gender-balanced TVET intervention that aimed to increase the enrolment and retention rates of female students.

Policy level interventions to improve TVET for women and girls

Canada collaborates with government ministries, such as the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Senegal, to increase the supply of vocational and technical training while improving the ties between the labour market and the TVET sector. Canada's technical cooperation focuses on developing gender-responsive sector planning, engaging with women, youth and indigenous communities, and providing gender-sensitive and environmentally conscious services for learners and businesses with considerations for labour-market needs. In the case of Senegal, 71% of women trained went on to obtain a job or an internship or continued on to further studies.

France supported the development of gender equality in education by constantly advocating for gender-sensitive policy-making within partner countries, international organisations and donors. France supported access to quality education for all women and girls by developing gender-sensitive and transformative policies and budgets.

As part of the Skills initiative for Africa, **Germany** funded a vocational training project for women called ATVET4W. The German government committed a total of EUR 19 million to the project, of which EUR 5 million were dedicated to the period from 2019 to 2021. With this project, Germany, together with the African Union Commission and the African Union Development Agency, helped improve employment prospects, especially for women, in the agricultural sector in selected countries. The project supported 22 partner institutions in introducing gender guidelines that make it easier for women to participate in vocational training courses. In addition, 38 training models with high employment and earning potential were developed in selected agricultural value chains, and 17 partner institutions implemented gender-sensitive training. Target groups in

the six partner countries were women participating in TVET, small-scale farmers without access to training, and small and micro-entrepreneurs.¹¹ By 2019, 13,900 persons had taken part in education and training programmes, and the six partner countries had introduced gender-transformative initiatives.

Italy invested an estimated EUR 22.7 million in overall TVET projects from 2016 until 2021. The Italian development cooperation agency worked on TVET campaigns in different countries, for example Palestine and Afghanistan, with a special focus on women and girls. Due to the lacking data, Italy is not able to estimate the number of beneficiaries, but the government plans to improve the data collection mechanism in the next few years.

Through its tertiary education programmes, the **UK** supported 12 different policy-level interven-

tions, which had an estimated reach of five million women and girls. For instance, these have included promoting equitable access to TVET particularly for young women, addressing barriers to females' successful transition to the labour force, embedding industry-relevant core skills in vocational training, and creating employer engagement in driving system change.

USAID works to break down gender-related barriers to education so that children and youth in all their diversity – especially girls and women, and gender and sexual minorities including LGBTQI+ youth – have access to quality learning opportunities from pre-primary through higher education. In Georgia, for example, USAID is supporting Georgian university law schools to develop new courses and materials focused on anti-discrimination law, the protection of equality rights, disability law, gender equality and women's rights.

Table 15: G7 Technical and Vocational Education and Training Expert Working Group Assessment Framework

Intervention level	Data	Data sources	Proxy indicator
Individual intervention level (measures, projects or programmes that directly target the TVET of women and girls)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of female participants qualified through short- and long-term courses, coaching or consulting measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participant/graduate lists Project, evaluation and monitoring reports Implementing partner databases 	Number of women and girls directly reached through TVET measures
Institutional level interventions (measures, projects or programs that aim at building (technical, personal, financial) capacities of TVET institutions and/or improving the infrastructure needed for TVET)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of supported education institutions Total number of female students enrolled in supported institutions Total budget of supported institutions Total project budget spent (by donor) on institutional support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project evaluation and monitoring reports Implementing partner databases 	Number of women and girls indirectly reached through the support of educational institutions
Policy level interventions (Measures, projects or programs that aim at improving the general conditions in the TVET system of a country or region)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Funds spent on direct budget support, policy advice (etc.) in each partner country Total Budget allocated to TVET system in respective partner countries Number of femal TVET students in respective partner country 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project evaluation and monitoring reports Partner country economic data 	Number of women and girls indirectly reach through policy level interventions

Source: G7 TVET Expert Working Group

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. Number of women and girls reached through G7 TVET measures: a) directly, b) through support of educational institutions or c) through policy level interventions	Self-reporting according to the framework agreed within the G7 TVET Expert working group

Commitment 27

Women's economic empowerment

“We will support our partners in developing countries ... to overcome discrimination, sexual harassment, violence against women and girls and other cultural, social, economic and legal barriers to women's economic participation.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, pp. 19–20

Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 18

SDGs:



Score:




Satisfactory

Women's economic empowerment plays a central role in realising women's rights and the path towards gender equality, as well as inclusive economic growth. Women's economic empowerment includes matters such as participating equally in labour markets, access to productive resources and decent work, and freedom of choice, particularly in economic decision-making. Moreover, empowering women can lead to important improvements in organisational effectiveness and growth, as seen in studies that show companies with three or more women in senior management achieving better results in all dimensions of economic performance.¹² The OECD tracks ODA spending of its members who identify whether their projects have gender as a significant objective (Gender Marker 1) or principal objective (Gender Marker 2). Gender Marker 1 projects have gender as a secondary aspect – for instance, a transport project that integrates a gender perspective in its implementation, but gender is not the project's main objective. Development projects that focus specifically on achieving gender equality fall under the Gender Marker 2 category.¹³

During the 2015 Elmau Summit, G7 members committed to support developing countries in overcoming discrimination, sexual harassment and gender-based violence. To assess their contributions, the G7 leaders monitor their ODA spending for gender equality through the OECD Gender Marker, with a particular emphasis on sectors for economic development.

Figure 22 shows that G7's bilateral allocable ODA with gender equality as a significant or principal objective overall increased overall between 2015 and 2020, reaching USD 40.2 billion and accounting for 36.1% of Total Bilateral ODA in 2020. During the same period, ODA spending with a Gender Marker 1 nearly doubled, increasing from USD 19.9 billion to 36.4 billion. However, compared to 2019, spending as a share of total bilateral ODA decreased by 1.3%-points in 2020 (Figure 22). Spending on projects with gender equality as the principal objective stayed relatively constant in the same period, fluctuating between USD 2.8 billion and USD 3.8 billion. As a result, the share of spending on projects that have gender equality as their core focus decreased 5.6%-points since the baseline 2015.

Figure 22: Total G7 ODA spending in million USD on projects with a gender equality objective (significant or principal)



Source: Own compilation based on OECD CRS

G7 ODA dedicated to economic-growth-related initiatives advancing gender equality and women's empowerment

G7 ODA spending dedicated to economic-growth-related initiatives increased between 2015 and 2020. Over this period, the share of such initiatives having gender equality as an objective increased from 26.4% to 30.6%. In absolute figures, the G7 spent USD 12.3 billion on gender equality measures with an economic growth objective in 2020. A large share went to the Transportation & Storage and Agriculture Sectors, which received USD 2.6 billion and USD 2.8 billion in 2020, respectively.

UN Women identifies increasing educational opportunities and participation of women and girls over the educational life cycle as crucial factors contributing to their economic empowerment. Strengthening the educational attainment of women and girls has positive effects on their income generation opportunities.¹⁴ G7 spending with gender equality as an objective in the Secondary Education Sectors nearly doubled from USD 428.9 million to USD 812.3 million between 2015 and


2020. In the Post-Secondary Education Sectors, the G7 increased their ODA with gender equality as an objective from USD 377.7 million to USD 581.2 million in the same period.

Additionally, Figure 23 displays Gender Marker 1 projects as the % share of total ODA for gender equality for 2015 and 2020, highlighting the percentage for 2020. Notably, the Agriculture, Energy, Transport & Storage, Business & Other Services, Trade Policies & Regulations, and Multi-sector Education & Training sectors' shares of projects with gender as the principal objective decreased between 2015 and 2020, with the Agriculture sector recording the steepest fall of 17.7 %-points. The percentage in other sectors remained stable during the period. For instance, 14.6% of ODA for gender equality spending went to the Secondary Education sector in 2020 compared to 13.7% in 2015. Only in the Industry and Communications sectors were the spending shares for Gender Marker 1 projects significantly increased, from 1.9% to 6.6% and from 0.2% to 6.6%, respectively.

G7 ODA dedicated to economic-growth-related initiatives with gender equality as a significant or principal purpose increased between 2015 and 2020 from USD 6,270.3 million to USD 12,318.6 million, accounting for 41.6% of ODA spending on economic-growth-related initiatives in 2020 compared to 28.2% in 2015 (Figure 23). This upwards trend in spending on projects with gender equality as an objective was primarily driven by five sectors, namely Communication with an increase of 30.5 %-points, Agriculture with 14.1 %-points,

Transport & Storage with 32.9 %-points, Rural Development with 21.5 %-points, and Multisector Education & Training with 47.8 %-points over the period. Figure 23 also shows how projects with gender as a significant objective accounted for this rise. Their share increased by 13.5 %-points in a comparison of 2015 (26.7%) and 2020 (40.2%). Following an opposite trend, the spending share of projects with gender as the principal objective peaked in 2018 at 2.2% and declined to 1.5% in 2020 (Figure 23).

Figure 23: Share of G7 ODA dedicated to economic-growth-related initiatives with gender equality as a significant or principal objective



Source: Own compilation based on OECD CRS¹⁵

G7 ODA focused on the elimination of violence against women


One in three women experiences sexual and gender-based violence in their lifetime, which, among other consequences, often results in mental health problems, unwanted or unplanned pregnancies, and non-communicable diseases.¹⁶ The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated these issues due to lockdowns, changing home structure, social

isolation, other socio-economic impacts, and breakdown of public services, such as domestic violence shelters. Gender-based violence represents a barrier to women's economic empowerment and participation, as it can prevent women from leaving their homes, using public transportation to commute to and from work, and disrupt required work duties, resulting in dismissal.^{17, 18} The G7 members collectively spent USD 324.9 million

(0.29% of Total Bilateral ODA) on initiatives aiming to prevent violence against women in 2020 (Figure 24). Their spending increased sevenfold compared to 2016, with EU Institutions, Canada,

and the UK being the principal contributors (USD 188.7 million, USD 53.9 million, and USD 44.5 million in 2020, respectively).¹⁹

Figure 24: G7 members’ ODA spending in million USD to prevent violence against women



Source: Own compilation based on OECD CRS (15180)

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	<p>1. G7 ODA dedicated to economic growth-related initiatives focused on achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment (Gender markers: 2. Principal and 1. Significant – as total and single markers) as a percentage of total ODA screened in selected relevant OECD DAC codes: 113, 114, 12181, 12281, 14081, 210, 220, 230-236, 240, 250, 311, 312, 313, 321, 322, 323, 331, 332, 41081, 43030, 43040, 43081.</p> <p>2. G7 ODA focused on the elimination of violence against women (OECD DAC purpose code violence against women – 15180).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OECD CRS OECD Gender Policy Marker

Commitment 28

Advancing gender equality through non-discriminatory legislation

“We also intend to advocate for the promotion of gender equality, in order to create a global coalition committed to the full empowerment of girls and women around the world. In that regard, we express our deepest concern that too many women and girls around the world are affected by discriminatory laws and the lack of legal protection. Aside from our domestic commitments, we stand ready to support interested countries through our different expertise and development mechanisms to adopt, implement and monitor laws that remedy this and advance gender equality. The support of the G7 to these countries will be monitored by the existing G7 Accountability Working Group.”

“In recognition of increased violence against women and girls during the COVID-19 crisis, we commit to preventing, responding to and eliminating all forms of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV). We will achieve this through women’s empowerment and by scaling-up implementation of evidence-based, accessible survivor and victim-centred policies, prevention and support programmes, including through our pandemic response and recovery at home, in partner countries and in conflict zones.”

Biarritz 2019, Declaration on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, para. 3
Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 46

SDGs:



Score:



New commitment, no score

UN Women emphasises the universal pressure on gender equality efforts in light of the COVID-19 pandemic that showcased the structural weaknesses of current systems by intensifying existing gender inequalities. According to a World Bank report, discriminatory legislation affected 2.4 billion women and girls in 2021, creating barriers in terms of employment and entrepreneurship opportunities as well as access to economic security. They estimate that women have

three-quarters of legal rights compared to men. For instance, 104 countries legally limit women’s access to specific jobs, and approximately 50% of countries globally fall short of commission to submit complaints. The report further notes that in 30 countries, women and girls lack protection against domestic violence.²⁰

During the 2019 Biarritz and 2021 Carbis Bay Summits, the G7 committed to supporting the

implementation of evidence-based, accessible survivor and victim-centred policies, prevention and support programmes. To assess their achievements, the G7 partners monitor four indicators, including the partners' bilateral and multilateral ODA disbursements, the number of legislative frameworks to decrease barriers for women, the progress of the OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) and the number of countries that received G7 support to implement gender-sensitive frameworks.

G7 bilateral and multilateral ODA disbursements dedicated to achieving gender equality

G7 partners screen their ODA spending to identify projects that have gender as a significant objective (Gender Marker 1) and as the principal objective (Gender Marker 2) before providing the information to the OECD. Gender Marker 1 projects have gender as a secondary aspect. An example of such

a project would be a transport project that integrates a gender perspective in its implementation. Development projects that focus explicitly on achieving gender equality receive the Gender Marker 2.

Table 16 summarises ODA disbursements with the objective to achieve gender equality per partner between 2018 and 2020, displaying a steep spending increase on Gender Marker 2 projects (USD 818.6 million in 2020 compared to USD 408.1 million in 2018). Particularly, Canada and the EU provided more resources to developing countries, expanding their support by USD 319.9 million and USD 92.9 million from 2019 to 2020, respectively. Overall, the spending on Gender Marker 1 projects by all G7 countries and the EU Institutions remained between USD 503.0 million and USD 575.4 million. Additionally, G7 partners provided funding to several multilateral organisations that work towards improving gender equality.

Table 16: G7 ODA disbursements for legal and judicial development, ending violence against women and girls, and women's rights organisations and movements by gender equality marker in million US Dollar between 2018 and 2020²¹

	2018		2019		2020	
	Gender Marker 1	Gender Marker 2	Gender Marker 1	Gender Marker 2	Gender Marker 1	Gender Marker 2
Canada	32.7	28.1	70.9	69.0	21.1	388.9
EU Institutions	220.9	178.6	152.7	133.8	359.8	226.7
France	0.6	2.6	1.5	16.3	2.6	35.2
Germany	125.6	42.4	115.8	61.1	59.8	55.0
Italy	2.1	26.5	3.8	16.6	0.7	10.7
Japan	0.8	67.1	1.4	31.7	1.3	37.6
United Kingdom	47.5	56.0	57.5	70.5	36.5	56.4
United States	100.9	6.8	99.4	10.2	93.6	8.2
G7 members (including EU Institutions)	530.9	408.1	503.0	409.3	575.4	818.6

Source: OECD Grant Equivalent CRS Data (Purpose Codes 15130, 15170 and 15180)

From 2019 to 2021, close to 93% (CAD 6 billion) of **Canada's** bilateral ODA channelled through multilateral organisations supported gender equality either as a principal or significant objective. This includes Canada's support to multilateral initiatives dedicated to advancing gender equality as a principal objective, especially for the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, notably the UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women (CAD 14 million, 2019–2022) and the UNFPA-UNICEF Global Programme to Accelerate Action to End Child Marriage (CAD 30 million, 2019–2023). It also includes support to specific initiatives implemented by multilateral organisations such as the Eliminating Violence against Women and Girls in the West Bank and Gaza project with UN Women (CAD 17 million, 2017–2023) and the Justice, Empowerment and Dignity of Women and Girls project in the Democratic Republic of Congo with UNDP (CAD 18 million, 2017–2022).

France provided funding to three organisations in 2021, namely UN Women (EUR 5.6 million), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (EUR 18.0 million), the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa programme (EUR 4.5 million) and the Global Survivors Fund (EUR 2.0 million). Contributions to these organisations increased considerably since 2019; for instance, UNFPA received EUR 1.1 million, UN Women EUR 1.8 million and the Global Survivors Fund EUR 0.2 million in 2019.

Between 2019 and 2021, **Germany** contributed to the UN Trust Fund (EUR 2.8 million) and UN Women (EUR 31 million). Additionally, Germany supported the Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund with EUR 12 million in the framework of the Action Network on Forced Displacement – Women as Agents of Change, and with EUR 17.1 million for various regional contexts and outcome areas. Other German contributions aiming to support gender equality totalled EUR 409.5 million and benefitted UNFPA, Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative, and the Umbrella Facility for Gender.

Italy paid unearmarked and core funds to various multilateral organisations dedicated to gender equality, including UNICEF (EUR 0.5 million), UN WOMEN (EUR 2.5 million) and UNFPA (EUR 4.5 million), and provided earmarked funding for girls education programmes (EUR 2.5 million).

Japan supported UN Women, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSV-SVC) and the Global Survivors Fund in the areas of eliminating gender-based violence, improving legal systems, and training officers to combat sexual violence in conflicts.

Between 2019 and 2021, the **UK** contributed over GBP 6,500 million in core and multi-bi funding to multilateral development banks (World Bank Group, Asia Development Bank, African Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Caribbean Development Bank). The multilateral development banks that the FCDO contributed to have gender equality as a key objective and mainstream gender across operations. Moreover, the UK provided GBP 19.4 million to UN Women in 2020 and GBP 2.4 million to the World Bank Umbrella Facility for Gender Equality in 2020/21.

From 2019 to 2021, the **EU** disbursed EUR 255.7 million through the EU-UN Spotlight Initiative, implemented by 11 UN agencies, including the UN Women, UNFPA and UNDP as core agencies. In addition, USD 9.1 million were reallocated to address COVID-19's impact on civil society through the UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women. In 2021, the EU approved a EUR 2 million Regional Programme with UNFPA on addressing gender-based sex selection.

Number of legislative frameworks aiming at women's economic and political participation

UN Women and the World Bank publish annual reports summarising the number of implemented legislative frameworks that aim to foster women's

empowerment. According to UN Women’s annual reports, the organisation supported 94 (2019) and 124 (2020) countries implementing laws and policies to improve various aspects of gender equality (Table 17). Since 2010, 89 countries have passed an average of 70 laws per year, indicating that countries implemented more legislation than

usual in 2019 and 2020. Most governments introduced policies to promote women’s land rights tenure security, as well as frameworks to provide decent work. The G7 contributions to UN Women accounted for one-third of the organisation’s revenues in 2019 and 2020.^{22, 23}

Table 17: Laws and Policies to promote gender equality in 2019 and 2020

Area	2019	2020
Laws promoting gender balance in elections and decision making bodies	8	8
Development strategies, bolstering gender-responsive governance	9	15
National action plans on gender equality	13	14
Legal, regulatory and policy frameworks on decent work for women	24	18
Laws and regulations on unpaid care and domestic work	4	25
Gender-responsive fiscal, monetary and trade policies	8	14
Policies on women’s land rights and tenure security	28	30
Total	94	124

Source: UN Women Annual Reports for 2020 and 2021

Table 18: New laws and reforms in the seven areas of the WBL Index in Lower, Lower-Middle and Upper-Middle-Income Countries between 2019 and 2021

Area	2019	2020	2021
Mobility (e.g. access to passports for women)	–	3	3
Workplace (e.g. same rights to get jobs)	4	4	3
Pay (e.g. equal remuneration)	6	3	4
Marriage (e.g. legislation addressing domestic violence)	7	3	2
Parenthood (e.g. paid leave to mothers)	3	7	2
Entrepreneurship (e.g. access to credit)	1	1	4
Assets (e.g. equal ownership on immovable properties)	1	1	–
Pension (e.g. retirement age)	3	3	1
Total	25	25	19

Source: Women, Business and the Law Reports for 2019, 2020 and 2021.

The Women, Business and the Law (WBL) Report, published annually by the World Bank, monitors the implementation of legislative frameworks, contributing to women's economic and political empowerment. It analyses legal reforms to create the WBL Index. Table 18 summarises the recorded changes through the WBL data between 2019 and 2021. Most changes occurred in the areas of Marriage in 2019, Parenthood in 2020, and Pay and Entrepreneurship in 2021. However, the overall number of laws decreased from 25 to 19 in 2021. For instance, Armenia introduced legislation to protect women from domestic violence, and Costa Rica abolished a law prohibiting women from working at night.^{24, 25}


OECD SIGI Index measures

The OECD Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) series provide information on discriminating between formal and informal legislation, social norms, and practices.²⁶ The negative consequences of limiting women's contribution to sustainable and inclusive development affect the well-being of women, their families, and societies. The current

level of discrimination decreases global income by USD 6 trillion.²⁷ 45 out of 120 countries have a SIGI score over 0.3, meaning that in these countries, at least 30% of gender-based discrimination with regard to laws, social norms and practices has yet to be overcome.²⁸

The sub-index *Restricted Physical Integrity* shows that the global level of discrimination that needs to be overcome in terms of violence against women and restricted reproductive autonomy is 0.4 and 0.3, respectively. According to the 2019 SIGI report, no country has a legal framework that protects women against all forms of violence in a comprehensive way. Figure 25 illustrates this point, as all regions score between 0.51 and 0.65 under the indicator of Law, indicating that legal frameworks protect women but have legal loopholes.^{29, 30} Notably, 46% of African women perceive violence against women as justified (Figure 25 – Attitudes), and about one third of women worldwide experienced intimate partner violence in their lives (Figure 25 – Practice).^{31, 32}

Figure 25: Regional measures on violence against women in 2019



Source: Own compilation with SIGI data

Adoption, implementation, and monitoring of legislative frameworks of interested countries with G7 support

To promote gender equality in legislative frameworks, the G7 members work with partner countries and support them at different stages of the policy cycle to design, operationalise and assess new and existing regulations.

Through its Anti-Crime Capacity Building programme, **Canada** contributed to the gender mainstreaming in the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC). In March 2021, JCLEC formally released a “statement of intent” to mainstream gender equality and women’s empowerment throughout their operations and training. The statement set out a requirement for all training to incorporate gender considerations, and for the creation of a gender focal point system to ensure the implementation. JCLEC is now the first institution within the Indonesian security establishment to adopt any form of comparable gender mainstreaming instrument.

During the 2019 G7 Summit in **France**, leaders launched the Biarritz Partnership, which aims to improve gender equality through legislation. Currently, 14 states and organisations make up the Biarritz Partnership, including G7 countries, the EU, Australia, Chile, India, Senegal, Spain and Ukraine. For instance, Ukraine decided to adopt a new law to reform the parental leave system and reduce gender pay gaps.

German ministries provided support to legislative frameworks in 50 countries. For instance, the German Foundation for International Legal Cooperation (IRZ) supported partner countries in the process of reforming their legal system to ensure non-discrimination based on gender in four countries.³³ Germany accompanied political dialogues in 22 countries, leading to legislation as well as implementation and monitoring of laws that contribute to ensuring gender equality and ending gender-related discrimination. In addition,

31 countries received technical and financial support to prevent rape and sexual and gender-based violence.

In Kenya, **Italy** funded the third phase of the UN Women project “Let it Not Happen Again” with EUR 0.9 million, which aims to ensure access to justice for survivors of gender-based violence and to strengthen preventive and response mechanisms. Additionally, Italy supported UN Women and UNFPA to address gender-based violence by strengthening institutional capacities to scale up and improve the multi-sectoral response in Iraq.

Japan has supported the Global Survivors Fund, which has been conducting the Global Reparations Study in over 20 countries. The study, including the legal framework analysis, has aimed to assess the impact of conflict-related sexual violence and survivors’ access to reparations and to identify opportunities for reparations and interim reparative measures. Moreover, Japan supported UN Women’s projects for addressing discriminatory legal systems in Morocco, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia in 2020 and 2021. Japan has also been supporting a project of UN Women in Arab states to promote improving legal systems to prevent online GBV in 2021 and 2022.

The **UK** co-led the negotiations that resulted in the ILO Convention on ending violence and harassment in the world of work, which ten countries ratified. In addition, the UK shared evidence on effective legislation and thereby supported countries to create new legislative frameworks. For instance, Sierra Leone adopted legislation to amend the Sexual Offences Act in 2019. In 2020 and 2021, the UK supported 36 countries, the majority in Africa, to improve 2.8 million women’s land tenure rights with the Enhancing Governance for Economic Development (LEGEND) programme, as improved property and inheritance rights positively affect gender gaps in labour force participation.

Between 2019 and 2020, the **US** assisted 22 countries with proposals, drafts and the adoption of legal instruments, promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment, and strengthening prevention and response to gender-based violence. For instance, the Women’s Political Participation Programme in Jordan advocated using the term “harassment” in the Labour Law, resulting in an endorsement by Jordan’s parliament and an amendment to the Labour Law.

The **EU** supports the Spotlight Initiative with 26 country programmes to establish legislative and policy frameworks against all forms of violence against women and girls (VAWG) and harmful practices. In 2020, 17 participating countries signed or strengthened 84 relevant laws and policies. The initiative partnered with legislative bodies to enhance transformative and systemic change in legal frameworks and practices. Overall, 6,347 parliamentarians from nine countries participated in capacity-building measures.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2019	1.1 G7 bilateral ODA disbursement dedicated to achieving gender equality (Gender markers: 2. Principal and 1. Significant – as total and single markers), in volume and as a percentage of total ODA screened, as a whole and for the specific purpose code for legal and judicial development, ending violence against women and girls, women’s rights organisations and movements (purpose codes 15130, 15180 and 15170).	OECD CRS (purpose code 15130 for legal and judicial development, 15180 for ending violence against women and girls and 15170 for women’s rights organisations and movements).
	1.2 G7 disbursements of ODA to multilateral organisation dedicated to achieving gender equality.	Self-reporting for contributions to multilateral organisations dedicated to achieving gender equality.
	2. Number of legislative frameworks that have been reformed or created to decrease legal and regulatory barriers for women’s economic and political participation and prohibit all forms of gender-based violence in developing countries, in line with the Declaration on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment and its reference to the Biarritz Partnership on Gender Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Gender Equality Advisory Council • UN Women Annual Report • World bank (Woman business and the Law) • International Development Law Organization
	3. SIGI measure of discrimination against women in social institutions (formal and informal laws, social norms, and practices including GBV), regional and global aggregate	OECD SIGI Index
	4. Number of interested countries supported by the G7 to adopt, implement and monitor legislative frameworks to ensure non-discrimination on the basis of gender, provide full and equal legal protection to women and girls and advance gender equality	Self-Reporting



Case Study: France

The Support Fund for Feminist Organizations of France



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As France has committed to conducting a feminist diplomacy since 2019, led by the French International Strategy for Gender Equality (2018-2022), one of its concrete and innovative tools is *the Support Fund for Feminist Organizations*. Announced in 2019 by French President Emmanuel Macron and launched in July 2020, the Fund is mobilizing EUR 120 million over three years (2020-2022) to support feminist civil-society organisations operating in partner countries of France's development policy (including 65% in Africa). The fund is co-managed by the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and AFD. It will finance the structural costs and activities of local civil-society organisations (CSOs) promoting gender equality and the rights of women and girls, especially the organisations working on priority issues: SRHR, GBV, women's empowerment and economic participation, women's social and political leadership, girls' access to education, the "Women, Peace and Security" Agenda, and Gender and Climate.

After two years of implementation, the Fund has shown both **financial and programmatic results**. For the first time, more than EUR 40 million per year have been invested for dozens of CSOs of all sizes, which are key players but often far from funding. They are financed in Africa for the most part, but also in Central and South America, the Middle East and Asia, through three funding channels:

- AFD's calls for projects targeting local feminist CSOs in partner countries: three were launched in 2020 and 2021 on SRHR (EUR 15M), Climate (EUR 5M) and GBV (EUR 10M), and two more will be launched in 2022 on the WPS Agenda (EUR 10M) and girls' education (EUR 10M);

- AFD's "CSOs Initiative" mechanism targeting French CSOs operating in partner countries;
- The FSPI/PISCCA funding mechanism managed by the French embassies around the world: 27 projects financed small or medium-sized feminist local CSOs in 2020 and 2021, from the 3M project to improve SRHR in Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, to the fight against GBV in South Africa and the promotion of female entrepreneurship in Iraq. At least 5 new projects will be identified in 2022.

The Fund has also proved its **methodological results** by initiating an innovative co-construction process with civil society. The strategic framework has been entirely co-built through a set of collaborative workshops, and regular consultations allow CSOs, from the global North and South, to express their views on the different steps of the process. This method is greatly appreciated by civil society. It responds to a need for real inclusion in the elaboration of public policies concerning feminist diplomacy and ODA.

A mid-term evaluation has been initiated to identify the results and impacts of the Funds. The conclusions will feed into reflections on the most sustainable way to meet the needs and expectations of the field and of feminist civil-society organisations in the future.

Endnotes Chapter 6:

- 1 United Nations. (2021). The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021. New York: Author. Retrieved from <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/#>
- 2 See the report of the Guttman-Lancet Commission, New York, 2018, which is taken into consideration by relevant states consistent with national law (<https://www.thelancet.com/commissions/sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights>)
- 3 UNFPA. (2022). Nearly half of all pregnancies are unintended—a global crisis, says new UNFPA report. Retrieved from <https://www.unfpa.org/press/nearly-half-all-pregnancies-are-unintended-global-crisis-says-new-unfpa-report>
- 4 WHO. (2022). Third round of the global pulse survey on continuity of essential health services during the COVID-19 pandemic: November–December 2021: interim report, 7 February 2022. Geneva: Author. Retrieved from <https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/351527>
- 5 Global Financing Facility. (2021). Emerging data estimate that for each COVID-19 death, more than two women and children have lost their lives as a result of disruptions to health systems since the start of the pandemic. Retrieved from <https://www.globalfinancingfacility.org/emerging-data-estimates-each-covid-19-death-more-two-women-and-children-have-lost-their-lives-result>
- 6 UNICEF. (2021). Towards ending child marriage: Global trends and profiles of progress. Retrieved from <https://data.unicef.org/resources/towards-ending-child-marriage/>
- 7 UNICEF. (2021). COVID-19: A threat to progress against child marriage. Retrieved from <https://data.unicef.org/resources/covid-19-a-threat-to-progress-against-child-marriage/>
- 8 UNICEF. (2022). Female genital mutilation (FGM). Retrieved from <https://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/female-genital-mutilation/>
- 9 UNFPA. (2022). World Population Dashboard. Retrieved from <https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard>
- 10 Please note that not all RMNCH data contained in the CRS database are consistent. The RMNCH marker was introduced with a distinct scoring system, which has evolved over time from a 0–2 system to the 0–4 system in 2012, then back to a 0–2 in 2017. However, this has not completely replaced. Members can report data under either scoring system, where data originally submitted in the 0–2 format are transformed to 0–4 by the Secretariat or data provider; or where data is reported in the 0–4 format.
- 11 Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Togo
- 12 UN Women. (2018). Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment. Retrieved from <https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-figures>
- 13 OECD. (2022). Aid projects targeting gender equality and womens empowerment (CRS). Retrieved from https://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=DV_DCD_GENDER&Lang=en
- 14 UN Women. (2018). Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment. Retrieved from <https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-figures>
- 15 OECD CRS Codes 113, 114, 12181, 12281, 14081, 210, 220, 230–236, 240, 250, 311, 312, 313, 321, 322, 323, 331, 332, 41081, 43030, 43040 and 43081
- 16 UN Women. (2022). Facts and figures: Ending violence against women. Retrieved from <https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures>
- 17 WHO. (2021). Violence against women. Retrieved from <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/violence-against-women>
- 18 Coalition for Women's Economic Empowerment & Equality. (2020). Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence, a Critical Component of Economic Development and Women's Economic Empowerment Retrieved from <https://www.icrw.org/publications/preventing-and-responding-to-gender-based-violence-a-critical-component-of-economic-development-and-womens-economic-empowerment/#:~:text=GBV%20creates%20barriers%20for%20economic,economic%20hardship%2C%20especially%20for%20women>
- 19 OECD CRS data on initiatives aiming to prevent violence against women for 2015 were not available, as the sector did not exist at that time.
- 20 World Bank. (2021). Women, Business and the Law 2021. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35094>
- 21 All disbursements are displayed as ODA Grant Equivalent values.
- 22 2019 contributions in million USD: EU 84.4, Japan 17.7, Germany 14.2, UK 26.7, Canada 14.4, USA 14.2, Italy 8.7, and France 3.6; UN Women's Total Revenue 527.4.
- 23 2020 contributions in million USD: EU 74.7, Japan 22.6, Germany 20.4, UK 19.1, Canada 18.7, USA 18.6, Italy 6.5, and France 4.4; UN Women's Total Revenue 563.9.
- 24 World Bank. (2020). Women, Business and the Law 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32639>
- 25 World Bank. (2021). Women, Business and the Law 2021. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/35094>
- 26 The index includes 16 indicators distributed over four dimensions (sub-indices), measuring the level of discrimination in legal frameworks and social norms, as well as prevalence rates that assess the level of discrimination in practices.
- 27 OECD. (2019). SIGI 2019 *Global Report: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities*, Social Institutions and Gender Index. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1787/bc56d212-en>
- 28 SIGI scores measure levels of discrimination. A value of 0 suggests no discrimination, a value of 1 means absolute discrimination against women. The OECD identifies the following groups: (1) Very low level (SIGI score below 0.2), (2) Low level (SIGI score between 0.2 and 0.3), (3) Medium level (SIGI score between 0.3 and 0.4), (4) High level (SIGI score between 0.4 and 0.5), and (5) Very high level (SIGI score over 0.5).
- 29 Score between 0 and 1. A score between 0.5 and 0.74 means that “The legal framework protects women from violence including intimate partner violence, rape and sexual harassment. However, some legal exceptions occur.”
- 30 OECD. (2019). SIGI 2019 *Global Report: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities*, Social Institutions and Gender Index. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1787/bc56d212-en>.
- 31 “Percentage of women aged 15–49 years who consider a husband to be justified in hitting or beating his wife for at least one of the specified reasons.”
- 32 “Percentage of ever-partnered women who ever suffered intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence.”
- 33 Egypt, Vietnam, North Macedonia and Kosovo

7. Governance

Concerning governance, the G7 focuses its development and development-related commitments primarily on four issues: the fight against corruption, resources governance, taxation, and land transparency.

Corruption represents a significant hindrance to economic development. It can reduce the quality of public services, erode trust in governments, increase economic inequality, and slow down investment. While this is a global problem, low-income countries are often particularly affected by the negative impacts of corruption. Transparency and well-functioning accountability systems are vital in fighting corruption.

Extractive industries dominate the economies of many countries subject to the so-called resource curse – that is, the paradoxical situation that an abundance of natural resources can worsen countries' prospects in terms of economic development, democratic institutions and political stability. However, this curse is not inevitable. Strong institutions and effective governance can, as several examples have shown, enable countries to harness their natural resources for the benefit of citizens and society at large.

Improving tax systems is essential in order to mobilise the public resources necessary to foster sustainable development. Tax avoidance and corrupt outflows of capital reduce tax revenues of all countries. Emerging economies and low-income countries are hit hardest. For instance, international cooperation must create transparency on beneficial ownership, prevent profit-shifting by

multinational enterprises, improve the transparency of taxation of large multinationals, and support capacity-building in national tax administrations.

Fair and reliable access to land is vital for rural communities all over the world. Weak land governance – including lack of land transparency – adversely affects economic development, the sustainable use of land, and social stability. Unclear ownership or use rights can, for instance, lead to land conflicts, environmental degradation and discrimination against certain population groups such as women and indigenous peoples. International initiatives and guidelines, such as the FAO's Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT), aim to support national governments in improving their land governance tenure systems.

This chapter monitors commitments related to all of these four areas. Regarding corruption, Commitment 29 concerns the G7 anti-corruption initiatives, Commitment 35 anti-bribery, and Commitment 36 the recovery of stolen assets. Relating to resources governance of extractive industries, Commitment 30 looks at the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), Commitment 31 reviews G7 partnerships on Extractives Transparency, and Commitment 32 focuses on the G7 initiative to strengthen assistance for Complex Contract Negotiations (CONNEX). For taxation, Commitment 33 concerns the OECD project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), Commitment 34 transparency of beneficial ownership, and Commitment 37 tax capacity-building. Commitment 38 addresses issues related to land transparency.

Commitment 29

G7 Anti-corruption initiatives

“International cooperation against corruption should be enhanced in order to achieve effective results. We are therefore committed to update G8 anti-corruption initiatives and further support outreach activities and technical assistance to other countries.”

L’Aquila 2009, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, para. 31

SDGs:



Score:  Good

Corruption can slow down economic development, increase inequality, drive political divisions, and exacerbate conflict. It disproportionately affects the most vulnerable in society, impeding, for instance, access to health, education, and justice. The World Bank reports that the poorest pay the highest share of their income in bribes. Corruption reduces trust in governments and jeopardises social cohesion within countries. Effective measures against corruption can increase jobs and business opportunities that promote sustainable economic development. To fight corruption, governments and civil society must address vested interests and increase transparency in business and government activities.¹

During the 2009 L’Aquila Summit, the G7 committed to supporting the fight against corruption with initiatives that support outreach activities and provide technical assistance. To monitor the achievement of this commitment, the G7 partners assess their expenditure on anti-corruption organisations and institutions as well as assistance provided to anti-corruption capacity building programmes.

G7 expenditure on anti-corruption organisations and institutions

The G7 partners increased their ODA provided to anti-corruption organisations and institutions between 2009 and 2020 from USD 109 million to USD 170 million (Figure 26). The G7’s ODA payments to organisations and institutions steadily rose since 2016, reaching USD 194 million in 2018. Afterwards, it fell to USD 170 million in 2020. Overall, the US accounted for most of the funding since the baseline, followed by the UK and Germany, with USD 741.9 million, USD 503.8 million and USD 253.7 million, respectively.


G7 support to anti-corruption capacity building

Other investments also aim to improve the anti-corruption capacities of developing countries. G7 ODA on sectors relevant to anti-corruption capacity building increased in the same period from USD 8.1 billion to USD 9.4 billion (Figure 27). Most funding was provided with respect to environmental policy and administrative management, legal and judicial development, and public-sector policy and administrative management, with

USD 20.2 billion, USD 26.2 billion and USD 25.3 billion since 2009, respectively. As a share of total expenditure in these sectors, investments in anti-corruption organisations and institutions


increased from 1.3% in 2009 to 1.8% in 2020. However, the percentage was higher in previous years, reaching 2.7% in 2012 and 2.3% in 2019.

Figure 26: G7 expenditure on anti-corruption organisations and institutions in million USD



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (15113)

Figure 27: G7 ODA spending in sectors related to anti-corruption efforts in billion USD



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (15110, 15111, 15113, 15130, 15150, 32210, 41010)

The G7 members offered additional support to developing countries with the objective of increasing their capacities to fight corruption. Since 2019, **Canada** has provided nearly CAD 15 million in support of anti-corruption capacity building programmes. This includes over CAD 5 million supporting the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) review mechanism, national risk assessments, technical assistance for anti-corruption legal frameworks, and justice sector anti-corruption training. Since 2016, Canada has provided CAD 8 million to the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions Development Initiative. Approximately CAD 2.4 million focused on anti-corruption capacity building, supporting the implementation of the International Standards for Supreme Audit Institutions and assessments of Codes of Ethics. From 2016 to 2021, Canada provided CAD 13.6 million to Transparency International, supporting anti-corruption programmes in 12 countries and regional knowledge exchange and corruption surveys. Canada continues to support the U4 Resource Centre, and contributed CAD 983,948 between 2019 and 2021.

Since 2019, **France** has financed several anti-corruption capacity building activities and continued its partnerships with NGOs. Between 2017 and 2021, the Open Government Support Program in Francophone Countries (PAGOF) supported the implementation of Open Government Partnership standards. In total, 1,400 state and civil society actors in open government were trained in three OGP members' countries, and 20 NGOs received funding to implement projects on open government. The programme's results gave rise to a second phase launched in 2022 in six countries. Moreover, support for investigative journalists was renewed in 2019 after training 20 investigative journalists in 2018. France also financed a project coordinated by Transparency International in 2020. In 2021, France partnered with the International Organisation of la Francophonie to fund a project

aiming at reinforcing collaboration between anti-corruption and human rights agencies.

The **German** Ministry for Development started a strategic partnership with the Transparency International Secretariat in 2014, which was recently extended for five additional years until 2025. Between 2001 and 2022, Germany supported Transparency International with EUR 13.6 million. Moreover, Germany supported several outreach conferences and capacity building activities, including side events at the eighth and ninth sessions of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2019 and 2021.^{2,3} Moreover, Germany assisted in the launch of the multi-stakeholder platform Global Forum on Illicit Financial Flows and Sustainable Development in 2020 and the International Conference on Anti-Corruption in Fragile States in 2019. Additionally, Germany continued programmes to strengthen anti-corruption and integrity and to combat illicit financial flows in BMZ partner countries, such as the multi-stakeholder initiative Alliance for Integrity.⁴ Furthermore, Germany funded the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre in Norway, which has provided capacity building and research on anti-corruption since 2002.⁵

Japan has implemented projects to provide capacity building to assist Asian countries in implementing the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In cooperation with UNODC, Japan has provided technical assistance to five countries consisting of anti-corruption workshops for government officials.⁶ In 2019, by contributing USD 85,161, Japan strengthened legal frameworks for whistleblower protection and its implementation in Southeast Asian countries, emphasising the implementation of Article 33 of the UNCAC. Furthermore, Japan contributed USD 100,000 to the review mechanism for the implementation of the UNCAC between 2019 and 2022. Additionally, Japan actively participated in and contributed to

the activities of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) which annually holds international anti-corruption training courses and seminars for Southeast Asian countries on good governance. During the period between 2019 and 2021, 113 legal experts from 40 countries participated in these courses.⁷

The **UK's** Global Anti-Corruption Programme supported UNODC's initiative to fast-track the implementation of UNCAC. Funding to the Open Contracting Partnership enabled the provision of technical support to 63 countries in 2020. The UK-hosted International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC) brings together specialist law enforcement officers from fifteen countries to tackle allegations of grand corruption. Since its launch in 2017, the IACCC has helped affected states restrain over GBP 300 million worth of suspected stolen assets in various jurisdictions. The UK's latest report on the implementation of its 2017–2022 Anti-Corruption Strategy reviews its efforts to support anti-corruption efforts globally.⁸

The **US** government provided USD 223 million for capacity building and technical assistance to prevent and combat corruption globally over the last two years. For instance, projects increased fiscal transparency, boosted accountability, and enhanced global public financial management

standards. With partner governments, the US collaborated to strengthen the capacity of criminal justice sector partners around the globe to identify, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate complex corruption cases. In December 2021, the US announced it would provide up to USD 15.1 million to launch the Democracies Against Safe Havens Initiative, which will work to build the capacity of partner governments to fight corruption. The US also announced it would build on its support for the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium by providing up to USD 6 million to enhance the Consortium's work of connecting media and civil-society organisations.

The **EU** provided approximately EUR 34 million to anti-corruption projects in developing countries in 2019. Key areas included legal and policy frameworks, anti-corruption institutions and oversight bodies, as well as civil society. An example of a dedicated anti-corruption programme is the 2020 SANCUS project, designed to address accountability deficits in 21 countries by working with civil-society networks to improve accountability, which received EUR 5 million in support. The project aims to increase public demand for accountability, mobilise civil-society organisations to demand more accountability by rights holders, and pressure democratic checks-and-balances institutions to monitor accountability.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2009	1. Expenditure against the OECD DAC code for anti-corruption organisations and institutions (15113)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD data • Self-reporting
	2. Expenditure against a broader set of OECD DAC codes that could be considered relevant to wider anti-corruption capacity building.	
	3. Expenditure and activities in support of anti-corruption capacity building according to the internal definitions and reporting of individual G7 members.	

Commitment 30

G7 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

“The G8 will take action to raise global standards for extractives transparency and make progress towards common global reporting standards, both for countries with significant domestic extractive industries and the home countries of large multinational extractives corporations.

- EU G8 members will quickly implement the EU Accounting and Transparency Directives.
- The US, UK and France will seek candidacy status for the new EITI Standard by 2014.
- Canada will launch consultations with stakeholders across Canada with a view to developing an equivalent mandatory reporting regime for extractive companies within the next two years.
- Italy will seek candidacy status for the new EITI Standard as soon as possible.
- Germany is planning to test EITI implementation in a pilot region in view of a future candidacy as implementation country.
- Russia and Japan support the goal of EITI and will encourage national companies to become supporters.”

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, paras. 36, 38

SDGs:



Score:  **Excellent**

Extractive industries have played a crucial role in economic development since the industrial revolution. As of 2021, the sector dominates the economies of 63 countries, many of which struggle with resource dependency and weak governance.⁹ Extractive industries are facing new challenges. On the one hand, sourcing of fossil fuels will likely decrease as countries switch to renewable energy to fight climate change. On the other hand,

companies involved in extracting minerals will probably have an increased demand for materials and metals to enable green technologies, for instance to produce renewable energy. To handle the changes within the extractive industries sector, countries require reliable data, disclosures and dialogues to assess the transition’s economic risks, as well as standards for national and international governance.¹⁰

Initiatives and institutions, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), have the potential to support developing countries and international organisations in this process.¹¹ EITI aims to strengthen accountability, reduce corruption, attract investment, and mobilise revenues for development through a global standard for extractive transparency, building on national multi-stakeholder groups and open data systems.¹² With its central governance standard, EITI prevents and fights tax evasion and illicit financial flows, and can support the Energy Transition process by increasing the understanding of the financial implications for governments, businesses and civil society.¹³

The G7 committed to supporting extractive transparency by implementing the EITI Standard in national legislation during the Lough Erne Summit in 2013, aiming to establish a global reporting standard. Each member committed to realising specific measures connected to the initiative's standards.

The G7's contributions to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

The EITI Board adopted a paper setting out six strategic priorities between 2021 and 2022 to reflect the changing context.¹⁴ These include focusing on the energy transition, addressing corruption risk, promoting domestic revenue mobilisation, informing investment decisions based on ESG metrics, emphasising open data and measuring impact. The G7 countries and the EU are active partners in supporting these strategic priorities. In 2020, the EITI Board decided on recommendations for the energy transition.¹⁵ Most of EITI's 65 supporting companies in the oil, gas and minerals sector are headquartered in G7 countries.

Canada is an EITI supporting country and provides annual financial contributions to the EITI International Secretariat (Table 19). It has not joined EITI as an implementing country but has implemented

the *Extractive Sector Transparency Measurements Act (ESTMA)*, which became effective in 2015 and designated the Minister of Natural Resources (NRCan) as the responsible authority for its administration and enforcement. The Act requires businesses engaged in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals to publicly report certain payments of CAD 100,000 or more to all levels of government and Indigenous groups, both in Canada and abroad, on an annual basis. Since 2015, over CAD 580 billion have been reported by nearly 1,100 entities on operations in 134 countries. As of 2021, over 2,600 individual, consolidated and substituted ESTMA reports have been published and linked to the NRCan website. In addition, payments to Indigenous governments in Canada made after 1 June 2017 are now being reported.

France has implemented the EU Accounting Directive in its national regulations and was a member of the EITI Board in 2015 and 2019. Additionally, the country assumed this role for 2022 as a representative of the EITI supporting states. Since France became an EITI supporting country in 2005, it provided consistent support to the initiative in political, financial and technical terms (Table 19). It successfully hosted the EITI Global Conference in 2019, which led to adopting the 2019 EITI Standard. The French government joined the EITI Board in 2021 and participated in the EITI Validation Committee.

Germany has implemented the EITI since 2016 and reached its EITI compliance status in 2019. The German EITI is contributing to the advancement of EITI reporting by exploring alternative reporting methods to traditional payment reconciliations.¹⁶ Through political, financial and technical support, Germany has contributed to the progress of the EITI since its inception in 2003 (Table 19). This includes assisting national EITI processes in more than 30 partner countries as well as engaging in international EITI governance and the World Bank's multi-donor trust funds for EITI

implementation. Germany's most recent term on the EITI Board was in 2019 and 2020.

Italy originally signed up as an EITI supporting country. However, Italy does not currently play an active role in the EITI Supporting Countries Constituency and does not provide financial contributions to the EITI International Secretariat (Table 19).

Japan is an EITI supporting country and approached a wide range of stakeholders to inform them about the importance of transparency in the extractive industries, encouraging them to become supporters of EITI following the 2013 Lough Erne communiqué. However, it is not currently a financial supporter of the EITI despite expectations for all EITI supporting countries to support the core management expenses of the International Secretariat (Table 19).

In 2021 the **UK** was assessed against the EITI Standard and received a high score of 90 out of 100. The score reflects the UK's concerted efforts to ensure that the EITI becomes a tool for increasing the accessibility of extractive sector data and centralising information about opportunities for multi-stakeholder input into oil, gas and mining-sector governance. In addition to implementing the standard, the UK financed a range of efforts to support the implementation of the EITI Standard in at least 50 countries, including project support to advance beneficial ownership transparency and contract transparency (Table 19).

The **US** has been an active supporter of the EITI since its inception in 2003. This has included serving on the EITI Board, as well as substantial support provided from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for the International Secretariat and for robust bilateral support for EITI implementation around the world

(Table 19). The US was admitted as an EITI implementing country candidate in 2015; due to feasibility issues, the US withdrew its implementing country candidacy in 2017. The US has remained a supporting country, currently with a representative on the EITI Board (current term from June 2019).

The **EU** has regularly contributed to the functioning of the EITI Secretariat, with grant allocations amounting to EUR 2,250 million between 2016 and 2022 (Table 19). The European Commission is also a partner of the World Bank's Extractives Global Programmatic Support (EGPS) Trust Fund to support EITI's implementation. The Commission became an observer of the EITI Board in 2020. It plans to co-host the EITI International Board meeting with the government of Belgium in 2022.

As reported in the 2019 Biarritz report, all EU member states adopted the EU Accounting Directive (2013/34/EU), ensuring the clarity and comparability of financial statements. Thereby, they also aim to improve the transparency of payments made to governments all over the world by organisations in the extractive industries. According to the EU, the benefits of this directive are twofold. First, it helps civil societies in resource-rich countries to track government revenues from the extractive industries and hold officials accountable. Second, the directive promotes the adoption of the EITI in resource-rich nations.¹⁷ A study on the efficiency of the directive finds that harmonising financial reporting is a step in the right direction. However, the paper criticises the transposition strategies of the EU member states, as the directive does not successfully establish a fully harmonised reporting standard.¹⁸ In 2021, the European Commission proposed amending the Accounting Directive to increase its target group and amplify the scope of the information reported by companies.¹⁹

Table 19: G7 contributions to the EITI International Secretariat²⁰

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Canada	USD 75,820	USD 103,086	USD 108,915	CAD 160,000	CAD 100,000	CAD 160,000	CAD 160,000*
France	USD 89,593	USD 69,180	USD 116,039	EUR 160,000	EUR 100,000	EUR 100,000	EUR 100,000*
Germany	USD 209,911	USD 222,809	USD 222,809	EUR 290,000	EUR 250,000	EUR 250,000	EUR 300,000
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	USD 36,815	-	-	-	-	-	-
UK	USD 805,716	USD 1,031,978	USD 1,393,072	GBP 900,000	GBP 575,000	GBP 385,000	GBP 200,000
US	-	-	USD 101,353	USD 155,162	USD 10,750**	USD 206,239	Up to USD 793,761***
EU	EUR 375,000	EUR 300,000	EUR 75,000	EUR 500,000	EUR 500,000	EUR 350,000	EUR 150,000

* To be confirmed with the country

** Expected contribution. In 2019, the US moved from core funding to project funding on a reimbursement basis.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there were delays in signing a contract and start of project work in 2020.

*** Reimbursement-based grant

Source: EITI International Secretariat

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2013	1. Number of EU G7 members that have passed legislation or put into force regulations to implement EU AD and TD.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU • EITI Secretariat, EITI Board circulars and minutes • Self-reporting
	2. US, UK, France have applied formally for candidacy to the EITI Board by end 2014.	
	3. US, UK, France have been accepted as a candidate by the EITI Board by end 2015.	
	4. Italy has launched consultations with stakeholders (companies, academia, civil society and ONG) and has appointed the EITI Italian champion as soon as possible.	
	5. Italy has applied formally for candidacy to the EITI Board.	
	6. Canada has led national engagement sessions with provinces/territories (including securities regulators), Aboriginal governments, industry, investors and civil society, from July 2013 to September 2014, and discussed implementation issues.	
	7. Canada will introduce federal legislation to support the establishment of mandatory reporting standards for the extractive sector, by June 2015.	
	8. Germany launched EITI pilot.	
	9. Germany has applied formally for candidacy to the EITI Board.	
	10. Japan has taken actions to encourage its extractive companies to become supporters of the EITI.	

Commitment 31

G7 Partnership on Extractives Transparency

“We will partner with resource rich developing countries, the private sector and civil society to strengthen capacity and increase transparency in the extractive sectors. [Partnerships will be] tailored to the needs of each country and support national development plans with the objective of improving transparency and governance in the extractive sector by 2015.”

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, paras. 41–42

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

As pointed out in Commitment 30 on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), the extractive sector plays a crucial role in the economic development of many countries. Improved accountability, the fight against corruption, long-term investments and the use of revenues to foster sustainable development are key areas for transparency in order to fight tax evasion and illicit financial flows within extractive industries. Relying on national multi-stakeholder groups and open data systems, improved transparency attracts investment and mobilises revenues for development. EITI works to support developing countries and international organisations in this process.

During the 2013 Lough Erne Summit, the G7 committed to supporting resource-rich developing countries, the private sector and civil society to strengthen transparency in the extractive sector. Many G7 members established partnerships with governments and reported continuously on the implementation of work plans to assess the achievement of this commitment.

In Argentina, **Canada** provided support for civil society participation in EITI, including training and public advocacy, thereby enabling citizens to engage in decision-making in the extractive sector. In Colombia, Canada provided support to strengthen the capacities of local and national government entities to promote environmental sustainability, transparency and the use of extractive sector information by rural communities and Indigenous peoples and to increase access to economic benefits.²¹ In Senegal, Canada supported reforms that promote transparency and accountability measures for the mining, oil and gas sectors, enabling Senegal to produce timely EITI reports and make progress towards compliance with the EITI standard.²² In East Africa, Canada’s Supporting Inclusive Resource Development project built the capacity of legal professionals and law societies to advocate for reforms to increase transparency, gender sensitivity and accountability in the extractive industries. The project supported community participation, particularly of women, to advance and protect their rights and access to benefits related to the extractive industries.²³

Under the leadership of **France**, the G7-Burkina Faso Partnership Action Plan on Extractives Transparency was implemented between 2013 and 2017, with technical assistance in public finance and mining governance. Burkina Faso was found to have achieved meaningful progress in implementing the EITI Standard in February 2018 and meaningful progress in its 2019 EITI Validation. From 2019 to 2020, France also funded a development project to help formalise artisanal and small-scale mining in Burkina Faso.

The G7 Fast-Track Partnership between Mongolia and **Germany** set up a Regional EITI-Peer Learning Platform to advance uptake and implementation of the EITI Standard in Asia, with Mongolia as the primary knowledge carrier. Between 2014 and 2016, six regional peer-learning conferences and workshops were organised in Mongolia, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. The Fast-Track Partnership created a country-neutral, protected space that fostered trust-building across stakeholder groups. The exchange between countries of similar backgrounds and more EITI-experienced countries enabled participants to gain a deeper understanding of region-specific challenges in the extractive sector and of how to address them efficiently through improved transparency and governance. Participating countries appreciated the opportunity to experiment with different transparency instruments before committing to implementing the EITI Standard.²⁴

Japan is an EITI supporting country and has approached a wide range of stakeholders to inform them about the importance of transparency, encouraging them to become or continue to be EITI supporters.

Since 2003, the **UK** has continued to support implementation of the EITI Standard in a number of countries through programmatic support to the EITI directly, as well as through the World Bank's Extractives Governance Programme Support

(ESGP) trust fund. The UK supports impactful work on extractives and governance via a partnership with the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals and Metals (IGF). IGF is an expert organisation for the specific challenges developing countries face in effectively and efficiently taxing the extractive sector. UK funding supports IGF deep dives in Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Ecuador, Guinea and Sierra Leone. These deep-dive programmes give long-term assistance to governments to support fiscal regime reforms in mining. This work promotes improvements in both domestic resource mobilisation and natural resource governance.

The **US** has maintained a high-level commitment to extractives transparency and to the EITI since at least 2003. Activities have supported EITI-related disclosure of government revenue, exploration and concession data; strengthened multi-stakeholder governance; promoted beneficial ownership processes; and strengthened civil-society organisations' oversight. Furthermore, the US government helped enhance the capacity of national EITI secretariats, improve domestic resource mobilisation related to extractives, and address legal and institutional constraints to reform. Between 2019 and 2021, USAID provided support for such activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Guyana, Ecuador and Peru.

The **EU** provided indirect support to the commitment, for instance by publishing the Commission's Communication on "Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a path towards greater security and sustainability" in 2020. The communication aims to secure the supply of 30 critical raw materials required to support the energy transition through implementing the EU Green Deal, while promoting responsible business practices in the sector. The EU is actively engaged with its partner countries to establish strategic partnerships to develop their mineral resources sustainably, including in the informal mining sector. In particular, the EU aims

to improve its investment attractiveness and management capacity through improved transparency and negotiation capacity, good governance, due diligence and implementation of responsible mining practices at the extractive level. The EU

Regulation on Conflict Minerals (Regulation (EU) 2017/821), requiring the application of due diligence to EU importers covering tin, gold and the critical raw materials tantalum and tungsten, formally entered into force in January 2021.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2013	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Collective assessment. Individual partnerships will have their own accountability frameworks, and G7 technical leads will draw on these to assess collective progress against this commitment. 2. The degree to which the partnerships are meeting / have met the delivery outcomes as set out in their detailed work plans and reported on in their most recent progress report. 	<p>The Partnership Reports. At country level, partnerships will agree on source and minimum quality of data, against which, partnerships will report. The G7 technical leads will track progress and ensure overall consistency.</p>

Commitment 32

CONNEX

“We today announce a new initiative on Strengthening Assistance for Complex Contract Negotiations (CONNEX) to provide developing country partners with extended and concrete expertise for negotiating complex commercial contracts, focusing initially on the extractives sector, and working with existing fora and facilities to avoid duplication, to be launched in New York in June and to deliver improvements by our next meeting, including as a first step a central resource hub that brings together information and guidance.”

Brussels 2014, The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration, para. 18

SDGs:



Score:  Excellent

Extractive industries play a crucial role for economic development, in particular in developing countries. Large-scale investments require strong regulatory frameworks that are equally beneficial for host governments, societies and investors. However, many developing countries lack such regulatory frameworks and have to revert to individual state-investor agreements. Thus, the CONNEX Negotiation Support Forum initiated the Guiding Principles for Durable Extractive Contracts in the framework of the OECD Policy Dialogue on Natural Resource-based Development. The initiative established guidelines for state-investor agreements that aim to promote long-term development, improve alignment of expectations, build trust and confidence between stakeholders, and ensure all parties equally benefit from the collaboration. In order to promote these principles it is important to draft extractive contracts in such a way that they have positive economic, social and environmental outcomes, supporting sustainable development in developing countries.²⁵ Given the challenges

involved in drafting the often complex and far-reaching contracts, many developing countries require additional multi-disciplinary support.

During the Brussels Summit in 2014, the G7 committed to addressing the challenges of developing countries in drafting commercial contracts in the extractive sector, and increasingly in infrastructure, with the Strengthening Assistance for Complex Contract Negotiations (CONNEX) Initiative. To track this commitment, the G7 partners decided to establish a functioning implementation structure for CONNEX, ensure the initiative's recognition, and secure its financial sustainability.

CONNEX's development between 2017 and 2022

In 2017, Germany established the CONNEX implementation structure with the “CONNEX Support Unit”, which coordinates the implementation of all support and advisory activities in partner countries and hosts a network for partners and

collaborators in the extractive and infrastructure sector. It consists of a Governing Board as the main decision-making body, an Advisory Committee, which provides advice and helps to promote the initiative, and a Secretariat, which coordinates the assistance provided by the CONNEX Support Unit and the further development of the CONNEX Initiative.

As of 2022, the CONNEX Support Unit is the only provider of multi-disciplinary support to ODA-eligible governments on a global level. CONNEX has provided support in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and is recognised for its impact by its partner countries and relevant international stakeholders such as the World Bank, the OECD, the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF). Regional and international organisations, as well as client countries, proactively reach out to the CONNEX Support Unit to request support. 24 support activities have been implemented in 18 countries.²⁶ CONNEX may cooperate with other available service providers of legal advice, like the International Senior Lawyers Project, the African

Legal Support Facility and the International Development Law Organization. The promotion by G7 members of CONNEX is well received at the international level and helps to further institutionalise the initiative. For instance, the European Commission regularly endorsed CONNEX in its development cooperation portfolio and among its development partners as an initiative supporting transparent and mutually beneficial contract negotiations, which incentivise sustainable investments through a responsible role of the private sector and a more reliable investment climate.

Germany ensured CONNEX’s financial sustainability with limited co-funding by the EU in the 2017–2021 project phase. The current project phase runs until 2024. Overall, Germany provided EUR 14.1 million to the initiative, including the seed funding during the pilot phase between 2015 and 2017. The EU provided EUR 1 million to CONNEX in 2020. The CONNEX Support Unit is currently in advanced discussions with the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships for renewed, expanded co-funding and is involved in further donor exchanges in various stages.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2014	1. A CONNEX implementation structure is established and functioning.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD, especially Negotiation Support Forum Series • CONNEX Support Unit • Self-Reporting
	2. CONNEX Initiative is recognized as service provider by client countries and other key actors.	
	3. CONNEX’s financial sustainability is secured.	

Commitment 33

Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

“We look forward to the OECD recommendations [on addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)] and commit to take the necessary individual and collective action. We agree to work together to address base erosion and profit shifting, and to ensure that international and our own tax rules do not allow or encourage any multinational enterprises to reduce overall taxes paid by artificially shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. The ongoing OECD work will involve continued engagement with all stakeholders, including developing countries.”

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders' Communiqué, para. 24

SDGs:



Score:




Excellent

Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) pose a significant challenge to countries all over the world. Oftentimes, multinational enterprises use aggressive tax planning strategies to avoid paying taxes, taking advantage of gaps and mismatches in regulations and artificially shifting profits to no- or low-tax jurisdictions without sufficient economic substance. Such practices are not intended by the legislator and result in considerable tax revenue losses for governments. The OECD estimates that BEPS costs countries between USD 100 and USD 240 billion in annual revenues.²⁷ Developing countries are affected disproportionately by this because they depend to a larger degree on corporate income taxes. Thus, the OECD at the request of the G20 developed the BEPS Action Plan (BEPS 1.0), which consists of 15 Actions to address tax

avoidance, improve the coherence of international tax rules, and ensure a more transparent tax environment.²⁸ Figure 28 shows all 15 Actions that form part of the G20/OECD BEPS Action Plan, with Actions 5, 6, 13, and 14 giving rise to the four BEPS minimum standards. For instance, member countries must require the filing of, and must automatically share, Country-by-Country reports as a minimum standard under Action 13. To ensure the global implementation of the BEPS Action Plan and to ensure that interested countries and jurisdictions, including developing economies, can participate on an equal footing in the development of standards on BEPS-related issues, the OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS was established in 2016. It now has 141 members.

Figure 28: G20/OECD Action Plan of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting



Source: Own compilation inspired by SIF²⁹

The BEPS initiative aspires to create a modern international tax framework with the goal of ensuring that corporate profits are taxed where economic activity and value creation occur. In this context, the Inclusive Framework is currently working on a consensus-based, long-term solution to the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy (BEPS 2.0). In this regard a two-pillar approach consisting of new nexus and profit allocation rules as well as a global minimum tax is under development. The importance of this initiative and the fight against BEPS is further underlined by the following: The costs of the COVID-19 pandemic make fair and efficient tax systems ever more critical, as households' and businesses' recovery depends on the fiscal ability of governments to address the arising challenges. At the Lough Erne Summit in 2013, the G7 committed to supporting the initiative of the G20 and

OECD, endorsing the 15 Actions, promising to take the necessary individual and collective action, and calling for the work to engage with all stakeholders, including developing countries. The OECD is monitoring the implementation of the measures, with a special focus on the four minimum standards for which peer reviews are conducted. In 2021, the G7 also committed to the two-pillar approach that is currently under development, and which is expected to generate additional revenues.

Outputs achieved by the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

Since its start in 2016, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS had increased its members from 82 to 141 countries as of 2022. The members of the BEPS initiative are obligated to implement the minimum standards contained in Actions 5, 6, 13 and 14. All G7 members form part of the BEPS

Inclusive Framework and formally fulfil the requirements of these four minimum standards. Additionally, in 2021, following earlier work on BEPS Action 1, 137 jurisdictions, including the G7, endorsed the two-pillar Solution to address tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy.³⁰ Under this Solution, the participating states want to improve fairness in the taxation of the largest and most profitable multinational companies, including those that operate in the digital economy and online. Pillar 1 establishes new rules on where taxes should be paid and innovative approaches on how to share taxing rights among countries. Pillar 2 introduces a global minimum tax that aims to level the playing field and obligates multinationals to pay a minimum amount of taxes globally.³¹ However, the OECD and the Inclusive Framework are still working on finalising all the technical details of these rules. After the finalisation a swift worldwide implementation of the rules is envisaged. Countries will need to consider how to develop a practical plan to introduce both the remaining BEPS actions as well as the new Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 rules. Lower-income and lower-capacity countries may find this challenging. For this reason the OECD, and other organisations, are planning assistance programmes to help developing countries with this process.

Overall, members of the BEPS initiative achieved notable results concerning the four minimum standards. Action 5 has the objective to end harmful preferential tax regimes that contain harmful features and to exchange tax rulings regimes. To support this effort, the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) reviewed more than 300 tax regimes, identifying harmful elements and making recommendations on how to change them. OECD data suggests that 73.9% of Inclusive Framework members have a tax system in place that does not promote harmful practices. Most countries that need to review their tax system are located in the Americas with 14.7% of Inclusive Framework members being in the process of amending or eliminating harmful practices.^{32, 33}

Moreover, governments in the BEPS initiative engaged in 41,000 exchanges of information on tax rulings, with peer reviews covering 131 jurisdictions. In March 2021, 12 countries with no or nominal tax jurisdictions were reviewed and began exchanging data under the FHTP standard.³⁴ After an appraisal of the Action 5 transparency framework in 2021, the terms of reference and methodology for peer reviews were updated to improve the exchange of information on tax rulings.³⁵


Under Action 6, members want to prevent legal entities from indirectly accessing the benefits of a tax treaty between two jurisdictions if they are not entitled to such benefits. Such practices undermine the tax sovereignty of nations by claiming treaty benefits in situations where these benefits were not intended to be granted, thereby depriving the countries of tax revenues. The third report on the implementation of Action 6 demonstrates that most members have integrated mechanisms to prevent treaty shopping into tax treaty networks. The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (MLI) supports countries with the implementation of Action 6 and other treaty-related rules under BEPS. It contributed to the modification of 650 tax treaties in 68 jurisdictions. The OECD estimates that an additional 1,100 treaties will be changed as soon as all signatories ratify the MLI. To monitor the success of their activities, all member countries, including the G7, participate in annual peer reviews.³⁶

The last two minimum standards are Actions 13 and 14. The former establishes country-by-country reporting requirements for large multinational companies on activities, taxation and annual income. This information is shared among tax administrations for assessing high-level transfer pricing risks, other BEPS-related risks, and economic and statistical analysis, where appropriate. The latter seeks to improve mechanisms for the resolution of tax disputes, foster better communications between taxpayers and authorities, and improve communication between tax authorities

for the interpretation and application of tax treaties.³⁷ The peer-review report on Action 13 finds that over 90 jurisdictions have a domestic legal framework, and many are finalising their legislations. Moreover, 82 countries were able to demonstrate that the implemented measures allow for the appropriate use of the reporting requirements.³⁸ According to the OECD, nearly every MNE with consolidated group revenue of at least EUR 750 million is already required to file a Country-by-Country report (CbCR), and the gaps that do remain are closing. However, as Figure 29 shows, significant regional differences exist concerning the activation of the multilateral competent authority agreement. For example, while 90.9% of Western European jurisdictions signed and activated the multilateral competent authority agreement, 71.4% of African countries have not signed the

agreement that establishes the exchange mechanism. This lack of a legal exchange framework is one of the reasons that few developing countries receive CbCRs. Furthermore, many developing countries do not fulfil the additional technological and domestic legal and administrative framework requirements to receive CbCRs. Specifically, they may lack an adequate IT infrastructure, and may not meet the strict confidentiality and data safeguarding requirements to ensure the appropriate use of the information. Meeting these requirements is the biggest challenge in this context. Therefore, capacity-building in these areas remains crucial to ensuring the access of developing countries to those reports through the adoption of domestic law, treaties and practices that qualify them for access to CbCRs.

Figure 29: Status of the country-by-country multinational reporting requirement in member countries – Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement³⁹



Source: Own compilation based on OECD tax co-operation data.


In Action 14, the completion of peer reviews shows progress but cannot be relied upon as a sole measure of success. The OECD reports that members finalised 82 Stage 1 and 45 Stage 1 and 2

peer-monitoring reports for effective dispute resolution. However, Figure 30 highlights enormous regional differences in peer review completion, as 85.7% of African countries have not started the

review process. Overall, 40.3% of members did not begin the review. One reason for the delay is that many of these countries have very low numbers of mutual agreement procedure (MAP) requests and there is no feedback from other members of the FTA MAP Forum indicating that their MAP regimes require improvement. Thus, their peer review has been deferred. It should be noted, however, that a

low number of MAP cases and no feedback are not necessarily indicative of a lack of tax disputes or an indication that no improvement is needed. For example, a low number of MAP cases may indicate barriers to accessing MAP or a lack of confidence in the process, which are both problems Action 14 seeks to remedy.

Figure 30: Peer review reports on dispute resolution in member countries⁴⁰



Source: Own compilation based on OECD tax co-operation data.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2014	1. Implementation of the G20/OECD Action Plan on BEPS.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> OECD monitoring of information about domestic implementation of agreed measures. The OECD Action Plan on BEPS has been endorsed by the G20 and there is now a G20/OECD BEPS project to take forward work on the 15 Actions identified. The OECD will monitor progress of this project and the implementation of the agreed outputs. The G7 will draw on the OECD/G20 reporting to measure G7 progress.

Commitment 34

Beneficial ownership

“We agree to publish national Action Plans to make information on who really owns and profits from companies and trusts available to tax collection and law enforcement agencies, for example through central registries of company beneficial ownership.”

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 3

SDGs:



Score:  *Excellent*

Transparency about beneficial ownership of companies is key for preventing and investigating criminal activity. Anonymity becomes problematic when the legal entity obscures the identity of beneficial owners, as that allows for unlawful actions, such as tax evasion, corruption and money laundering. Criminals intentionally set up such blurred company structures to prevent law enforcement from tracing financial flows and investigating illegal activities. In addition to other measures, countries have started to establish beneficial ownership registries that clarify who owns or controls a legal entity.⁴¹ These registries typically require legal entities to report their beneficial owners to a specific government authority that stores their beneficial ownership information.⁴² In March 2022, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog, adopted revised standards on transparency and beneficial ownership by legal persons. The revised FATF Standards require, among other things, the establishment of beneficial ownership registries or other mechanisms that also provide authorities with efficient access to adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial ownership information.^{43, 44}

During the 2013 G7 Summit in Lough Erne, the G7 members committed to creating their national action plans to address the challenges connected to beneficial ownership. Thus, the partners committed to strengthening and implementing beneficial ownership registries in their respective jurisdictions that align with the G7’s core principles. In 2019, all G7 countries had developed their national action plans or enacted the necessary legislation.⁴⁵

Achievements since the implementation of the country action plans

In 2020, **Canada** held public consultations on beneficial ownership registries, publishing a summary of consultation feedback in April 2021.⁴⁶ Building on these consultations, the government pledged CAD 2.1 million over two years to Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada to support the implementation of a publicly accessible corporate beneficial ownership registry by 2025. In 2021, the province of Quebec passed legislation obligating companies to disclose their ultimate beneficiaries to the provincial enterprise registry and to make this information public. The above-noted measures further align Canada with the G7 core principles for preventing the misuse of

companies and legal arrangements. They require companies to know their beneficial owners and to make corporate beneficial ownership information more accessible to law enforcement, tax authorities and other authorities.

France enshrined access to beneficial ownership information in commercial law, implementing the European Anti-Money Laundering Directive (2015/849/EU). The National Trade and Companies Register (*RNCS – Registre national du commerce et des sociétés*) centralises and stores beneficial ownership information electronically. A wide range of company data is stored in the RNCS and is accessible through the InfoGref and the National Institute of Intellectual Property, which provide the public with quick access to information on companies and associations. The registry also includes information on executive officers and directors.

Following the implementation of the fifth European Anti-Money Laundering Directive (2018/843), **Germany** made beneficial ownership information publicly accessible through the “transparency register” website in 2020.⁴⁷ The government increased the user-friendliness of the registry by providing centralised beneficial ownership information on the website instead of links to other registries. Additionally, Germany works on improving the interconnectivity of the “transparency register” with other EU registries.⁴⁸

To implement the EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, **Italy** amended its Anti-Money-Laundering Law in 2017, introducing a Business Registry that records the Beneficial Owners of Legal Persons and Trusts. Under the changed Anti-Money-Laundering Law, shareholders of a legal entity have to provide the relevant information on beneficial owners, while each legal entity is responsible for identifying its beneficial owners. Failure to provide the information is punished with a fine between EUR 103 and EUR 1,032. In 2019, the Italian Ministry of the Economy and Finance published on its website a draft of the Ministerial Decree setting forth the provisions for the establishment and

operation of the Register of Beneficial Owners of business entities, non-commercial entities and trusts. The new beneficial owners’ filing obligations apply to commercial entities, private non-commercial organisations, trusts, foundations and other fiduciary arrangements, requiring disclosure of information on directors, managers, trustees, administrators and the entity’s ultimate owners. The procedure to legally adopt the new tool was concluded, and the new framework is at its final stage for publication in the Official Journal.

In **Japan**, the Act on Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds requires that the National Public Safety Commission conduct annual risk assessments and publish them. The latest version was published in 2021. Under the act, financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (excluding independent legal professionals and accountants) are obliged to confirm the beneficial owner of any legal person or legal arrangement who is their customer. Additionally, under the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Notary Act, when making an application to a notary for the authentication of a new stock company, the applicants must declare the beneficial owner’s identity in order to prevent criminal activities. Furthermore, Japan also established a system under which certificates related to beneficial ownership of stock companies are issued at commercial registries upon application by stock companies. This system was implemented in January 2022. To enhance international cooperation within the framework of information exchange, Japan established a framework for information exchange with 107 foreign financial intelligence units (FIUs).

Published in 2021, the latest version of the Anti-Corruption Strategy Update sets out the **UK’s** progress on beneficial ownership.⁴⁹ Since the publication of this Strategy, the UK has passed the Economic Crime Act 2022, establishing a public register of the beneficial ownership of UK property by overseas legal entities.⁵⁰ The Registration of Overseas Entities Bill established a public register of the beneficial ownership of UK property by overseas

legal entities. The government plans to introduce the bill when parliamentary time allows. Moreover, the UK has implemented changes to public procurement, which entail using existing transparency mechanisms to publish beneficial ownership information on foreign companies that win government contracts. Additionally, the UK implemented measures under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 in relation to public registers of company beneficial ownership in the UK Overseas Territories. The UK has secured the commitment of all Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories to implement publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership information by 2023.

In January 2021, the US Congress enacted the Corporate Transparency Act, which will pave the way for creating a federal register of company owners in the country. In December 2021, the US published the first-ever US Strategy on Countering Corruption. The Strategy outlines a whole-of-government approach to elevating the fight against corruption. A central pillar of this Strategy is strengthening US efforts to curb illicit finance. Among the various lines of effort outlined, the US committed to effectively collecting beneficial ownership information on those who control anonymous shell companies, and increasing transparency in real estate transactions. The US Department of the Treasury is working on implementing this commitment by developing effective beneficial ownership regulations and building a database of the beneficial owners of certain companies. This work is key to complying with the provisions of the Corporate Transparency Act. This law requires covered business entities to disclose to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

(FinCEN), a bureau of the US Department of the Treasury, information on their true beneficial owners. FinCEN is tasked with maintaining a non-public national database of this beneficial ownership information and is authorised to share this information with certain Government agencies, financial institutions and regulators, subject to appropriate protocols.⁵¹

The EU's regulatory framework ensures and enhances the transparency of legal entities, implementing the FATF's international standards. With the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (2015/849/EU and 2018/843/EU), the EU introduced the concept of beneficial ownership, aiming to increase the transparency of corporate structures. Member states must ensure that the beneficial ownership information is held in a central register and that this information is adequate, accurate and current. Competent authorities in the fields of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, including law enforcement authorities and FIUs as well as tax authorities, should have unrestricted access to beneficial ownership information. The public should have access to a limited set of data in relation to beneficial owners of legal persons. Member states should enforce effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for breaches of beneficial ownership transparency requirements. To date, all EU member states have implemented the directive. The European Commission is also working on the interconnection of beneficial ownership registries at the EU level, which is already in progress. The IT system is ready to create links with national registers. However, interconnecting databases is a complex legal and technical process during which the individual registers will be connected gradually.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2013	1. Publication and implementation of individual country Action Plans.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Publicly available individual G7 self-assessment of progress FATF mutual assessments
	2. Compliance of the Action Plans with the G7 core principles	

Commitment 35

Anti-bribery

“We will fully enforce our laws against bribery of foreign public officials and, consistent with national legal principles, will rigorously investigate and prosecute foreign bribery offences.”

L'Aquila 2009, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, para. 30

SDGs:



Score:  Good

Bribery is still a prevalent phenomenon in international business transactions, weakening good governance and economic progress. All countries need to collaborate to combat bribery at the local and international levels.⁵² Particularly, corruption of public officials can affect the functioning of national and international markets, for instance, when government officials accept bribes and reward large-scale public contracts to businesses as a result of bribes rather than based on the quality of service and goods. With the aim of fighting such corrosive behaviour, several anti-bribery laws and conventions have been established, including the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The convention establishes legally binding standards to criminalise bribery of foreign public officials and encourages implementing countries to investigate, prosecute and sanction wrongdoings, thereby focusing on the supply side of corrupt transactions.⁵³

The G7 committed to addressing corruption and bribery of foreign public officials within their domestic legislation, enabling the prosecution of bribery offences through their own jurisdiction. As pointed out in the 2019 Biarritz progress report,

“all countries are members of the OECD anti-bribery convention and adopted sound legislation and regulations against bribery of public officials.” Thus, the following indicator assessment will focus on the support for anti-bribery activities and enforcement of anti-bribery laws by each G7 partner.

G7 efforts to support anti-bribery

Canada actively participated in the OECD Working Group on Bribery (WGB) peer review mechanism as a lead examiner, evaluated country, and member of the working group. Along with Switzerland, Canada began to carry out its duties as co-lead examiner for the OECD WGB’s review of France’s implementation of the anti-bribery convention. This included liaising with the OECD WGB Secretariat and participating in a virtual visit to France in 2021 to obtain information from government officials and business and civil-society representatives concerning the country’s efforts to implement the anti-bribery convention. France’s review was presented to the WGB in December 2021. The next steps include finalising the draft report and facilitating its adoption through the WGB. The WGB’s peer review of Canada is scheduled to be presented to

the group in 2023, with preparatory work on the report expected to start in 2022. Co-lead examiners are Austria and New Zealand.⁵⁴

France carried out many reforms in multiple areas to implement the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. A 2013 Act created the PNF (*Parquet national financier*), which relies on a specialised office, also created in 2013, for its investigations. Additionally, a large number of new legislative provisions introduced reforms in various areas, for instance reorganising criminal courts, strengthening the plea-bargaining system framework, and improving the governance system that combats money laundering and terrorist financing. In 2016, France adopted an Act on transparency, combating corruption and the modernisation of economic interaction, which strengthened the preventive aspect of France’s anti-corruption system. It notably established the French Anti-Corruption Agency and required large companies to set up compliance programmes. The act also removed certain procedural obstacles to enforcing the foreign bribery offence committed abroad and introduced an additional penalty, requiring companies convicted of bribery to implement compliance programmes.

In 2021, **Germany** presented its two-year written follow-up report to the OECD WGB, outlining the steps taken to implement the 35 recommendations and to address the follow-up issues in its 2018 evaluation. Based on that report, the working group concludes that Germany fully implemented ten recommendations, partially implemented seven recommendations and did not implement 18 recommendations. Germany developed legislative proposals to implement the recommendations that are currently assessed as “not implemented”.⁵⁵

Italy strengthened its legal framework in the last three years by adopting various reforms, such as amendments to the Criminal Procedural Code and the Anti-Mafia Code as well as a new law on the protection of whistle-blowers in 2017 that extends

protection to the private sector. Furthermore, Italy adopted a law strengthening the fight against bribery in December 2018, and a new law was introduced in January 2019. The new regulation strengthened measures aimed at preventing and punishing corruption involving public agencies, thereby significantly amending the liability of legal entities. Moreover, it includes debarment, stronger sanctions for corruption offences, a trading in influence offence, as well as new and strong obligations with respect to the financing of political parties. The law also gives public prosecutors who investigate bribery cases the power to use undercover agents and technical instruments. More broadly, the law makes the Italian framework more compliant with pivotal multilateral systems such as the UNCAC, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (broader definition of public officials according to said Convention) and the Council of Europe Anti-Corruption Convention.

In response to an amendment of the Act on Punishment of Organised Crimes and Control of Crime Proceeds, **Japan** revised the “Guidelines for the Prevention of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials” in 2021, updating the guide and responding to recommendations made by an OECD follow-up evaluation on the implementation of the anti-bribery convention.⁵⁶

The **UK’s** 2010 Bribery Act covered foreign bribery offences in line with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.⁵⁷ The UK was re-designated as an active enforcer of foreign bribery by Transparency International in 2020. The UK continues to play an active role in the OECD Working Group on Bribery and reported back on its Phase 4 recommendations in 2019 and 2021; 37 of its 44 recommendations are now either fully or partially implemented. Over 2021, the UK’s Serious Fraud Office successfully prosecuted GPT Special Projects Ltd. and Petrofac Ltd. with combined fines, costs and confiscation of just over GBP 100 million. Since 2019, it also has coordinated the return of funds to Chad and obtained compensation for the people

of Nigeria, among other countries. The UK also supports the fight against bribery and corruption globally, including in low- and middle-income countries. The National Crime Agency's International Corruption Unit has restrained, detained, confiscated or returned to victim states GBP 1 billion since its establishment, including the restraint of GBP 20 million belonging to a UK citizen involved in corruption in Malawi in 2021. The UK also supports the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC). The IACCC brings together specialist law enforcement officers from fifteen countries to tackle allegations of grand corruption. Since its launch in 2017, the IACCC has helped affected states to restrain over GBP 300 million worth of suspected stolen assets in various jurisdictions.

The **US** actively enforced a comprehensive foreign bribery framework. A central pillar of this framework was the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which integrated as criminal offences the recommendations made by the UNCAC and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. As the principal statute that prohibited bribery of a foreign public official or an official of international organisations, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act contained both anti-bribery and accounting provisions. The anti-bribery provisions banned US persons and domestic businesses, foreign public companies listed on the national stock exchanges, and certain foreign persons and businesses operating in the US from making corrupt payments to foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business. The US also countered bribery through its money laundering statutes and charged foreign public officials involved in bribery schemes with money laundering offences under its money laundering statutes.⁵⁸

The **EU** introduced several directives on anti-bribery, aiming to fight corruption of EU officials. The Directive on the fight against fraud criminalises active and passive corruption, which affects the

Union's financial interests.^{59, 60, 61} The EU Staff Regulations established obligations for EU officials concerning anti-corruption. For instance, before recruiting an EU official, the selection board must examine whether the candidate has any conflict of interest connected to the advertised position. Additionally, the regulations required immediate reporting of instances of fraud or corruption by EU officials. The Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the Commission played a key role in ethics enforcement by conducting administrative inquiries, disciplinary proceedings, suspension proceedings and proceedings related to waivers of immunity of staff. The European Anti-Fraud Office allowed for administrative investigations within the EU institutions and member states to fight fraud, corruption, and any other illegal activity affecting the EU's financial interests. Under this regulation, the office can conduct internal investigations relating to serious misconduct, including corruption by EU staff and members of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.⁶² In addition, the European Public Prosecutor's Office can investigate and prosecute corruption.⁶³ At the international level, the EU remains both an adamant promoter of anticorruption standards, and a fully engaged actor in the fight against corruption. The EU is a signatory party of the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and in 2021 it launched the first cycle of the EU implementation review under this Convention.

Enforcement of anti-bribery legislation

Table 20 highlights enforcements of actions against foreign bribery cases against natural and legal persons since 1999. Overall, Germany and the US prosecuted and sanctioned the largest number of natural persons with a cumulative 348 and 133 cases in 2020, respectively. In terms of penalties against legal persons, the United States enforced the most cases with a total of 154 in the same year. The other G7 countries lag far behind in both categories.

Table 20: Cumulative decisions on criminal foreign bribery cases between 1999 and 2020^{64, 65, 66, 67}

Category	Year	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	UK	USA
Natural Persons Sanctioned	2017	1	15	316	12	10	14	99
	2018	1	20	326	13	10	21	108
	2019	1	20	340	16	13	21	123
	2020	1	22	348	16	16	25	133
Legal Persons Sanctioned	2017	3	2	11	6	2	7	125
	2018	3	5	11	6	2	10	136
	2019	4	12	12	7	2	12	145
	2020	4	15	12	7	2	13	154

Canada had 15 ongoing investigations as of the end of 2020. As a matter of longstanding policy, the Canadian government does not provide information that is not in the public domain. Thus, the country does not report on investigations or parties under investigation, explaining the low number of cases in Table 20. As of 2021, **France** imposed sanctions on 23 individuals, including five for foreign bribery or complicity in foreign bribery, with fines of up to EUR 2.6 million. **Germany** investigated 62 cases, of which 47 were already ongoing at the time in 2021.⁶⁸ In **Italy**, 84 investigations on foreign bribery cases led to proceedings against natural or legal persons. Since 2019, **Japan**

indicted six natural persons for foreign bribery.⁶⁹ In 2021, the **US** Department of Justice charged 26 individuals and convicted 19 individuals for foreign bribery offences. Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the US government resolved three criminal enforcement actions against legal entities, which resulted in approximately USD 262.3 million in corporate criminal penalties and a total of USD 649 million in enforcement action fines.⁷⁰ Additionally, the Securities and Exchange Commission's FCPA unit resolved five foreign bribery cases with penalties and disgorgements totalling almost USD 200 million in the same year.⁷¹

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
	1. Existence and quality of legislation to implement OECD Anti-Bribery Convention	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Peer review reports completed by the OECD Working Group on Bribery OECD Comparative Table of Enforcement Data. Self-reporting
N/A	2. Enforcement results	

Commitment 36

Asset recovery

“We will promote the effective implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), as well as other key international instruments such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and will promote full participation in their respective review mechanisms.”

“Reaffirming that strengthening international cooperation among law enforcement agencies is a global imperative to effectively combat transnational corruption and to facilitate effective recovery of stolen assets, their disposal and social re-use, we will carry on making efforts through:

Continuing to promote efficient and effective means for providing mutual legal assistance (MLA) and extradition of persons for corruption offences, consistent with applicable domestic and international instruments, while respecting the principle of the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

With a view to facilitating MLA requests and other forms of international cooperation, promoting dialogue among practitioners which are particularly valuable in investigations of corruption, and coordination and cooperation on asset recovery through interagency networks, including regional networks where appropriate.

Following up on asset recovery efforts of Arab countries and, applying the lessons learned in this effort to address global needs. In this regard, we will focus on promoting practical cooperation and engage financial centers in Asia and other parts of the world. In this context, we welcome proposals for a Global Asset Recovery Forum to be held in 2017, co-hosted by the United States and United Kingdom, with support from the joint World Bank and UNODC Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), which will focus on assistance to Nigeria, Ukraine, Tunisia and Sri Lanka. (...)”

*Ise Shima 2016, Leaders’ Declaration and G7 Action to Fight Corruption, Section 2
“Strengthening Law Enforcement Cooperation on Corruption”, paras. 1 to 4.*

SDGs:



Score:  Excellent

Asset recovery refers to the return or repatriation of proceeds that were illegally removed from countries as a result of corruption.⁷² It encompasses complex processes, including coordination between domestic and foreign jurisdictions, investigative skills and techniques to trace illicit flows, the ability to open and conduct legal investigations, and the enforcement of legal actions to repatriate stolen funds.⁷³ The exact amount of revenue loss due to corruption remains unknown. However, the World Bank estimates that developing countries lose USD 20 to 40 billion every year.⁷⁴ Thus, asset recovery could be an important pathway to support development, as the additional resources could fund programmes and policies that promote the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.⁷⁵ Moreover, theft of assets, especially in public institutions, reduces confidence in governments, damages the private investment environment, and delays development in key sectors of the economy such as health, education and infrastructure.⁷⁶ Asset recovery, when carefully implemented, could serve as a tool both to enforce anti-corruption laws and to prevent money laundering.⁷⁷

The G7 committed to assisting asset recovery activities, by promoting strategies and approaches to combat corruption and recuperate stolen funds, during the Ise-Shima Summit in 2016. The partners committed to participating in asset recovery fora and initiatives to strengthen the implementation of the G20 Asset Recovery Principles and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) Chapter V mechanisms.⁷⁸

G7's activities and support to promote and implement asset recovery mechanisms

Canada has remained active in international activities around asset recovery. Along with other G7 members, Canada committed to updating its Asset Recovery Guide in 2021 and also participated in the 2017 GFAR. Canada also took part in the annual meetings of the UNCAC Working Group on Asset Recovery and has contributed to its various

information products. Canada has been a member of the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR)/ Interpol Global Focal Point Network, hosting the network's annual conference in 2017, and has participated in the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC). In addition, the country has been an active observer in the Camden Asset Recovery Interagency Network and Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for the Caribbean. Canada's second-cycle review under UNCAC (Chapter II and Chapter V) was initiated in late 2020, and Canada has acted as an expert reviewer for other country reviews in this cycle. The Canadian delegation to the Financial Action Task Force remains actively engaged in strengthening asset-recovery-related international anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing standards.

France systematically participates in meetings of the UNCAC Working Group on Asset Recovery to engage with other members on good practices and challenges in implementing UNCAC Chapter V. Together with Nigeria, France co-sponsored a side event during the Implementation Review Group and Working Group on Asset Recovery meetings in 2021, which Transparency International and the UNCAC Coalition organised. The session's title was: What is the key to improving asset recovery? French officials participated as speakers in the event and presented on the new French law that created an additional legal mechanism for asset return. On the one hand, this is based on a legal provision requesting approval to use the revenues from stolen assets for the direct benefit of local populations, and on the other hand on the creation of a new budgetary programme to do so. A similar presentation was made during the thematic session of the UNCAC Conference of the States Parties on asset recovery in 2021. At this Conference and as part of *Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) Day*, France also participated in a session on how a corruption investigation can assist tax authorities in collecting revenue, and how tax

investigations can lead to the recovery of the proceeds of corruption.

Germany organised the second Asset Recovery Dialogue in cooperation with the International Centre for Asset Recovery and the Basel Institute on Governance in 2019.⁷⁹ In 2020, Germany initiated the Global Forum on Illicit Financial Flows and Sustainable Development, including a thematic stream on Global Asset Recovery.⁸⁰ In 2021, the German government hosted an Asset Management Forum on best practices and lessons learnt in the accountable and transparent management of seized or confiscated assets. The event promoted exchanges between asset management agencies, international experts and civil-society representatives. Moreover, Germany organised three practice-oriented exchanges between the Asset Recovery Interagency Networks (ARINs) in 2021. In particular, the meetings were attended by representatives from ARIN-Eastern Africa and ARIN-Western Africa, as well as by Latin American experts and the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network. According to the 2019 UNODC Implementation Review Group report, Germany enhanced and facilitated mutual legal assistance related to asset recovery. This entailed signing several multilateral agreements to strengthen cross-border asset recovery and ensure cooperation. Moreover, Germany implemented and periodically reviewed the Directive on the Prevention of Corruption to improve the legal and institutional framework on asset recovery. Additionally, the country facilitated the return of assets by establishing asset disposal agreements with other EU members.⁸¹

According to the 2019 UNODC Implementation Review Group report, **Italy** had well-established mechanisms for asset recovery. This encompassed criminal procedure codes and collaborative mechanisms on asset recovery and disposition with other foreign jurisdictions. These translated into several agreements with other international bodies to facilitate international cooperation and enhance

efficient information sharing. Additionally, Italy continues to strengthen its legal framework on asset recovery through the amendment of the Anti-Money Laundering Law. The amendment appoints entities to conduct extensive due diligence about customers in high-risk countries as well as politically exposed persons. The Bank of Italy continues to serve as a regulatory tool in the asset recovery process, as it provides financial and technical resources, equipment and personnel.⁸²

Italy takes part in all of the Asset Recovery Multilateral Fora, contributing to their respective processes. Italy, in particular, shares its advanced models, which are based on four factual premises, harmonised with a recent evaluation by the Financial Action Task Force. This includes the finding that crime is often profit-oriented, profit is at the core of crime phenomena, illegal capital is systematically fed into the market to increase the profit margins and to better cover up the illicit activities and facilitate the gradual social infiltration of criminal groups, and cracking down on illicit capital is the best way to quantitatively reduce the constant regeneration of criminal associations and the foundations of their negative social influence and territorial control. Therefore, all forms of contemporary crime need to be tackled through high-impact instruments of criminal asset seizure. Italy is also engaged in the capacity-building activities developed by these fora, through capability and training activities, institution-building programmes and enhancement of legal frameworks in this sector. The Italian Constitutional Court stated that the wealth originated by illicit assets should not be lost to the surrounding communities. Consequently, all efforts should be deployed to integrate the confiscated property into the virtuous economic circuit.

Japan participated in the Global Forum for Asset Recovery co-hosted by UNODC and the World Bank in 2017. During the event, the Japanese delegation had bilateral consultations with other countries to promote the exchange of information and cooperation on ongoing asset recovery cases.

The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), fully staffed and funded by the Japanese government, conducts the “UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme” annually to improve the implementation of anti-corruption strategies, including mechanisms for asset recovery.⁸³ In addition, UNAFEI holds an annual regional seminar on good governance to promote openness, transparency and the rule of law in Southeast Asian countries. In 2019, the seminar had a particular focus on the issue of asset recovery.⁸⁴ Japan participated in an annual meeting of the ARIN-Asia Pacific in 2019. Through the active participation in ARIN-Asia Pacific, Japan promoted the sharing of information and experiences for asset recovery among law enforcement agencies in the region.

The **UK** actively promotes and cooperates on asset recovery at the international level. For instance, the UK co-hosted the Global Forum on Asset Recovery with the US in 2017 to support the recovery of stolen assets in four countries.⁸⁵ GFAR convened law enforcement officials from 26 jurisdictions to facilitate international cooperation and to make significant progress on ongoing cases. GFAR also led to the GFAR Principles on Asset Return to guide coordination and cooperation on asset return, and to promote transparency and accountability processes in the return of stolen assets. The UK also participated in the 2020 UNODC-led international experts’ meeting on asset return, which established recommendations to reinforce the GFAR Principles. In 2021, the UK published the Framework for Transparent and Accountable Asset Return, drawing on the GFAR Principles.⁸⁶ In 2020, the UK participated in the UNODC-led international experts’ meeting on asset return, which established recommendations to reinforce the GFAR Principles. At the UN Conference of States Parties in 2021, the UK participated in World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery Day. The UK funded the work of the World Bank’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative between 2017 and 2020 and continues to fund the

work of the International Centre for Asset Recovery, which it has supported since 2006.⁸⁷ The UK works with the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group and with G7 partners to support anti-corruption work streams, including on asset recovery. The UK has established comprehensive legal, administrative and enforcement mechanisms dedicated to investigating, freezing and confiscating assets stolen from other countries.⁸⁸ According to the most recent assessment of the UNODC Implementation Review Group Report in 2019, the UK remains committed to asset recovery, implementing a broad legal and regulatory framework coupled with solid inter-agency support geared towards international cooperation on the recovery of assets.

The **US** remains committed to the recovery of assets worldwide through a range of initiatives and participation in asset recovery fora. For instance, asset recovery is an important component of the US Strategy on Countering Corruption released in December 2021. With the Strategy, the US aimed to expand its involvement in formal and informal networks like the Camden Asset Recovery Inter-agency Network and its regional bodies, and the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre, which has multi-country membership and observers. The US also committed to engaging directly to increase cooperation with other countries’ law enforcement, particularly on investigations leading to asset recovery and asset returns consistent with Global Forum on Asset Recovery principles. Since the Department of Justice’s Kleptocracy Initiative was announced in 2010, the US has sought to confiscate over USD 3.4 billion in corruption proceeds; successfully confiscated over USD 1.7 billion of these assets; and returned and assisted in the return of over USD 1.6 billion to the economies from which the money was stolen. In 2020 alone, the US returned and assisted in the return of over USD 1 billion dollars to other economies impacted by corruption, and is in the process of negotiating the return of hundreds of millions more dollars stemming from corruption around the world.

In 2021, US asset recovery efforts were further strengthened with the passage of legislation to establish a pilot Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Rewards Program. The programme provides payments to individuals for information leading to the identification and recovery of stolen assets linked to foreign government corruption held at U.S. financial institutions. Designed to complement the US government's other anti-kleptocracy efforts, the pilot programme provides law enforcement with an additional and effective avenue to obtain valuable information and evidence that

could assist in their investigations and, where possible, support the repatriation of assets to the countries from which they were stolen.

In 2021, the **European Commission** participated in the Working Group on Asset Recovery during the 15th Session Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption. During the event, EU officials informed participants about recent legislative and other anti-corruption activities at the EU level.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
N/A	1. Participation in asset recovery fora (e.g., GFAR, UNCAC Working Group on Asset Recovery) and initiatives	Participation in asset recovery fora (e.g., GFAR, UNCAC Working Group on Asset Recovery) and initiatives
	2. Implementation of the G-20 Asset Recovery Principles and of UNCAC chapter V.	Implementation of the G-20 Asset Recovery Principles and of UNCAC chapter V.

Commitment 37

Tax capacity-building

“We will continue to provide practical support to developing countries’ efforts to build capacity to collect the taxes owed to them and to engage in and benefit from changing global standards on exchange of information, including automatic exchange of information ... and we will continue to provide practical support for developing countries seeking to join the Global Forum [on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes]. We each commit to continue to share our expertise, help build capacity, including by engaging in long-term partnership programmes to secure success ... We will take practical steps to support [the OECD’s Tax Inspectors Without Borders] initiative, including by making tax experts available.“

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, paras. 27–28

SDGs:



Score:  Good

Adequate tax capacity is crucial for development, as effective tax systems are a fundamental building block for increased domestic resources in developing countries, promoting sustainable development, self-reliance, good governance, growth, and stability.⁸⁹ Well-functioning tax systems are a key factor in allowing developing countries to provide essential services for their citizens, such as education or health services, without increasing the tax burden, and to improve the trust of their population in the work of governments as well as providing consistency and certainty to businesses.⁹⁰ Consequently, developing countries are empowered to shape their own future by having effective tax systems.

During the 2013 Lough Erne Summit, the G7 committed to assisting countries in modernising their tax systems and making them more effective.

For the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, revenue mobilisation is likely to play an important role, and many countries are enquiring about technical assistance and other capacity-building support.⁹¹ The G7 members cooperate with partner countries and multilateral platforms⁹² to provide practical support and facilitate the exchange of information and expertise as well as building and strengthening developing countries’ tax capacities. This will continue to be of enormous significance in order to mitigate potential risks of tax evasion or tax avoidance and to facilitate a better recovery at all levels. In the following, the G7 partners’ contributions to the OECD Global Forum, practical support and expertise-sharing to developing countries, and assistance to the OECD/UN Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) initiative are assessed.

The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes

In 2021, the **Canada** Revenue Agency (CRA) assisted the Global Forum in hosting six events, which focused on a variety of themes relating to the exchange of information (EoI) and reached over 650 individuals through the Knowledge Sharing Platform for Tax Administrations (KSP_{TA}). The Global Forum joined the KSP_{TA} in 2021 as a contributing hub. This addition furthered the goal of providing practical tools to help tax officials support efforts to mobilise domestic resources, improve governance, and combat tax evasion and tax avoidance. The Global Forum uses the KSP_{TA} library and eLearning catalogues to publish courses, reference material and toolkits for over 25,000 users from 209 jurisdictions and 27 international and regional tax organisations. In 2021, CRA and Finance Canada officials participated virtually in the 2021 Global Forum Plenary meeting. The meeting provided participants with an opportunity to take stock of recent developments in tax transparency and celebrate the 10th anniversary of its capacity-building programme.

France is a founding member and financially supports the Global Forum's capacity-building programme for African countries. Within the framework of its inter-ministry domestic revenue mobilisation strategy, France has pledged a grant of EUR 1.5 million between 2020 and 2023 to support the Global Forum's initiative in Africa.

Germany supported partner countries to join the Global Forum and to implement peer review recommendations. In 2021, the German government supported the Global Forum financially in developing the Automatic Exchange of Information Toolkit through its development agency, GIZ. Further financial support is committed for the coming years.

Italy mostly provided expertise through multilateral programmes. In 2015, Italy, along with the Global Forum, started a pilot project to support Albania in implementing the Automatic Exchange of Infor-

mation standard by 2020. The project lasted longer than expected and was successfully concluded in 2020, with Albania starting to exchange information as planned.

Japan has been making contributions to help developing countries reform their tax policies and strengthen their tax administration capacities, enabling them to join the Global Forum.

The **UK** continued to fund the Global Forum and delivered technical assistance, including induction programmes and campaigns like the Africa Initiative. Members of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs' (HMRC) Capacity Building Unit worked alongside the Global Forum and peers in ODA-eligible jurisdictions supporting work to meet the standards of the Global Forum.

The **EU** provided EUR 2 million to the Global Forum, aiming to support technical assistance in partner countries and facilitating their engagement with the Global Forum. This also contributed to the financing of induction programmes.

Practical support to build tax capacities in developing countries

In **Canada**, the CRA works closely with the Global Forum Capacity Building and Outreach team to help developing countries engage in and benefit from EoI standards. Since 2020, Canada has been a member of and chaired the Global Forum Automatic Exchange of Information Peer Review Group, which completed and approved peer review determinations of the legal frameworks of 100 jurisdictions that aspired to meet EoI standards. The peer review group worked on the second stage of its peer review determinations and aimed to publish final reports with approved ratings by the end of 2022. CRA provided an expert resource to the Confidentiality and Data Safeguard Group, which conducted reviews to ensure jurisdictions have appropriate organisational safeguards to meet EoI standards.

France advocated for a differentiated rollout of technical assistance programmes on international taxation, in particular transfer pricing, that respected the administrative capabilities of the beneficiary countries. The government focused on countries that have integrated tax administrations as well as the necessary fiscal resources to support the required technical, financial, and human resources needs.

In 2020, **Germany** supported Ghana with the review of its EoI standard, updating its training manual and providing trainings for trainers. In addition, Germany partnered with Georgia to introduce the Automatic Exchange of Information (AEOI) by 2024. Moreover, the German government helped Ghana to exit the EU's and Financial Action Task Force's grey list.

Japan's practical support includes contributing to technical assistance and outreach programmes on EoI standards, tax administrations and tax policies in collaboration with the OECD, Global Forum, IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. Japan also supported the Platform for Collaboration on Tax to enhance the coordination of technical assistance provided by international institutions and bilateral donors. Moreover, Japan provided bilateral technical assistance to developing countries through medium and long-term support programmes that involved experts from the National Tax Agency.

The **UK** provided focused Exchange of Information on Request and EoI peer-to-peer technical assistance to ten ODA jurisdictions.⁹³ Working closely with the Global Forum, HMRC has helped Ghana, Nigeria and Pakistan to successfully introduce and comply with the EoI standard. Pakistan passed its first EoIR Peer Review, and Montserrat introduced the Global Forum's determination in its EoI legal framework. Technical support on transparency is also provided to the African Tax Administration Forum's Committee for EoI and events by the Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators.

The **US** supports the Global Relations Programme learning events by partnering with hosting countries and providing experts to lead the learning events. The topics the US supports range from Exchange of Information to Transfer Pricing. Its partner host countries include Mexico, Turkey, Brazil and India. These events are presented virtually and provide an opportunity for participants to ask questions answered by the expert presenters. The US hosts a hub on the Forum on Tax Administration's Knowledge Sharing Platform for Tax Administrations to promote the sharing of tax knowledge and expertise among tax officials, including EOI.

In addition to the global programme, the **European Commission** funds EoI capacity-building by the Global Forum in Egypt, the ECOWAS region, Tunisia and Vietnam. At the regional level, the OECD component of the fiscal transition in the West Africa programme included establishing an EoI system between ECOWAS countries, which received EU funding of EUR 2 million.

G7 expertise sharing through long-term partnership programmes

From 2019 to 2021, **Canada** disbursed a total of CAD 66.5 million (preliminary figures) for long-term domestic revenue mobilisation and tax capacity-building. About half of this support was provided bilaterally and the other half multilaterally. Canada's contribution is provided via 3 departments, the CRA, Finance Canada and Global Affairs Canada (GAC). For example, GAC funded key long-term bilateral initiatives in Mali, where an 11% increase in revenue mobilisation was recorded during the first phase of the initiative. Another initiative operated in Benin and established a Taxation Policy Unit. Thereby, Canada supported the modernisation and adaptation of the Directorate's information management systems to increase tax collection. Moreover, the government-assisted Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Centre, which aims to enhance the management of public finances in the region. With this effort, Canada's intent was to increase

the effectiveness of domestic revenue systems, make budget preparation and execution more effective and transparent, and support technical assistance and training by the IMF upon request by Caribbean governments. In addition, GAC led a project on providing transfer pricing training to Mongolia's Ministry of Finance, strengthening its extractive sector management between 2019 and 2020. CRA has provided assistance, training, and sharing of best practices with the Barbados Revenue Authority on tax administration and compliance, EoI standards, audit and compliance since 2020.

France mobilised expertise from its tax and customs administrations through the government's technical cooperation operator, Expertise France. This organisation implements several technical assistance programmes with France's development agency (AFD) in Mali, Armenia, Niger, and Indonesia. With funding from the EU, the organisation has supported Mauritania, Guinea and Haiti since 2019. Implemented or planned EF projects in domestic revenue mobilisation include regional efforts with member countries of the West African Monetary and Economic Union and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa. Additionally, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Madagascar received assistance.

Germany supported the strengthening of public finance systems in more than 30 partner countries. Half of the value of the German "Good Financial Governance" technical cooperation portfolio is committed to supporting domestic revenue mobilisation measures. On a sectoral level, Germany supports the Inter American Center of Tax Administrations activities to support developing countries in their fight against tax avoidance and evasion. Additionally, Germany hosted the secretariats of the Addis Tax Initiative (ATO) and the Network of Tax Administrations (NTO), which enable peer learning and experience sharing among their members. Furthermore, Germany co-funded

capacity-building deployed by the IMF Revenue Mobilisation and the TADAT Trust Fund.

Italy promoted and supported, both financially and by providing experts, the OECD Academy for Tax and Financial Crime Investigation and the Africa Academy for Tax and Financial Crime Investigation. The premises, the organisation and the expertise for the OECD Academy for Tax and Financial Crime Investigation are provided on a long-term basis by Italian economic and financial police.

Japan provided bilateral technical assistance to Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam through experts dispatched from Japan's National Tax Agency, operating with long-term assistance programmes.

The **UK** delivered peer-to-peer tax capacity-building activities across all areas of tax administration through HMRC's Capacity Building Unit, and aligned with the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office's tax development activities in ODA-eligible jurisdictions. Key programmes engaged in long-term peer-to-peer activities, which ranged in subject from data to human resources and strategy, tax-related and compliance capacity-building work, depending on the peer authorities' requirements. Other long-term programming covered 11 multi-subject programmes with several single-subject pieces of technical assistance, including those delivered in partnership with the OECD's Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) initiative. In addition, the UK implemented several bilateral tax programmes and built the capacity of finance ministries' tax policy units to model and analyse tax measures in Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda and Uganda. These programmes involve long-term advisers and remote support from two UK economic think tanks. The UK also sent an expert on value-added tax (VAT) to the African Tax Administration Forum to boost its capacity and support members implementing VAT reforms.

The **US** disbursed USD 63 million of bilateral technical assistance during 2019 and 2020 toward the goal of improved domestic revenue mobilisation in 37 partner countries. Most of the larger development projects (El Salvador, Guatemala, Bosnia, Jordan, Tunisia) included resident expatriates and locally recruited experts who assisted the introduction and improvement of a broad range of information technology functions and applications in tax and customs administration. Other programmes, such as those of the U.S. Treasury Office of Technical Assistance, provided intermittent assistance in specific functional areas. For tax administration, an important theme of several projects (e.g. in Liberia and the Philippines) was to improve e-filing and e-payment systems to make them more widely accepted and adopted by taxpayers. Other initiatives helped to mobilise local or non-tax revenue (Bosnia, Libya, Tanzania), launch or improve taxpayer education programmes (Guatemala, Liberia, Uganda, Tunisia) or combat tax evasion and corruption (Bosnia, El Salvador). In the area of tax policy, several US projects fostered the development or creation of a consensus and/or laws and procedures for the rationalisation of tax expenditures, like in the Philippines and Jordan.

The **European Commission** assisted domestic revenue mobilisation in partner countries through its 90 budget support programmes and dedicated bilateral technical assistance programmes. Furthermore, the Commission co-funded capacity-building deployed by the IMF Revenue Mobilisation Thematic Fund, the IMF Management of Natural Resource Wealth Thematic Fund, and the TADAT Trust Fund with EUR 9 million. Under the Addis Tax Initiative, the Commission delivered on the collective commitment of doubling support to domestic revenue mobilisation between 2015 and 2020.

G7 support to the OECD's Tax Inspectors Without Borders

With the ambition to address international tax challenges, the **Canada** Revenue Agency provided expert assistance in tax risk assessment, audit and transfer pricing techniques related to taxation of the forestry industry through the TIWB initiative in Papua New Guinea since 2019. Additionally, the CRA sent expert assistance in the same areas to Guinea to improve the taxation of the mining industry since 2021. The CRA Commissioner, Bob Hamilton, represents the OECD Forum on Tax Administration on the TIWB Governing Board.

Since 2014, **France** deployed tax experts to Senegal, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Madagascar, Mali and Chad. France participated with technical experts in the IISF programmes, which the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs also financed.

Germany supported the TIWB programme through the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative. For instance, a German technical advisor has engaged in the TIWB programme with the Jamaican Tax Administration since 2017.

The **UK** engaged with the existing TIWB programmes' delivery and pilot programmes. The UK responded to TIWB requests from at least eight countries from 2019 onwards. The British government provided experts for pilot programmes, supporting the initiative's expansion into the new work streams of criminal investigations and EoI. This includes supporting the early development of the potential future digitalisation programme.

The **US** has been engaged with the TIWB to advise the tax administration of Dominican Republic with its international tax program. The US is continuing its engagement with TIWB to build the capacity of a new auditor unit to handle Advance Pricing Agreements for the tax administration of Colombia.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2013	1. Support provided for developing countries seeking to join the Global Forum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • G7 members own records • OECD • EU • Global Forum • IMF • World Bank
	2. Practical support provided to developing countries efforts to build capacity and engage in and benefit from changing EoI standards.	
	3. Expertise shared including by engaging in long-term partnership programmes.	
	4. Practical steps taken to support TIWB, including by making tax experts available	

Commitment 38

Land transparency

“We will support greater transparency in land transactions including at early stages, and increased capacity to develop good land governance systems in developing countries. [Partnerships] will be tailored to the needs of each country and support national development plans with the objective of improving land governance and in particular transparency in land transactions by 2015. In addition, Japan and Italy are providing increased support through FAO and World Bank to support implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land in developing countries.”

Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders' Communiqué, paras. 44–45

SDGs:



Score:  Good

Weak land and resource governance, including deficiencies in land transparency, can cause serious problems, including social instability, slow economic development and environmental degradation; these issues arise in rural areas. Increased political efforts to establish socially and environmentally sound land policies are necessary.⁹⁴ In 2012, the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT) were adopted to support the development of governance systems that promote sustainable development and secure tenure rights for equitable access to land, fisheries and forests.⁹⁵

During the Lough Erne Summit in 2013, the G7 partners committed to supporting developing countries with the development of sound land governance systems and the implementation of the VGGT. Each G7 member entered into partnerships to help national governments implement structures to govern land tenure. To monitor their

achievements, the partners regularly assess the support provided to partner countries and the implementation of work plans.

G7 support provided to partner countries with respect to land transparency

France supported Senegal financially and technically to establish the National Commission for Land Reform. France also collaborated with Italy to organise dissemination workshops on good practices in land governance, which resulted in a participatory land reform process, including local stakeholders. Moreover, the French development agency, AFD, is currently developing a new project in the Senegal River Valley to support land security in partnership with a Senegalese society to develop and exploit lands.⁹⁶ AFD reported that its interventions influenced land tenure and water allocation policies by introducing tenure offices in Madagascar, Mali and Senegal.⁹⁷ Additionally, France

developed a framework to consider VGGT in AFD projects linked to agriculture.⁹⁸

Under a bilateral trust fund, FAO and **Germany** supported Sierra Leone with the implementation of the VGGT. The project supported the implementation of the National Land Policy through the formal recognition of customary rights. An evaluation found a functioning multi-stakeholder platform and a successful mapping exercise in Sierra Leone.⁹⁹ The ongoing support focuses on enhancing the enabling environment for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. This includes a situation analysis and capacity development activities, which will be based on lessons learnt. Germany supports land governance in developing countries via a bilateral, regional and global technical cooperation portfolio with a total budget of over EUR 245 million. Specifically with regard to land transparency, there is additional collaboration with partners like Transparency International and the Land Matrix Initiative.

Italy financed a FAO programme that aimed to facilitate the implementation of the VGGT with EUR 4.9 million between 2016 and 2021. The initiative contributed to starting improvement processes for the governance of land tenure in almost 40 countries, with a particular focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. The programme's activities emphasised policy and legal support, multi-stakeholder platforms and partnerships, capacity-building and knowledge sharing, land-based investments and administration, gender and human rights, and the SDGs. The preliminary achievements will guide the course of action for FAO and partners in the coming years.

Japan, through JICA, has been conducting training programmes for trainees from the administrative agencies of central and local governments of developing countries that engage in planning and supervising agricultural land systems to encourage participants' comprehension of international movement and issues concerning agricultural land,

with reference to the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (PRAI) and VGGT. The programmes aim at enhancing the participants' capacity for improving responsible and sustainable agricultural land utilisation in their countries.

The **UK** supported partnerships in Nigeria and Tanzania focused on promoting responsible land investment and tenure reforms in line with the VGGT. In 2018, the UK concluded the Nigeria Land Partnership with the completion of the UK-funded Growth and Employment in States Programme. The programme supported interventions to improve land, tax and investment promotion systems in selected states of Nigeria. Moreover, the Tanzania Land Partnership was advanced through the UK-funded Land Tenure Support Programme, working with the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements. The programme concluded in 2021 and aimed to build a basis for resolving issues that constrained Tanzania's land-sector contributions to achieve the country's broader development goals by establishing a road map for long-term support.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the programme helped establish a multi-stakeholder group to support the government in addressing land policy issues, and piloted ways to improve land data mapping and registration in collaboration with the USAID-funded MAST project.

In line with the VGGT, the **US**, through USAID, is collaborating with governments, civil society, the private sector and other donors to improve land and resource governance and strengthen property rights for individuals, communities and businesses around the world. USAID has focused on supporting land and resource governance programmes in 17 countries, with over USD 300 million.¹⁰¹ USAID publishes quarterly and annual work plans for its land programmes and land-related activities on the Development Experience Clearinghouse site.

Over the 2018–2020 period, the **EU** funded land governance-related actions in 29 countries with

a total budget of nearly EUR 235 million. The EU Land Governance Programme supported 18 countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa using the VGGTs.¹⁰² To ensure coherence and support the project implementation, the EU funds FAO’s participation in its Land Governance Programme. FAO provided support for capacity development, the establishment of a platform for the exchange of lessons learnt, experiences and knowledge, and monitoring and evaluation. In Ethiopia, Laos and Uganda, a new programme implemented by the German development agency involves communities, landowners, local authorities and private investors to promote the application of the VGGTs.

Germany, the **UK**, and the **US** collaborated with Ethiopia under the “Land Partnership for Ethiopia” programme, formerly known as the G7 Land Partnership Group. UK’s FCDO contributed to the joint initiative with its Land Investment for Transformation programme, which concluded in 2021. The programme supported the government in

issuing land certifications and implementing digitalised Rural Land Administration Systems, certifying over 14.5 million land parcels, with 74% of certificates jointly held by males and females. German Development Cooperation contributed through the Support to Responsible Agricultural Investment project, improving the regulatory framework and national and local actors’ capacities to implement standards like the VGGT. USAID launched its new Land Governance Activity to strengthen policy, management and administration and to improve land tenure and rights for farmers and pastoralists in Ethiopia. The new project builds on USAID’s substantial past investments in land governance and administration, and strengthens land tenure rights in Ethiopia.

The above-mentioned G7 Land Transparency Partnerships evolved over the years and are no longer based on formal work plans. Thus, reporting on the second indicator is no longer possible.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2013	1. Individual partnerships will have their own accountability frameworks, and G7 technical leads will draw on these to assess collective progress against this commitment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Partnership Reports • Self- assessment narrative reporting for non-partnership related land commitments (by Japan and Italy). • At country level, partnerships will agree on source and minimum quality of data, against which partnerships will report. The G7 technical land leads will track progress and ensure overall consistency.
	2. The degree to which the partnerships are meeting/have met the delivery outcomes as set out in their detailed work plans with a reference to the relevant sections of the Voluntary Guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests (VGGT).	
	3. Work plans available from December 2013 for partnerships launched in June 2013, and for partnerships launched subsequently at a suitable later point in time and reported on in their most recent progress report.	



Case Study: Japan

The “GG seminar” – Promoting the rule of law and good governance in South-East Asia



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Recognizing that corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development, and destabilises governments, Japan has committed to fighting corruption by sharing best practices. As corruption has become increasingly transnational, international cooperation in the form of mutual legal assistance (MLA) is critical to gathering information and evidence for use in criminal investigations and at trial.

Japan has been leading efforts to preserve the rule of law and promote good governance in Asia. It fully staffs and funds the activities of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI). At UNAFEI, the Regional Seminar on Good Governance for South-east Asian Countries (GG seminar) has been held annually since 2007 to prevent and combat corruption in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The GG seminar contributes to sharing current challenges and best practices in the prevention of corruption, promotes international cooperation through the implementation of UNCAC, and provides an important networking opportunity for practitioners from the participating countries.

The 15th GG seminar was hosted online in December 2021. The theme of the seminar was “Effective International Cooperation for Combating Corruption”. Eighteen anti-corruption practitioners from nine ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus Timor-Leste participated. After hearing specialist lectures from Japan and Hong Kong, the participants presented

on the status of corruption, the legal system, and best practices in their countries. As a result of the discussions, the following practices were recommended: Utilise informal channels to share leads and intelligence; enhance international and domestic efforts aimed toward capacity-building and knowledge-sharing; and build strong professional networks among MLA practitioners, etc. Detailed information from the seminar, including the chair’s summary and recommendations, can be found on UNAFEI’s website.¹⁰³

The seminar enabled participants to acquire broader knowledge about the legal frameworks, procedures, and requirements for providing MLA in the participating countries, as well as common reasons for refusal of requests. It also helped foster personal and professional relationships among the participants, thereby strengthening and promoting international cooperation.

Japan will continue to work, through the GG seminar and UNAFEI’s other activities, to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including Target 16.5, which seeks to eliminate corruption and bribery in all their forms.

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8. Peace and security

In many parts of the world, major threats to peace and security persist. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, armed conflicts in Ethiopia and Yemen, and the violent takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban are among the most visible recent incidents. Security issues arise not only from violent conflicts, but can also take different forms, such as organised crime or terrorism. The causes are complex and manifold. They can, for instance, concern conflicts over scarce resources, poor governance and malfunctioning institutions, and socio-economic inequalities between identity groups, and they can have deep historic roots.

The impacts on the local populations are grave. In the 12 deadliest armed conflicts between 2015 and 2020 at least 176,095 civilian deaths were recorded.¹ Many more people were injured, lost their livelihood, or were forced to migrate. For instance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) February 2022 report noted almost 2.2 million displaced people in the Sahel and almost 1 million refugees and asylum seekers. The Sahel is also on the front lines of the climate crisis, with temperatures increasing at 1.5 times the global average. This is aggravating conflicts over scarce resources, exacerbating conditions for those already forced to flee. The COVID-19 pandemic is also complicating the situation, in a region where health structures have been weakened by insecurity. As violent conflicts and other threats to human security are able to undo within days the progress that was made on human development over many years, their prevention, and appropriate responses to and recovery from them, are crucial for the realisation of development goals.

Security issues are often transnational in nature. The international coordination of measures to effectively prevent, respond to and recover from

impacts on human security is thus highly important. In this light, the G7 has made three commitments concerning peace and security whose implementation is monitored in this report.

First, the G7 committed at several Summits since 2002 to advance measures to increase maritime security in Africa (Commitment 39). Initially, the G7 focused mainly on the Gulf of Aden, while later maritime security issues in West Africa became more important as the Gulf of Guinea became the global hotspot for piracy and armed robbery. G7 activities were aimed at supporting capacity development and regional coordination, for instance by providing funding for or deploying experts to initiatives and training events related to maritime security.

Second, the G7 committed in 2016 to advancing the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda by supporting countries in establishing and implementing National Action Plans (Commitment 40). These action plans describe how governments intend to protect and further promote women's and girls' rights in conflict settings and enable a more active role of women in peace and security, for instance in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Third, in 2017 the G7 committed to supporting African capacity in order to better prevent, respond to and manage crises and conflicts through cooperation and dialogue with African countries and regional organisations (Commitment 41). In this regard, G7 members have, for instance, provided funding for training activities and participated in peacekeeping missions in African countries.

Commitment 39

Maritime security in Africa

“Support maritime security capacity development in Africa and improve the operational effectiveness and response time of littoral states and regional organizations in maritime domain awareness and sovereignty protection.”

Kananaskis 2002, G8 Africa Action Plan

Sea Island 2004, 9

Heiligendamm 2007, paras. 40, 42

L’Aquila 2009, para. 129

Muskoka 2010, Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, Annex II/II

SDGs:



Score:



Good

For many years now, piracy and armed robbery have posed a threat to the security of maritime trading and fishing. In Africa, the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea are especially affected. Today, however, maritime threats in the region are not limited to piracy and armed robbery, but also encompass the trafficking of people and illegal goods, illegal fishing, and maritime pollution.

At the L’Aquila Summit in 2009 and the Muskoka Summit in 2010, G7 leaders committed to supporting maritime security capacity development in Africa, thus extending previous commitments to support the capacity development of security authorities in several African countries. The G7 members agreed to monitor progress on this commitment against two indicators: 1) Increased capacity and collaboration of affected states and regional organisations to counter maritime security infringements and indict offenders; and 2) G7 support for key areas.

State of maritime security off African coasts

In the waters off the Somali coast, the threat of piracy attacks has decreased in the past years. Since 2019, only one incident was reported in the Gulf of Aden (2021, attempted attack) and none in Somali waters. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Somali pirates continue to have the capacities to carry out attacks. However, patrolling international navies, which coordinate with merchant and fishing fleets to identify and apprehend pirate action groups, have played an important role in increasing maritime security in that region.

Whereas the situation in the Gulf of Aden has improved significantly in the past years, the Gulf of Guinea has become the new global piracy hotspot. Since 2016/2017, attacks in this region became increasingly violent and often included kidnappings

of crew. In 2021, the Gulf of Guinea remains worst affected by piracy, accounting for all kidnapping incidents globally. On a positive note, the number of total reported incidents declined from 81 in 2020 to 34 in 2021 (27 of these were actual attacks and 7 were attempted attacks). Also, the number of people kidnapped more than halved (-55%). The IMB, which monitors and publishes this data, sees a connection between the positive developments and the increased presence of international naval vessels and the cooperation of regional authorities. Nevertheless, the Gulf of Guinea continues to be a threat for seafarers, with 57 crew members kidnapped in seven separate incidents in 2021. Therefore, the IMB calls for continued and increased collaboration of coastal states and their physical presence in their waters.²

Other threats to maritime security include illegal fishing, marine pollution and the smuggling of goods and humans. Especially in West Africa, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, mostly by foreign commercial vessels from Europe or China, has devastating effects on marine ecosystems and the livelihoods of local smallholder fisheries.³ In the East and Indian Ocean island states, drug trafficking has significantly increased in recent years. Irregular maritime migration to Europe remains a largely unaddressed humanitarian crisis. In the absence of safer options to reach Europe, people resort to increasingly dangerous smuggling patterns to cross the Mediterranean Sea. On this journey, more than 20,000 people have lost their lives since 2015.⁴

G7 activities to increase capacity and collaboration of affected states to counter maritime security infringements

In the beginning, G7 actions to increase maritime security mainly focused on the Gulf of Aden, but have extended to the Gulf of Guinea since 2011 as well. In 2013, 25 West and Central African states passed an agreement to cooperate in their fight against transnational organised crime in the maritime domain, maritime piracy, illegal fishing,

and other illegal activities, known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. On the basis of this agreement, the countries started to build a maritime security architecture, the Yaoundé Architecture.⁵ To support this process, G7 members created the G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (FoGG). This support takes many forms and is executed through each member's international assistance infrastructure. Thereby, the FoGG functions as a forum for the harmonisation of activities in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Yaoundé Architecture together with states of the region as rotating partners and co-chairs. In the following, G7 members' individual contributions to maritime security in Africa are reported.

In 2018, **Canada** and Ivory Coast co-chaired the FoGG meeting in Abidjan. Among other things, the meeting mobilised support for the harmonisation of legislative frameworks in the fight against maritime piracy and the strengthening of inter-state cooperation. Canada also engaged in maritime security capacity-building in Africa. Since 2017, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has supported several African countries to help them improve regional capabilities in information and resource sharing, incident response, and the development of harmonised standard operating procedures (SOPs). Furthermore, the Royal Canadian Navy participated in international training events in West Africa and Tunisia (Neptune Trident 17-01, Obangame Express 19, Op EDIFICE). Since 2019, Canada has supported a project addressing the threat of human smuggling by sea. It aims to provide practical training and cooperation support to participating states in order to respond to crime committed at sea under a sound rule-of-law framework. The project is part of Canada's Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program, and is carried out by the CCG and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The activities will complement the existing efforts of the UNODC GMCP in Obangame Express and Cutlass exercises. For the project phase 2021–2023, Canada is attributing CAD 2.8 million to the project.

In 2021, **France** deployed 19 experts in 14 countries, and had allocated EUR 2 million to maritime safety and security in Africa. France works in collaboration with several European programmes either directly (WeCAPS, SEACOP, MASE) or via the Interregional Maritime Safety Institute in Abidjan (SWAIMS, PESCAO). It has also forged closer links with the UNODC and its Global Marine Crime Programme in order to achieve greater complementarity and offer African partners actions that are more effective. Since 2019, France has reduced the number of experts in the Gulf of Guinea (from 17 to 14), while strengthening their presence in East Africa and the Indian Ocean. In addition to its permanent deployments, France has promoted the European concept of Coordinated Maritime Presences (see EU section). On the East African Coast, France is a member of the Regional Maritime Security Architecture and has signed regional agreements establishing a Regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre in Madagascar and a Regional Operations Coordination Centre in the Seychelles. Further, France supports two schools in Ivory Coast Equatorial Guinea, who train staff of various administrations (including navy, customs, police) from several African countries on issues related to maritime security.

Germany's support for increased capacity and collaboration of affected states and regional organisations mainly takes the form of participating in related activities under the umbrella of the EU, both within the EU's internal and its external security mechanisms. Germany's activity between 2002 and 2022 has significantly increased, with a sharp increase over the past years. Bilaterally, Germany supports the Indian Ocean Rim Association (which also has several African member states) as a dialogue partner, and with a two-year programme for capacity-building activities in priority areas, including Maritime Safety and Security and Disaster Risk Management. As part of the G7 presidency, Germany has taken on the co-chairmanship of the G7++ Group of Friends of the Gulf

of Guinea together with Côte d'Ivoire. Both co-chairs will place a strategic emphasis on supporting resilience and the rule of law in the context of maritime security, protecting marine resources and biodiversity, as well as boosting coordinated regional responses and aligning international initiatives with regional needs and plans.

Italy conducts capacity-building initiatives with the aim of preventing and combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as part of the Gabinia naval campaign. This materialised in December 2021 with the launch of the Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure support and evidence collection training programme, funded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in collaboration with the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Program. The programme aims at supporting the application of maritime legislation in the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and consists of training activities for the benefit of the military navies of Ghana and Nigeria. Italy also took part in the OBANGAME EXPRESS 2021 operation in collaboration with the European and US Navies and the coastal countries of West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, adhering to the Architecture of Yaoundé. Italy is a major personnel provider of EUCAP Somalia, contributing with an integrated approach to the strengthening of capacities of the Somali Coast Guard forces by providing support to the Somali Maritime Administration and to the Puntland Maritime Police Force. It has also been an active member of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

Japan has contributed USD 4.5 million to an international trust fund managed by the UNDP, through which it assists Somalia and neighbouring countries in improving courts and training of judicial officers to enhance maritime law enforcement. Moreover, Japan has assisted in the establishment of Information Sharing Centres in Yemen, Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the construction

and development of the Djibouti Regional Training Centre for capacity-building in the region, by contributing USD 15.5 million to a fund established by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).⁶ Further, Japan assisted in capacity-building for maritime security of the West and Central African countries. It contributed USD 1 million to the West and Central Africa Maritime Security Trust Fund established by the IMO.⁷ Since 2020, Japan has also contributed USD 1 million to peacekeeping training centres in Ghana and Nigeria through UNDP for capacity-building on anti-piracy in Gulf of Guinea.

The **UK** has contributed over GBP 9.0 million to maritime-security-focused capacity-building projects in East, West and Central Africa since 2011, working both bilaterally and with multilateral partners. This has included support for the IMO's Djibouti Code of Conduct and the West and Central Africa trust fund, as well as supporting other IMO and UNODC projects. With East African piracy suppressed, the UK has transitioned to supporting wider maritime security issues impacting regional stability and economic factors. In 2021, the UK's predominant efforts focused on the Gulf of Guinea as the global piracy hotspot. Ongoing efforts in the region include working with the UNODC on the passage of anti-piracy legislation in Nigeria and training of federal prosecutors, as well as capacity-building with the Nigerian Navy. In 2021, the UK and Senegal co-chaired the FoGG, delivering tangible initiatives to support the implementation of the Yaoundé architecture, and integrating industry and civil society. The UK also supported regional capability-building with a focus on Ghana and Nigeria, including by deploying training teams into the Maritime Operational Centres. The Royal Navy patrol vessel HMS TRENT undertook training and exercises with regional governments, with priorities determined by the capacity-building needs of regional partners.

The **US** provides training and equipment to African coastal countries and cooperates with international partners to support maritime training, exercises and operations. In East, West, and Southern Africa, the US has provided over USD 40 million since 2019 to increase regional cooperation and share actionable information on maritime crimes, including through increased maritime domain awareness. The Initiative on Maritime Security and Terrorist Travel assists affected countries to increase capacities and draw on recommended good practices for countering terrorist travel and related activities in the maritime domain. The initiative provides information and access to subject-matter experts through ongoing workshops. The US also supported efforts that aided in the drafting and passage of new legislation to combat piracy in Nigeria and Togo, and similar legislation has been sent to the parliaments of Benin, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire for review and passage. Further, US-funded projects have provided training to prosecutors and investigators in the aforementioned countries to investigating and prosecuting piracy crimes. The US is also launching a Port State Control project, which will provide training, mentoring and support for improving Port State Control functions in selected countries. In addition, the US chairs the operational working group under the G7++ FOGG and chaired FOGG together with Gabon in 2020. Under the Africa Maritime Security Initiative, the US government provides support to Senegal, Angola and Djibouti to build sustainable partner-nation capacities to address illegal maritime activity occurring in the coastal waters of Africa.

The **EU** has reinforced its engagement to enhance the capacities of coastal states and pertinent organisations to fight illicit maritime activities in Africa. In the Gulf of Guinea, two EU initiatives are ongoing. The SWAIMS Programme has provided legal reform and capacity-building for tackling and

prosecuting piracy and maritime crime in 12 countries. The PASSMAR programme has provided support to review national legal frameworks, while also strengthening maritime law enforcement and response capacities of states in the Central Africa region. In the Western Indian Ocean, the EU carries out the MASE programme, in partnership with EUNAVFOR ATALANTA and UNODC, which supports capacity-building for the entire Piracy Prosecution Pathway in Seychelles, Kenya and Mauritius. In addition, two Regional Maritime Centres were set up to enhance maritime domain awareness through information-sharing. In addition to MASE, two regional initiatives were

launched in 2019-2020 focussing on enhancing maritime law enforcement and judicial capacities of coastal states and regional institutions, as well port security and safety standards and norms. In 2021, the EU launched the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) Concept pilot case, which aimed to synchronise naval deployments in the Gulf of Guinea, promote information-sharing among Europeans and support the Yaoundé Architecture. The CMP Concept has recently turned into a permanent Concept in the Gulf of Guinea, and is being extended into the north-west Indian Ocean, including the Horn of Africa.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2002	<p>1. Increased capacity and collaboration of affected States and regional organisations to counter maritime security infringements and indict offenders.</p> <hr/> <p>2. Is G7 support hitting key areas?</p>	We have drawn on our own G7 records and monitoring and reporting systems.

Commitment 40

Women, Peace and Security

“We ... remain committed to supporting efforts by other countries, both financially and technically to establish and implement National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security or similar gender-equality related strategies.”

Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p. 14

SDGs:



Score:  Good

Armed conflicts tend to affect women and girls disproportionately and in specific ways. Women and girls often become victims of gender-based violence, including rape and other forms of sexual violence. In addition, their perspectives and substantial capacities for conflict prevention and resolution, as well as for peacekeeping and peacebuilding, are often overlooked, under-valued and under-utilised. In 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed the first resolution on Women, Peace and Security, UNSCR 1325. For the first time, it recognised the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women and stressed the importance of their equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security.⁸ To encourage the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda on a national level, the UNSC passed a presidential statement in 2004 calling for the establishment and implementation of National Action Plans (NAPs). A NAP outlines a government's approach and activities to secure women's and girls' human rights in conflict settings, to prevent armed conflict and violence, including violence against women and girls, and to ensure the meaningful participation of women in peace and security.⁹

At the Ise-Shima Summit in 2016, G7 leaders committed to supporting efforts by other countries to establish and implement NAPs on Women, Peace and Security. In order to track progress on this commitment, the G7 members agreed to monitor: 1) financing, technical, and legal assistance or policy support to partner countries for establishing and implementing NAPs, 2) the number of countries that established such a plan following direct G7 engagement, and 3) coordination and implementation mechanisms in place in partner countries.

G7 support for NAP development and implementation in partner countries

To date, 98 UN Member States (51%) have adopted an NAP on UNSCR 1325, including all G7 countries, with numerous countries having developed updated versions to implement lessons learnt. However, only 35 NAPs include an allocated budget for implementation.¹⁰

G7 members have provided different forms of support for the development and implementation of NAPs to a variety of countries. In a common

effort, the G7 launched the Women, Peace and Security Partnerships Initiative in 2018, which aims to encourage implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and the development of G7 coordination and information-sharing mechanisms. In the following, activities of individual G7 members are described.

Canada provided guidance to Cyprus, Croatia, Lebanon and Slovakia on the development or implementation of their NAPs. Through the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives, Canada also supported projects aimed at strengthening local capacities to establish and implement NAPs in Brazil, Argentina, Tanzania, Côte d'Ivoire and ASEAN member states. Through the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, Canada has been supporting Ukraine with over CAD 10 million per year (2019–2022), with a focus on security-sector reform, countering disinformation, human rights, and advancing Ukraine's Women, Peace and Security NAP. As Co-Chair of the Women, Peace and Security Focal Points Network 2020–2021, Canada convened meetings to share best practices on NAP development with government officials. Further, Canada supports the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) to increase local women's participation and to advance implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lebanon and Nigeria. Under the Canadian-led Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations launched in 2017, Canada also supported military and police institutions in a range of countries to identify and address barriers to women's meaningful participation in UN peace operations, all in alignment with NAP objectives. Canada also supported NAP coordination and implementation mechanisms. In 2018, as part of the G7's Women, Peace and Security Partnership Initiative, Canada supported a workshop on renewing Côte d'Ivoire's action plan and launched the G7 Women, Peace and Security Partnerships Initiative network of embassies. In Iraq, Canada supported a project (CAD 117,757)

that involved a range of civil-society actors and assessed opportunities for enhancing the effectiveness of Iraq's next NAP.

In addition to national coordination and consultations on implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, **France** is considering the possibility of exchanges of best practices with other states. These consultations will take place within the EU framework and will involve third countries that have adopted or wish to adopt their own national action plan.

Germany provided technical support for the development of NAPs on Women, Peace and Security in Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, the Palestinian territories, and Sudan. Further, Germany peer-reviewed Switzerland's 4th NAP and, with other actors, advised the government of Vietnam on the conception of its 1st NAP. In addition, Germany worked with regional institutions in establishing regional NAPs and setting up support structures for member states, including the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). Germany also supported coordination, implementation and monitoring for NAPs. For example, Germany supports NAP implementation and monitoring in Iraq through trainings with government and civil-society actors. In Lebanon, Germany funds a project that supports the National Commission for Lebanese Women in its coordinating role for NAP implementation. Germany also supports the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), its member states and civil society in developing and evaluating Women, Peace and Security plans and protocols.¹¹

Under the framework of the G7 Women, Peace and Security Partnerships Initiative, **Italy** is providing assistance to municipalities in Libya with the aim of increasing women's participation in the whole cycle of local peace processes, especially through mediation activities. Italy supported the programme "Stabilization Facility for Libya – SFL", a

multi-donor fund managed by UNDP, with two separate contributions (AID 10780 and AID 11995) for a value total of EUR 2.5 million.

In partnership with UN Women, **Japan** has provided financial and technical support to the governments of Timor-Leste (2016–2020)¹² and Lebanon (2018–2019)¹³ to develop and – in the case of Timor-Leste – partly implement NAPs on Women, Peace and Security. Further, Japan has been working with Sri Lanka to formulate its first NAP, also in partnership with UN Women. Sri Lanka’s NAP was drafted in 2021 and is expected to obtain approval from Sri Lanka’s cabinet in 2022.¹⁴ In the meantime, Japan has provided financial assistance to its implementation through UN Women and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) projects.¹⁵

Japan also supports coordination and implementation mechanisms. The projects in Sri Lanka have been under the G7’s Women, Peace and Security Partnership commitment, which requires the embassy in the partner country to take the lead to coordinate with other G7 nations’ embassies. Thus, the Embassy of Japan holds coordination meetings with the Government of Sri Lanka, UN Women, other G7 delegates and other UN agencies to exchange updates on the project and for possible cooperation within the group.

Since the start of the **UK’s** current NAP on Women, Peace and Security in 2018, it has supported a number of countries in their efforts to develop, update and implement NAPs. This included Afghanistan, Argentina, Azerbaijan, DRC, Egypt, Indonesia (through the UK’s International Programme Fund), Iraq, Jordan (GBP 4.27 million since 2018), Kenya (through CSSF funding), Lithuania, Nigeria, North Macedonia, South Africa and Yemen. In North Macedonia, for example, UK support was key in stakeholder engagement, securing senior level buy-in, development of milestones and drafting of a Strategic Framework. In the case of

drafting Argentina’s 2nd NAP, the focus was on the inclusion of lessons learned and best practices, and on future monitoring.¹⁶ As part of the G7 Women, Peace and Security Partnership initiative, the UK works closely with Nigeria to support implementation of Women, Peace and Security objectives in the country.

The 2019 **US** Strategy on Women, Peace and Security was developed as a whole-of-government policy to advance women’s meaningful participation in preventing and resolving conflict, countering violent extremism (CVE), and building post-conflict peace and stability. In support of the objectives outlined in the strategy, the US partners with diverse stakeholders, particularly with host governments, to adopt policies, strategies and plans that aim to increase women’s participation and protection in peace, security and CVE-related processes. This includes the development, implementation and review of partner governments’ NAPs on Women, Peace and Security. The US continues to provide assistance to the Office of the Special Envoy for Women, Peace and Security at the African Union to establish a Continental Results Framework on the issue (2018–2028). Through this initiative, in 2020, the Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, South Africa and Sudan finalised their NAPs, bringing the total number of African Union member state NAPs to 30 – a critical increase due to the support of the African Union and the US government.

The **EU** provides political, diplomatic, financial and capacity-building support to countries that have a NAP on Women, Peace and Security and where the EU has deployed delegations and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. On principle, the EU supports civil-society and women-led organisations working in this field. In 2020, the EU organised a joint workshop on NAPs in Women, Peace and Security together with NATO, focussing on sharing best practices. Also in 2020, the EU adopted its third Gender

Action Plan, which for the first time included a regional action plan on Women, Peace and Security. This action plan requires EU delegations to establish and institutionalise a mechanism to consult with women from diverse backgrounds and CSOs, including in conflict-related settings, where the EU is operating. By the end of December 2021, this was partly established.

Further, the civil component of the EU-supported African Union Mission in Somalia includes a specific unit on Gender, aiming at an increased level of gender sensitivity and women's involvement in peace. Moreover, the EU-AU's contribution agreements explicitly require specific information to be provided on the number of women serving within the mission, with the aim to boost women's participation and views in AMISOM.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2016	1. Number of countries, which establish a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (NAP) following direct G7 engagement or technical assistance.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-reporting on outreach to third countries • Peace Women, reports on comprehensive approach to EU implementation of the UNSCRs on WPS
	2. Financing, technical assistance, legal assistance or policy support by G7 governments to partner countries for establishing and implementing National Action Plan.	
	3. Coordination and implementation mechanisms in place in partner countries.	

Commitment 41

Crises and conflicts in Africa

“Our goal is indeed to strengthen cooperation and dialogue with African countries and regional organizations to develop African capacity in order to better prevent, respond to and manage crises and conflicts, as regards the relevant goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

Taormina 2017, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 26

SDGs:



Score:  *Satisfactory*

Ending existing wars and conflicts, preventing the causes of conflict, and promoting a culture of peace have been key priorities of the African Union (AU) and its Agenda 2063. In past years many violent conflicts have persisted, spread, and in some cases newly emerged, posing a significant threat to human security and well-being. Among the biggest threats on the continent are terrorism and violent extremism, which often transcend borders and thus require effective cooperation between African states and regional organisations.¹⁷


At the Taormina Summit in 2017, G7 leaders committed to strengthening cooperation and dialogue with African countries and regional organisations to develop African capacity in order to better prevent, respond to and manage crises and conflicts. To monitor this commitment, the G7 decided to report on any activities contributing to

this aim, as well as reporting on G7 ODA to activities related to conflict, peace and security to African states in particular. Further, UN statistics on the implementation of relevant indicators of SDG 16 are reported for additional context.

G7 bilateral ODA to activities related to conflict, peace and security

G7 members’ (incl. EU Institutions’) bilateral ODA to activities related to conflict, peace, and security in developing countries in Africa has increased from USD 909 million in 2017 to USD 922 million in 2020 (see Figure 31). Looking at the G7 members individually, Canada, France, Japan and EU Institutions have increased their ODA to activities related to conflict, peace and security in developing countries in Africa in 2020 as compared to the baseline year 2017, while Germany, Italy, the UK and the US contributed less in 2020 than in 2017.

Figure 31: G7 members' bilateral ODA to activities related to conflict, peace, and security in developing countries in Africa (in USD million)



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (Purpose code 152)

G7 actions to increase capacity and collaboration for response to and prevention of crises and conflicts in Africa

This section reports actions that G7 members have undertaken to increase collaboration between African States and regional organisations, with the aim to improve the prevention of and responses to crises and conflicts.

Canada has financed efforts to increase the effectiveness of African countries and regional organisations in preventing, responding to and resolving conflict, especially through its Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs), through trainings for police and troop contributors to UN and African Union-led peace operations, and through trauma training courses for medical personnel. Canada is also a supporter of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, including through funding and deployments of armed forces and

police officers. Canada has also worked with the African Union, AMISOM and the security forces of Somalia and DRC to build their capacities in the area of child rights and child protection. Further, Canada supports capacity-building of African states in the Sahel and East Africa and their armed forces in order to counter terrorism. Canada also participates in Operation FLINTLOCK, which brings together more than thirty African and partner nations to increase multinational cooperation against violent extremist groups in North and West Africa. Finally, Canada is engaging with the African Union Commission (AUC) on increasing the involvement of women in peace-building, early warning and mediation efforts in Africa (see also Commitment 40).

France has increased the funds allocated to the prevention and resilience tool “Minka” by EUR 200 million per year, with a significant share devoted to

Africa. In the Sahel, France has provided financial and operational support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, as well as to the G5 Sahel Priority Investment Plan, which includes actions for conflict and crisis prevention. Jointly with Côte d'Ivoire, France initiated the establishment of the International Counter-Terrorism Academy (AILCT) in Abidjan. Additionally, French security and defence cooperation assists security-sector reform across the continent, with military and civilian experts and a budget of EUR 28 million, mainly for trainings and logistics support.

Germany continues to support the security architecture of the AU and its regional organisations. Besides providing substantial contributions to ensure funding for an African peace and security policy, Germany aims to support stronger civilian oversight exercised by the national authorities responsible for security. In this context, Germany engages intensively with the AUC and regional organisations, such as the ECOWAS, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the SADC, as well as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) training centres, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) and the Southern African Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC RPTC, Zimbabwe). As head of the political steering committee of the Sahel Alliance, Germany has worked towards a strong collaboration between G5 Sahel and Sahel Alliance. Furthermore, Germany has fostered conflict resolution in the Sahel Region by supporting the Lake Chad Basin Commission.

Italy provided funding to IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), which promotes trainings for the prevention and countering of violent extremism, the strengthening of the peace process in Somalia and South Sudan, as well as training activities in the field of countering the illicit trafficking of cultural goods (see Commit-

ment 5). Further, Italy provided funding to the G5 Sahel secretariat to support the development of peace and security in member states. Finally, Italy supported the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa in combating terrorism, strengthening border security agencies, and increasing capacity-building to prevent the acquisition of weapons and ammunition by violent extremist groups in Central and Western African countries.

Japan has provided financial assistance and expertise through the UNDP to Peacekeeping Training Centres in 13 African countries (Benin, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania and Togo) since 2017. Japan has also contributed to the AU Peace Fund to support the implementation of African-led activities for Peace and Reconciliation, including in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Ethiopia. In addition, Japan has implemented projects promoting social cohesion and youth employment in Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia.

The **UK** continues to partner with African states and organisations to improve conflict prevention and responses, prioritising conflict and security issues in Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Support is provided through both ODA and non-ODA funding, including through the cross-governmental Conflict, Security and Stability fund, which supports a blended approach to crisis prevention and management. The UK supports local actors to address threats to stability, focusing on grievances and broadening political settlements, and it works with partners to hold African governments to account for the commitments they make to their citizens. The UK is also collaborating with the African Union (AU), including through engagement on security and training partnerships, critical political transitions, and strengthening early warning and early responses to crises and emerging conflicts. Further, the UK works closely with African military partners in

peace support operations, through its deployment of 300 peacekeepers in Mali and through the deployment of experienced Military Staff Officers to UN and AU missions, and through funding to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The **US**, through USAID, has facilitated the creation of the Security Management Institute (SMI) within the Kenya School of Government, which provides capacity-building initiatives for civil servants and other security sector stakeholders. Through the Partnerships for Peace's (P4P) programme, USAID supported the development of the G5 Sahel Regional Guiding Framework, which guided the development of Niger and other member states' national P/CVE strategies, and, in addition, provided technical assistance and financial support at the country level. Further, USAID supported the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE) to enhance the capacities of the region's governments and civil-society organisations, among other actors, to detect and prevent violent extremist ideology, radicalization and recruitment. USAID's Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD II) programme bolsters the capacity of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to monitor, gather, analyse and disseminate human security information to its 15 member states in order to support peace and security in the region.

The **EU** has continued its support of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as the continental framework within which the AUC and

eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts to, among other matters, strengthen early warning systems and improve articulation between continental and regional actions (EUR 24.8 million 2016–2020; EUR 40.5 million 2020–2024). The EU has also continued supporting locally-owned actual interventions. The EU-financed Early Response Mechanism has provided the AU, RECs and Regional Mechanisms with resources against violent conflicts, allowing interventions in 12 African countries between 2017–2021.

UN statistics on the implementation of SDG 16

Between 2015 and 2019, the number of civilian deaths in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa increased by 66%. Most civilian deaths are caused by small arms and light weapons; however, there was not much progress in the collection of small arms and light weapons by national authorities on the African continent in recent years (slight decline between 2016–2019 to under 20,000). Intentional homicide rates on the African continent have not shown progress between 2015 and 2019. In sub-Saharan Africa, they remained at a very high level of 15.2 homicides per 100,000 population. In Northern and Western Africa the rate remained at 3.8 homicides per 100,000 population. On a positive note, the number of human rights defenders, journalists and trade unionists killed in the region has continuously decreased in both North and Western Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁸

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2017	1. G7 actions to increase capacity of and collaboration with affected African States and regional organizations to improve response to and prevention of crises and conflicts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-reporting and African Union • OECD-DAC statistics on ODA (152) • UN statistics on the implementation of SDGs



Case Study: USA

“Advancing Women, Peace, and Security in Africa”



"Prevention is driven by citizens who want to stand up and be counted because they feel they have a role to play. So, the first thing I have to say to Sisters Without Borders, is we appreciate you standing up."

AMBASSADOR DR. MARTIN KIMANI

Former Director of the Kenya's National Counter Terrorism Center



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The historic Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017 was the first-ever legislation requiring a whole-of-government strategy on Women, Peace, and Security to advance women’s meaningful participation in preventing and resolving conflict, countering violent extremism (CVE), and building post-conflict peace and stability.

The US remains a steadfast supporter of the WPS agenda through its diplomacy, development, and defence objectives. The US supports targeted foreign assistance programs that advance women’s meaningful participation in decision-making and peacebuilding processes in areas experiencing conflict, crisis, instability and violent extremism. This includes dedicated funding to support the implementation of the joint Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) *Strategy to Support Women and Girls at Risk from Violent Extremism and Conflict*. Global activities address the distinct needs of women and girls affected by violent extremism and conflict, including localisation efforts that empower women’s organisations to participate in national CVE policy development processes.

For example, the Department of State supports Sisters Without Borders, a network of women-led organisations in Kenya. Since 2014, Sisters has formed a strong working relationship with Kenya’s National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which consulted

members of the network when drafting the 2016 National CVE Strategy. Since the Strategy’s release, the NCTC has regularly sought the Sisters’ input on activities and implementation. As a result of the Sisters’ leadership, the NCTC committed to adding a pillar for “promotion of gender equity and equality” in the next Strategy. Network members also now sit on 47 County Action Plan committees, analysing CVE priorities and solutions alongside security forces and government officials.

To increase the WPS work of multilateral organisations, recognising their critical role and reach, USAID provided assistance to the Office of the Special Envoy for WPS at the African Union (AU) to establish a Continental Results Framework on WPS through which the AU catalyses and assists member states to develop WPS National Action Plans (NAPs) and tracks their implementation, along with that of other international instruments in AU member states that protect women’s rights and promote their meaningful participation in peace, political and security-related processes. Through this initiative, the Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, South Africa, and Sudan finalized WPS NAPs in 2020, bringing the total number of AU member state NAPs to 30 – a critical increase due to the support of the AU and the US government.

Endnotes Chapter 8:

- 1 United Nations (2021). *The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021*. (p. 59) New York: UN Statistics Division. <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/#>
- 2 International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) & International Maritime Bureau (IMB) (2022). *Annual piracy report 2021*. Paris: Author. Retrieved from <https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/1314-caution-urged-despite-lowest-reported-maritime-piracy-incidents-since-1994>
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- 4 International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2021). *Maritime migration to Europe: Focus on the overseas route to the Canary Islands*. Geneva: Author. Retrieved from <https://publications.iom.int/books/maritime-migration-europe-focus-overseas-route-canary-islands>
- 5 The components of the Yaoundé Architecture are: the Interregional Coordination Centre, the Centre Régional de Sécurité Maritime de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, the Centre Régional de Sécurité Maritime de l'Afrique Centrale, the Maritime Multinational Coordination Centres of zones A, D, E, F, and G, and the National Maritime Operations Centres.
- 6 More information: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2021). *Diplomatic Bluebook 2021. Chapter 4: Japan Strengthening Its Presence in the International Community*. (Sections 4.B.B and 4.B.C). Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/en_html/chapter4/c040203.html
- 7 International Maritime Organisation (IMO) (2014). *Japan gives one million dollar boost to Gulf of Guinea fund*. Retrieved from <https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/06-japanfund.aspx>
- 8 Since the passing of UNSCR 1325, the UNSC adopted 9 additional resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. Together, these 10 resolutions form the international policy framework on Women, Peace and Security. More information: Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) (s.a.). *About Women, Peace and Security in the Security Council*. Retrieved from <https://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/WPS-in-SC-Council>
- 9 WILPF (2022). *1325 National Action Plans (NAPs); WILPF Monitoring and Analysis of National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security*. Retrieved from <http://1325naps.peacewomen.org>
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 The ICGLR is an inter-governmental organisation of the countries in the African Great Lakes Region. It has 12 member states: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.
- 12 Tatoli (2020). *Timor-Leste hosts 20th anniversary of the UN-Woman Peace and Security [sic]*. Retrieved from <http://www.tatoli.tl/en/2020/11/10/timor-leste-hosts-20th-anniversary-of-the-un-woman-peace-security/>
- 13 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) (2019). *Lebanon Government Adopts National Action Plan on Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security*. Retrieved from <https://unscol.unmissions.org/lebanon-government-adopts-national-action-plan-resolution-1325-women-peace-and-security>
- 14 Embassy of Japan in Sri Lanka (2019). *Japan provides USD 2 million grant aid for Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Sri Lanka*. Retrieved from https://www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_ja/00_000930.html
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- 16 Government of the UK (2021). *UK national action plan on women, peace and security 2018–2022: Annual reports to parliament 2018, 2019 and 2020*. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-national-action-plan-on-women-peace-and-security-2018-to-2022>
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- 18 UN (2021). *The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2021. Extended Report. Goal 16*. Retrieved from [https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/extended-report/Goal%20\(16\)_final.pdf](https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2021/extended-report/Goal%20(16)_final.pdf)

9. Environment and energy

The biodiversity and climate crises are two of the greatest challenges of our time. Loss of biodiversity, impacts from climate change and other environmental degradations are threatening the livelihoods and human rights of hundreds of millions of people all over the world. According to estimates of the World Bank, the climate crisis might, for instance, push over 130 million people into poverty by 2030 and cause over 200 million to migrate within their own countries by 2050.¹ As the energy sector substantially contributes to the climate crisis and causes additional pollution, such as of nitrogen oxide or sulphur dioxide, energy policy is closely related to environmental issues. At the same time, insufficient access to clean and reliable energy hampers socio-economic development and entails significant health risks. Establishing a clean energy infrastructure and effective climate action, and ensuring environmental sustainability in general, are thus integral parts of sustainable development as envisioned in the 2030 Agenda.

Environmental degradations and climate change impacts are in many cases transnational phenomena that do not stop at national borders. Greenhouse gas emissions cause *global* climate change, marine litter spreads across the oceans, and in times of global supply chains the pollution caused by production processes in one part of the world is

often linked to consumption decisions elsewhere. Environmental protection can take the form of a global public good, giving rise to the well-known incentive and coordination problems. Climate action and policies that address other environmental issues can thus benefit strongly from international cooperation. The G7 members belong to the countries with the largest environmental footprints and bear, in part also due to historical emissions and pollution, an important share of the responsibility for the environmental and climate crises.

In recent years, the G7 made several commitments regarding environmental and energy issues that are monitored in this report. Commitment 42 from 2021 (superseding a commitment from 2011) concerns biodiversity loss. In addition, the G7 committed to increasing the number of people with access to climate risk insurance and promoting early warning systems for disaster prevention in vulnerable countries (Commitment 44). Commitment 46 concerns the reduction of marine litter. Further, the G7 committed to increasing public and private climate finance for mitigation and adaptation measures (Commitment 48). The chapter also includes the reporting on Commitment 43 on energy infrastructure in Africa, Commitment 45 on access to renewable energy in developing countries, and Commitment 47 on fossil fuels.

Commitment 42

Biodiversity

“We ... commit to the global mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030.”

“We commit to champion ambitious and effective global biodiversity targets, including conserving or protecting at least 30 per cent of global land and at least 30 per cent of the global ocean by 2030.”

“Committing to increase finance for nature-based solutions through to 2025”

“Supporting agreement and delivery of targets to prevent loss, fragmentation and degradation of ecosystems and to restore significant areas of degraded and converted ecosystems.”

Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué (Annex of the G7 2030 Nature Compact), para. 43

SDGs:



Score:



New commitment, no score

Biodiversity – at the genetic, species, and ecosystem level – is being destroyed at a high and accelerating rate. More than 40,000 species are currently threatened with extinction according to the red list of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Unlike previous mass extinction events millions of years ago, the current biodiversity crisis is caused by human activities, such as land and sea use changes and over-exploitation, pollution and human-caused climate change. Besides harming the intrinsic value of animal life on our planet, biodiversity loss also puts human well-being in danger. Nature plays a critical role in, for instance, providing us with food, energy and medicine. The quality of air and water also depend crucially on well-functioning ecosystems, and biodiversity loss can increase the risk of the emergence of zoonotic diseases.

In light of the significance of the biodiversity crisis, the G7 committed in 2011 to intensify efforts to slowing down the loss of biodiversity. In 2021, the group adopted the G7 2030 Nature Compact and renewed and extended its commitment to protect biodiversity. The commitment now demands that biodiversity loss be halted and reversed by 2030. To this end, the G7 committed to championing ambitious and effective global biodiversity targets, increasing finance for nature-based solutions, and supporting the agreement on and delivery of targets to prevent loss, fragmentation and degradation of ecosystems and to restore significant areas of degraded and converted ecosystems. To follow up on this commitment, the G7 monitors the number of species added to the IUCN Red List Index categorised as vulnerable, endangered, critically endangered and extinct in the wild.

In addition, the G7 reports on ODA programmes and other investments by member countries related to protected areas and Other Effective Area-Based Conservation Measures (OECMs). Further, the group monitors International Finance Flows for Nature-Based Solutions. Finally, ecosystem extent (total areas) and condition (in terms of certain characteristics) is monitored.

Number of extinct or threatened species

The “Red List of Threatened Species” of the IUCN assesses the extinction risks of more than 142,500 species using several criteria that refer, for instance, to the population size of a species or the geographic range in which it occurs. In 2021, 40,084 species were assessed as threatened, i.e. as “vulnerable”, “endangered”, or “critically endangered”. This equals 28% of all assessed species. 958 species are currently listed as “extinct in the wild” or “extinct”.

However, these numbers are not comparable over time because many species move from one category to another due to improved knowledge or taxonomic revisions. To be able to identify trends, the Red List Index has been developed, which takes into account only genuine improvements or deteriorations. In the future, the G7 monitoring of extinct or threatened species will thus rely on this index. As of today, data for this index for the baseline year of this commitment (2021) is not yet available.

Information on ODA programmes and other investments by G7 members related to protected areas and OECMs

G7 members use ODA and other investments to counter biodiversity loss and support the establishment of protected areas and OECMs.

Canada is dedicating 20% of funding through its CAD 5.3 billion climate finance commitment to projects that leverage nature-based solutions and projects that contribute to biodiversity co-benefits

in developing countries. In addition, Canada contributed a total of CAD 229 million to the seventh replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The GEF supports developing countries’ work on climate change and takes an integrated approach to supporting more sustainable food systems, forest management and cities.

In 2020–2021, Parks Canada continued to focus on activities to support biodiversity and protected areas in developing countries. The Agency collaborates with international partners to share best practices related to ecological restoration, wildlife conservation, fire management and the management of protected areas. Global Affairs Canada bilateral programming is also paying more attention to biodiversity projects, including protected areas, and a series of projects is currently in development.

Germany is supporting 78 partner countries in combining biodiversity conservation with measures that safeguard the livelihood base of the local population. Germany supports more than 650 protected areas, covering a total of over two million square kilometres. Germany contributed ca. USD 200 million to the Legacy Landscapes Fund (LLF), which combines private and public funding to ensure long-term core financing for the protection of at least 30 particularly biodiverse areas in developing countries until 2030. In addition, the German contribution to the Blue Action Fund (BAF) reached a total of EUR 104.8 million in 2021 in support of NGO-managed protected area projects that conserve the ocean and improve the livelihoods of coastal communities in developing countries.

Germany’s International Climate Initiative (IKI) also supports partner countries in their efforts to establish, expand, consolidate and connect protected areas and OECMs. Territories and areas conserved by indigenous peoples and local communities (ICCAs) play a vital role with regards to

protected areas and OECMs. As an example, Germany is supporting a programme that strengthens ICCAs in 45 countries, assisting them in preserving their traditional living environments and lifestyles, and in conserving biodiversity on some 8 million hectares of land, including by supporting up to 600 small-scale projects.

Through the Agence française de Développement, **France** supports large ODA programmes dedicated to protected areas and OECMs. In total, AFD has invested more than EUR 500 million in favour of biodiversity in 2021. 657 projects are in progress and 13.6 millions of hectares of natural spaces are being protected or restored thanks to the projects financed. A few examples:

- Varuna project: EUR 10 million subsidy for financing a regional project aimed at protecting a biodiversity hotspot in the south-western Indian ocean;
- Ziama project: EUR 5 million for a conservation project involving biodiversity and improving climate resilience in a biosphere reserve in Guinea (Ziama);
- SANBI project: EUR 2 million subsidy to finance a project involving evaluation, spatial planning of biodiversity in Southern Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Malawi and Mozambique).

Italy is strongly committed to the protection and conservation of biodiversity. Examples of ODA programmes and other investments related to protected areas and OECMs include:

- UNESCO Network for Earth: Italy is the main donor – with USD 3.9 million – of this international network that aims at increasing the conservation of terrestrial, coastal and marine biodiversity and improving the management of global ecosystems services.
- Mozambique: Italy is financing, with EUR 3 million, the project “ManGrowth – Preservation of Ecosystems for Sustainable Development”

aimed at preserving the mangroves as an essential ecosystem for the ecological balance of coastal areas of Mozambique.

- Kenya: Italy has committed more than EUR 2 million (2021–2023) to finance a community conservancy model in Kenya for integrated and sustainable protection of the environment and biodiversity.
- Agricultural biodiversity: Italy provided more than EUR 700,000 in 2021 for its activities aimed at using and safeguarding agricultural biodiversity.

Many other projects in Egypt, Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, Albania and other countries are financed by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation or by the Ministry of Ecological Transition to assist the local authorities in protecting their biodiversity.

Japan has contributed to the establishment of protected areas and OECM through ODA. Moreover, Japan established the Japan Biodiversity Fund in 2010. The Fund has facilitated, funded and supported a wide array of activities, including capacity-building relating to protected areas. In 2021, at the first part of CBD COP15, Japan pledged to continue its global support as a second phase of the Japan Biodiversity Fund, with around USD 17 million of additional contribution included. Moreover, for the purpose of promoting biodiversity conservation of socio-ecological production landscapes and seascapes through the Satoyama Initiative, Japan will continue to provide JPY 120 million (USD 1.0 million) in 2021 to support the Secretariat of the International Partnership for the Satoyama Initiative. Japan is the largest donor to the GEF. According to the GEF database, 29 projects were approved in 2021 under the theme of protected areas, and their total amount is USD 216 million. Japan’s contribution to the GEF for this cycle is 19% of the fund, effectively translating into about USD 41 million of contributions for the year 2021 in protected areas through the GEF. Furthermore, Japan continued to constructively contribute

toward an ambitious 8th replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund, leading to a record-high allocation of dedicated resources toward the biodiversity focal area and related areas that yield increased co-benefits for biodiversity conservation.

The **UK** has committed to spending at least GBP 3 billion of International Climate Finance on protecting and restoring nature and biodiversity between 2021 and 2026. It has several ongoing competitive grant programmes and new large-scale programmes providing support to protected areas and OECMs:²

- The Darwin Initiative has committed over GBP 198 million and supported more than 1,319 projects across Africa, Asia and Central and South America.
- The Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund (IWTCF) is a competitive grant scheme established to tackle the IWT and, in doing so, to contribute to poverty reduction in developing countries.
- The Illegal Wildlife Trade Challenge Fund (IWTCF) has committed GBP 37 million since 2014 to counter the illegal wildlife trade by developing sustainable livelihoods, reducing demand for illegally traded wildlife products, ensuring effective legal frameworks, and strengthening enforcement, including anti-poaching initiatives in protected areas.
- The UK provides support to the Global Environment Facility (GBP 250 million; 2018–2022), which adopts an integrated landscape and seascape approach that uses multiple tools and strategies, including protected areas, to respond to the drivers of biodiversity loss.
- The GBP 100 million Biodiverse Landscapes Fund (2022–2029) will support a series of

landscapes in ODA-eligible countries to reduce poverty and to support and facilitate sustainable economic development whilst providing long-lasting protection and conservation of biodiversity alongside helping to tackle climate change.

- The UK launched the GBP 500 million Blue Planet Fund in 2021, which will support ODA-eligible countries in their efforts to protect and restore the marine environment and to reduce poverty, including by establishing and managing marine protected areas and OECMs.

The **EU** intends to significantly increase biodiversity ODA over its 2021–2027 programming period. Almost all EU programs concerned have direct or significant indirect positive impacts on area-based protection and conservation. In 2021, preliminary estimates put EU external biodiversity financing slightly over EUR 526 million. In particular, the implementation of the EU’s new flagship initiative for Biodiversity in Africa, NaturAfrica, started in six regional landscapes and in several countries (Togo, Benin, Cameroon, DRC, Burundi, Congo). NaturAfrica is based on a fully integrated approach of conservation that aims to improve the livelihood of 65 million people, sequestering up to 21 billion tons of carbon, stabilising 3 million km² of land and ensuring water security.

Since final ODA data for 2021 and beyond is not yet available, this report does not monitor indicator 3 on International Finance flows for Nature-Based Solutions. Similarly, as of today, data on indicator 4 on ecosystem extent and condition and the global ecosystem restoration index (GERI) is not yet available for 2021 and can thus not be included in this report.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2021	1. Number of species added to the IUCN Red List index categorised as vulnerable, endangered, critically endangered or extinct in the wild.	IUCN Red List Index of threatened species
	2. Information on ODA programmes and other investments by G7 countries related to protected areas and Other Effective area-based Conservation Measures.	Self-reporting from G7 country's ODA portfolio and other international finance flows
	3. International Finance flows for Nature-Based Solutions	OECD DAC data on finance flows marked as principal or significant for both biodiversity and climate change Rio markers, SDG (15.a) data (SDG indicators – SDG Indicators (un.org))
	4. Ecosystem extent (total areas) and condition (in terms of certain characteristics) and the global ecosystem restoration index (GERI).	UN System of environmental economic accounting Global Ecosystem Restoration Index (GERI)

Commitment 43

Energy infrastructure in Africa

“We will continue to promote inclusive and resilient growth in Africa, working with governments and citizens in Africa to ... improve infrastructure, notably in the energy sector ...”

Brussels 2014, The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration, para. 14

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

Access to energy is a prerequisite for many important human capabilities. Heating, cooking, light, communication technology and mobility all require energy. Energy is also an important input for economic production processes. At the same time, the energy sector is associated with substantial greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution. A reliable and clean energy infrastructure is thus crucial for sustainable development. However, in 2019, about 53% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa did not have access to electricity (according to the World Bank Global Electrification Database).

In 2014, the G7 committed to working with governments and citizens of African countries to improve energy infrastructures. To follow up on this commitment, the G7 reports on relevant direct financial, technical, legal and policy support by G7 members. In addition, outcome indicators concerning access to energy and the growth rate of energy in Africa are monitored. Where possible, data is disaggregated to indicate energy from renewable sources.

G7 support for improving energy infrastructure in African countries


Compared to 2013, ODA provided in 2020 by G7 countries and EU Institutions for energy-related projects in African countries was substantially higher (USD 2,289 million in 2020 compared to USD 1,434 million in 2013). Between 2016 and 2018, though, G7 contributions had decreased. In the current reporting period since 2019, a slight renewed increase can be observed. However, ODA for energy-related projects has not reached the peak of 2016 again. In 2020, the EU Institutions were the largest donor among the G7 and provided about USD 738 million.

Focusing on ODA spending specifically for energy generation in African countries, disaggregated numbers for renewable and non-renewable energy sources are available. In 2020, G20 countries and EU Institutions spent USD 2,957 million on projects related to renewable energy generation (DAC-CRS Purpose Code 232) and USD 1,045 million on projects related to non-renewable

energy generation (DAC-CRS Purpose Code 233) in African countries. The division of ODA between renewable and non-renewable energy generation

projects fluctuated significantly since 2013 and did not show a clear trend.

Figure 32: G7 ODA spending for energy-related projects in African countries (USD million)



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (Purpose Code 230)

The support of individual G7 members for energy infrastructure in African countries is described in more detail in the following.

Examples of **Canada's** support for green energy infrastructure in African countries, including projects that complement infrastructure-related funding, are:

- part of Canada's CAD 122.9 million contribution to the Canada-African Development Bank (AfDB) Climate Fund (2021-2046) seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by scaling up renewable energy and supporting energy-efficient projects in the region.
- in 2017, a CAD 150 million contribution was made to the African Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), a loan fund managed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
- since 2006, Canada has contributed CAD 25 million in support of the AfDB-hosted NEPAD-IPPF, which supports African countries in their

efforts to prepare economically, environmentally, socially and gender-responsive regional infrastructure projects.

Besides financing energy infrastructure projects in African countries, Germany also provides technical assistance for developing policy frameworks for renewable energy and energy efficiency, technical and legal assistance for renewable energy integration, financial advice, and training. Between 2013–2020, a total of 8.3 million people, 4,196 social institutions, and 7,205 SMEs in several African countries gained sustainable access to modern energy services with support from the multi-donor programme Energising Development (EnDev). The contribution of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to EnDev's interventions in African countries in 2019–2021 amounts to around EUR 31.7 million. The German initiative "Green People's Energy for Africa" (GBE) aims to improve the conditions for a climate-friendly, decentralised and citizen-oriented

energy supply in rural African areas. In 2019–2021, GIZ was commissioned for this project with a volume of EUR 44 million.

France, represented by AFD, financed investments in energy in several African countries and provided technical assistance in various areas: Modelling energy trajectories, energy planning, benchmarking and evaluating policies, supporting the elaboration of new policies, and capacity-building. In addition to energy supply projects, AFD is also financing transmission and distribution projects as well as off-grid energy access projects. In total, AFD has supported 218,000 people in gaining access to electricity in African countries between 2019 and 2020, and 656,000 between 2015 and 2020. AFD is supporting Africa’s infrastructure for renewable energy toward (i) financing infrastructure projects and (ii) supporting policies enabling the development of renewable energy projects. As a consequence, 978 MW of new renewable capacities have been installed in African countries between 2019 and 2020, and 2046 MW between 2015 and 2020.

Italy’s ODA for energy-related projects in African countries between 2013 and 2020 amounted to USD 54 million in total. As data for 2021 are not yet available, here are few examples of projects funded in 2021:

- Libya: EUR 2.3 million to promote clean energy development
- Sub-Saharan Africa: EUR 300,000 to SEforAll to develop a Virtual Knowledge Hub

Furthermore, Italy supports Open Africa Power, a programme organised by the Enel Foundation that, since 2018, provides a cohort of young energy professionals with a complete set of technical, regulatory and business skills needed to trigger a sustainable energy future for all in Africa. The initiative stems from the awareness that education is an essential vehicle for the development of the African continent and that energy, in particular, is a

crucial factor for Africa’s progress. This year the programme will engage up to 150 African students and over 240 alumni, with at least 50 percent women, in a series of professional development and leadership activities provided in partnership with top academic institutions in Italy and Africa. Open Africa Power 2022 will comprise online and residential modules from academic institutions such as Strathmore University, the University of Cape Town, Politecnico di Torino, Politecnico di Milano, SDA Bocconi, Florence School of Regulation, and Venice International University.

Japan’s assistance for African countries has focused on developing key infrastructure in both urban and rural areas, especially affordable, reliable and sustainable energy infrastructure. Japan supported the improvement of access to energy in Mozambique (about 1.5 million people), Kenya (about 1.8 million people), Malawi (about 1 million people), and the reform of the power sector in Egypt (about 100 million people), through yen loans and grant aids.

UK programmes covered energy policy, generation and distribution through technical assistance, legal and policy support in grid and off-grid energy. The UK has also invested substantially in renewable energy including geothermal, grid-scale solar and hydropower. It has covered sector reform, market development, quality standards, and variable renewable energy (VRE) integration and innovation. Between 2015 and 2021, programmes of the UK improved access to clean energy for at least 6.8 million people and led to an installation of clean energy capacity of 43.65 MW.

The **US’s** ODA for energy-related projects in African countries between 2013 and 2020 amounted to USD 1,414 million in total. The US programs advance sub-Saharan Africa’s transition to cleaner, renewable sources through innovation, commercialization and deployment of clean energy technologies and infrastructure. The US also

attracts and sustains long-term private-sector investment in SSA's energy future through the development and financing of climate-smart energy projects and critical enabling reforms. Since 2013, programming, in cooperation with private-sector and development partners, has supported 138 power projects, resulting in 13,000 MWs at financial close, with 6,748 MWs from renewable energy. In addition, with US and partner support, 75 power projects were commissioned, leading to 5,733 operational MWs, including 3,214 MWs from renewable energy. US programs have also resulted in 28.9 million connections, providing first-time electricity for over 137.3 million people.


Between 2013 and 2020, the EU's financial contribution to sustainable energy cooperation with African countries yielded concrete results: Around 20 million more people gained access to electricity with EU support, through a) new access and b) improved access. 8 GW of new renewable generation capacity was installed and around 34 million tonnes CO_{2eq} were avoided each year. These results were achieved through a range of policies and programmes, including support to grid networks

and renewable energy technologies; contributing to the improvement of the regulatory environment through technical assistance; and diversified investments in sustainable energy, notably through innovative financial instruments. For example, the EU Technical Assistance Facility for sustainable energy was set up to deliver support at the country, regional and global level, including in Africa, and to help improve partner countries' policy and regulatory framework in order to create attractive and enabling conditions for increased public and private investment in energy access, renewable energy as well as energy efficiency.

Access to energy and growth of energy consumption in African countries

Data on access to energy is available in the World Bank Global Electrification Database. Between 2013 and 2019 the share of the population of sub-Saharan Africa with access to energy increased from 38.09% to 46.75% (see Figure 33). In the Middle East and North Africa this share was already 97.08% in 2013 and did not show a substantial change in 2019 (97.23%).³

Figure 33: Share of population with access to electricity in sub-Saharan Africa



Source: Own compilation based on the World Bank Global Electrification Database

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), energy consumption in African countries increased from 637.9 TW in 2013 to 732.4 TW in 2019.⁴ The growth rate of energy consumption was

1.88% in 2013; it peaked in 2017 at 3.82% and declined afterwards to 1.99% in 2019.

Current data on load factors of energy in African countries is not available.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2013	<p>1. Direct financing, technical assistance, legal support, and policy support by G7 governments for improving Africa’s energy infrastructure. (Where possible, this information will be disaggregated to indicate support for improving infrastructure for renewable energy sources.)</p> <hr/> <p>2. Number of people in Africa with access to energy; growth rate of energy in Africa; load factors of energy in Africa. (Where possible, this data will be disaggregated to indicate energy from renewable sources.)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-reporting by G7 governments • SDG7 Tracking Report • ClimateScope • DAC coding • AfDB’s Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program • International Energy Agency (IEA) • IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency) • UN Energy Statistics • World Bank

Commitment 44

Climate risk insurance

“We will intensify our support particularly for vulnerable countries’ own efforts to manage climate change related disaster risk and to build resilience. We will aim to increase by up to 400 million the number of people in the most vulnerable developing countries who have access to direct or indirect insurance coverage against the negative impact of climate change related hazards by 2020 and support the development of early warning systems in the most vulnerable countries. To do so we will learn from and build on already existing risk insurance facilities such as the African Risk Capacity, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility and other efforts to develop insurance solutions and markets in vulnerable regions, including in small islands developing states, Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.”

*Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p. 13, para. a
Carbis Bay G7 Summit 2021 para. 41*

SDGs:



Score:



Below expectations

Over the last 50 years, over 11,000 disasters were attributed to weather-, climate- and water-related hazards, leading to 2 million deaths and economic losses of USD 3.6 trillion.⁵ Reducing greenhouse gas emissions remains the most important measure to address the risk of disasters, as climate change will greatly increase the frequency and intensity of such events. However, to foster resilience and enable rapid response to and recovery from disasters, early warning systems and climate risk insurance can also play a constructive role. This holds true especially in developing countries, in which 91% of all deaths and 59% of economic losses from weather-, climate- and water-related hazards between 1970 and 2019 occurred.⁶

The G7 committed in Elmau 2015 to supporting particularly vulnerable countries in managing

climate change-related disaster risk and building resilience. This commitment was reaffirmed in Carbis Bay in 2021. In order to follow up, the G7 monitors the number of people in the most vulnerable countries with access to risk insurance; the number of most vulnerable developing countries where early warning systems for disaster prevention and preparedness are promoted; and the G7’s support to strengthen Multi Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWS) capacities in the most vulnerable developing countries.

Access to climate and disaster risk insurance

At their summit in Elmau in 2015, the G7 members launched the InsuResilience Initiative, which aimed to provide access to Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance (CDRFI) for 400 million

people in the most vulnerable developing countries by 2020. In 2017, this initiative developed into the InsuResilience Global Partnership (IGP), which was officially launched at the COP23 and initiated during the German G20 Presidency with involvement of the Ethiopian V20 Presidency.⁷ One of the IGP's key targets, which was set in 2019 as part of the InsuResilience Vision 2025, is to provide financial protection through CDRFI solutions for 500 million people in 2025. In 2021, 24 programmes with more than 300 projects in over 100 countries contributed to financially protecting 150 million people. This represents a significant increase compared with about 30 million people in vulnerable countries who had financial protection against climate and disaster risks before the establishment of the initiative in 2015.

At Carbis Bay, the UK, along with Germany and the US, announced substantial new support: GBP 120 million in new funding from the UK was announced to protect those most at risk from extreme weather and climate-linked disasters, including investments in the regional disaster protection schemes across Africa, South-East Asia, the Caribbean and Pacific. This support contributes to the InsuResilience Global Partnership's Vision 2025 and the Risk Informed Early Action Partnership (REAP).

G7 support for early warning systems


Early warning systems can reduce fatalities and economic losses due to disasters. However, on average one in three people globally was not covered by such systems in 2020. Only 39% of the member states of the World Meteorological

Organization (WMO) reported that they are providing impact-based forecasting services.⁸

G7 members have supported early warning systems in vulnerable countries by providing funding to the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) initiative since its inception in 2015. CREWS's overall objective is to substantially reduce disaster mortality by 2030 and to significantly increase access to early warnings and risk information. To this end, the initiative works towards improving risk knowledge, modernising the hydro-meteorological infrastructure, improving dissemination and communication of actionable warnings, and strengthening the ability to prepare for and respond to warnings. In 2020, the initiative assisted 57 countries through national and regional programmes, and has raised USD 330 million since 2015.⁹

G7 members also provided funding for the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF finances early warning components, including weather-monitoring technology, training technical staff and building robust communication networks to ensure that community members receive and understand climate information.¹⁰

G7 countries' and EU Institutions' spending for multi-hazard response preparedness in general (not only for early warning systems) amounted to about USD 549 million in 2020. This was lower than in the baseline year 2015 (USD 567 million). In 2020, the largest donor for multi-hazard response preparedness among the G7 were the US, which provided ODA of USD 185 million in this area.

Figure 34: G7 ODA spending for multi-hazard response preparedness (USD million)

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (Purpose Code 74020)

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Number of additional people in most vulnerable countries with access to risk insurance. Number of most vulnerable developing countries where early warning systems (for disaster prevention and preparedness) are promoted. G7 support to strengthen multi-hazard early warning systems (MHEWS) capacities in the most vulnerable developing countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> “InsuResilience” initiative Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) initiative OECD-DAC (74010) World Meteorological Organization Sendai Framework

Commitment 45

Renewable energy

“We will [...] Accelerate access to renewable energy in Africa and developing countries in other regions with a view to reducing energy poverty and mobilizing substantial financial resources from private investors, development finance institutions and multilateral development banks by 2020 building on existing work and initiatives.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 13, para. B

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory


The energy sector is responsible for almost three-quarters of historical greenhouse gas emissions. In 2020, less than one-third of global electricity generation used renewable sources.¹¹ At the same time, 770 million people globally do not have access to electricity. After decreasing by 9% annually on average between 2015 and 2019, this number has almost stagnated since 2019.¹² Improving access to renewable energy is thus of major importance for climate mitigation and sustainable development.

In 2015, the G7 committed to accelerating access to renewable energy in Africa and in developing countries in other regions. To follow up on this commitment, the G7 monitors G7 ODA dedicated to renewable energy in developing countries, the number of initiatives/policies addressing renewa-

ble energy implemented, the amount of private investment mobilised by G7 members towards renewable energy, the installation of renewable energy capacity (GW) supported by G7 countries, and the number of new connections.

G7 support for renewable energy projects in developing countries

In 2020, G7 countries and EU institutions provided USD 2,957 million of ODA for projects related to energy generation from renewable sources. Compared to the baseline year 2015 (USD 1,911 million), this equals an increase of about 35%. However, in this period ODA contributions for renewable energy generation showed substantial fluctuations. The largest donor in this area among the G7 was Germany, whose contributions amounted to USD 917 million in 2020.

Figure 35: G7 ODA spending on energy generation from renewable sources (USD million)

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (Purpose Code 232)

In the following, support for renewable energy generation by individual G7 members is described in more detail (including the number of projects and the renewable energy capacity installed where these data were available).

Since 2017, **Canada** supported, on average, 17 initiatives per year to support renewable energy. Preliminary data for 2021 indicate that Canada provided CAD 354 million through 24 bilateral projects and large repayable contributions, which in turn funded other projects. The CAD 2.65 billion climate finance commitment (2015–2021) included 25 programmes with different partners that supported renewable energy implementation in developing countries. For example, the International Finance Corporation-Canadian Climate Change Program partially funded the Scaling Solar Zambia project Phase I & II in 2017 and 2018, which will supply 75.7 MW to Zambia’s electricity grid. The Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia’s sub-project “Viet Nam floating solar 2019–2039” produced 71.5 GWh of renewable electricity in the first year of operation.

Since 2017, Canada’s international assistance in support of renewable energy has totalled more than CAD 1.2 billion. Canada’s CAD 2.65 billion climate finance commitment (2015–2021) included programmes with various partners that supported renewable energy implementation in developing countries. For example, the Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in Asia Phase II funded the Viet Nam Floating Solar initiative to support the construction of a 47.5-megawatt peak (MWp) floating solar power facility – the first floating solar installation in the country. The Canadian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in the Americas funded the Jacaranda Solar project in Brazil, which comprises the design, construction, operation and maintenance of four bifacial photovoltaic plants, with a combined capacity of 187 MW.

Through the AFD Group, **France** has committed EUR 7.7 billion to support the development of renewable energy capacities between 2015 and 2021 and EUR 3.1 billion between 2019 and 2021. In general, AFD supports renewable energy through financing infrastructure projects,

supporting policies that enable the development of renewable energy projects and participating in international advocacy for the energy transition.

Germany contributed EUR 2.9 billion to the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) between 2015–2019. In 2021, Germany joined the International Solar Alliance (ISA), launched in 2015 at COP21 by France and India, to overcome challenges to the massive deployment of solar energy at scale by reducing financing costs, harmonizing regulatory environments, and enhancing technology reliability and affordability. Further, between 2015 and 2021 the German KfW Development Bank financed additional renewable energy generation capacity of around 7,100 MW (3,500 of which were in the period 2019–2021). Technical assistance, moreover, contributed indirectly to the installation of renewable energy capacity, e.g. through political consulting on the creation of enabling framework conditions and capacity-building. In 2020, for instance, this led to an added renewable energy capacity of approximately 3,256 MW.

In 2019, the headquarters of the **Italian** Agency for Development Cooperation in Addis Ababa organised a “skills development” course in the context of the “Multi-actor platform for renewable energies” programme. Further, Italy contributes to “ILUMINA – Access to energy for local development and women’s empowerment” in Mozambique and to the World Bank Trust Fund for managing assistance to the energy sector, “Clean energy for sustainable access to basic services”.

Japan’s Ministry of the Environment provides financial support through the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM). The JCM has provided funding for a total of 103 renewable energy projects (such as photovoltaics, wind, biomass, hydro and geothermal) as of FY 2021, which have been introduced with an approximate capacity of 1.4 GW. Further, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has also supported the installation

of renewable energy capacity (1.2 GW) such as photovoltaics (Egypt), geothermal (Kenya and Costa Rica), and hydro (pumped storage) (India).

The **UK** supported numerous initiatives and policies to address renewable energy implementation across a wide portfolio of programmes, including through bilateral and multilateral channels such as the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA). SEFA supported Chad’s first solar photovoltaics power plant by an Independent Power Producer (IPP) which released funds from AfDB (EUR 18.5 million) as well as co-financiers and climate funds (EUR 19 million). In 2021, SEFA’s USD 50 million COVID-19 Off-Grid Recovery Platform provided relief and recovery capital to energy-access companies to protect essential energy services and jobs. The **US**, as reported in its 7th National Communication to the UNFCCC, committed USD 5.87 billion to finance clean energy activities in developing countries from fiscal year 2015–2018. This climate assistance focused on countries and sectors offering significant emission-reduction potential over the long term, as well as countries that offered the potential to demonstrate leadership in sustained, large-scale deployment of clean energy. In terms of sector coverage, this includes renewable energy and energy-efficiency activities. The US is also helping countries expand access to clean, affordable electricity through such programmes as Power Africa, the hydrogen collaborative research mission under Mission Innovation, the US-Africa Clean Energy Finance initiative, and the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation. In South Africa, USAID’s Power Africa initiative has helped bring 27 procurements to financial close under the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program, resulting in 2,200 MW of new renewable energy generation and approximately USD 4 billion in investments through support to the government of South Africa.

The Africa-**EU** Green Energy Initiative (AEGEI) that was proposed to African partners by the EU side during the African Union – EU Summit 2022 aims to contribute to bridging the energy access gap in Africa while protecting the people, the climate and the environment and creating added value and opportunities for African and EU businesses. Increasing the share of renewable energy sources in primary energy demand will be at the core of the initiative's priorities. In addition, the EU is one of the partners of the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), which aims to mobilise African potential to generate at least 300 gigawatts by 2030.

Further, the G7 members have put an emphasis on mobilising private investment towards renewable energy in developing countries. Between 2016 and 2020, **Canada** is credited with mobilising an additional CAD 547 million from private-sector resources towards renewable energy in developing countries. Between 2015 and 2020, **France**, through the AFD Group, committed EUR 2.1 billion to support investment in renewable-energy capacities through the private sector (private utilities and/or local banks). Between 2019 and 2021, this amount reached EUR 0.7 billion. As a traditional instrument to foster private investments, the **German** Export Credit Guarantees provided support for exports in renewable energies to developing countries amounting to a total of EUR 2.1 billion during the years 2019–2021. The **UK** supported bi- and

multilateral programmes raising private capital for renewables. In 2021, the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) informed World Bank loans (USD 10.4 billion) and mobilised public/private financing of USD 3.6 billion. Between 2015 and 2021, UK ICF programmes mobilised GBP 703.7 million of private investments for SDG7 activities. In Nigeria, Power Africa has achieved nearly two million new on- and off-grid connections, more than USD 4.3 billion of power sector investment mobilised through **US** Government assistance, and an increase of 662 MW of on-grid electricity delivery capacity since 2013. Power Africa also helped develop the USD 330 million Solar Power Naija programme, providing concessionary financing to private-sector developers to deploy five million new solar connections by the year 2023. In India, since 2016, USAID has helped mobilise USD 1.1 billion of private-sector investments, installed and integrated about 6,000 MW of clean energy, and improved energy access for five million people. By the end of 2020, the investment series for private-sector-led sustainable projects boosted by **EU** programmes amounted to more than EUR 130 million, with EUR 89 million already invested in 45 projects across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

As recent data on new connections to renewable energy are currently not available, this report does not monitor Indicator 5.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of initiatives/policies addressing renewable energy implemented in developing countries. 2. G7 ODA dedicated to renewable energy in developing countries. 3. Amount of private investment mobilised by G7 members towards renewable energy in developing countries. 4. Installation of renewable energy capacity (GW) supported by G7 countries. 5. New connections (based on existing methodology – World Bank/SE4ALL methodology – measuring access to renewable energy). 	<p>The following data sources, in which all G7 members are involved, are primarily used:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OECD-DAC (231, 232, 23410, 41010) • International Renewable Energy Agency – IRENA • World Bank, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank • International Energy Agency (IEA) • UNDESA <p>The following data sources can be also used as a supplement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) • Electrification Financing Initiative (ElectriFI) • Africa-EU Energy Partnership – AEEP • International Solar Alliance • National project and portfolio overviews (self-reporting) • Power Africa initiative • National energy information agencies/institutions of G7 members • African Renewable Energy Initiative

Commitment 46

Marine litter

“The G7 commits to priority actions and solutions to combat marine litter as set out in the annex, stressing the need to address land- and sea-based sources, removal actions, as well as education, research and outreach.”

Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p. 14 (see also Annex, pp. 8–9)

SDGs:



Score:  *Satisfactory*

An estimated 4.8 to 12.7 million tonnes of plastics leak into the oceans each year, with about 80% of the plastic pollutants emanating from Asia.¹³ Moreover, a great concern is the rapid increase and volume of plastic waste: During the past four decades, global plastic production has more than quadrupled. Further, the level of greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production, use and disposal of conventional fossil-fuel-based plastics is predicted to increase to approximately 2.1 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents (GtCO_{2e}) by 2040. This represents 19% of the global carbon budget.¹⁴ In financial terms, the global economy loses USD 80–120 billion worth of plastic packaging due to a lack of or sub-optimal recycling.¹⁵ Further, marine litter causes severe damage to about 200 aquatic species, such as mangroves, seagrasses and corals. It poses a serious threat to the climate resilience of the ecosystems to which these species belong and can, due to the role of these ecosystems in carbon sequestration, also contribute to climate change. Regarding human health, the leaking of plastics into coastal waters and the ingestion of seafood contaminated with plastic pose severe human health risks.¹⁶

Due to the topic’s increasing importance, the G7 made a commitment in Elmau in 2015 to combat marine litter. In order to follow up, the G7 monitors the funding by G7 countries for marine-litter-related activities as part of international development assistance and investments, including pilot projects and the number of related projects initiated in developing countries by the G7.

Funding for marine litter related activities and projects initiated in developing countries addressing marine litter

Several interventions are supported by G7 members that address marine litter. One such initiative is PROBLUE, a World Bank-managed multi-donor trust fund that is dedicated to promoting healthy oceans, including through the reduction of marine litter and pollution. At the G7 Environment, Clean Energy and Oceans Ministerial Meeting in September 2018, **Canada** and the **EU** announced their support for PROBLUE. Since the programme was created in 2019, it has initiated many projects in developing countries that focus, among other things, on the threat posed to ocean health by marine pollution, including plastics. Since its

inception, **Canada** (the largest donor), **Germany**, **France**, the **EU**, the **UK**, and the **US** have donated to PROBLUE.¹⁷

Another initiative is the Global Plastic Action Partnership (GPAP), a public-private collaboration platform led by the World Economic Forum (WEF) that aims to help translate the political commitment to addressing plastic pollution into tangible strategies in selected coastal economies. Its goal is to avert the growth of global plastic pollution in rivers, deltas and oceans by 2025 through a circular economy approach. GPAP was initiated by **Canada** and is further supported by the **UK**. Other projects supported by individual G7 countries that operate through a circular economy approach or address marine litter, in general, are described in the following.

Canada's total funding for marine-litter-related activities amounts to approximately CAD 104 million. The country has initiated four projects that address marine litter in developing countries, including Nesta's Afri-Plastics Innovation Challenge, which aims to reduce marine plastic litter in sub-Saharan African countries by developing and scaling innovative solutions to plastic mismanagement (CAD 20 million). It involves a public competition that will reward the best solutions to addressing marine plastic litter in developing countries while also promoting gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. As mentioned above, Canada further supports the World Bank's PROBLUE Program (CAD 69 million) and the Global Plastic Action Partnership (CAD 6 million). Finally, Canada provides funding to SecondMuse's Incubation Network (CAD 9 million), a multi-donor project that seeks to reduce plastic leaking into the world's oceans while at the same time improving the livelihoods of people, especially women and girls, working in waste management and recycling systems in South and South-East Asia.

At the international level, **France** supports the marine-litter agenda of the regional programmes

and conventions – OSPAR (North-East Atlantic), Barcelona (Mediterranean), Nairobi (Western Indian Ocean), SPREP and ICRI (Pacific) – as well as the work of the UNEA (Global Partnership on Marine Litter) and the Basel Convention. Since 2019, AFD has approved 17 marine plastic waste projects. These projects include sanitation, storm-water management and solid waste projects implemented on the coastline, as well as awareness-raising and policy-dialogue projects dedicated to the reduction of marine litter. These projects are monitored under the Clean Oceans Initiative, a partnership initiative launched in October 2018 by the EIB, KfW and AFD dedicated to reducing plastic pollution at sea. The collection and treatment of waste before it reaches the sea is a significant part of AFD's activity and has received EUR 640 million of financing since the beginning of 2019. It is mainly done downstream via interventions in the sanitation and solid-waste sectors. Given the scale of the problem and the regulatory constraints that could result from the adoption of a treaty on plastics and the future global framework on biodiversity, this activity is set to increase and be diversified in favour of more upstream and transformative circular-economy projects and public-policy dialogues.

From 2016 to 2021, **Germany** committed over EUR 81 million to marine-litter-related activities as part of international cooperation and development assistance. An additional EUR 55 million were committed to various funds addressing marine litter. Germany supports the Prevention of Plastic Waste in Central America and the Caribbean (Caribe Circular with EUR 7 million), the Reduce, Reuse, Recycle to Protect the Marine Environment and Coral Reefs in selected ASEAN states (3RPro-Mar) with EUR 16 million, and Integrated Waste Management and Marine Litter Prevention in the Western Balkans with EUR 3.5 million. In addition, Germany supports, for instance, the projects Mitigating Marine Plastic Debris in Vietnam with EUR 11 million, Circular Economy Solutions Preventing Marine Litter in Ecosystems (CES) in

India with EUR 5 million and Sustainable Capacity against Irreversible Pollution by Plastics (SCIP Plastics) in Bangladesh with EUR 5 million. In total, Germany has initiated 33 pertinent projects in developing countries since 2015, of which 13 projects are considered 100% relevant for marine-litter prevention.

Italy mainly focuses on protecting the Mediterranean Sea as part of the broader framework of achieving the objectives of environmental sustainability and conservation of marine ecosystems. Reducing marine litter, promoting and developing Marine Protected Areas and the blue economy, and combating climate change are particularly important in this area, as an estimated temperature increase of 0.03 °C per year has been recorded as well as a reduction in summer rainfall of between 10 and 30%. Italy, as president of COP21 of the Barcelona Convention,¹⁸ obtained the creation of an Emission Control Area for Sulphur Oxides in the Mediterranean, a measure that will significantly improve the environment as well as human health. Further, Italy strongly supports initiatives to protect water resources in every aspect, as also shown in its 2021 G20 presidency.¹⁹ In particular, the systematic and safe reuse of treated wastewater was promoted at an international level. This measure makes it possible to reduce the withdrawal of water from water bodies, protecting its qualitative and quantitative status in the context of the circular-economy principles. Specific attention was also paid to reverse the dramatic loss of marine biodiversity in the Mediterranean: eight Mediterranean governments, including Italy, and five international organisations launched an action plan: “The Mediterranean: A model sea by 2030” (PAMEx). This action plan contains 19 concrete actions that aim to collectively preserve biodiversity in the Mediterranean Sea, end overfishing, limit plastic pollution and develop sustainable maritime transport by 2030.

In 2018 and 2019, **Japan** contributed approximately JPY 2.84 billion to building scientific knowledge and

developing capacities for measures against marine plastic litter in the Asia region through international organisations, including the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).²⁰ At the G20 Osaka Summit in June 2019, under Japan’s G20 Presidency, the member countries shared the Osaka Blue Ocean Vision, which aims to reduce additional pollution by marine plastic litter to zero by 2050 and has now been shared by 87 countries and regions as of December 2021. In order to achieve the Vision, Japan announced that it would support capacity-building infrastructure development for waste management in developing countries, and launched the MARINE Initiative, which focuses on the Management of wastes, Recovery of marine litter, Innovation, and Empowerment, to encourage effective marine plastic litter measures worldwide.²¹ Since 2015, JICA has initiated many projects regarding solid waste management (SWM) in developing countries. Thirty of them receive technical assistance (approx. JPY 8.2 billion), and five are supported by grants (approx. JPY 5.6 billion). One of the projects is called J-PRISM (Japanese Technical Cooperation Project for Promotion of Regional Initiative on SWM) and aims to strengthen the capacity of central and local governments for SWM in nine Pacific Island countries.²² Finally, the Ministry of the Environment (MOEJ) promotes cooperation with East Asian countries by developing marine-litter monitoring manuals for the respective countries and annually organising technical training programmes on monitoring methodologies for marine litter.²³

In April 2018, the **UK’s** Prime Minister announced a GBP 61.4 million package of support to tackle marine plastic pollution, of which at least GBP 20.5 million were delivered in the current reporting period 2019–2021. Further, the UK has initiated 18 programmes or projects mainly across Africa, Asia and the Pacific addressing marine litter and plastic recycling since 2015. In the 2019–2021 period, 14 of these have completed their delivery and were closed. These include research programmes and implementation of pilot projects (GBP 7.5 million).

Through public-private partnerships with Unilever and the mobile industry association (GSMA), the UK supports developing innovative business models that encourage plastics reduction, reuse, recycling and reintegration into a circular supply chain. This includes an investment in Côte D'Ivoire (Coliba) that provides mobile credit to consumers in return for recycling plastic waste. Moreover, GBP 15.8 million supported technical assistance and partnership programmes like the GPAP. Other examples of UK support to tackle marine plastic pollution include:

- the Kampala Plastics Recycling Partnership, delivered by GIZ, which brought together private companies, national and local government bodies and other stakeholders to increase collaboration and improve plastic waste management in Greater Kampala
- Tearfund, working with communities on waste collection in Haiti (GBP 1 million) as well as in Pakistan (GBP 2 million)
- WasteAid (GBP 80 thousand) prevents plastics from reaching the ocean in Cameroon
- the Marine Plastics Research and Innovation Framework (GBP 20.8 million)

From 2016 to 2021, the **US**'s funds contributing to marine-litter-related activities amounted to USD 109 million, with a notable increase from 2019 to 2021 on – USD 94 million were spent in that last reporting period alone (USD 7 million in 2019, USD 12 million in 2020 and USD 75 million in 2021).

At the 2019 Our Ocean conference, the US further announced new commitments at USD 1.21 billion over the next decade to promote sustainable fisheries; combat marine debris; and support marine science, observation and exploration. The US government, through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), implemented three major projects in developing countries to address marine litter:

- Municipal Waste Recycling Program (2016–2021) – USAID's first programme to combat ocean-plastic pollution worked primarily through small grants to reduce land-based sources of plastic pollution in four Asian countries: Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.
- Clean Cities, Blue Ocean (2019–2024) – USAID's global flagship programme to combat ocean-plastic pollution works across seven countries and more than 25 cities in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Circulate Capital Partnership (2019-2028) – A blended-finance partnership with the impact investor Circulate Capital to catalyse investments in the recycling value chains in Asia.

Through these projects alone, over 55,000 metric tonnes (MT) of plastic waste were prevented from entering the ocean.

The **EU** finances many external projects that contribute to tackling marine litter directly or indirectly, from action on waste management and treatment of water to addressing pollution of rivers, sustainable fisheries, sustainable consumption and production, the circular economy and actions for the conservation of coastal and marine biodiversity. Our ongoing projects identifying marine waste as a strategic objective include, for instance, a EUR 9 million grant on “Reducing plastic waste and marine litter in East and South-East Asia – Supporting a transition to a circular economy in the region” in China, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, under the EU's Partnership Instrument. The main objective is to support the international aspects of the EU's 2018 Plastic Strategy in East and South-East Asia, thereby contributing to strengthening EU cooperation with countries in the region in the areas of the circular economy, plastic-waste and marine-litter reduction. It mainly focuses on the transition to sustainable consumption and

production of plastic. Further financing in this region is forecast in the Philippines Multiannual Indicative Programme for 2021–2027, and other examples of actions include recent projects in the Mediterranean and Black Sea Regions. In the Western Balkans, the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) supports capacity-building on aligning with waste and water acquis and a

forthcoming regional agreement on marine litter. In addition, the Clean Oceans Initiative (COI) by several key European Development Financial Institutions might become an important vehicle to enhance European investments in relation to the key themes of plastic-waste management and marine litter.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	1. Number of projects in developing countries to address marine litter initiated by G7 countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Self-reporting • [UN]GPML (Global Partnership on Marine Litter) • relevant Regional Sea Conventions (RSC) and Regional Sea Programmes • UN Environment Assembly as appropriate
	2. Funding support by G7 countries for marine-litter-related activities as part of international development assistance and investments, including pilot projects	

Commitment 47

Fossil fuel

“We will phase out new direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy as soon as possible, with limited exceptions consistent with an ambitious climate neutrality pathway, the Paris Agreement, 1.5°C goal and best available science (...) We commit now to an end to new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021, including through Official Development Assistance, export finance, investment, and financial and trade promotion support (...) we reaffirm our existing commitment to eliminating inefficient fossil fuels subsidies by 2025.”

Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, paras. 38–39

SDGs:



Score:



New commitment, no score

Fossil fuel energy has far-reaching negative climatic, environmental and health impacts. Since the energy sector is currently responsible for 80% of anthropogenic CO₂ emissions, a rapid reduction of the use of fossil fuels is essential for climate mitigation.²⁴ However, governments still support carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy. In 2021, global fossil fuel subsidies amounted to USD 440 billion.²⁵ In addition, electricity generated from coal power reached a new record high in 2021, increasing by 9%.²⁶

The G7 committed in Carbis Bay in 2021 to phase out new direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy as soon as possible (with limited, Paris-aligned exceptions). To follow up on this commitment, the G7 monitors whether all relevant aid and export credit planning and programming includes references to phasing out new direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy as well as

references to ending new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021. Further, the G7 monitors the value of its ODA and export credit support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy and for unabated international thermal coal power generation.

References to phasing out direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy in aid and export-credit planning and programming

Most G7 members have included references to phasing out direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy in aid and export-credit planning and programming.

Canada's “Energy Transition Priorities at Multilateral Development Bank” policy guidance document states that Canada takes a case-by-case approach to projects involving fossil fuels, but opposes the

use of multilateral development bank (MDB) funding for upstream oil and gas development.²⁷ Canada has committed to end new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022, except in limited and clearly defined circumstances, by signing the COP26 “Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition”.²⁸ Under Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, Environment and Climate Action is one of six priorities with a focus on increasing investment and business opportunities as well as enhancing livelihoods, including for women and vulnerable people, in low-carbon, clean-growth sectors. However, there is no reference to phasing out new direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy. Such references also are not included in Global Affairs Canada’s Environmental Integration Process, which is the main tool used to assess and integrate the department’s environmental policy and legal requirement into aid programming.

The **French** policy regarding export-credit support for the fossil fuel energy sector is the following:

- end of official export credit for all coal-related projects;
- end of official export credit for all exploration production of oil and gas projects using fracking, routine flaring or any other unconventional method;
- end of official export credit for all exploration production of oil projects in 2025 and gas projects in 2035;
- end of official export credit for thermal power plant projects that do not improve the carbon intensity of the electric mix of the recipient country.²⁹ In 2022 France will reassess its trajectory in accordance with the commitment made by the Minister of the Economy, Finance and Recovery.

At COP26 France signed the “Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition”, thus committing to ending internation-

al direct public support to the unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022. For France, this declaration covers both bilateral official development assistance and export finance. Regarding ODA, France was among the OECD DAC members to commit to limiting ODA investments in fossil fuels to cases where there are no economically or technically feasible clean energy alternatives (OECD DAC Declaration on a new approach to align development co-operation with the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change). The conclusions of the mid-term review of the Energy Transition Strategy of the AFD Group (2019–2022) reinforced the Agency’s commitment to no longer financing the construction, expansion or renovation of electricity or heat production plants powered by fossil fuels, except in limited, defined exceptions.

Germany has made reference in its 2021 “Development Policy Report”³⁰ as well as in the 2021 strategy paper on Climate and Energy of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development³¹ to its commitment to ending international financing of fossil fuels. Furthermore, Germany has committed to ending new direct public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector by the end of 2022, except in limited and clearly defined circumstances that are consistent with a 1.5 °C warming limit and the goals of the Paris Agreement, by signing the COP26 “Statement on International Public Support for the Clean Energy Transition”.³² To date, the German government has not issued a federal resolution that includes the phasing out of direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy in general in aid planning and programming, but is assessing projects on a case-by-case basis to deliver on its international commitments.

Since 31 March 2021, the **UK** no longer provides any new direct financial or promotional support for the fossil fuel energy sector overseas, other than in very limited circumstances, and is aligning its support to enable clean energy exports. The scope

covers the extraction, production, transportation, refining and marketing of crude oil, natural gas and thermal coal, as well as fossil-fuel-fired power plants. The policy³³ applies to any new Official Development Assistance (ODA), investment, financial and trade promotion activity overseas, including support provided by UK Export Finance (UKEF). FCDO's Programme Operating Framework (PrOF), which guides the design and delivery of aid programming, provides that all new projects must be aligned with the Paris Agreement (Rule 5).³⁴

It also references the UK's overseas fossil fuel support policy. References to ending support for fossil fuels are also included in the "UK Export Finance's Climate Change Strategy 2021 to 2024", Strategic Pillar 2.³⁵ Limited exceptions to the UK fossil fuel support policy are clearly defined in the guidance document "Aligning UK international support for the clean energy transition".³⁶

The **EU** internationally promotes the rapid phase-out of the most polluting and carbon-intensive energy sources and advances further reductions in methane emissions across the globe. This commitment is reflected in the legislation setting out programming rules for EU external action. Indeed, "Promoting the phasing-out of environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies" is listed as one of the main objectives for the cooperation in the field of environment and climate change, in the EU Regulation establishing the "Global Europe: Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument" (NDICI).³⁷ Additionally, the NDICI Regulation stipulates that the instrument shall not finance actions that promote investments in fossil fuels, such as the exploration or production of hydrocarbons. Exceptions are considered only when "these activities are strictly necessary to achieve the objectives of the Instrument and when they are accompanied with appropriate measures to avoid, prevent or reduce and, if possible, off-set these effects, including support to phase out environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies".³⁸

References to ending new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021 in aid and export credit planning and programming

References to ending new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation have in recent years been included in many aid and export-credit planning and programming documents of G7 members.

Canada's "Energy Transition Priorities at Multilateral Development Banks" policy document states that Canada will oppose unabated coal-fired electricity generation projects and projects that would sustain or extend the use of existing coal power systems. However, there is no reference to phasing out new direct government support for international thermal coal power generation in Global Affairs Canada's Environmental Integration Process.

France enshrined the end of official export credit for all coal exploration production and power generation projects (not only unabated) in its law on 30 December 2019.³⁹

Germany has committed to ending new direct government support for unabated international coal-fired power generation by supporting the COP26 "Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement".⁴⁰ However, the German government has not yet issued a federal resolution that includes the phasing out of unabated international thermal coal power generation in aid planning and programming. As of November 2021, the arrangement excludes officially supported export credits for coal-fired power plants. The German Export Credit Guarantee Scheme has supported no exports for coal-fired power generation since 2019.

Japan published "The Sixth Strategic Energy Plan" in October 2021 and amended the "Infrastructure System Overseas Promotion Strategy 2025" in June 2021, which stipulate that the government will end

new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021, including through Official Development Assistance, export finance, investment, and financial and trade promotion support, based on the G7 Summit communiqué in Cornwall in June 2021.

In January 2020, the **UK** government announced that it would no longer provide any new direct Official Development Assistance, investment, export credit or trade promotion support for thermal coal mining and coal power plants overseas.⁴¹ Unabated international thermal coal power generation is included in all fossil fuel policy documents as outlined with respect to Indicator 1 above.

The **EU** supports partner countries outside the EU in their efforts to embark on the pathway to phase out coal and become climate neutral. Investments in fossil fuels that comprise unabated coal are excluded from the scope of activities that can be financed by the NDICI.

Since final ODA data for 2021 and beyond are not yet available, this report does not monitor Indicators 3 and 4 of this commitment.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
	1. References to phasing out new direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy* are included in all relevant aid and export-credit planning and programming. Where there are limited exceptions consistent with an ambitious climate neutrality pathway, the Paris Agreement, the 1.5 °C goal and best available science, these are clearly defined.	Self-reporting by G7 governments
	2. References to ending new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021 are included in all relevant aid and export credit planning and programming.	Self-reporting by G7 governments
2021	3. Value of ODA and export credit support provided by G7 countries for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy.	G7 governments will be required to submit reports based on OECD DAC data on ODA expenditure by country, DAC Purpose Codes 233 (energy generation, non-renewable sources) and 234 (hybrid energy).
	4. Value of ODA and export credit support provided by G7 countries for unabated international thermal coal power generation.	G7 governments will be required to submit reports based on the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, plus sector-specific annexes including the Coal-Fired Sector Understanding.

Commitment 48

Climate finance

“We commit to each increase and improve our overall international public climate finance contributions for this period ... (through to 2025)”

“[this] includes more finance contributing to adaptation and resilience, disaster risk and insurance...”

“(...) the G7 commits to leverage different types of blended finance vehicles including through our greater strategic approach to development finance, greater collaboration between our DFIs and billions worth of planned commitments towards CIF and Green Climate Fund, all of which will mobilise billions more in private finance. We commit to establishing the necessary market infrastructure for private finance to support and incentivise the net zero transition. (...)”

“we will develop gender-responsive approaches to climate and nature financing, investment and policies, so that women and girls can participate fully in the future green economy.”

Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, paras. 40 & 41

SDGs:



Score:



New commitment, no score

Climate finance enables activities that are aimed at climate mitigation or adaptation. In light of the tremendous challenges associated with the necessary reduction of emission levels and the adaptation to the already unavoidable impacts of climate change, the important role of climate finance is widely acknowledged. In 2009, developed-country parties committed in the context of COP15 in Copenhagen to the goal of jointly mobilising USD 100 billion per year by 2020 for climate finance. This goal was reaffirmed at COP21 in Paris in 2015 and extended to 2025. According to the latest data, in 2019, climate finance provided

and mobilised by developed countries reached USD 79.6 billion and is unlikely to have reached the USD 100 billion goal by 2020.⁴²

In this context, the G7 committed in Carbis Bay in 2021 to increasing and improving international public climate finance and to increasing financial contributions to improve adaptation and resilience, disaster risk and insurance. To this end, the G7 decided to leverage different types of blended finance vehicles while also developing gender-responsive approaches to climate and nature financing, investment and policies. To follow up

on this commitment, the G7 monitors the amount of additional climate finance provided by each G7 member through to 2025; the amount of additional finance provided by G7 members that contributes to adaptation and resilience, including disaster risk and insurance; the volume of additional investment by the private sector that is mobilised as a result of G7 support for climate change purposes by 2025; and the proportion of bilateral international climate finance provided by each G7 member that also targets gender equality.

Amount of additional climate finance provided by each G7 member through to 2025

G7 members individually have made several commitments on climate finance through to 2025.

In June 2021, **Canada's** Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced a doubling of Canada's climate finance, from CAD 2.65 billion (2015–2021) to CAD 5.3 billion (2021–2026), including increased support for adaptation, as well as nature and nature-based solutions that are in line with the G7 Nature Compact.⁴³

France has committed to providing EUR 6 billion of climate finance per year from 2021 through to 2025 for climate action in developing countries. A third of this amount is to be dedicated to adaptation.

At the G7 summit in June 2021, Chancellor Merkel announced that **Germany** plans to increase its annual climate finance from budgetary sources from EUR 4 billion to EUR 6 billion at the latest by 2025. Italy has committed USD 1.4 billion each year for 5 years in international climate finance directed to developing countries. **Italy** has also created a new 'climate fund' that is being operationalised in the next few months.

In November 2021, at the COP26 World Leaders Summit, **Japan** announced the provision of up to USD 10 billion in additional climate finance, both

public and private, in the coming five years, from 2021 to 2025.⁴⁴ This commitment is in addition to the previous commitment of climate finance, both public and private, totalling JPY 6.5 trillion yen in the same period.

The **UK** has committed to providing GBP 11.6 billion in international climate finance over 2021/22 to 2025/26, with an additional GBP 1 billion in 2025 if the economy grows as forecast.⁴⁵ This additional GBP 1 billion is conditional on the UK economy's meeting the necessary conditions to return to spending 0.7% of its GDP as ODA.

The **US** announced at the UN General Assembly in 2021 that President Biden intended to work with Congress to scale up US international public climate finance to over USD 11 billion per year by 2024. This announcement builds on the U.S. International Climate Finance Plan, which sets out the US government's strategic vision of international climate finance through to 2025.

Thanks to the **EU's** Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF), levels of climate finance of the EU over the next seven years are expected to exceed EUR 28 billion. A key channel for the EU to support climate action in developing countries is the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI – Global Europe). The NDICI has an overall EUR 79.5 billion budget allocation for the 2021–2027 period, of which 35% is to be made available to developing countries to pursue climate action. Climate finance provided and mobilised by the European Investment Bank and the EU's 27 Member States will come on top of the EU's own funding.

Amount of additional finance provided by G7 members that contributes to adaptation and resilience including disaster risk and insurance.

The division of climate finance between mitigation and adaptation measures differs among G7 members.

Canada will dedicate 40% – or CAD 2.12 billion – of its total contribution of CAD 5.3 billion to climate finance in 2021-2026 for climate adaptation projects. In addition, a minimum of 20% – or CAD 1.06 billion – will be dedicated to nature-based climate solution projects with biodiversity co-benefits. At COP26, Canada announced up to CAD 57.5 million for three targeted initiatives dedicated to building resilience in developing countries:

- up to CAD 37.5 million for the Least Developed Countries Fund
- up to CAD 10 million for the Adaptation Fund
- up to CAD 10 million for the National Adaptation Plan Global Network

France has dedicated a third of its annual EUR 6 billion climate finance commitment from 2021 through to 2025 to climate adaptation.

Germany aims to strike a balance between providing mitigation and adaptation finance. In the past, mitigation finance made up about 60% and adaptation finance about 40% of climate finance from budgetary sources. At COP26, Germany announced an additional EUR 150 million for climate-change adaptation, supporting the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF). Furthermore, Germany supports flagship initiatives such as the InsuResilience Global Partnership and the Global Risk Financing Facility (GRiF).

In November 2021, at the COP26 World Leaders Summit, **Japan** announced it would be doubling its assistance for adaptation, from its level of 2019, to approximately USD 14.8 billion.⁴⁶

The **UK** is committed to maintaining a balanced split between mitigation and adaptation spend in its climate-finance commitment. At COP26, the UK announced a range of ambitious new adaptation funding commitments, including GBP 274 million to the Climate Action for a Resilient Asia Programme,

GBP 15 million to the Adaptation Fund, almost GBP 50 million to help small island states develop resilient infrastructure and support capacity-building, and GBP 143.5 million to support adaptation in Africa.⁴⁷

The **US** announced, at the 26th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC, the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE) to support developing countries and communities in vulnerable situations around the world in their efforts to adapt to and manage the impacts of climate change. The President will work with Congress to provide USD 3 billion in adaptation finance annually for PREPARE by FY2024. It is the largest US commitment ever made to reduce climate impacts on those most vulnerable to climate change worldwide.

The **EU** expects that the distribution of its climate finance flows will be balanced between mitigation and adaptation in the next seven years, with a slight prevalence of adaptation over mitigation flows. At COP26 in November 2021, the European Commission pledged a EUR 100 million contribution to the Adaptation Fund.

Volume of additional investment by the private sector that is mobilised as a result of G7 support for climate-change purposes by 2025.

The G7 members have expressed their willingness to mobilise private investments as a result of their support for climate-change purposes. However, most members are not able to quantify the volume of additional private investment.

While **France** is actively supporting increasing investments by the private sector for climate change, no public commitment has been taken on this topic.

Germany uses public finance to leverage private climate finance, mainly in the form of revolving credit lines for local (development) banks,

investments in structured funds, and public-private partnerships (PPPs). In its international climate policy, Germany supports innovative projects that have great private-sector mobilisation potential, such as Green Bonds.⁴⁸

Japan has not specified, in its commitment, the exact volume of additional private investment mobilised by public climate finance; meanwhile, Japan will continue to make further efforts to scale up the mobilisation of private finance.

Mobilising Institutional Capital Through Listed Product Structures (MOBILIST), the **UK's** flagship programme to mobilise large-scale investment through publicly listed markets, received a GBP 66 million funding boost at COP26. The UK and US governments also announced their intention to work together to establish a new collaboration to mobilise private finance and to support developing countries in accessing capital markets in London and New York.

The **US**, in its International Climate Finance Plan, underscored the importance of mobilising private finance internationally to support climate action, including doing more with existing resources. The International Climate Finance Plan identifies a number of key actions to be undertaken on this issue, including increasing the Development Finance Corporation's climate-related investments so that beginning in FY2023, at least one-third of all its investments will be linked to addressing the climate crisis, exploring opportunities for the Multilateral Challenge Corporation to bring in new private-sector partners, and expanding the use of blended finance to catalyse private-sector finance aligned with climate objectives. In addition, the Export Import Bank of the United States will identify ways to significantly increase, as per its mandate, support for environmentally beneficial renewable-energy, energy-efficiency and energy-storage exports from the US.

The NDICI of the **EU** includes a new European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) under which financing capacity in the form of grants, technical assistance, financial instruments, budgetary guarantees and blending operations will be deployed across sub-Saharan Africa, the Neighbourhood and Enlargement countries, Asia and the Pacific, and the Americas and the Caribbean. Budgetary guarantees under EFSD+ will particularly contribute to increasing capital flows towards climate investments in both adaptation and mitigation, while leveraging private-sector investment in emerging and frontier markets.

Proportion of bilateral International Climate Finance provided by each G7 member that also targets gender equality

Some of the G7 members put a strong emphasis on gender equality targets in their climate finance.

Canada will ensure that at least 80% of climate finance projects integrate gender equality considerations.

While **France** is supportive of a more gender-responsive climate action. However, the climate finance commitment does not entail a specific objective regarding targeting gender equality.

Gender equality is of crucial importance for **Germany**, both in bilateral and in multilateral channels. Germany is an active proponent of gender equality in negotiations of multilateral environment and climate funds. For instance, Germany advanced this topic strategically in the context of the GEF-8 replenishment.

Japan has not committed a proportion of bilateral international climate finance that also targets gender equality. However, Japanese ODA is conducted in accordance with JICA Thematic Guidelines, including the guideline on Gender and Development.⁴⁹ This guideline instructs project

organisers to take into account gender perspective, including in mitigation and adaptation assistance.

The **UK** is committed to strengthening its provision of gender-responsive climate finance. The UK hosted a successful Gender Day at COP26 and announced GBP 165 million in funding to programmes that tackle climate change, while addressing the inequalities that make women and girls more vulnerable to climate change and empowering them to take climate action. This included GBP 45 million for the Community Resilience Partnership Programme (CRPP) to help

local communities and grassroots women’s groups adapt to climate change while challenging gender inequalities in Asia and the Pacific. It also includes GBP 120 million for the Bangladesh Climate and Environment programme, which will tackle climate mitigation and adaptation, biodiversity loss, and waste management and pollution control while also supporting women’s leadership and their access to finance, education and skills.

The **US** is supportive of a gender-responsive approach to climate action, including in the context of climate finance.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2021	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Amount of additional climate finance provided by each G7 member through to 2025. 2. Amount of additional finance provided by G7 members that contributes to adaptation and resilience including disaster risk and insurance. 3. Volume of additional investment by the private sector that is mobilised as a result of G7 support for climate change purposes by 2025. 4. Proportion of bilateral International Climate Finance provided by each G7 member that also targets gender equality (Scores 1 or 2 against the OECD DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker) 	<p>1, 2, & 4:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public commitments (self-reporting) • UNFCCC 5th Biennial Reports • first biennial transparency reports (BTR1) • Article 9.5 submissions of the Paris Agreement • OECD assessment of USD 100 billion goal in progress reports <p>3:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Above sources + OECD DAC Private Sector Mobilisation Methodology



Case study: Canada

Canada's leadership in mobilising finance for climate mitigation and adaptation



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Canada recognizes the critical role that private finance plays in meeting international climate goals. By working with multilateral development banks and bilateral partners, Canada actively leverages its international climate finance to increase private-sector investments for climate action in developing countries.

Through the establishment of the International Finance Corporation-Canada Climate Change Program (IFC-CCCP) in 2011, Canada was the first bilateral partner to support the IFC's blended finance investments for climate change projects. As of December 2021, Canada's USD 214.8 million contribution in concessional funds, combined with the IFC's USD 476.8 million in funds on commercial terms under the IFC-CCCP, have helped mobilise USD 390.8 million in private finance as well as USD 370.5 million in additional funding from MDBs and other donors for climate change projects in developing countries.

Part of IFC-CCCP programming includes support for the "Scaling Solar Zambia (Phase I & II)" initiative, which has facilitated the lowest solar tariffs in the region from reputable multinational energy companies. The IFC-CCCP contributed a total of USD 25 million to the initiative through senior debt, which is directly attributable to mobilising USD 23 million in private finance. Canada's concessional funding, and the meaningful participation of the Zambian government and multilateral institutions, helped create favourable market conditions to mobilise private-sector investments. As 90% of Zambia's electricity comes from hydropower

plants in the Zambezi river basin, "Scaling Solar Zambia" has been critical for delivering low-cost renewable power to 27,000 Zambian households. This is helping the country cope with prolonged droughts that have been threatening the livelihoods of millions. The initiative also provided partners with a set of best practices for future projects, including by building domestic capacity in procuring and operating large-scale solar projects aligned with national development goals.

Canada's successful partnership with the IFC has since grown to include two additional programmes: the Canada-IFC Blended Finance Program and the Canada-IFC Renewable Energy Program for Africa. Both programmes aim to mobilise private capital for global climate action, while also ensuring that Canadian investments advance gender equality, in line with Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy.

Canada continues to be committed to international climate goals, including the joint mobilisation of USD 100 billion per year through to 2025 from a variety of sources to support climate action in developing countries. In 2021, Canada doubled its climate finance commitment to CAD 5.3 billion over five years (2021–2026). Going forward, Canada will leverage this commitment to further increase and improve the effectiveness of private finance mobilised in line with the collective actions by developed countries outlined in the *Climate Finance Delivery Plan*.

More information on Canada's international climate finance is available [online](#).

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10. Human mobility

Migration and forced displacement are complex topics. Nevertheless, well-managed migration can have positive effects on sustainable and inclusive economic development for both host and origin countries. According to the UN, in 2020, 281 million people lived in a country other than their countries of birth, accounting for 3.6% of the global population.¹

Forced displacement is the tragic side of human mobility. In the past years, violent conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Ukraine, Syria, Yemen and South Sudan, displaced millions of people. Moreover, weather-related disasters increased internal displacement and are expected to further increase displacement in the near future due to climate change and other environmentally induced pressures. Overall, there were 26.4 million international refugees,² and 55 million people were internally displaced in 2020.³

Even though the COVID-19 pandemic slowed down migration in all forms, it highlighted the vulnerable situation of refugees and migrants, for

instance, as travel restrictions resulted in millions of people being unable to travel to their homes. Remittances, which assume a crucial role in poverty reduction, declined by 2.4% in 2020. Before that, global digitalisation trends had contributed to the importance of remittances, as such technologies provided more opportunities for sending money back to migrants' families and relatives. Compared to the start of the century, the global flow of remittances has increased by USD 574 billion per year, amounting to USD 702 billion in 2020.

The G7 identified human mobility as a core topic and aimed to support the needs of migrants and refugees as well as addressing the drivers of forced displacement and irregular migration. The monitoring on two commitments in this chapter assesses the G7's achievements in providing bilateral and multilateral development and humanitarian assistance to help countries address the drivers of migration within their own borders, among other indicators.

Commitment 49

Migration and refugees

“We commit to increase global assistance to meet immediate and longer-term needs of refugees and other displaced persons as well as their host communities, via humanitarian, financial, and development assistance, cooperation ... (We recognise ... migration management, and) ... we commit to strengthen our development cooperation with our partner countries, with special attention to African, Middle East and neighbouring countries of origin and transit.”

Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p. 18

SDGs:



Score:



Satisfactory

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2020 about 281 million people (or 3.6% of the world's population) lived in a country other than their countries of birth.⁴ UNHCR estimates that over 84 million people were forcibly displaced from their homes in 2021. 35 million of these refugees are children, and up to 390,000 children are born as refugees every year. Moreover, 55 million people were internally displaced in 2020.⁵ The main burden of care lies on the shoulders of developing countries, which host 86% of all displaced people.⁶ The 2030 Agenda emphasises the need to empower migrants and refugees and provide them with opportunities to work and participate in societal life, thereby recognising their positive contributions to economic development.


To support refugees and other displaced persons as well as their host communities, the G7 committed to increasing global assistance to meet immediate and longer-term needs during the 2016

Ise-Shima Summit. The G7 monitors their achievements by reporting on their ODA provided to developing countries for purposes related to migration and forced displacement, and their relevant support to multilateral development organisations. Moreover, the G7 monitors assistance and funding for Africa, the Middle East and neighbouring countries of origin and transit.

G7 bilateral and multilateral development assistance and humanitarian assistance

The G7 ODA investment towards humanitarian assistance increased between 2015 and 2020, from USD 11.3 billion to USD 15.3 billion (Figure 36). While the spending on relief coordination and support services increased by USD 3.1 billion, the expenditure on material relief assistance and services decreased slightly by USD 0.3 billion. The contributions dedicated to African and Middle Eastern countries decreased by 6.6% and 4.3%, respectively.

Figure 36: G7 ODA support to humanitarian assistance efforts in million USD



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS (Purpose Codes 72040, 72010, 72050)

Table 21 summarises the funding G7 partners provided to multilateral organisations from 2015 to 2020 to support refugees and migrants as well as host communities in hot spots around the world. **Canada** provides a mix of un-earmarked and softly earmarked funding to support the work of key humanitarian partners, including UNHCR, WFP and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)⁴. Of Global Affairs Canada’s total support of CAD 26.37 million to IOM, CAD 13.55 million were provided to support IOM’s humanitarian operations in 2020, reaching over 37 million beneficiaries. Additionally, Canada provided CAD 91.9 million to UNHCR’s operations worldwide in 2020, including UNHCR’s COVID-19 appeal and its Syria and Iraq responses. **France** has supported IOM’s work through the Disaster Displacement Platform, the UN Migration Network and dedicated projects such as the Central Mediterranean Route. **Germany’s** development assistance for tackling the root causes of displacement and supporting refugees,

IDPs and host communities increased from EUR 2.5 billion in 2015 to EUR 5.5 billion in 2020. In the same year, Germany spent a total of EUR 2.1 billion on humanitarian assistance. **Japan** provided services in the areas of shelter, food and nutrition, health care, water and sanitation, education and livelihood support in cooperation with partners such as UNHCR, UNRWA, IOM, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), providing approximately USD 1.22 billion between 2019 and 2020. The **UK** supported several international organisations providing support for refugees and internally displaced persons, focusing on providing opportunities for sustainable jobs, livelihoods, education and access to other essential services. The **US** advocated for coordination with development actors, such as the World Bank, to include refugees and stateless people in development programming to improve their resilience, self-reliance and well-being.

Table 21: G7 funding provided to international organisations in million (2020)⁷

	Japan	Germany	UK	France	US	EU	Italy	Canada
UNHCR	USD 126.3	USD 446.9	USD 96.0	USD 45.9	USD 1,612.0	EUR 93.6	EUR 25.9	CAD 91.9
UNRWA	USD 33.1	EUR 99.2	USD 51.0	USD 23.0	USD 425.0	EUR 3.6	EUR 15.6	USD 24.1
IOM	USD 51.3	EUR 40.1	USD 62.5	USD 13.7	USD 2,556.0	EUR 88.5	EUR 17.1	USD 40.0
WFP	USD 196.1	EUR 1,056.0	USD 484.0	USD 31.3	USD 340	EUR 150.4	EUR 36.8	
UNICEF	USD 217.0	EUR 647.0	USD 460.7	USD 39.1		EUR 83.9	EUR 16.6	
ICRC	USD 26.0	EUR 246.8	USD 167.7	EUR 32.2		EUR 89.3	EUR 18.7	
IFRC	USD 26.4		USD 9.1			EUR 342.8	EUR 7.0	
OCHA	USD 5.7	EUR 340.0				EUR 9.3	EUR 11.8	

G7 development assistance and funding to countries of origin and transit

The following section reports on G7 development programming to create opportunities in refugees' and forced displaced persons' home countries as well as protection during their trajectory, among other things by supporting host and home countries.

France implemented several projects in Africa and the Middle East. For instance, one project aimed to support civil-society organisations in Guinea, where weak economic prospects result in migration to other countries, particularly affecting young people. Migration from Guinea to France has been steadily increasing in recent years. The project's objectives include providing Guinean youth with opportunities in their home country, as well as facilitating their socio-economic integration when they move to France. Another initiative supported education for vulnerable children in Iraqi Kurdistan. Between 2017 and 2020, it enabled the rehabilitation of 10 schools, as well as creating ten parent

associations and training 156 teachers in providing psychological support and preventing school dropouts.

Through its Special Initiative on displacement, **Germany** allocated EUR 433.7 million to development projects in the Middle East, about EUR 99.3 million for projects in Africa and EUR 5 million to activities in the Northern Africa Region in 2020. The Special Initiative also provided funds for other regions affected by displacement, including Asia and Latin America. In total, EUR 3.1 billion were provided between 2014 and the end of 2020; roughly 15.5 million people benefited from projects implemented with these funds.

Italy assisted refugees and internally displaced persons in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries as well as in the Sahel region and sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, some activities were implemented to assist people displaced in Venezuela and neighbouring countries.

In Africa, **Japan** contributed to peace and stability under the New Approach for Peace and Stability presented at the Seventh Tokyo International Conference on African Development in 2019. The approach addresses the root causes that hamper peace and stability while respecting host countries' autonomy in conflict resolution.⁸ Additionally, Japan provided humanitarian assistance by offering health support and other relief items totalling USD 18.0 million in 2021 for people affected by the military engagement in Northern Ethiopia.^{9,10} Japan announced an additional contribution of about USD 200 million at the fifth conference on "Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region" in 2021. Additionally, Japan provided emergency assistance of USD 65 million to Afghanistan and neighbouring countries for the growing humanitarian needs in 2021.

With a total volume of GBP 210 million, the **UK's** Building Resilience and an Effective Emergency Refugee Response (BRAER) programme supported refugees and their host communities in Uganda. The programme aimed to save lives by providing for immediate needs, including food assistance. In addition, BRAER strengthened resilience and self-reliance and enhanced learning and accountability through beneficiary engagement.¹¹ In Kenya, the UK's bilateral support to the refugee operation amounted to GBP 14 million per year between 2016 and 2020. The UK is stepping up its assistance through the World Bank for increased refugee and host community self-reliance, including support to businesses to create jobs and expand market opportunities.¹² In Lebanon, the UK has provided GBP 732 million to support refugees and the Lebanese communities that host them since 2011. The funding helped WFP provide monthly support to 20,000 Syrian families, allowing them to meet basic needs.¹³

In 2020, the **US** Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration began supporting an NGO partner to promote opportunities around the globe for refugees to become self-reliant and achieve a better quality of life, contributing to resilience. The partner identifies effective programming for self-reliance and develops self-reliance measurement tools.

Launched in 2015 and in its fifth year of implementation, the **EU** Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa) continued to address urgent needs to ensure long-term stability and sustainable development for migrants and forcibly displaced persons, as well as affected communities. It has supported partner countries' efforts to provide alternatives to irregular migration by improving access to basic services and boosting employment opportunities, in particular for young people. It has also worked along cross-border areas to stem conflict and bolster economic development and has contributed to pioneering the Global Compact on Refugees, reinforcing the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. Resources allocated to EUTF Africa amount to approximately EUR 5 billion. The EU regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis (EUTF Syria) provided a coherent and integrated EU response to an unprecedented refugee crisis via large-scale and flexible projects in different development sectors in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. In 2021, the European Council agreed to continue supporting Syrian and other refugees and their host communities, setting out a four-year package that will amount to over EUR 5.7 billion. Over EUR 3.5 billion will be provided to refugees in Turkey and EUR 2.2 billion to support displaced people in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2015	<p>1. G7 bilateral and multilateral development assistance and humanitarian assistance including for material relief assistance and services; emergency food aid; relief and coordination, protection and support services benefiting affected populations, including refugees, IDPs, migrants, and host communities, primarily in developing countries, in situation of large-scale migration movements and protracted displacement.</p> <hr/> <p>2. G7 development assistance and funding to African, Middle East and neighbouring countries of origin and transit.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OCHA/FTS data • UNHCR, UNRWA, IOM, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC/IFRC data • OECD DAC CRS • Self-reporting

Commitment 50

Drivers of migration

“We agree to establish partnerships to help countries create the conditions within their own borders that address the drivers of migration, as this is the best long-term solution to these challenges ... we will safeguard the value of the positive aspects of a safe, orderly and regular migration.”

Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 25

SDGs:



Score:



Good

The drivers of migration are multifaceted, comprising demographic, economic, environmental, human development, individual, politico-institutional, security, socio-cultural and supranational factors.¹⁴ Those factors relate not only to migration but also to forced displacement. Addressing forced displacement and irregular migration helps alleviate structural conditions detrimental to people's safety, well-being, and economic prospects. At the same time, safe, orderly and regular migration can enhance the development of countries of destination and origin alike and be beneficial for the migrants themselves. Addressing the drivers of migration therefore aims to improve the livelihood conditions in countries of origin and to mitigate forced displacement and irregular migration, whilst at the same time taking advantage of the opportunities that arise from the link between safe, orderly and regular migration and development.

During the 2017 Taormina Summit, the G7 leaders committed to supporting countries by addressing such drivers of migration. In particular, the members aimed to address the root causes of displacement

and irregular migration within the countries of origin and to strengthen migrant and diaspora communities within their borders and abroad. Therefore, all G7 partners started implementing projects and initiatives aiming to support migrants and diaspora communities. The achievement of the commitment is measured through initiatives that address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration in the countries of origin and efforts that aim to improve diaspora engagement.

G7 initiatives to address drivers of migration abroad

Canada supported the project *Creating Opportunities and Preventing Migration of Adolescent Unaccompanied Migration from Honduras* between 2018 and 2020, which Save the Children Canada implemented. The project helped 145 at-risk adolescents between the ages of 15 and 19 (96 women), providing them with career counselling, guidance on employment opportunities, and individual psychosocial support. As a result, the project increased the feeling of safety among boys and girls at school by 37.0 %-points and 19.2 %-points,

respectively. In addition, the implementers put a strong emphasis on gender sensitivity, resulting in the training of 56 government officials and members of community child protection committees and the integration of seven policies at the national and regional level. From 2017 to 2021, the project Preventing Irregular Child and Youth Migration in Central America implemented by Children Believe Canada trained 7,614 young women and men from Middle America on civic participation and leadership.¹⁵ Furthermore, the initiative connected 962 youths from these regions with internships, apprenticeships, jobs and capital. The project also provided training on designing and implementing integrated gender-responsive child protection programmes and policies for 1,095 staff from social services and child protection institutions.

France puts a strong emphasis on the root causes of irregular migration, including conflict and persecution, failures of governance and lack of economic perspectives. A number of development projects targeted youth, giving them educational and economic opportunities within their own countries. For instance, one project aimed to strengthen the educational system and the economic insertion of young people in Côte d'Ivoire. The third phase of the project started in 2018 and ended in 2022. Its objectives included building 58 secondary schools in peri-urban areas, training teachers, and investing in dormitories. Another project promotes sustainable development in two rural, emigration-prone regions of Morocco, aiming to create an economic system that adapts to climate change in the region between 2018 and 2021. The French government supported the implementation of efficient local governance structures and skill transfer between regions. In Lebanon, a development initiative supported professional skill-building through economic insertion and microbusinesses between 2021 and 2023

In 2020, **Germany** invested EUR 9.9 billion to address the root causes of displacement and irregular migration, increasing its annual spending by EUR 2.8 billion compared to 2017. Germany's comprehensive approach to migration and displacement, which combines development assistance, support to refugees, stabilisation of host regions, and return and reintegration programmes, is interlinked with the EU's approach to addressing the adverse drivers of migration. Until December 2021, Germany also contributed to the instrument of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa as set out in the Valetta Action Plan framework. In total, Germany contributed EUR 228.5 million to the EU Emergency Trust Fund and an additional EUR 70.7 million for individual projects under German leadership. These aimed to create new jobs by initiating economic programmes, increasing food security through resilience building, improving migration management in partner countries, and advancing governance structures in origin or transit countries. In addition, the German government has donated EUR 12.3 million to the UN's Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund since its inception in 2019. The trust fund aims to support countries in implementing their commitments to safe, orderly and regular migration under the UN Global Compact for Migration.

Italy's actions to address drivers of migration focus on countries from the sub-Saharan Africa region. The primary financial tool is the Fund for Africa, which the Italian government has supported with EUR 22.5 million since 2016. In particular, Italy financed regional programmes to promote safe migration and create alternatives to youth irregular migration by fostering agency and employment in the communities of origin. For instance, OIM implemented one regional programme in the Gambia, Guinea-Conakry and Guinea-Bissau. Another programme offered internships to youth in Italy to facilitate job placement in countries of origin and focused on Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. On the other hand, Italy's efforts aimed to

strengthen access to information in order to raise awareness and achieve better knowledge and understanding in the region. The Italian government supported two programmes implemented by OIM in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, the Gambia, Nigeria and Sudan, and by UNESCO in Senegal, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Ghana and Mali.

Japan used a comprehensive approach to address drivers of migration and to support countries of origin and destination, enhancing its humanitarian assistance and development cooperation to tackle the root causes of forced displacement. For instance, the Japanese government provided self-reliance assistance to refugees and migrants, and supported host countries and communities through international organisations like the IOM and the UNHCR. In 2019 and 2020, Japan provided approximately USD 340 million to those agencies. Additionally, it promoted humanitarian assistance, including support for refugees, peace-building and nation-building assistance based on the humanitarian-development-peace nexus concept. This effort aimed to reinforce responses to fundamental causes of conflict, which is a root cause of migration.¹⁶

The **UK** sought opportunities for targeted assistance to partner countries to address factors such as lack of economic opportunities or insecurity, which can force people to move. The British government has donated GBP 3.7 million to the UN's Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration since its inception in 2019. The Fund, working through UN agencies, helps countries implement their commitments to safe and orderly migration under the UN Global Compact for Migration. Areas of support include data and evidence building for effective migration policy, identification and mitigation of the root causes of migration, and actions to tackle irregular migration and transnational crime. The Fund supported 12 projects around the world in 2022.

Additionally, the UK provided bilateral support, for example through the UK Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. The "Eastern Route" programme worked with the Government of Turkey to develop policies that enabled Turkey to manage migrants and refugees in line with domestic and international legal obligations. It also strengthened the protection given to the most vulnerable groups, especially women and girls.¹⁷

The **EU confirmed its continued commitment to addressing all aspects of migration and forced displacement, based on its** comprehensive and balanced Partnership approach to migration, in line with the European Consensus on Development and the Agenda 2030. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum proposed by the European Commission in 2020 reflected the same approach. This commitment also includes increased attention for addressing the root causes of irregular migration in a more targeted way. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa continued to foster stability as well as addressing migration and forced displacement challenges and opportunities, including their root causes, in close cooperation with African partners. Resources currently allocated to the EUTF amount to approximately EUR 5 billion, out of which EUR 2.9 billion go to resilience and improved migration management (last data available 31 December 2021). EU development assistance in Asia included a strategic focus targeting poverty and inclusive growth, thereby addressing the root causes of fragility and irregular migration. Furthermore, the EU External Investment Plan (EIP), the European Fund for Sustainable Development and its successor, the EFSD+, aim at improving economic and social development and creating jobs. For instance, the EFSD is expected to leverage EUR 47 billion in investments for sustainable development in Africa and the EU Neighbourhood, through an EU contribution of EUR 4.6 billion in guarantees and blending operations. These actions contribute to tackling some of the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. The new

development funding instrument for 2021–2027, NDICI-Global Europe, included increased attention for migration and forced displacement, including its root causes, with an indicative spending target of 10% of the overall instrument.

G7 enhancement of migrant and diaspora contributions to development

Between 2021 and 2022, **Canada** invested approximately CAD 918.6 million to support the settlement needs of newcomers, applying a gender-based analysis to ensure inclusive outcomes for newcomers and refugees.¹⁸ In 2018, Canada launched the *Immigration Matters* initiative to highlight the benefits of immigration in communities across Canada through storytelling and facts to promote positive engagement between Canadians and newcomers.¹⁹ As Co-Chair of the Global Forum on Migration and Development’s Working Group on Public Narratives on Migration, the Canadian government worked closely with partners to jointly lead the international *It Takes a Community* campaign, aiming to showcase the positive contributions migrants make to communities worldwide. The average cost of sending remittances from Canada fell from 8.3% in 2019 to 6.1% in 2021, putting Canada on track to meet the 2030 Agenda goal of reducing remittance transaction costs to 3% or less.²⁰ To better understand remittances and improve regulation of the remittances industry, a new research initiative in collaboration with the World Bank will observe global remittance flows from Canada between 2022 to 2024.

France highlighted the positive contributions of migrants and diaspora to the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, through its migration and development policy. Many of its policy initiatives and projects in the field of migration focused on this objective. The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs provided political, technical and financial support to development organisations owned by diaspora communities, creating a government-funded Forum that

united them. Another priority was to enable migrants in France to send remittances at a low cost to relatives in their country of origin. Through this initiative, the government aimed to incentivise beneficiaries to use their savings to promote their countries’ development. The DIASDEV project, which operates in many African countries, contributed to this objective by informing diaspora communities about different options on the remittances delivery market. It also improved the entry of new actors onto the market. The project started in 2021 and runs until 2024.²¹

The diaspora in **Germany** is a crucial partner for development cooperation. The Federal Government established a development policy dialogue with German migrant umbrella organisations in 2021. Moreover, the German government used the potential of diaspora engagement to drive social and economic development in selected partner countries, offering funding and advice for projects in the countries of origin. Additionally, Germany facilitated knowledge and skill transfer by supporting temporary assignments of diaspora professionals in partner country institutions. In addition, highly qualified experts received financial support to return to their countries of origin for work. The German Development Cooperation assisted diaspora entrepreneurs in founding start-ups, thereby contributing to innovation and economic development in countries of origin. The Federal Government responded to the need for exchange, networking and mutual learning of the diaspora by financing a yearly Diaspora Forum and other needs-oriented exchange formats. Since 2017, diaspora organisations have implemented 150 projects with German development cooperation support. Local employers and institutions benefited from the services of more than 1,100 returning experts and more than 450 diaspora professionals. Overall, 90 businesses were founded. Germany further encourages diaspora investments in Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Togo, Ethiopia and Tunisia to micro and small businesses by granting financial

support and business coaching, managed through the digital “WIDU.africa” platform. Since November 2019, private investments of over EUR 4.5 million have been committed, and 2,380 entrepreneurs have been supported.

Several national **Italian** projects focused on developing employment opportunities and key economic sectors in countries of origin, with the involvement of the diasporas where feasible (i.e. Tunisia and Egypt). In 2021, three programmes further enhanced the role of diasporas in development, building on previous initiatives promoted and financed by the Italian development agency, AICS. “Draft the Future” used experiences gained during the “National Summit of Diasporas” initiative. The project aimed at providing technical training to the diaspora associations on development cooperation and project management, encouraging registration in the official civil-society organisation registers, which are potentially fundable by AICS. The national strategy for the involvement of Egyptian Expats 2022–2026 aimed to promote local development in Egypt through the support of the diaspora community. It encouraged the involvement of expatriates for the development of the country, not only through economic or entrepreneurial initiatives, but also to enhance human capital. The “Migration as a resource: Mobilisation of the Tunisian diaspora and stabilisation of disadvantaged communities in Tunisia” project created mapping and socio-economic profiling of the Tunisian diaspora residing in Italy, identifying investment opportunities in micro and small businesses from marginalised regions in Tunisia.

Japan provided assistance through the IOM and the WFP to Guatemala and Honduras to curtail immigration and emigration caused by economic distress and to reintegrate migrants into their former communities upon their return. The deterioration in social and economic conditions in Venezuela resulted in a large number of displaced

persons. In response to this situation, Japan worked with the IOM to provide food support and vocational training to displaced persons in Peru, as well as capacity-building to Peruvian communities that received displaced persons. In Venezuela, Japan partnered with UNICEF to increase access to regular vaccinations of children and expectant mothers.²² In Bangladesh, a large-scale influx of displaced persons from Rakhine State in Myanmar and prolonged evacuation caused the deterioration of humanitarian situations in camps for the displaced and had severe impacts on the living conditions of surrounding communities. In response to this situation, Japan provided support through international organisations and NGOs in the areas of water and hygiene, health and medical care, food security, livelihood assistance, education, and environmental conservation.²³

The **UK** worked with key stakeholders to identify opportunities that support greater access to low-cost, secure digital remittance services. In 2020, the UK, together with the Swiss government, launched a Call to Action to highlight and address the forecasted decline in remittances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁴ Additionally, the British government supported the implementation of the Financial Stability Board and Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures Roadmap to enhance cross-border payments via a cross-government Action Plan on Remittances, led by Her Majesty’s Treasury. To simplify diaspora remittances, a Financial Action Task Force project reviewed the unintended consequences of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing standards, including de-risking and financial exclusion. The UK supported this project with data and information. The UK aimed to maximise the socio-economic benefits of regular migration within regions. The Better Regional Migration Management Programme, launched in 2021, supported this approach in East Africa. Working with two partners, the programme developed the skills of migrants looking for work, ensured that

national qualifications are recognised across borders, and enhanced protection for migrants in destination countries.²⁵

The **US** Department of State works through international and non-governmental organisation partners to provide humanitarian assistance for refugees, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers and other vulnerable migrants in countries around the globe. Under the Biden administration, reengagement in international fora such as the InterGovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum, and Refugees and the US-EU Migration Platform allow the US government to participate in important, high-level discussions around migration-related topics. President Biden announced a multipronged approach for working with the country's neighbours to address the root causes of irregular migration and to collaboratively manage migration flows. The US government is focusing its efforts on addressing the three significant push factors of irregular migration: Governance and Anticorruption, Economic Opportunity, and Security. It will also look to address other drivers of irregular migration, including extortion

and gender-based violence (GBV). Further, the US supports the implementation of bilateral and multilateral treaties, including the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (“UNTOC”) and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, which promotes effective international and regional cooperation to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants.

The **EU** launched the EU Global Diaspora Facility to strengthen capacities and engagements between governments and their diaspora, and to promote diaspora members' becoming development agents. Moreover, the EU partnered with the International Fund for Agricultural Development to support the financing facility for remittances, thereby maximizing the contribution of migrants' remittances to development. Further, the EU promoted financial inclusion as well as migrant and diaspora engagement for rural investment in communities of origin. Under the PRIME project in Africa, the EU worked with other partners to maintain the flow of remittances and to support its digitalisation and inclusion in the formal economy during the COVID pandemic.

Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data Sources
2017	1. G7 actions that support countries in addressing the drivers of migration within their own borders. 2. G7 actions that support the positive contributions of migrants and diasporas to the development of both countries of origin and destination.	Self-reporting



Case Study: Germany

Standing up for Displaced Women: Action Network on Forced Displacement



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Project Displacement

The global *Action Network on Forced Displacement – Women as Agents of Change* aims to raise the visibility of women as actors in situations of displacement and to strengthen them in their rights, opportunities and activities for economic and political participation. It was initiated in 2020 by the *German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)* and is currently under the patronage of Parliamentary State Secretary Dr. Bärbel Kofler. The Action Network serves as a positive example for grassroots engagement, participation, and inclusive leadership.

The Action Network is a **collaboration of women members** who are actively engaged on behalf of, and jointly with, displaced women. This includes women with lived experience of displacement, decision-makers, and activists from the political, economic and social spheres. **Four Spokespersons** currently represent the Action Network to foster its self-governance and smooth functioning. Several representatives of donor and host countries, international organisations and public personalities are **partners of the Network**. As allies and multipliers, they support the members in creating visibility and policy-level access. Regular internal workshops, annual Network meetings and thematic exchanges ensure the close collaboration, networking and strategic alignment of the Network.

The Action Network is equipped with a **fund to support grassroots women's rights organisations** in

displacement contexts and acute crisis situations. For that purpose, BMZ joined efforts with the *UN Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund* to set up the Funding Window on Forced Displacement. Currently, the Funding Window is endowed with **EUR 12.5 million** to support projects in and around **Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Colombia, Iraq, Moldova, Nigeria, Ukraine and Yemen**. Action Network members are involved in the selection of target countries and projects. Additionally, a mentorship program has been set up to connect the Action Network members with the civil-society partners in the selected countries.

At the international political scale, the Action Network commits to promoting the efforts of the **Global Compact on Refugees and joined the Compact on Women, Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action** as a signatory. The Action Network members advocate for the economic and political participation of displaced women in relevant international fora, such as the European Humanitarian Forum 2022. They are outspoken in addressing the needs of women in emerging conflicts too: In solidarity with refugees and displaced women from Ukraine, the Network is publishing a joint statement. The Action Network is committed to achieving further growth, to strengthening its strategic ties with relevant stakeholders, and to widening its scope of action and representation on the global stage.

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Methodological Note

Since 2009, the G7 Accountability Working Group (AWG) has monitored the implementation of the G7's development and development-related commitments. Every three years, the AWG compiles a Comprehensive Accountability Report (CAR) that reviews all G7 commitments currently included in the monitoring – the active commitments. In the interim years, the AWG elaborates Annual Progress Reports that have a narrower topical focus, reviewing progress in a specific area. The AWG selects the commitments to be included in the monitoring from the G7 leaders' communiqué every year. In the year in which a Comprehensive Accountability Report is compiled, the AWG also identifies commitments whose monitoring is to be terminated ("sunsetting").

The country holding the G7 presidency chairs the AWG. The Chair is responsible for steering the reporting process, collecting information from different data sources on the implementation and level of achievement of each active commitment, and providing first report drafts. During the AWG meetings, the working group members review the report text for each commitment and modify the text, if necessary. As with all G7 documents, partners must reach consensus on the report text before it can be published. The AWG aims to submit its report to the G7 leaders before the Summit.

Assessment method

Currently, the AWG is monitoring the implementation of 50 active commitments that are subdivided into ten chapters, covering crucial topics of sustainable development. The assessment methodology developed for each commitment in the year of its adoption specifies a baseline, context and/or output indicators, and the data sources taken into account.

Baseline and indicators

Each commitment has a *baseline* that is used as reference point in the progress assessment. *Indicators* either describe contextual information or review specific G7 contributions to achieve the goal set out in a commitment. For instance, contextual information, such as information on changes in educational outcomes in a specific area, can provide an overview of wider developments and put the G7's activities into perspective. Output indicators review specific G7 measures. These measures can include development cooperation projects, financial contributions to the initiatives of other agents, or regulatory measures.

Data sources

To ensure consistency in the reporting, the AWG establishes specific data sources for each active commitment, including external databases and reports from multilateral organisations. In addition to publicly available data sources, the AWG collects information from the responsible departments and entities in each of the seven countries' governments and the EU administration. Where possible, this "self-reporting" includes references to reports, databases and websites that provide further information.

For many commitments, the G7 decided to monitor their Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending on certain countries, sectors or aims. ODA is the main financial source of international development cooperation. Like all OECD-DAC members, G7 members annually report their ODA to the OECD, which checks the data and publishes the figures on its [statistical online platform](#).

ODA flows from a donor to a recipient country in the form of grants or loans. In 2018, the OECD-DAC introduced the grant equivalent measure as a

new way of calculating ODA, aiming to more accurately reflect the actual effort of donor countries concerning loans. Until then, the ODA target was indicated only as net ODA on a flow basis, subtracting incoming flows (i.e. loan repayments) from outgoing flows (i.e. grants and loans at their face value). The new method converts loans to their grant equivalent, making loans and grants better comparable. (Private-sector instruments continue to be recorded only on a flow basis.)

For all G7 commitments that were made since 2018, ODA figures are reported using the grant equivalent measure. For all commitments that were adopted prior to the introduction of the measure, ODA figures continue to be reported as net ODA flows to increase consistency and comparability with previous Progress Reports. An exemption in this regard is the ODA/GNI ratio monitored for Commitment 1. As this quota is now conventionally monitored using the grant equivalent method, the Elmau Progress Report 2022 adopts this method despite the fact that the commitment was made prior to 2018. In addition, all ODA figures are reported as current prices (i.e. using the exchange rates prevailing in the year of the flow) and refer to disbursements (i.e. to actual international transfers of financial resources instead of to the expressed intentions of donors).

The report draws on the most recent ODA data available during the drafting process, which in most cases includes the year 2020. To facilitate retraceability of the data presented, figures and tables on ODA expenditure include information on which exact OECD DAC data table was used (DAC1, DAC2a, CRS). Most often, however, this report draws on data from the CRS data table, which provides project-level information on ODA expenditure. This includes information on ODA spent for specific sectors and purposes, on ODA spent through certain channels, and on policy

markers that are assigned to it. Policy markers indicate, for instance, contributions to advancing gender equality.

Scoring

Like previous G7 accountability reports, the Elmau Progress Report 2022 assesses the progress made regarding the implementation of each commitment by assigning it a score on a 5-level scale (excellent, good, satisfactory, below expectation, off-track). The scores are based on the track record since the baseline year. Thus, commitments only receive a score if data for the respective indicators are available for the baseline year as well as at least one more recent data point.

The scores are the result of a self-assessment by G7 members evaluating their efforts to implement the commitment. Due to the overarching and broad nature of most G7 commitments, assigning scores is associated with a high degree of discretion. The data provided in the detailed reporting on the indicators of each commitment should provide readers with a comprehensive picture of the implementation status, and should also allow them to arrive at their own assessments.

- 
- *Excellent*
 - *Good*
 - *Satisfactory*
 - *Below expectation*
 - *Off track*
 - *New*

List of Abbreviations

A

ACFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
ADP	Access and Delivery Partnership
AEEP	Africa-EU Energy Partnership
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AFD	French Development Agency
AfDB	African Development Bank Group
AfT	Aid for Trade
AICS	Italian Agency for Development Cooperation
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AMR	Antimicrobial Resistance
ARIN	Asset Recovery Interagency Networks
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATPC	African Trade Policy Centre
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission

B

BEPS	Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
BHA	Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
BII	British International Investment
BMZ	German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BRAER	Building Resilience and an Effective Emergency Refugee Response

C

C19RM	COVID-19 Response Mechanism
CAD	Canadian Dollars
CAR	Comprehensive Accountability Report
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CASA	Commercial Agriculture for Smallholders and Agribusiness Programme
CCG	Canadian Coast Guard
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CDRFI	Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance
CEFM	Child Early and Forced Marriage
CEPI	Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations
CFE	Contingency Fund for Emergency
CMP	Coordinated Maritime Presences
CONNEX	Strengthening Assistance for Complex Contract Negotiations

COVAX	Global Vaccine Access Initiative
CRA	Canada's Revenue Agency
CRPP	Community Resilience Partnership Programme
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
CVE	Counterting Violent Extremism
D	
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAP	Digital Access Programme
DG INTPA	Directorate-General for International Partnerships
DPT3	Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus vaccine
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTIS	Diagnostic Trade Integration Study
E	
EAC	East African Community
EA-SA	East and Southern African
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECW	Education Cannot Wait
EFSD	European Fund for Sustainable Development
EFSD+	European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus
EIF	Enhanced Integrated Framework
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EMT	Emergency Medical Teams
EoI	Exchange of Information
ESG	Environmental, Social, and Governance
ESTMA	Extractive Sector Transparency Measurements Act
EU-JAMRAI	European Joint Action on Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare-Associated Infections
EWEC	Every Women Every Child
F	
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAO SOFI	The State of Food Security and Nutrition Report
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FHTP	Forum on Harmful Tax Practices
FMT	Foreign Medical Team
FoGG	Group of Friends of the Gulf of Guinea
FPRW	Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
FSS	Forward Spending Survey
G	
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GAFSP	Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme

GAP	Global Action Plan for Healthy Lives and Well-being for All
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GCI	Gender at the Centre Initiative
GEAC	Gender Equality Advisory Council
GF	Global Fund
GFAR	Global Forum for Asset Recovery
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
GHIT	Global Health Innovative Technology
GIF	Global Infrastructure Facility
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNI	Gross National Income
GNR	Global Nutrition Report
GOARN	Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
GPAP	Global Plastic Action Partnership
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation
GPEI	Global Polio Eradication Initiative

H

HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs
HRC	Human Rights Council
HSS	Health System Strengthening

I

IATI	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICCAs	Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICN2	International Competition Network
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IEA	International Energy Agency
IFC-CCCP	International Finance Corporation-Canada Climate Change Program
IFFIm	International Finance Facility for Immunisation
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGF	Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development
IGP	InsuResilience Global Partnership
IHR	International Health Regulations
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMB	International Maritime Bureau
IMF	International Monetary Fund

IMO	International Maritime Organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPPF	Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility
IPV	Inactivated Polio Vaccines
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organization
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
J	
JCLEC	Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation
JCM	Joint Crediting Mechanism
JDR	Japan Disaster Relief
JEE	Joint External Evaluation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
L	
LaGreen	Latin America Green Bond Fund
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
LICs	Low Income Countries
LLDCs	Landlocked Development Countries
LMICs	Lower Middle-Income Countries
M	
MAV+	Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies
MDB	Multilateral Development Banks
MEA	Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MHEWS	Multi Hazard Early Warning Systems
MLA	Mutual Legal Assistance
MLI	Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS
MOBILIST	Mobilising Institutional Capital Through Listed Product Structures
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSIs	Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives
N	
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NCP	National Contact Points
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NRCan	Minister of Natural Resources
NTD	Neglected Tropical Diseases

O

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECMs	Other Effective area-based Conservation Measures
OIE	World Organisation for Animal Health
OSBP	One Stop Border Posts

P

PASEB	Support Program to Basic Education System in Senegal
PEF	Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility
PASSMAR	Programme to the Maritime Security Strategy in Central Africa
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PPDF	Project Preparation Development Facility
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PPP	Public Private Partnerships
PRAI	Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems
PRCC	Trade Capacity Building Program
PSE	Private Sector Engagement
PSI	Private Sector Instruments

R

RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RKI	Robert Koch Institute
RMNCH	Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, and Child Health
RNCS	Registre national du commerce et des sociétés / National Trade and Companies Register

S

SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC RPTC	Southern African Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SEACOP	Seaport Cooperation Project
SEEG	German Epidemic Preparedness Team
SEFA	Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa
SHRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
SIDSs	Small Island Development States
SIGi	Social Institutions and Gender Index
SMEs	Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
STEM	Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics
SWAIMS	Support to West Africa integrated Maritime Security
SWM	Solid Waste Management

T

TAF2+	Trade and Investment Advocacy Fund
TB	Tuberculosis
TEI	Team Europe Initiative
TFA	Trade Facilitation Agreement
TIMB	Polio Transition Independent Monitoring Board
TIWB	Tax Inspectors Without Borders
TMEA	TradeMark East Africa
TOSSD	Total Official Support for Sustainable Development
TrACSS	Tripartite Antimicrobial Resistance Country Self-assessment Survey
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training

U

UHC	Universal Health Care
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UKHSA	UK Health Security Agency
UK-PHRST	UK Public Health Rapid Support Team
UMICs	Upper Middle-Income Countries
UNAFEI	United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders
UNAIDS	The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

V

VAT	Value-Added Tax
VGGT	Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land

W

WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB	World Bank
WBL	Women, Business and the Law
WeCAPS	The European Union West and Central Africa Port Security Project
WFP	World Food Programme
WGB	Working Group on Bribery
WHA	World Health Assembly
WHO	World Health Organisation
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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